Subversion & Espionage

CIA's Panetta Shakes up His Spy Corps - Washington Whispers (usnews.com)

2011-02-08T19:10:00.000-05:00

CIA's Panetta Shakes up His Spy Corps - Washington Whispers (usnews.com)

British Intelligence and the 1916 Mediation Mission of Colonel Edward M. House - Intelligence and National Security

2011-01-29T09:35:00.001-05:00

British Intelligence and the 1916 Mediation Mission of Colonel Edward M. House - Intelligence and National Security

Abstract

Colonel Edward M. House, the close personal confidant of American President Woodrow Wilson, disembarked in Great Britain in January 1916 on a mission to bring the First World War to a close under the auspices of American mediation. Although his mission, which culminated in a secret pact between the United States and Great Britain known as the House-Grey Memorandum, has been studied by several scholars, the involvement of British intelligence with respect to that mission has never received more than cursory attention. Through a careful analysis of the surviving documents, this article reconstructs British intelligence's activities with respect to House's mission, examines the countermeasures that House employed as he attempted to protect the secrecy of his negotiations, delineates the role played by different British intelligence agencies and assesses their response to their findings.

The Golden Age of Soviet Espionage

2011-01-03T09:43:00.003-05:00

Former Russian Spy Recalls the Golden Age of Espionage

Andrei Vandenko, Itogi 4:18PM GMT 02 Jan 2011 -- UK Telegraph

Yuri Kobaladze was a spy for Russia, and for seven years (1977 to 1984) he was based in London. He lifts the lid on his time as a Cold Warrior

Were you recruited to spy as soon as you entered the Moscow State Institute of International Relations?

Everything happened when I was working at TASS [the government-controlled news network]. From there I went to the third (English) section of the First Main Administration of the KGB.

When did your wife find out that your work in journalism was just a front?

I told her even before we were married, but after that I tried to let Alla know as little as possible. Only once did I ever ask her to help me – by making a phone call, that was all. Her hands were trembling, her face was streaming with sweat. After that, I promised myself never ever to do that again.

Where did you learn the craft of espionage?

At the Krasnoznamenny Institute of the KGB. The focus was on foreign languages and special disciplines. The craft of espionage hasn’t changed much in recent decades. The methods and approaches are the same, only the technical equipment has improved.

Did the English know you were a spy from the start?

It wasn’t difficult to figure out. All they had to do was compare my work schedule with Boris Kalyagin’s (a London correspondent), compare the frequency of visits to the embassy, notice a certain license in my behaviour and an abundance of contacts.

There were some amusing episodes. Kalyagin set up an interview with the editor of an influential paper. I acted as cameraman and I asked Kalyagin to pose questions that interested me. But he became so wrapped up in the conversation that he forgot all about my request. What to do? The interview was over and as I was gathering up the equipment, I asked the interviewee, by the way, as it were: “Mister Smith, what do you think about US-Chinese relations?” Mister Smith looked up for a second, grinned and said: “Russia is an invincible country if even the cameramen are interested in such questions.”

Some of our best sources were British journalists. The irony is that these reporters thought the real Soviet correspondents were the spies, not us. We would travel all over the country in search of information, then be up all night getting pickled in pubs with our British colleagues.

I had some real friends among those English reporters, despite the fact that the years when I was based in England were not the easiest in terms of relations between our countries. Those were the years of Margaret Thatcher, her relationship with America, missiles aimed at the “evil empire”, and Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Every day was so tense.

I’ll never forget the scene with [theatre director] Yuri Lyubimov when he was invited to London to stage Crime and Punishment . On the eve of his arrival, we received a telegram saying that the director, famous for his anti-Soviet remarks, should be watched carefully. He was indeed very forthright; Yuri called a spade a spade.

He became the subject of a heated debate at a Party meeting an the embassy. What should be done about this man who publicly insulted the Motherland? In the end, the decision was taken to send a messenger to the theatre to give Lyubimov a stern talking-to and ask him to come to the embassy “for a conversation”.

Pasha, the cultural attaché, was nominated for this task, the sweetest and quietest of men. The day of the premiere, the press and their photographers were jostling backstage. Pasha, feeling horribly nervous, walked up to Lyubimov and was at pains to choose the right words: “The ambassador would like to see you since certain remarks of yours…” Lyubimov didn’t let him finish and began shouting: “They’ve sent a KGB agent in here! He’s threatening me with reprisals!”

By then Lyubimov had decided to remain in the West. He needed an excuse to create a public scandal, and here it was. Poor Pasha couldn’t get out of the theatre fast enough. The last thing he said to Lyubimov in his panic was: “Watch out, Yuri Petrovich! There’s been a crime, beware the punishment!” The phrase was splashed across the front pages with commentary to match. The editors claimed that the bony arm of the KGB was at the maestro’s throat. That’s how legends are born. It all happened before my eyes; but the “office” had nothing to do with it.

Did Britain try to recruit you?

The British knew very well with whom it made sense to ingratiate themselves, and with whom it was useless.

No one came near me, but they did try to lure a friend of mine.

They promised him a house, a car, a job and half a million pounds in expenses – a colossal sum. I guess they had some compromising information about him, although even now my friend won’t tell me what it was.

At the time he said to his would-be recruiters: “How will I be able to look my father in the eye?” They gave up… it’s not everyone who can live with a sin on his soul, though traitors try to justify their treason.

Oleg Gordievsky cultivated the image of a Soviet Kim Philby who, in essence, was a traitor. Philby first chose the path of serving communism and only then entered into contact with Soviet intelligence and, at its request, went to work for British intelligence. Oleg, too, tries to give the impression that he went over to the enemy not because of money, but for reasons of ideology.

I consider myself a fortunate person. It’s through my work that I came to know people whom I would never have met otherwise – people who became my friends.

I feel nostalgic for Britain.By means of natural selection I have come to the conclusion that there is nothing better than a 16-year-old Lagavulin whisky, which I first tried in England. Later, in the Nineties in Moscow, everyone became interested in whisky, and I was regularly called in as an expert.

By the way, I once beat the owners of a London pub in their traditional beer-drinking contest: a yard of ale. The Englishmen were disgraced. They didn’t realise that here was a Georgian able to drink from a horn!

In short, I left a bright trail in the history of Britain, and when my tour was over Margaret Thatcher’s press secretary was at my farewell party. I doubt he knew I worked for Soviet intelligence, he wouldn’t have come if he had, but I was pleased.

Curriculum Vitae: Yuri Kobaladze

NATIONALITY:

Georgian

AGE:

61

STATUS:

Married, with two daughters

EDUCATION:

Moscow Institute of International Relations, graduating in International Journalism (1972).

EXPERIENCE:  

• Foreign Intelligence Service of the KGB (1972-1999)

• Soviet news agency TASS

• British correspondent,  Gosteleradio

• Central office of PGU, KGB

• Director, press bureau of the  Foreign Intelligence Service

• First deputy director,  news agency ITAR-TASS 

• Since 2000: executive  director of investment bank  Renaissance Capital; later  managing director of retail  group X5.

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The End of German Military Counterintelligence?

2011-01-01T11:05:00.003-05:00

German Co-ruling Party Urges Disbanding of Army Spy Agency: Report

IRNA - Islamic Republic News Agency

Berlin, Dec 31, IRNA -- A leading lawmaker of the co-governing Free Democratic Party (FDP) called for abolishing the country's military counter-intelligence agency MAD.

Talking to the daily Luebecker Nachrichten on Friday, Christian Ahrendt said Germany's security could be boosted, if MAD's 1,300-strong workforce could be used for other tasks like thwarting cyber attacks.

He also cited cost factors such as MAD's annual budget of 73 million euros as another reason for permanently closing the doors of the German army's counter-intelligence unit.

Ahrendt stressed that Germany domestic secret service, Verfassungschutz, and its foreign counterpart, Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), could jointly assume MAD's duties.

Based in the western city of Cologne, MAD has around 12 regional offices throughout the country, including Hanover, Munich, Stuttgart, Leipzig, Mainz, Kiel, Koblenz, Rostock, Kiel and Wilhelmshaven.

Established during the Cold War in 1956, MAD is under the control of the German defense ministry.

OT**1420
Islamic Republic News Agency/IRNA NewsCode: 30162484
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Intelligence Applications of Hypnosis

2010-12-28T10:09:00.002-05:00

Docs Detail CIA’s Cold War Hypnosis Push
By Spencer Ackerman December 28, 2010 7:00 am Wired

Excerpt: It was an innocent time, the mid-1950s. America wasn’t yet cynical about its geopolitical games in the Cold War. Case in point: In order to maintain its spying edge over the Russkies, the CIA considered the benefits of hypnosis.

Two memos from 1954 and 1955 dredged up by Cryptome show the CIA thinking through post-hypnotic suggestion in extensive, credulous detail. How, for instance, to pass a secret message to a field operative without danger of interception?

Encode it in a messenger’s brain, an undisclosed author wrote in 1954, so he’ll have “no memory whatsoever in the waking state as to the nature and contents of the message.” Even if a Soviet agent gets word of the messenger’s importance, “no amount of third-party tactics” can pry the message loose, “for he simply does not have it in his conscious mind.” Pity the poor waterboarded captive.

But the counterintelligence benefits of hypnosis are even greater. . .

See: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/12/cia-hypnosis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+wired%2Findex+%28Wired%3A+Index+3+%28Top+Stories+2%29%29

For a number of fascinating records, be sure to visit Cryptome!

1917 -- Spies & Saboteurs!

2010-12-27T16:27:00.004-05:00

The Hidden History of the Espionage Act
The much-maligned 1917 law had a real purpose—stopping spies and saboteurs.

By David Greenberg
Slate
Posted Monday, Dec. 27, 2010, at 8:47 AM ET

On July 24, 1915, the World War was raging in Europe and the belligerents were vying for the sympathy of the neutral United States. In Lower Manhattan, on a Sixth Avenue elevated train, Secret Service agents were tailing George Sylvester Viereck, a German propagandist and a mysterious companion of his—who was, unbeknown to the agents, Heinrich F. Albert, an attaché in the German Embassy. When Viereck got off at 23rd Street, one agent followed him; Albert continued on to 50th Street, where he suddenly looked up from his newspaper, noticed he had reached his stop, and hurried off the car, leaving behind a brown briefcase that the second agent promptly seized. A chase ensued, but the purloined bag ultimately made it to Treasury Secretary William McAdoo, who shared it with President Woodrow Wilson.

The documents that Wilson and McAdoo beheld detailed a sweeping secret campaign, linked to high-ranking German officials, of espionage, sabotage, and propaganda. There were plans to take over American newspapers, bankroll films, send hired lecturers on the Chautauqua circuit, and create pseudo-indigenous movements to agitate on behalf of pro-German policies. More disturbing were schemes to provoke strikes in armaments factories; to corner the supply of liquid chlorine, an ingredient in poison gas, in order to keep it from Allied hands; even to acquire the Wright Brothers' Aeroplane Company and use its patents on Germany's behalf. American officials also learned of sabotage plans hatched by a different German spy, Franz Rintelen von Kleist, who was plotting to destroy American munitions plants and blow up the Welland Canal, a Canadian waterway of vital importance to the United States. It was no wonder that Wilson wrote to his adviser Edward House that summer that the country was "honeycombed with German intrigue and infested with German spies."

Although these plots are omitted from most discussions of the 1917 Espionage Act—the law now being invoked by those who would prosecute WikiLeaks mastermind Julian Assange—they go a long way toward explaining (but not excusing) that unfortunate piece of wartime legislation. When Wilson made the case for entering the world war, he warned that "if there should be disloyalty, it will be dealt with with a firm hand of stern repression." Contrary to some interpretations, the president wasn't perversely touting his intention to trample civil liberties; he was grimly cautioning would-be saboteurs, like those who had blown up the supply depot at Black Tom, New Jersey, the year before, not to undermine the combat effort.

The Espionage Act had a legitimate purpose: to try to stop the real threat of subversion, sabotage, and malicious interference with the war effort, including the controversial reinstatement of the draft. It's context that's worth recalling as Democrats and Republicans alike clamor to use the law against Assange

On April 6, 1917, Congress declared war on Germany and for the next nine weeks it engaged in robust, contentious debate about the proper scope of an espionage bill. Some elements were struck from the first drafts. Originally, the White House wanted to censor the press, but Congress—reflecting fierce resistance in the newspapers—killed the provision. A provision to let the postmaster general regulate the mails remained, but was narrowed to restrict suppressible materials to those urging treason or lawbreaking that would hinder the war effort. A ban on efforts to "cause disaffection" in the military was replaced with a more closely tailored prohibition on efforts to cause insubordination, mutiny, or disloyalty—that last word used, as it was in Wilson's speech, to mean disloyal action, not private sentiment. Overall, the act wasn't meant, as it has often been represented, to stifle antiwar dissent, but to address particular wartime problems that officials had good reason to worry about: draft avoidance, sabotage, espionage.

Nonetheless, the Espionage Act was deeply problematic. Above all, its wording, even in its softer version, left far too much room for aggressive prosecutors and overzealous patriots to interpret it as they wished. (Things got worse the next year when Congress passed more draconian amendments that came to be called the Sedition Act; that law outlawed statements during war that were "disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive … about the form of government of the United States." Unlike the Espionage Act proper, though, the Sedition Act was repealed when World War I ended.)

The resulting crackdown on antiwar groups under the Espionage Act—and the shame it brought to Wilson and the nation—is widely known. Postmaster General Albert Burleson, a reactionary and intolerant Texan considered by Edward House to be "the most belligerent member of the cabinet," denied use of the mails to publications like the left-wing Masses and scared many others into silence. Around the country, meanwhile, the U.S. attorneys in Thomas Gregory's Justice Department prosecuted socialists, pacifists, and German-Americans on flimsy grounds. Many people were arrested for crimes of mere speech. Filmmaker Robert Goldstein was prosecuted for making a movie about the American Revolution that depicted the British—now a U.S. ally—in an unfavorable light. The socialist leader Eugene Debs was thrown in jail for a speech that defended freedom of speech. Of 1,500 arrests under the law, only 10 involved actual sabotage. To the dismay of progressives, moreover, not even the Supreme Court stopped the prosecutions. In March 1919, the liberal icon Oliver Wendell Holmes, coining his famous "clear and present danger" standard, led the court in upholding three dubious Espionage Act verdicts, including the conviction of Debs.

It has been common to view the Espionage Act as the product of a paroxysm of wartime hysteria. There's obviously some truth to that view. In 1917 and 1918, war fever drove many politicians, in all three branches of government, to lose sight of basic rights—just as during other wars a sense of urgency led Abraham Lincoln to wrongfully suspend the habeas corpus writ and subject civilians to military trials, and Franklin Roosevelt to approve the internment of Japanese-Americans. But just as the presence of real communist spies during the early Cold War years helps to explain (but, again, not excuse) the witch hunts that followed, so the legitimate fears of German saboteurs constitute an important piece of the context in which the Espionage Act became law.

The real problem occurred not in its drafting but in its application. All laws are enforced selectively. Discretion always shapes which possible violations of a law are prosecuted and which are deemed unwise to pursue. In deciding whether to indict Assange, President Obama—who has already endorsed the worst of George W. Bush's civil-liberties violations, the indefinite jailing of suspects without trial—might do well to consider how his decision will look in the light of history. Wilson's greatness is sullied today because of the license he granted to Gregory and Burleson to abuse the act; conversely, Richard Nixon's reputation as our worst president is only enhanced by his attempt to use the law to retaliate against Pentagon Papers leaker Daniel Ellsberg.

Assange's case is different, of course, from Ellsberg's, but it's still far from clear that his posting and sharing of classified government documents—as embarrassing and frustrating to diplomats as their publication may be—amounts to the kind of sabotage or espionage that the law was intended to punish. A former professor who taught his students ably about the Constitution, Woodrow Wilson would fare better in the history books today had he instructed his Cabinet officials more emphatically that laws on the books are only as wise as the people who enforce them.

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Help Wanted -- CIA & NSA

2010-12-15T08:05:00.004-05:00

A Glimpse at Positions at the CIA and NSA
Washington Post -- December 12, 2010

It is hard to keep up with the ever-changing global developments in technology, but that is the mission of those who work for such government agencies as the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.

The classified work these agencies undertake means there are a multitude of positions in the fields of science, engineering and technology that hold the nation's security as their utmost goal.

"We're always looking for engineers, computer scientists and other technically qualified applicants who can advance our vital mission of keeping America safe," CIA spokeswoman Paula Weiss said. "Anyone with a scientific or technical background who would like to apply his or her skills to our intelligence mission should check out our Web site to see the wide range of opportunities we offer. It's helpful to have an interest in world affairs, overseas experience or language skills, but it's not necessary."

Not surprisingly, the CIA is on the cutting edge of technological developments, and it develops and implements many state-of-the-art technologies in order to help the agency fulfill its mission of gathering foreign intelligence.

Among the positions the CIA is currently recruiting for are electrical engineer, materials engineer, mechanical engineer, programs management engineer and systems engineer. In the science, technology and weapons areas, positions are open for research scientist; science, technology and weapons analyst; technical/targeting analyst; machinist; and technical operations officer.

CIA employees come from a variety of academic and professional disciplines and experiences. The agency's recruitment Web site lists various career paths. In addition to science, engineering and technology positions, there are jobs in areas such as National Clandestine Service, languages and support services, to name a few.

Requirements for CIA jobs include U.S. citizenship as well as successful results from a thorough medical exam, polygraph test and background investigation.

If you are considering a job in the intelligence field, the CIA offers undergraduate student internships or co-ops as well as graduate studies. The programs combine educational and practical work experiences that complement students' preferred academic fields. Students receive a salary and benefits.

Another of the country's foremost intelligence agencies, the National Security Agency, is also actively recruiting for students, professionals and transitioning military.

The NSA Web site notes that "intelligence and imaginative critical thinking skills" are important attributes for applicants. In the technology fields, positions are available in computer science, computer/electrical engineering, information assurance and security, among others. Posted on the NSA's Web site under "Hot Jobs" are computer scientists, software developers and software engineers.

"For diverse, technologically savvy people looking to work in cutting-edge areas of IT, it really doesn't get much better than the National Security Agency," Lori Weltmann, NSA recruitment marketing manager, said. NSA is a leader in the intelligence community in areas such as network management and compliance, cyber defense, biometrics and wireless mobility.

"And we're not new to any of this," Weltmann continued. "We've been leaders for years. Given the increasingly complex and rapidly changing world of global communication, our need for qualified people with technology skills continues to grow. In fiscal year 2011, we plan to hire more than 1,500 new workers-¿more than half of whom will have skills in areas such as computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering and mathematics. A career at NSA offers the opportunity to work with the best and brightest, shape the course of the world and secure your own future."

As at the CIA, U.S. citizenship and a thorough background investigation are required for prospective NSA employees.

Professional development is an important aspect of working at NSA, and career development programs are available in numerous disciplines including computer science, information assurance, business and others. There is also the opportunity to pursue your education at outside educational institutions, as well as at the NSA's own National Cryptologic School.

For more information on career opportunities at the CIA or NSA, visit cia.gov or nsa.gov.
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Turkish "Surprise"? Um, I don't think so . . .

2010-12-10T14:31:00.009-05:00

Mysterious Cache Found at Turkish Naval Base

ISTANBUL - Huerriet Daily News with wires
Friday, December 10, 2010

The confiscation of nine sacks of documents that were hidden at a Turkish naval base is expected to intensify investigations into alleged anti-government activity. The files are said to provide detailed information about coup plots.

The documents were confiscated Tuesday from a hidden location under the floor of the office of the head of intelligence at Gölcük Navy Command in the northwestern province of Kocaeli.

The confiscated documents include data on plans to be implemented after a military coup, including where to keep 167 special figures incarcerated; special dossiers on 46 high-level government officials; charts pointing to hidden locations of ammunition; data gathered on the wives of admirals; documents that appear to be a continuation of the “Kafes” (Cage) and “Action Plan for the Fight against Fundamentalism” plots; a list of military personnel who would be deported after a coup; secret documents from crucial state organizations; a Navy fleet command navigation logbook; and 34 voice recording tapes.

The operation was conducted by Fikret Seçen and Ali Haydar, both public prosecutors with special authority, as part of an ongoing espionage investigation into Turkish naval forces.

The search began after an unidentified person called in a tip to prosecutors, saying some documents regarding the espionage case would soon be destroyed.

Seçen said Thursday the operation was not a police raid as mentioned in the press but was instead conducted with the military in his presence.

The confiscated documents were transferred to Istanbul for inspection and were opened in the presence of an Army colonel assigned by the Chief of General Staff. The presence of the colonel, who videotaped the process and the search for DNA, hair samples and fingerprints on the documents, is to prevent allegations of the planting of suspicious evidence, as has happened in past investigations.

The espionage investigation, which began in August with blackmail charges against members of the Navy following claims of running a prostitution ring, was initially referred to as the “prostitution gang investigation” in the press. The prosecution later dropped the charges of prostitution after evidence of espionage emerged.

A number of military secrets and issues concerning national defense has allegedly been leaked by the alleged gang.

The alleged “action plan” features strategies to end both Justice and Development Party, or AKP, rule and the activities of the Fethullah Gülen religious community by planting fake evidence and weaponry in various locations. “Cage,” meanwhile, is an alleged anti-government plan to target non-Muslim communities in Turkey so as to bring heat upon the AKP from the West.

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Comment re: WikiLeaks

2010-12-05T08:48:00.002-05:00

I've deliberately ignored it until now, but after a couple of emails from readers . . .
Here's my assessment of the impact of the latest WikiLeaks release: So what?
Is there anything major that you didn't really already "know" or suspect? The only persons surprised by anything Mr. Assange pumped out into the Internet are naive or uninformed generally. Embarrassing? Awkward? Sure.
Next.
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Espionage Case Breaks at Fort Bragg

2010-12-04T13:20:00.002-05:00

Espionage Case Unfolding at Ft. Bragg
Saturday, December 04, 2010

FORT BRAGG, N.C. (WTVD) -- A man with high-level military security clearance is under arrest, accused of trying to sell access to classified military computers.

The suspect is Bryan Martin, who is enlisted in the Navy, and assigned to the Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg.

According to federal documents obtained by the I-Team, Martin told an undercover F-B-I agent he had access to military computer systems, and said he was seeking long-term financial reimbursement.

The undercover agent paid Martin $3500 for documents labeled "Top Secret."

The I-Team has learned Martin thought he was selling U.S. military secrets to China.

According to the court documents, he also told the FBI agent that over his 15-20 year career, he could be very valuable because of his access to military secrets.

"These cases are rare," said Frank Perry, who used to run the Raleigh FBI office. "For a case like this to have been made in Raleigh or certainly in North Carolina - this area - is quite significant."

The undercover sting operation to arrest Martin happened at three different hotels - one on post, and two in Spring Lake.

The FBI says none of the Joint Special Operations Command secrets were ever compromised by the sting.
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Army Stonewalls on Probe of Spying on US Civilians

2010-12-03T11:27:00.005-05:00

Army Withholding Results of Ft. Lewis Spying Probe
By GENE JOHNSON

Associated Press -- Thursday, December 2, 2010

The Army is still refusing to release the results of its investigation into spying on anti-war activists by a civilian intelligence specialist at Joint Base Lewis-McChord south of Seattle.

Officials released more than 100 pages of records this week to The Associated Press in response to a Freedom of Information Act request, most with names redacted. The Army withheld the results and recommendations made by an investigating officer, citing law enforcement and privacy exemptions.

Col. John Wells of the Army's Litigation Division noted an ongoing federal civil rights lawsuit brought by the activists and the possibility of criminal charges against Army employees, and said release of the documents could impair the rights of those involved to fair trials or disciplinary proceedings.

The documents outline the scope of the inquiry, which was initially completed in mid-2009 and then reopened early this year to determine whether military legal advisors were given complete and accurate information about the protest group's infiltration.

They also show that before the story broke, senior officials at the base were concerned about bad publicity "should mainstream media decide to report U.S. 'spying' on protesters," and they were upset that local agencies, including the city of Tacoma, had turned over documents to the protesters revealing the intelligence specialist's involvement.

"Future information sharing operations with local agencies are at risk because we cannot depend on them to comply with FOIA restrictions and/or our dissemination guidance," said a "point paper" dated March 2, 2009.

The base's leadership should "express their displeasure with their Tacoma counterparts (for) the mishandling of this FOIA request," the paper said.

Anti-war activists with a group called Olympia Port Militarization Resistance discovered in early 2009 that the administrator of their e-mail list-serve, whom they knew as John Jacob, was actually John Jacob Towery, then an employee of the Force Protection Division at Lewis-McChord. The Force Protection Division includes civilian and military workers who support law enforcement and security operations to ensure the security of Fort Lewis personnel.

Towery had been attending the group's meetings for two years, and information he collected about the protesters appears to have been passed to his superiors on base as well as local law enforcement, documents released to the AP show.

The Reconstruction-era Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the Army from directly engaging in domestic law enforcement.

The Army launched its investigation in July 2009, after members of the group complained. The investigating officer's marching orders said the inquiry should focus on Towery's actions, whether he undertook them at the behest of civilian law enforcement, whether he was paid by any civilian police agency, what his supervisors knew of his activities, and whether he might have violated federal law or Army directives.

The highest-ranking person interviewed for the investigation appears to have been a colonel, whose name is redacted.

One of the documents provided to the AP, an "information paper" apparently prepared by the Force Protection Division, says: "Information provided by (redacted) and a law enforcement official with the Pierce County Sheriff's Office (PCSO) indicate that the activities alleged by the Olympia activist were done in support of the PCSO and Tacoma Police Department as a confidential informant/source and not as a member of the FP Division."

The protest group, which formed in 2006, was one of several in the region opposed to the use of civilian ports for shipping military items, such as Stryker vehicles, overseas. They claim that thanks to Towery's infiltration, police knew where they were going to protest in advance - sometimes arresting them before their civil disobedience even began.

Having a spy among them chilled their First Amendment and other rights, they argued.

About 200 people were arrested over a two-week period in November 2007, but only about three dozen were ever charged.
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Mexican-American Intel Center Profiled

2010-11-16T14:22:00.002-05:00

North American Union – “U.S. Super Spy Center” Uncovered in Mexico

- Mexican Magazine Proceso reveals the location of a US Military-Intelligence Megaplex in Mexico City.

-Megaplex includes offices for the CIA, FBI, DEA, Defense Intelligence, BATF, Department of Treasury and others.

- U.S. Intelligence Operatives will no longer have to disguise themselves as diplomats.

- Mexico will now have a Military ‘Liaison’ for NORTHCOM.

- U.S. is now in charge of all tactical efforts against the drug war, counter-insurgency, and counter-terrorism in Mexico.

- Obama and Hillary Clinton are credited for the creation of the Office of Bi-lateral Intelligence in Mexico (OBI).

Jorge Carrasco and Jesus Esquivel
proceso.com.mx
Translated by Mario Andrade

With the approval of Felipe Calderón’s Administration, the U.S. Government finally got what it always wanted: To set up a super spy center in Mexico City. It was the escalation of the drug war in the country what opened the door to all U.S. intelligence agencies, including the military, to operate out of the Federal District without having to disguise their agents as diplomats.

The establishment of the Office of Bi-national Intelligence (OBI) was authorized by Calderon, after negotiations with Washington, which began under the government of his predecessor, Vicente Fox Quesada. The creation of the super spy center was authorized by the director of the Center for Investigation and National Security (CISEN), Guillermo Valdés Castellanos, without taking into account any objections from the Mexican military.

Through the OBI, Calderon has given the green light to U.S. Intelligence agents to spy on organized crime syndicates and drug cartels. They can also spy on Mexican government agencies, including the Secretariat of National Defense, Navy, and the diplomatic missions in Mexico.

The building headquarters, which includes offices from the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and the U.S. Department of Treasury is located at 265 Paseo de la Reforma Avenue, approximately 250 meters from the U.S. embassy.

The most significant presence at the OBI building is that of the Pentagon, which includes the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the National Security Agency (NSA). It is followed by the U.S. Department of Justice, also with three agencies: the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF).

With two services, there is the Department of Homeland Security: Coast Guard Intelligence (CGI) and the Bureau of Customs and Immigration Enforcement (ICE), while the Treasury Department has officers of the Bureau of Intelligence on Terrorism and Financial Affairs (TFI) .

In addition, the OBI opened two remote offices: one in Ciudad Juarez and one in Tijuana, housing U.S. agents and “task force commanders” who coordinate operations against drug trafficking with the support of Mexican Government personnel.

It is not known how many intelligence agents from the U.S. are operating in Mexico with the authorization of the Mexican Federal Government, since the creation of this center was announced on August 31st. They maintain that the exact number is “classified.”

The building occupied by the OBI in the Federal District is right next to the Mexican Stock Exchange and is part of what the security and intelligence services in Mexico define as a “soft target area” in reference to the possibility of an attack on U.S. interests in Mexico.

At this strategic point for Washington in the Mexican Federal District, there are also facilities for transnational corporations such as Ford, American Airlines, as well as Marriott and Sheraton hotels, among others.

The building where the OBI is located gives the impression of an ordinary business facility, with banks, insurance, telecommunications, commercial offices and private offices. The only thing that stands out is the entry and departure of U.S. citizens.

The building directory lists the names of the occupants all the way up to the 21st floor. However, after the 22nd floor, there are three penthouses that are only listed as “occupied.” And on the roof, there is a dozen satellite dishes placed just above the logo of the telecommunications company Axtel.

“It’s the best covert location for the agencies to operate,” said the source that provided the location of the OBI. The ordinary appearance of the building is the way in which the United States often disguise intelligence centers around the world.

The reception and parking are guarded by private security services, while Federal District Police provide outside support.

Furthermore, the city government has installed special surveillance cameras with sirens to observe the movement of pedestrians and vehicles outside the building.

The scope and power of the OBI in Mexico is similar to the El Paso Intelligence Center, in Texas (EPIC), which dates back to 1974 and operates exclusively to combat drug trafficking, weapons and money laundering on the border between Mexico and United States.

EPIC has been credited for creating the strategies launched against drug trafficking and organized crime in Mexico. Among the most successful are “Operation White Tiger,” which was used to investigate the activities of the Hank Rhon family in 1997, the capture and extradition, a year earlier, of Gulf Drug Cartel Leader Juan Garcia Abrego, and the discovery of narco-graves in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, in 1998.

Subordination

Overrun by drug trafficking, the government of Felipe Calderón agreed to the establishment of the OBI in Mexico, which was a proposal of the then head of National Intelligence in the United States, Admiral Dennis Blair, who last March was accompanied by Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, during his working visit to Mexico.

According to the formal agreement, the new U.S. office workers interact with their Mexican counterparts, under the coordination of the State Department and the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE).

For the Pentagon, the strong presence of its agents in Mexico is intended to merge the intelligence and espionage services of both countries to identify and exploit the vulnerabilities of drug trafficking organizations and organized crime gangs.

Under this directive, issued on 18 March by Gen. Victor Eugene Renuart, then head of Northern Command (NORTHCOM), Mexico has carried out several operations against drug traffickers.

Since then, among some of the actions taken against the drug lords have been the killing of Arturo Beltran Leyva, (aka El Barbas), Ignacio “Nacho” Coronel, and Ezequiel Cardenas Guillen (aka Tony Tormenta), in addition to the arrests of other drug lords, such as Edgar ‘Barbie’ Valdez Villarreal.

Since the killing of Beltran Leyva in December of 2009, U.S. intelligence services, mainly the DEA, have mentioned their participation in various operations, against the very Arturo Beltran Leyva, Barbie Valdez, Teodoro Garcia Simental (aka El Teo), Jose Gerardo Alvarez Vazquez (aka El Indio or El Chayán), operator of the Beltran Leyva organization and Carlos Ramon Castro, a drug dealer who worked for several organizations.

As part of the Mexican government’s need to justify the militarization of the fight against drug trafficking, the Pentagon has strengthened its cooperation with the Mexican military. In early 2009, just as the Department of State and the Mexican Exterior Relations Secretariat (SRE) fine-tuned the details for the establishment of the OBI, the U.S. Department of Defense stepped up military training for Mexicans in Mexico and in several U.S. military bases.

The training has been an unprecedented event in the history of military relations between the two countries. For the first time, the Pentagon has brought counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism expertise from Iraq and Afghanistan to their offices in central Mexico.

In the case of Mexico, the training courses are developed and run by the Defense Department, and are focused on intelligence and tactical operations against drug trafficking, terrorism and the implementation of counterinsurgency tactics.

In addition to the courses offered in Mexico, the Mexican military has significantly increased the number of special forces troops in the Army, Air Force and the Navy to attend specialized intelligence training in U.S. military bases.

Liaisons

The main example of this cooperation is the presence -for the first time in the bilateral relationship- a member of the Mexican Army as a “liaison” between the Mexican military (Central Command) and the Northern Command in Colorado (NORTHCOM), according to a military source who spoke to the Mexican magazine Proceso.

On Wednesday 10, The Washington Post published on its front page a note informing that the liaison will also serve as deputy commander of the Institute for Security and Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere at Fort Benning, Georgia. From the sixties to the eighties, these facilities housed in the so-called School of the Americas, which went down in history as a supplying center for Latin American dictators, which are characterized by the systematic violation of human rights.

A U.S. official, who told the Post on condition of anonymity, said that given the seriousness of the drug violence in Mexico, “we have received direct instruction from the President (Barack Obama) and the highest levels in government, to really examine what more can be done in this counter-narcotics cooperation with Mexico.”

The establishment of the Office of Bi-national Intelligence (OBI) implies that for the first time in the history of Mexico, surveillance, supervision and qualification of work against organized crime between federal government agencies, including the military, rests in part on foreign officials.

According to the document unveiled by the White House on March 25, 2009 on the establishment of the OBI, the office is also responsible for overseeing the proper use of resources that Washington provides the Calderon administration in combating drug trafficking through the ‘Merida Initiative.’

“We will be coordinating our efforts with the government of Mexico through high-level contacts, which in part are related to the new intelligence services responsible for overseeing the implementation of Merida Initiative,” according to the document released by the White House (published by Proceso).

A year later, on March 23, 2010, Hillary Clinton announced during her working visit to the Federal District, in the context of the implementation of Plan Merida, the establishment of two “pilot programs” in the Tijuana-San Diego and Ciudad Juárez-El Paso corridors.

The two governments declared in a joint statement, that in the case of Ciudad Juárez, the program considers the development of “a model for the Mexican Government to collect and analyze tactical intelligence” as well as to “take action against drug trafficking, extortion, kidnapping and other criminal activities.”

However, the actual operations of the OBI in security and intelligence services, Mexicans will be subordinates of the U.S.. Agencies of the U.S. Government will play the role as experts in intelligence work, apart from previous advisory roles in order to increase Mexico’s ability to use information resources against drug cartel operations.
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Nordic Govts Supposedly Bristle @ CIA Ops

2010-11-15T16:32:00.003-05:00

Blogger Note: A thoroughly dishonest bit of "reporting" from that bastion of journalistic integrity and political independence, Pravda . . .

America Conducts Subversive Activities in Friendly Territories
13.11.2010 14:19
Pravda

The United States found itself embroiled in a major spy scandal. As many as five countries caught the Americans illegally spying on their citizens.

Nobody would think it was strange if we were talking about the citizens of Russia, China, Iran, Syria and Venezuela. With these five countries, everything is clear: U.S. officials constantly refer to them as those presenting threats to the national security. But this time the U.S. was caught by quite friendly countries of Northern Europe - Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Finland and Sweden.

The scandal erupted earlier this month. On November 3, Norwegian television channel TV2 released a report which stated that over ten years, a group of Americans have been doing surveillance on 15 to 20 Norwegian subjects - mostly participants of various kinds of rallies. Potential terrorists and other undesirable persons were photographed, and the information was sent to Washington.

The report stated that the purpose of the surveillance was supposedly to prevent terrorist attacks against U.S. embassies. Nordic Governments were not informed of such actions.

The spokesman of the U.S. State Department, Philip Crowley, on November 11 said that the Norwegian authorities have been notified about a covert operation. "We are implementing the program throughout the world and are vigilant against people who can keep track of our embassies, as we understand that our diplomatic missions are a potential target," he explained.

However, the Scandinavians were not satisfied with this comment. A representative of the American embassy was called to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry for an explanation, but no clear answers were provided. It turns out that the surveillance was conducted without the knowledge of the Norwegian authorities.

If it was limited to Norway, this episode could have been considered an isolated case. Yet, after the Norwegians, Denmark spoke about the surveillance of its citizens. Local newspaper Politiken wrote that all American embassies have groups of employees leading external surveillance of suspicious persons in order to address threats to the U.S. security. It has been suggested that Denmark was hardly an exception.

Former head of the Danish security service PET Jorgen Bonniksen said that he had never heard of such groups: "If this is true, then we have to deal with illegal intelligence operations in Denmark. On Danish territory such operations can be conducted by PET, and PET only," he stressed.

The current head of PET, Jakob Scharf, made it clear: if illegal activity is determined, "of course, we will take action." Justice Minister of Denmark Lars Barfoeda has been summoned for an explanation to the Folketing (parliament). The U.S. Embassy in Copenhagen, as well as in Oslo, provided no clear comments.

Followed by Norwegians and Danes, Swedes brought up the illegal activities of American agents. According to the Minister of Justice of Sweden Beatrice Ask, people connected with the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm have been spying on people on the Swedish territory since 2000. The Minister stated that it "is not yet known whether in this case Swedish law was violated." She did not rule out that the objects of the surveillance actually might have been people who pose a threat to the U.S. security.

On his part, head of the local security police Anders Danielsson directly accused the U.S. of violating international norms. He said that the U.S. did not bother to inform the Swedish authorities of their intentions. "The Swedish security police (SÄPO) did not give the U.S. a permission to engage in activities that are contrary to Swedish law," he said.

Representatives of the U.S. embassy were quick to say that "they have nothing to hide" and that they have notified the Swedish authorities about their actions. However, Sweden is the third country which had been "made aware." Could the Scandinavian countries have entered into a conspiracy to defame the United States?

When we talk about three countries at once, it looks like a trend. Following its neighbors, Finland grew concerned as well. Local security police SUPO originally said it had not found anything illegal in the activities of the U.S. Embassy in Helsinki. However, they immediately proceeded to a more detailed verification. Apparently, the Finns also did not believe the assurances of the Americans.

Only the small Iceland with the population of 320 thousand with no army is lacking to complete the picture. On November 11 it was revealed that the islanders also have questions for the U.S. Local authorities immediately declared that they suspected members of the American Embassy in Reykjavik in espionage. The diplomatic mission is being verified.

This is a stunning picture. The U.S. did not even consider it necessary to inform its allies of its actions on their territory, as if they were colonies. In fact, Denmark, Iceland and Norway joined NATO and, consequently, they entered the circle of the closest allies of the U.S. Finland and Sweden are not members of the North Atlantic alliance, but are working with it very closely. That's how Americans value their allies.

However, Washington seems to have confused Scandinavians with Poland, Lithuania and Romania. These countries have repeatedly been suspected of placing secret CIA prisons on their territories. The authorities of these states have been blindly following in the footsteps of American politics in the past two decades. This is not true about rich countries of Northern Europe. Given the national pride of the Scandinavians, they are unlikely to forgive the Americans the dismissive attitude.

Denmark is the only country that followed the U.S. without asking questions. Sweden and Finland harshly condemned the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Norway was among the first to withdraw its troops from Iraq, as well as (unlike Americans) has signed an agreement with Russia on the delimitation of the Arctic shelf. Even little Iceland allowed itself to contradict the States when it refused to extradite the late chess player Robert Fisher, who was facing a jail term at home.

The explanation of the incident with the need to combat terrorism, of course, can be taken into account. Radical Islamists are making themselves visible in Denmark and Sweden, as well as Norway and Finland. Yet, the United States could have informed the local security forces of their suspicions as these countries also have qualified staff. And as for surveillance of Icelanders - it is simply ridiculous. They have fewer than a hundred of Muslims, let alone Islamists.

The author of numerous books on the work of intelligence Alexander Kolpakidi commented on the behavior of the U.S. agents in the Nordic countries for Pravda.ru.

"There is nothing surprising here. U.S. intelligence services have always behaved that way around the globe. Virtually all countries of the world, including the members of European Union and NATO, have secret CIA tracking stations. This is not the first scandal of this kind. For example, several years ago, the Greek police found one of these stations having mistaken it for a terrorist base. When the attack began, "terrorists" opened a furious fire, killing a police officer.

Why is America conducting subversive activities in foreign territories, including, apparently friendly countries? This is because in an era of the global crisis, the U.S. changed its strategy. If before it had adhered to the concept of the "golden billion" according to which the good life was allowed to a limited group of countries, mainly Western countries, but now it has changed the strategy to the "golden million," which implies that the good life is the exclusive privilege of the U.S. ".

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Shcherbakov's Defection

2010-11-12T17:34:00.002-05:00

Medvedev Says He Knew about Double Agent

By Anna Smolchenko (AFP)

SEOUL — President Dmitry Medvedev confirmed Friday that a Moscow double agent helped Washington crack a major Russian spy ring that sparked the worst espionage row between the two countries since the Cold War.

Medvedev conceded that Russia would have to draw lessons from the fiasco but dismissed talk that it was time to start firing officials over the case -- an increasingly popular sentiment in disgruntled Moscow.

"To me, what Kommersant said was not news. I knew about it the day it happened, with all its attributes and accessories," Medvedev said at the G20 summit in South Korea's capital when asked about the respected daily's report.

Kommersant identified Washington's Russian accomplice as a colonel with the Russian foreign intelligence service named Shcherbakov, whose job was to plant civilian moles in the United States similar to the deep cover spy ring dismantled by Washington.

The paper also wrote that a Russian hit squad had been especially assigned to hunt down Shcherbakov in retribution and to prevent him from passing any other sensitive information to Washington.

"You can already have no doubt that a Mercader has already been sent after him," an intelligence source told the paper in reference to Ramon Mercader, the man sent by Stalin to Mexico to assassinate his rival Leon Trotsky.

Mercader used an ice pick for the job.

This summer's scandal culminated in 10 spies -- many working for years undercover in the United States as sleeper agents -- returning to Russia in exchange for four convicted US spies.

Medvedev did not confirm specific elements of the Kommersant story. But his comments suggested that he knew about the double agent before the June arrests and prior to his summit talks that month with his US counterpart Barack Obama.

But he firmly brushed aside suggestions that he should sack the head of his country's foreign intelligence service, Mikhail Fradkov, who has been the subject of growing dismissal talk.

His sacking was backed heavily Thursday by some opposition lawmakers and discussed widely both on television and in the popular press.

"I would not like to comment on the investigation," Medvedev said. "There has to be an investigation and we will draw our conclusions then."

Medvedev's comments echoed a similar statement from Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who suggested in the aftermath of the crisis that Russia knew about the double agent all along.

"This was the result of treason and traitors always end badly. They finish up as drunks, addicts, on the street," Putin said at the end of July.

Putin then enigmatically added that "recently one (traitor) for instance ended his existence abroad and it was not clear what the point of it all was."

But some Russian media and lawmakers suggested that the Kremlin was simply trying to put a brave face on a bad situation and that Shcherbakov had done long-term damage to Moscow's espionage programme.

"The damage committed by the colonel to the state is too enormous" not to have further repercussions, said parliament's security council deputy chairman Gennady Gudkov.

The double agent's naming forced Medvedev to return to a sensitive issue for Russia just as the country attempts to play a more forceful role in foreign affairs.

Medvedev came to the G20 summit promoting a makeover of the global economic order designed to win Russia respect and keep major economies such as the United States in check.

But Russian officials found themselves talking about the Cold War, with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov particularly stressing that it was time to move on from the issues of the past.

Lavrov said he would be heading to Russia-NATO talks in Lisbon next week expecting to register the "conclusion of the post-Cold War era."

See: http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iokhy5fQsMxUxOIv2_s_iVq6VSWQ?docId=CNG.4e6b770ae2ca3b8f8eb41fd7adc33980.241

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Nicholson & Son Espionage Services, Inc.

2010-11-09T14:12:00.002-05:00

CIA Officer Pleads to Spying for Kremlin
Son also has been convicted of receiving data for Russians

by Jerry Seper Washington Times 8 Nov 10

A former high-ranking CIA employee now serving a 23-year sentence for conspiracy to commit espionage pleaded guilty Monday in federal court in Portland, Ore., to new charges of conspiring to act as an agent of Russia and international money laundering, the Justice Department said.

Harold J. Nicholson, 59, pleaded guilty before U.S. District Judge Anna J. Brown, admitting that during the course of the conspiracy he met with his son, Nathaniel, on several occasions at the federal prison in Sheridan, Ore., where he provided information intended for Russia.

David Kris, assistant attorney general for national security, said Nicholson admitted that it was part of the conspiracy that his son would travel to several locations including San Francisco, Mexico City, Lima, Peru, and Nicosia, Cyprus, to meet with Kremlin agents.

At those meetings, Mr. Kris said, Nathaniel Nicholson provided the Russians with information they had requested from his father and collected money for his father's past espionage activities. The father admitted sneaking notes to his son on crumpled napkins during prison visits, which later were passed on to Russian agents.

Mr. Kris also said Harold Nicholson counseled his son on how to covertly travel with the Russians' funds and provide them to family members. The father was convicted of selling U.S. intelligence to Russia for $180,000 and was sentenced to prison in 1997.

"Harold Nicholson, one of the highest-ranking CIA officials ever convicted of espionage, dispatched his son around the globe to collect on past espionage debts from Russian agents," Mr. Kris said. "Today, he admitted using this scheme to continue to profit from his spying activities while in prison. The many agents, analysts and prosecutors who worked on this matter deserve our thanks."

Nathaniel Nicholson, 26, was arrested after traveling to Russia to negotiate a pension for his father and to learn whether any espionage funds were held in escrow. The son, who was paid $45,000 for meeting with the Russians, pleaded guilty last year to conspiracy charges and agreed to testify against his imprisoned father, if necessary, in a plea deal that could help him avoid jail time.

Harold Nicholson, who joined the CIA in 1980 after service as an Army captain, is serving a 283-month sentence at the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) in Sheridan, Ore., for a 1997 conviction of conspiracy to commit espionage. At a plea hearing, he admitted that from 2006 to 2008, with the aid of his son, he acted on behalf of the Russian Federation, passed information to the Kremlin, and received cash proceeds for his past espionage activities.

He had faced up to 30 additional years in prison and fines totaling $750,000. A plea agreement in the case states that both parties will ask the court at sentencing to impose an eight-year prison sentence to be served consecutively to the sentence he is currently serving. Judge Brown has scheduled sentencing on Jan. 18.

The guilty plea came on the same day his trial was scheduled to begin.

"Mr. Nicholson hopes that his resolution of these charges will allow his children to move on with their lives, and he appreciates their ongoing love and support," his lawyer, Samuel Kauffman, said in a statement.

Dwight C. Holton, U.S. attorney in Portland, said the elder Nicholson "admitted not only betraying his country — again — but also betraying his family by involving his son Nathaniel in his corrupt scheme to get more money for his past espionage activities."

Arthur Balizan, special agent in charge of the FBI field office in Portland, said the elder Nicholson took an oath when he was hired at the CIA to protect the nation's security, but he violated that oath.

Nicholson served as a deputy chief of station for the U.S. Embassy to the Philippines and a chief of station to the U.S. Embassy to Romania. He also was assigned as an instructor at Camp Peary, a training facility for new CIA agents in Williamsburg, Va.

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For Once, Security Trumps (Chinese) $$$

2010-11-08T13:15:00.002-05:00

Security Fears Kill Chinese Bid in U.S.

By JOANN S. LUBLIN and SHAYNDI RAICE
Sprint Nextel Corp. is excluding Chinese telecommunications-equipment makers Huawei Technologies Ltd. and ZTE Corp. from a contract worth billions of dollars largely because of national security concerns in Washington, according to people familiar with the matter.

The Defense Department and some U.S. lawmakers have been increasingly concerned about the two companies' ties to the Chinese government and military, and the security implications of letting their equipment into critical U.S. infrastructure.

Some officials argue China's military could use Huawei or ZTE equipment to disrupt or intercept American communications.

The Obama administration has also weighed in on the matter. Commerce Secretary Gary Locke called Sprint Chief Executive Dan Hesse this week to discuss concerns about awarding the work to a Chinese firm, but didn't ask Sprint to exclude the Chinese suppliers, according to an administration official familiar with the conversation. Mr. Hesse declined to comment.

Read more: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704353504575596611547810220.html?KEYWORDS=sprint#dummy#ixzz14iTo8bZx

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CIA Control of SF?

2010-11-04T15:57:00.005-04:00

Growing Support for CIA Control of Special Forces: Report
(AFP) – 3 days ago

WASHINGTON — Support is growing in the US military and administration of President Barack Obama for shifting to the CIA operational control over elite special forces teams secretly in Yemen, The Wall Street Journal reported Monday.

Citing unnamed officials, the newspaper said the foiled mail bombing plot by suspected Al-Qaeda militants in Yemen has added urgency to an administration review of expanded military options.

Officials said such a shift would allow the United States to strike suspected militant targets unilaterally with greater stealth and speed, the report said.

Allowing US Special Operations Command units to operate under the Central Intelligence Agency would also give the United States greater leeway to strike without the explicit blessing of the Yemeni government, the paper said.

In addition to streamlining the launching of strikes, it would allow the Yemeni government deniability because the CIA operations would be covert, The Journal said.

The White House is already considering adding armed CIA drones to the arsenal against militants in Yemen, the paper said.

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2010-11-04T12:08:00.006-04:00

Sarkozy Accused of Using Security Service to Spy on Journalists

Magazine editor claims President oversees 'dirty-tricks unit' to investigate reporters

By John Lichfield in Paris

Thursday, 4 November 201
President Nicolas Sarkozy personally supervises a team of security agents which spies on troublesome French journalists, it was claimed yesterday.

The claim – dismissed by the Elysée Palace as "utterly ridiculous" – follows a high-profile law suit brought in September by France's most prestigious newspaper and a series of burglaries in recent weeks at the homes or offices of investigative reporters.

According to the satirical weekly Le Canard Enchaîné, President Sarkozy regularly orders the boss of France's internal security service to investigate and uncover the sources of any journalist who writes stories which embarrass the government.

A team of agents within the Division Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur (DCRI) – the French equivalent of MI5 and Special Branch – has been created to lead the investigations, the newspaper said.

Le Canard said that "since the start of the year" the President had "personally" intervened on several occasions with the head of the DCRI, Bernard Squarcini, a Sarkozy appointment and loyalist. Whenever the President saw an investigative article which "embarrassed him or his friends", he ordered the journalist to be placed "under surveillance", the newspaper said.

The Elysée Palace dismissed the claims as "utterly ridiculous". The leader of Mr Sarkozy's centre-right party, Xavier Bertrand, accused the newspaper of publishing a "great absurdity". The DCRI said that Mr Sarkozy had never given direct orders to Mr Squarcini on any subject.

However, sources within the DCRI confirmed to Le Monde that an "anti-leak" team did exist within the counter-intelligence agency to "protect national security". An opposition politician compared the "shameful" allegations to the Watergate affair in the US in the 1970s. Aurélie Filippetti of the Socialist Party accused President Sarkozy of being the "spiritual son of Richard Nixon".

Unusually for Canard, the article making the claims against the President was signed by the newspaper's editor, Claude Angeli. He told French radio yesterday that the story was based on information from within the DCRI. "We would not have written such a hard headline unless our sources were solid," he said. The article was headlined: "Sarko supervises spying on journalists."

The allegations follow the dramatic decision in September by Le Monde to bring a criminal action against "persons unknown" for the alleged illegal use of the counter-intelligence service to muzzle the press.

France's most respected newspaper said that officials in Mr Sarkozy's office had deployed the DCRI like a "cabinet noir", or dirty-tricks operation, to uncover the source of leaks in the L'Oréal family feud and political financing scandal.

A legal case is proceeding against "X" or person unknown but the French government has refused to release sensitive documents to the Paris public prosecutor for "reasons of state security".

The DCRI admits that it searched mobile phone records to track down a senior figure in the Justice Minister's office as the source of embarrassing leaks to Le Monde in July in the so-called "Bettencourt-Woerth" affair. Although the agency claimed to have done so legally, it later emerged that it had not sought the permission of the state's surveillance watchdog. Although the Bettencourt affair began as a family feud between France's wealthiest woman, Liliane Bettencourt, and her daughter, it exploded last summer into a state scandal.

Mr Sarkozy's Budget Minister, and former campaign treasurer, Eric Woerth, was accused of soliciting illegal political donations – and a job for his wife – from Ms Bettencourt's personal fund manager.

In the last few weeks, there has been a series of unexplained burglaries, and the theft of computers and other equipment, from the homes or offices of journalists who wrote investigative articles on the Bettencourt affair.

A laptop computer and a global positioning system was stolen from the home of Gérard Davet of Le Monde. A computer belonging to Hervé Gattegno was stolen from the offices of the centre-right news magazine, Le Point. Two computers and tapes were stolen from the offices of left-wing investigative website, Mediapart, which has led the way in uncovering the political aspects of the Bettencourt affair.

Asked about these crimes at his press conference after the EU summit in Brussels last week, President Sarkozy hesitated and said: "I don't see what they have to do with me."

As Canard pointed out yesterday, it was unusual for Mr Sarkozy to miss an opportunity to condemn a crime.

Marie-Pierre de la Gontrie, the secretary general for public liberties in the main opposition party, the Parti Socialiste, said yesterday: "The revelations in Canard Enchaîné are extremely serious. There must be an official investigation and the boss of the DCRI, Bernard Squarcini, must appear before the legal committee of the National Assembly."

Sarkozy's media battles

* France's most prestigious newspaper, Le Monde, accused Mr Sarkozy in September of illegally using the counter-intelligence service to muzzle the press. The newspaper said it had started legal action against 'persons unknown' at the Élysée Palace for breaking a century-old French law guaranteeing the secrecy of journalistic sources. The Élysée Palace flatly denied the accusation.* President Sarkozy ordered the merger of two competing intelligence agencies two years ago. He said the change was necessary on efficiency grounds and would create a French FBI. However, it was claimed that he suspected that one or both of the agencies had played a part in a dirty tricks campaign that had led to leaks about his failing marriage to Cécilia Attias.

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Shin Bet Counter-Terror Strategy Outline

2010-11-03T23:20:00.006-04:00

Head of Israel's 'Shin Bet' Outlines Israel's Joint Countering Terror Strategy

The first decade of the 21st century demonstrated the potential risk of modern terror, and how determined response, led by dedicated personnel, backed by technological and a legal infrastructure, can defeat terror attacks.

Facing terror for over 60 years, Israel has developed the methods, means and procedures, to effectively combat this dangerous phenomena. During the 1970s most attacks were directed at Israeli-related aviation – airlines flying to and from the country. Palestinian terror activities gradually escalated, through domestic and cross-border attacks, through popular uprisals in the occupied territories, in the 1980s and a guerilla-like campaign in South Lebanon, waged through the 1990s.

Yet the terror campaign against Israel culminated in the early 2000s, as Palestinian Tanzim, Islamic Jihad and Hamas organizations launched a massive onslaught, employing a new type of weapon - suicide attacks - directed primarily against Israel's civilian population. This weapon was the most effective the terrorist organizations possessed - less than one percent of the activists were responsible to more than half of the casualties caused to the other side.

Israel's security services required time to adjust and develop new and effective countermeasures to combat the new threat of suicide bombers. The results were remarkable: Compared to 452 suicide attacks carried out by the Palestinians in 2003, only two suicide attacks occurred since 2007. (see also: "Suicide Bombers as Weapons")

According to Yuval Diskin, Director, Israel Security Agency (ISA – Shin Bet), the winning formula developed by Israel's security services is based on jointness - the ability of all services to work together, sharing operational concepts (CONOPS), with a clear definition of the combined objective for all the organizations engaged in homeland security and defense. Multidisciplinary intelligence activity, based on advanced technological and human intelligence, tailored and channeled through processing and dissemination, means to turn intelligence from raw data into an operationally valuable, real-time asset. "Operational systems must be adapted and learn to operate as efficiently as possible with such real-time intelligence assets" said Diskin.

Such adaptation is enabled by introducing technological means to improve connectivity, interoperability and joint operations by combined task forces, composed of elements from different organizations, such as ISA, National Police, Army and Air Force. Under such a cooperation umbrella, different organizations must share common counter-terror techniques, tactics and procedures (TTP), optimizing for rapid response, based on real-time intelligence. According to Diskin, the main advantage of the joint-operating concept is by combining the unique capabilities and characteristics of each of the participating organizations. "The main challenge is not integrating the technologies, but overcoming leadership and human nature obstacles" Diskin added.

One of the keys to establishing jointness was the setup of inter-service command posts, manned by representatives from all the services and organizations involved in operations.

Interoperability also requires maintaining real-time common operational pictures among all organizations - a task achieved by implementing common communications interfaces among all organizations, enabling real-time information flow between command centers. These preparations paid dividends in recent years, as Israel's security services managed to repel multiple Palestinian terror attacks, intercepting suicide bombers before they could reach their targets.

Diskin considers the legal infrastructure a critical element in the success of Israel's counter-terror campaign. "It took Israeli lawmakers 14 years to agree on the legal framework for the ISA, until the so-called 'ISA Law' was completed in 2002. Once implemented, this legal foundation became instrumental for the success of Israel's counter-terror campaign." Said Diskin.

The absence of terror strikes does not indicate that Israel's security organizations are remaining idle. On the contrary, during this period the Palestinians in the West Bank continuously and relentlessly prepared and launched attacks. They trained hundreds of potential suicide bombers and managed to launch about 120 attacks, alas, almost all were intercepted and repelled by Israel's security services. Real-time intelligence and the combined, rapid response capability developed by the ISA, the Special Police Unit, military and air force elements were instrumental factors for thIs remarkable anti-terror success.
According to Diskin, ISA' special operations units and the Police Special Unit (yamam) were able to intercept most of these suicide bombers before theise could reach their objectives. "It takes a suicide bomber launched from Nablus about 60 minutes to reach his target in a major Israeli city like Netanya" explains Diskin, "we had to tailor our response to meet this short cycle". Typically, the ISA would get fragments of information about an imminent terror act before, or when the suicide bomber is launched, immediately triggering an early warning. When such intelligence was accurate enough, pre-emptive action would take place.

But when the first indication is received after the suicide bomber leaves on its final mission,all the fragmented intelligence must be gathered and updated continuously, developed into a clear understanding of the threat and its potential target, enabling to scramble the rapid-response teams to disrupt the threat's movement. These action teams are called to establish contact with the target, identify the threat and eliminate it before reaching its target. These operational teams are controlled by the inter-agency operational command and control centers, conducting the entire intercept, feeding on all intelligence sources throughout the event, to maintain a constant situational picture in real-time.

It took years to prepare all the organizations responsible for homeland security to operate effectively under these short timelines. "These capabilities must be prepared in advance, in order to work effectively in time of crisis" Diskin concludes.

Future threats are expected to be more complex, as terrorist organizations, operating in the modern, globalized and networked world are less hierarchical, more elusive than ever. In fact, most Islamic terror organizations are 'state sponsored', even when they do not have direct geographical access to the host nation. For example, Palestinian terrorist movements in Gaza, like the Islamic Jihad and Hamas get their weapons from sponsoring nations like Iran or North Korea. The military supplies are shipped through a global supply network by sea, with destinations in Yemen or Sudan. From clandestine beachheads the loads are smuggled over-land, entering Gaza through tunnels dug under the Egyptian - Gaza border at Rafah. Palestinian terror activists are also sent to Iran to train in the operation of these weapons. The level and sophistication of weapons accessible by terrorists is becoming unprecedented - ranging from advanced, powerful explosives, to anti-aircraft missiles, guided weapons, unmanned aerial vehicles, long range rockets and missiles.

Cyber terrorism is also becoming a growing challenge, and, since such activities are performed over cyberspace, the location of the perpetrators is irrelevant to their ability to cause harm, get support or access their targets.

In fact, the global Internet provides terrorists with many advantages, including recruitment tools - certain social network sites and chat-rooms where potential candidates undergo 'brainwashing', with their minds being indoctrinated and 'tendered', preparing them for potential suicide attacks. Other sites are used as indoctrination, and training tools, transferring knowledge and developing skills among remotely located recruits, on how to prepare improvised weapons, counter-intelligence actions and terror cells operations.

Terrorist's cybernetic capabilities also exploit the information services made available for peaceful purposes, such as GPS and geospatial intelligence, real-time communications via Internet, cellular phones or messaging devices, powerful encryption devices etc. These capabilities are added to the determination and willingness of terrorist organizations to carry out 'mega-terror' actions, regardless of the casualties or damage they cause.

"The world can successfully defeat and win the war against global terror" Diskin stated, " But to win this war, the nations determined to fight terror, must join forces, develop joint intelligence and effective operational capabilities."

According to Diskin, such joint operability must rely on close cooperation among intelligence agencies, establishing an agreeable legal framework among nations that will eliminate potential loopholes to be exploited by terrorists, and formulating cooperation among homeland security and counter-terror organizations from different countries, by developing joint operational capabilities. "The is a growing understanding and openness to these cooperative principles among the countries facing terror threats" Diskin concluded.

See: http://defense-update.com/analysis/2010/02112010_isa_counterterror_strategy.html
###

Yet More Chinese Espionage

2010-11-02T14:15:00.004-04:00

Taiwan Military Intel Officer, 'Double Agent' Detained for Espionage

TAIPEI (Kyodo) -- A Taiwanese military intelligence officer and an alleged double agent for China were in custody Tuesday as investigators probe the latest espionage scandal to hit Taiwan's defense establishment and assess the damage to its intelligence network.

The detained officer, identified by local media as Col. Lo Chi-cheng, allegedly transferred classified data over several years to a Taiwanese man linked to Taiwan's intelligence network and who has business interests in China.

The data was then allegedly passed on to Chinese intelligence, media reports said.

The two suspects were arrested Sunday and their homes searched after investigators witnessed the two men allegedly exchanging classified data in a Taipei street.

The Defense Ministry confirmed late Monday that the officer had been arrested, while ministry spokesman Yu Sy-tue told a press conference Tuesday that the case only had a limited impact on military intelligence activities.

Nonetheless, the Taipei-based China Times newspaper, whose editorial line strongly supports integration with China, described the case in its report as "probably the highest-level case of espionage involving the military in 20 years."

Local newspaper reports Tuesday were inconsistent on details of the case, including the content of the leaked intelligence and the name of the alleged double agent.

But reports that the data included names of Taiwan's agents in China were seemingly vindicated when Premier Wu Den-yih told the legislature Tuesday that the government has a duty of care and will do its best to bring the agents to Taiwan, the semiofficial Central News Agency reported.

Wu added, however, that the leaked list of names is four years old and that the government could "only do its best," CNA reported.

Taiwan has suffered several security breaches in its intelligence apparatus in recent years, including retired agents working for China and weapons information being sold to Beijing.

The latest incident coincides with an easing of tensions between Taipei and Beijing as economic relations flourish.

But growing Chinese support for military-to-military contact and political talks with Taiwan has not been reciprocated, with Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou saying such talks must wait until at least the next presidential term.

(Mainichi Japan) November 2, 2010

###

Chinese Espionage (again)

2010-11-01T14:26:00.001-04:00

Chinese Espionage

From The New Yorker . . .

Now that Russian spies have fallen short of our Hollywood fantasies, Americans have come to view China’s espionage efforts as one of two caricatures: impossibly vast and sophisticated or bumbling and antiquated. A flurry of new evidence suggests that the reality encompasses everything in between.

At the low end is the case of twenty-eight-year-old Glenn Duffie Shriver, a former international-relations student at Grand Valley State University in Michigan, who admitted in federal court last week that “he was befriended by Chinese intelligence officers while studying in Shanghai, agreed to spy for them and was finalizing a job at the C.I.A. when U.S. authorities found out what he was doing,” according to the Detroit Free Press. (h/t Shanghaiist.) Shriver had answered a newspaper ad seeking someone to write an article for a hundred and twenty dollars on U.S.-China relations. Then, he was approached by a pair of guys—Wu and Tang, in court documents—who mapped out a plan in which they would pay Shriver and he would get a job in the U.S. government, and voila!

Alas, for him, it didn’t go smoothly: He tried to get into the State Department Foreign Service, but flunked the exam twice. Then he applied for a job in the C.I.A.’s National Clandestine Service in 2007, at which time the game was up. Even so, his handlers paid him seventy thousand dollars along the way. He has settled on a plea agreement that carries four years in prison. (The Chinese embassy has reacted with umbrage—“Any attempts to defame China with fabricated allegations will prove futile,” a spokesman said—though I’m not clear if the defamation is the suggestion of espionage or the suggestion of such a ham-fisted attempt at it.)

By some accounts, Chinese efforts to snoop for economic purposes are considerably more sophisticated. The Times has written recently about “the new trade in business secrets,” in which employees of Chinese descent are accused of sharing industrial and technology secrets with researchers in China who have a connection to the government. But courts are still figuring out when such cases constitute regular theft of trade secrets and when they rise to the level of espionage by contributing to the work of a foreign government. As the Times notes, the Justice Department lost a case involving two California engineers who the government accused of “working with a venture capitalist in China to seek financing for a microchip business from China’s 863 program, which supports development of technologies with military applications.” (The judge disagreed, and, indeed, this is a complex detail because, as I wrote last year, the 863 program is intended to promote not only military technology but civilian good as well. So if an electric-car engineer at G.M. shares designs with a Chinese firm that receives 863-funding, is the engineer guilty of theft or espionage? Perhaps both, but the courts will have to decide.)

In the magazine this week, Seymour Hersh explores how the U.S. has, at various moments, both underestimated and overstated the cyber-security threat posed by China—and how neither mistake should be a source of comfort. In addition to providing a vivid primer on how not to disable your plane when you crash-land in foreign territory, he also quotes James Lewis, a cyber-espionage expert who worked for the Departments of State and Commerce in the Clinton Administration. China “is in full economic attack” inside the United States, Lewis says. “Some of it is economic espionage that we know and understand. Some of it is like the Wild West. Everybody is pirating from everybody else. The U.S.’s problem is what to do about it. I believe we have to begin by thinking about it”—the Chinese cyber threat—“as a trade issue that we have not dealt with.”

Read more http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/evanosnos/2010/10/chinese-espionage.html#ixzz143Zjq5Ll

Turkish Espionage, Sex and Blackmail

2010-10-29T22:09:00.003-04:00

9 Military Officers Arrested on Espionage Charges

Nine military officers, out of 13 who had been referred to court by the İstanbul Prosecutor's Office, were in court on Wednesday on charges of blackmail and espionage, while four others were released.

A total of 16 suspects had been taken to the Beşiktaş Courthouse in İstanbul yesterday, including one civilian and 15 military officers. Prosecutor Fikret Seçen then referred the 13 officers to court, demanding their arrest. The other three were released by the prosecution after questioning. The suspects testified at the İstanbul 13th High Criminal court until after midnight on Wednesday.

The officers were arrested on charges of membership in a criminal organization; destroying, damaging and falsifying documents relating to state security; illegally obtaining documents related to state security and illegally acquiring confidential documents for political or military espionage purposes.”

Eight suspects, including four other military officers and four Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) members and a higher ranking bureaucrat inside the Defense Ministry, were taken to the courthouse yesterday. Their interrogation before the judge continued well into the late evening.

The Taraf daily yesterday reported that the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) was assisting in the search for three foreign women under the names of İnesa, Lia Rahmatova and Nona Burduli. According to the paper, these foreigners, who are believed to still be in Turkey, are suspected of liaising between the suspects and foreign military services to whom the stolen information was sold.

The arrests are a culmination of investigations that began in August this year into a gang inside the Naval Forces which had arranged prostitutes for senior military, police officers and bureaucrats for the purposes of using recorded footage to blackmail their victims. As the operation expanded, it turned into an espionage investigation that included highly confidential and strategic military documents.

There are 49 suspects in the investigation, most of whom are military officers on active duty, including four cryptology experts from TÜBİTAK. In coming days, two admirals, five senor colonels and six other members of the military are also expected to be brought for their testimonies. The prosecution yesterday said an arrest warrant had been issued for four other soldiers who are currently abroad.

In August police had seized documents with sensitive information at the houses of those who at the time were thought to be prostitution and blackmail suspects, which they then relayed to the MİT for advice on whether these documents could have been sent to foreign intelligence units. This is how the investigation expanded to reveal the espionage.

29 October 2010, Friday
TODAY’S ZAMAN İSTANBUL
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-225725-101-9-military-officers-arrested-on-espionage-charges.html

MI6 Chief: 1st Ever Public Speech - Transcript

2010-10-28T11:22:00.004-04:00

Sir John Sawers's Speech – full text - The Guardian

Transcript of today's [28 October 2010] first public speech by a serving MI6 chief:

The Times published a reader's letter earlier this year. It read: "Sir – is it not bizarre that MI5 and MI6, otherwise known as the secret services, currently stand accused of being – er – secretive?"

I may be biased. But I think that reader was on to something rather important and most government work these days is done by conventional and transparent processes. But not all.

Britain's foreign intelligence effort was first organised in 1909, when the Secret Intelligence Service was formed.

We have just published an official history of our first 40 years. I'm sure you will all have read all 800 pages of it.

The first chief, Mansfield Cumming, used to pay the salaries of SIS officials out of his private income, dispensed in cash from a desk drawer. I'm glad to say that, even after the chancellor's statement last week, I'm not in the same position.

SIS's existence was admitted only in 1994. We British move slowly on such things.

And this, I believe, is the first public speech given by a serving chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service.

"Why now?" might you ask. Well, intelligence features prominently in the National Security Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review, published last week.

We often appear in the news. Our popular name – MI6 – is an irresistible draw. We have a website, and we've got versions in Arabic and Russian. We recruit our staff openly, with adverts in the national press.

But debate on SIS's role is not well informed, in part because we have been so determined to protect our secrets.

In today's open society, no government institution is given the benefit of the doubt all the time. There are new expectations of public – and legal – accountability that have developed. In short, in 2010 the context for the UK's secret intelligence work is very different from 1994.I am not going to use today to tantalise you with hints of sensitive operations or intelligence successes.

Instead, I want to answer two important questions: what value do we get from a secret overseas intelligence effort in the modern era? How can the public have confidence that work done in secret is lawful, ethical, and in their interests?

First, how do we all fit in? The Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, operates abroad, dealing with threats overseas and gathering intelligence mainly from human sources. The security service, MI5, works here in the UK, protecting the homeland from terrorist attack and other threats.

GCHQ produces intelligence from communications, and takes the lead in the cyber world.

These three specialised services form the UK intelligence community, and we operate in what the foreign secretary has called a networked world. Technology plays an ever growing part in our work, for SIS as well as GCHQ, and the boundary line between home and abroad is increasingly blurred.

So the three agencies work increasingly closely together, and the next five years will see us intensifying our collaboration to improve our operational impact and to save money. Yes, even the intelligence services have to make savings.

Secret intelligence is important information that others wish you not to know; it's information that deepens our understanding of a foreign country or grouping, or reveals their true intentions. It's information that gives us new opportunities for action.

We at SIS obtain our intelligence from secret agents. These are people are nearly all foreign nationals, who have access to secret information and who choose to work with us.

Our agents are the true heroes of our work. They have their own motivations and hopes. Many of them show extraordinary courage and idealism, striving in their own countries for the freedoms that we in Britain take for granted.

Our agents are working today in some of the most dangerous and exposed places, bravely and to hugely valuable effect, and we owe a debt to countless more whose service is over.

Agents take serious risks and make sacrifices to help our country. In return, we give them a solemn pledge: that we shall keep their role secret.

The information we get from agents is put into an intelligence report. The source is described in general terms. It is just that – a report. It tells us something new or corroborates what we suspect.

A report's value can be overplayed if it tells us what we want to hear, or it can be underplayed if it contains unwelcome news or runs against received wisdom.

It is a part of the picture, and may not be even wholly accurate, even if the trusted agent who gave it to us is sure that it is.

So sources of intelligence have to be rigorously evaluated, and their reports have to be honestly weighed alongside all other information. Those who produce it, and those who want to use it, have to put intelligence in a wider context. The Joint Intelligence Committee plays a crucial role.

The Butler Review following Iraq was a clear reminder, to both the agencies and the centre of government, politicians and officials alike, of how intelligence needs to be handled. The SIS board recently reviewed our implementation of Lord Butler's recommendations, to make sure we've implemented them fully, in spirit as well as in substance.

I am confident that they have been. And we will look at the wider issues again once the Chilcott Inquiry reports.

So why do we need secret intelligence? Well, let's start with the terrorist problem.

Most people go about their daily work not worrying about the risk of a terrorist attack. That a bomb may have been planted on their route, or hostages might be seized. I'm glad they don't worry about those sorts of things: part of our job is to make people feel safe.

But those threats exist, as we're recalling now with the 7/7 inquest. That said, on any given day the chances that a terrorist attack will happen on our streets, even in central London, feel small enough to be safely ignored by the public.

You, and millions of people like you, go about your business in our cities and towns free of fear because the British government works tirelessly, out of the public eye, to stop terrorists and would-be terrorists in their tracks.

The most draining aspect of my job is reading, every day, intelligence reports describing the plotting of terrorists who are bent on maiming and murdering people in this country.

It's an enormous tribute to the men and women of our intelligence and security agencies, and to our cooperation with partner services around the world, that so few of these appalling plots develop into real terrorist attacks.

Some of these terrorists are British citizens, trained in how to use weapons, how to make bombs. Others are foreign nationals who want to attack us to undermine our support for forces of moderation around the world.

Many of the reports I read describe the workings of the al-Qaida network, rooted in a nihilistic version of Islam.

Al-Qaida have ambitious goals. Weakening the power of the west. Toppling moderate Islamic regimes. Seizing the holy places of Islam to give them moral authority. Taking control of the Arab world's oil reserves. They're unlikely to achieve these goals, but they remain set on trying, and are ready to use extreme violence.

Jonathan Evans, the head of MI5, recently described how the threat is intensifying. Precisely because we are having some success in closing down the space for terrorist recruitment and planning in the UK, the extremists are increasingly preparing their attacks against British targets from abroad.

It's not just the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al-Qaida affiliates in Yemen, Somalia and North Africa pose real threats to the UK.

From his remote base in Yemen, Al-Qaida leader and US national Anwar al-Awlaki broadcasts propaganda and terrorist instruction in fluent English over the internet.

Our intelligence effort needs to go where the threat is. One of the advantages of the way we in SIS work is that we are highly adaptable and flexible. We don't get pinned in one place.

There is no one reason for the terrorist phenomenon. Some blame political issues like Palestine or Kashmir or Iraq. Others cite economic disadvantage. Distortions of the Islamic faith. Male supremacy. The lack of the normal checks and balances in some countries. There are many theories.

I've worked a lot in the Islamic world. I agree with those who say we need to be steady and stand by our friends.

Over time, moving to a more open system of government in these countries, one more responsive to people's grievances, will help. But if we demand an abrupt move to the pluralism that we in the west enjoy, we may undermine the controls that are now in place and terrorists would end up with new opportunities.

Whatever the cause or causes of so-called Islamic terrorism, there is little prospect of it fading away soon.

SIS deals with the realities, the threats as they are. We work to minimise the risks. Our closest partners include many in the Muslim world who are concerned at the threat Al-Qaida and their like poses to Islam itself.

In the UK, the security service, MI5, leads our counter-terrorism effort. They do a superb job and SIS's work starts with the priorities that the security service sets.

It's not enough to intercept terrorists here, at the very last minute. They need to be identified and stopped well before then, which means action far beyond our own borders.

This is where SIS comes in. Over one-third of SIS resources are directed against international terrorism. It's the largest single area of SIS's work.

We get inside terrorist organisations to see where the next threats are coming from. We work to disrupt terrorist plots aimed against the UK, and against our friends and allies. What we do is not seen. Few know about the terrorist attacks we help stop.

It scarcely needs saying, but I'll say it anyway: working to tackle terrorism overseas is complex and often dangerous. Our agents, and sometimes our staff, risk their lives.

Much intelligence is partial, fragmentary. We have to build up a picture. It's like a jigsaw, but with key sections missing, and pieces from other jigsaws mixed in.

SIS officers round the world make judgements at short notice with potentially life or death consequences.

Say an agent warns us of a planned attack. We may need to meet that agent fast and securely, to understand his intelligence more fully. To work with GCHQ who look for other signs. To work with MI5 and the police to act on that intelligence here in the UK.

Ministers and lawyers need to be briefed and consulted on next steps. We need partner agencies abroad to pool information, to monitor individuals or to detain them where there are clear, specific concerns.

Disrupting the terrorists is a painstaking process with much careful preparation, and then sudden rapid activity. Details have to be got right. It all has to be tackled fast and securely. There is little margin for error.

All this goes on 24 hours a day, every day of the year. And it keeps us far safer than we would be without it.

Proliferation terrorism is difficult enough and, despite our collective efforts, an attack may well get through. The human cost would be huge. But our country, our democratic system, will not be brought down by a typical terrorist attack.

The dangers of proliferation of nuclear weapons – and chemical and biological weapons – are more far-reaching. It can alter the whole balance of power in a region.

States seeking to build nuclear weapons against their international legal obligations are obsessively secretive about it. SIS's role is to find out what these states are doing and planning, and identify ways to slow down their access to vital materials and technology.

The revelations around Iran's secret enrichment site at Qom were an intelligence success. They led to diplomatic pressure on Iran intensifying, with tougher UN and EU sanctions which are beginning to bite. The Iranian regime must think hard about where its best interests lie.

The risks of failure in this area are grim. Stopping nuclear proliferation cannot be addressed purely by conventional diplomacy. We need intelligence-led operations to make it more difficult for countries like Iran to develop nuclear weapons.

The longer international efforts delay Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons technology, the more time we create for a political solution to be found.

Long-range strategic intelligence: the National Security Strategy which the prime minister published last week sets out the strategic direction for foreign, defence and security policy for the years ahead. Intelligence is at the heart of that strategy.

SIS has the responsibility to gather long-range strategic intelligence, to track military and economic power in other countries, and find out what they going to do with it. We try to see inside the minds of potential policy adversaries and predict their behaviour.

We have expertise on states that operate opaquely and without public accountability. We provide early warning of new weapons systems, or of major changes in policy.

Machiavelli said that "surprise is the essential factor in victory". A lot of SIS work is about making sure that the British government does not face unwelcome surprises. And that some of our adversaries do.

Cyber: My colleague Iain Lobban at GCHQ recently described the cyber threats we face in the modern world.

Attacks on government information and commercial secrets of our companies are happening all the time. Electricity grids, our banking system, anything controlled by computers, could possibly be vulnerable. For some, cyber is becoming an instrument of policy as much as diplomacy or military force.

As Iain is the first to recognise, there isn't a purely technological solution. We need to invest in technology to defend ourselves, and the government has allocated funds for that purpose in the Spending Round.

Even high technology threats have that crucial human dimension, and SIS will be gathering intelligence on individuals and states launching cyber attacks against us, to find out how they organise themselves and to develop ways to counter them.

We have already set to work. It's a big task of the future.

Supporting the military, and building security where the military are involved in a conflict, you will find SIS and GCHQ alongside them.

In Afghanistan, our people provide tactical intelligence that guides military operations and saves our soldiers' lives. Our strategic intelligence helps map the political way forward.

We are building up the Afghan security service, already probably the most capable of the Afghan security institutions, to help the Afghans take responsibility for their own security.

Capacity building is not limited to Afghanistan. We offer training and support to partner services around the world. It wins their cooperation, it improves the quality of their work, and it builds respect for human rights.

Our government expects SIS to maintain a global reach, collecting intelligence in all areas of major British interest to reduce the risk of unpleasant surprises.

And we have our network of partners which provides us a discreet channel of communication to other governments on the most sensitive issues.

So we are a very special part of government. SIS exists to give the UK advantage. We are a sovereign national asset. We are the secret frontline of our national security.

How can the public have confidence that work done by us in secret is lawful, ethical and in their interests?

Let me explain how it all works in practice.

SIS does not choose what it does. The 1994 Intelligence Services Act sets the legal framework for what we do. Ministers tell us what they want to know, what they want us to achieve. We take our direction from the National Security Council.

As chief of SIS, I am responsible for SIS operations. I answer directly to the foreign secretary.

When our operations require legal authorisation or entail political risk, I seek the foreign secretary's approval in advance. If a case is particularly complex, he can consult the attorney general. In the end, the foreign secretary decides what we do.

Submissions for operations go to the foreign secretary all the time. He approves most, but not all, and those operations he does not approve do not happen. It's as simple as that.

There is oversight and scrutiny by parliamentarians and by judges.

The Intelligence and Security committee is chaired by Sir Malcolm Rifkind, and includes other senior politicians, many of them former ministers. They hold us to account and can investigate areas of our activity.

And two former judges have full access to our files, as intelligence commissioner and interception commissioner. They make sure our procedures are proper and lawful.

These processes of control and accountability are as robust as you will find anywhere. SIS fully supports them. We want to enjoy public confidence.

We don't operate on our own. Intelligence is a team game. If we need to track a British terrorist in another country, or stop a shipment of components for a secret nuclear programme, we need to work with services abroad.

We work with over 200 partner services around the world, with hugely constructive results. And our intelligence partnership with the United States is an especially powerful contributor to UK security.

No intelligence service risks compromising its sources. So we have a rule called the control principle – the service who first obtains the intelligence has the right to control how it is used, who else it can be shared with, and what action can be taken on it.

It's rule number one of intelligence sharing. We insist on it with our partners, and they insist on it with us. Because whenever intelligence is revealed, others try to hunt down the source. Agents can get identified, arrested, tortured and killed by the very organisations who are working against us.

So if the control principle is not respected, the intelligence dries up. That's why we have been so concerned about the possible release of intelligence material in recent court cases.

We can't do our job if we work only with friendly democracies. Dangerous threats usually come from dangerous people in dangerous places. We have to deal with the world as it is.

Suppose we receive credible intelligence that might save lives, here or abroad. We have a professional and moral duty to act on it. We will normally want to share it with those who can save those lives.

We also have a duty to do what we can to ensure that a partner service will respect human rights. That is not always straightforward.

Yet if we hold back, and don't pass that intelligence, out of concern that a suspect terrorist may be badly treated, innocent lives may be lost that we could have saved.

These are not abstract questions for philosophy courses or searching editorials. They are real, constant, operational dilemmas.

Sometimes there is no clear way forward. The more finely-balanced judgments have to be made by Ministers themselves. I welcome the publication of the consolidated guidance on detainee issues. It reflects the detailed guidance issued to SIS staff in the field and the training we give them.

Torture is illegal and abhorrent under any circumstances, and we have nothing whatsoever to do with it. If we know or believe action by us will lead to torture taking place, we're required by UK and international law to avoid that action. And we do, even though that allows the terrorist activity to go ahead.

Some may question this, but we are clear that it's the right thing to do. It makes us strive all the harder to find different ways, consistent with human rights, to get the outcome we want.

Other countries respect our approach on these issues. Even where we find deep differences of culture and tradition, we can make progress, slowly but surely, by seeking careful assurances and providing skilled training.

I also welcome the prime minister's initiative in setting up the Gibson Inquiry into the detainee issue. If there are more lessons to be learned, we want to learn them.

And, after 9/11, the terrorist threat was immediate and paramount. We are accused by some people not of committing torture ourselves but of being too close to it in our efforts to keep Britain safe.

Let me say this: SIS is a Service that reflects our country. Integrity is the first of the service's values.

I am confident that, in their efforts to keep Britain safe, all SIS staff acted with the utmost integrity, and with a close eye on basic decency and moral principles.

So, back to that reader's letter in The Times.

The recent debate about secrecy reflects two concerns. First, national security, and the need for the intelligence and security agencies to work in secret to protect British interests and our way of life from those who threaten it.

And second, the need for justice – the rights of citizens to raise complaint against the government and get a fair hearing.

As a public servant, and as a citizen, I devoutly want both objectives upheld, and not to have one undermine the other.

The judges have to determine what constitutes a fair trial.

We in the intelligence and security agencies have to make sure that our secrets don't become available to those who are threatening our country. And we have to protect our partners secrets.

As the prime minister said in parliament, at present we're unable to use secret material in court with confidence that the material will be protected.

The government has promised a green paper to set out some better options for dealing with national security issues in the courts, and I look forward to that.

Part of sustaining public confidence in the intelligence services is debate about the principles and value of intelligence work.

And the purpose of today is to explain what we in SIS do and why we do it. Why our work is important, and why we can't work in the open. A lot is at stake.

Secret organisations need to stay secret, even if we present an occasional public face, as I am doing today. If our operations and methods become public, they won't work.

Agents take risks. They will not work with SIS, will not pass us the secrets they hold, unless they can trust us not to expose them.

Foreign partners need to have certainty that what they tell us will remain secret – not just most of the time, but always.

Without the trust of agents, the anonymity of our staff, the confidence of partners, we would not get the intelligence. The lives of everyone living here would be less safe. The United Kingdom would be more vulnerable to the unexpected, the vicious and the extreme.

Secrecy is not a dirty word. Secrecy is not there as a cover up. Secrecy plays a crucial part in keeping Britain safe and secure.

And without secrecy, there would be no intelligence services, or indeed other national assets like our Special Forces. Our nation would be more exposed as a result.

Without secrecy, we can't tackle threats at source. We would be forced to defend ourselves on the goal-line, on our borders. And it's more than obvious that the dangers of terrorism, nuclear proliferation and cyber attack are not much impressed by international borders.

Ladies and gentlemen, the remarkable men and women who make up the staff of SIS are among the most loyal, dedicated and innovative in the entire public service.

We ask more of them than we do of any other public servants not in uniform. Exceptional people, doing extraordinary things for their country.

Our people can't and don't talk about what they do. They receive recognition for their achievements only within the confines of the service.

You don't know them, but I do. It is an honour to lead them.
###

See: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/oct/28/sir-john-sawers-speech-full-text

Another Hess Theory Involving MI6

2010-10-28T10:58:00.003-04:00

Rudolf Hess 'was lured to Britain by MI6 plot'
Rudolf Hess was lured to Britain in an elaborate MI6 sting, according to a new book that claims to solve one of the most enduring mysteries of the Second World War.

Published: 11:00PM BST 25 Oct 2010 -- UK Telegraph

The reason for Hitler's deputy making his solo flight to Scotland in May 1941 has kept conspiracy theorists busy for decades. He was arrested in Renfrewshire and spent the rest of his life in prison.

Nearly 70 years on, a fresh theory has emerged. Author John Harris claims that Hess was lured to Britain in an MI6 plot led by Tancred Borenius, a Finnish art historian who was working as an agent for the British secret service.

Borenius travelled to Geneva in January 1941 and convinced Hess that members of the Royal Family were willing to broker a peace deal with Germany, according to Harris. "Tancred was key in giving Hitler hope that Britain was interested in joining an alliance," he said.

Harris claims that Borenius's son, Lars, gave him the information shortly before he died. The theory is expounded in a book, Rudolf Hess: The British Illusion of Peace.

However, historians cast doubt on the theory. Roger Moorhouse, author of Berlin at War, said: "MI6 would have little to gain from luring Hess to Britain. Although nominally important, he was actually a peripheral figure by 1941. The most likely theory is that he came over of his own volition."

See: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/world-war-2/8086418/Rudolf-Hess-was-lured-to-Britain-by-MI6-plot.html

China's Efforts to Control US Telecom

2010-10-17T14:45:00.004-04:00

The Wall Street Journal

* OPINION ASIA * OCTOBER 17, 2010

The Huawei Security Threat
There is a genuine national security need to block a Chinese investment in U.S. telecommunications.

By MICHAEL R. WESSEL
AND LARRY M. WORTZEL

All signs point to a new round of Chinese investment attempts in America on the horizon, in industries ranging from oil to finance. The vast majority of these deals should be welcomed, but some raise genuine security worries that require careful attention from policy makers. Huawei's bid to provide telecommunications equipment to Sprint Nextel is a prime example of the latter.

A functional, reliable, resilient telecommunications network is a fundamental American national interest. Connectivity facilitates virtually all U.S. economic activity. Sound communications capabilities also serve as the basis of many other dimensions of national security, playing a key role in everything from emergency response to the transmission of sensitive information between government entities. Access to U.S. information and communications technology infrastructure could enable a motivated adversary to commit a range of malicious activities, including espionage, disinformation campaigns and disruption of service.

Any foreign investment in this sector should thus be carefully studied to ensure American regulators understand who is making the investment and why. Huawei raises many questions: While it claims that it is a fully independent and employee-owned company, it has strong connections to the Chinese military, Communist Party and government.

Retired General Ren Zhengfei, the company's founder and current president, was formerly the director of the People's Liberation Army General Staff Department's Information Engineering Academy, an entity responsible for telecommunications research for the military. The Communist Party and government remain extremely influential in China's large businesses in leadership placement and in directing funding. This is especially the case for firms in what China considers "strategic industries," which include the telecommunications sector.

That makes this deal very different from the scenario if a major publicly listed telecom from a democratic American ally were to invest in an American company. Indeed, Verizon Wireless started as a joint venture between America's Verizon and Britain's Vodafone with minimal controversy over the foreign company's role.

The U.S. government has voiced concerns over Huawei's attempts to enter the American market on previous occasions. In 2008, Huawei dropped plans to acquire 3Com after the U.S. Committee on Foreign Investment indicated that it would block the deal, and last year, the National Security Agency reportedly voiced concerns to AT&T over the firm's plans to buy Huawei equipment.

Several other nations have grappled with the same issues. Last year British intelligence officials warned of potential infrastructure threats from Huawei's communications equipment on networks operated by British Telecom, citing concerns that the equipment might allow attackers to "remotely disrupt or even permanently disable" critical communications networks. The Australian Security Intelligence Organization investigated claims by former employees that Huawei had engaged in cyber espionage against Australian interests and that the firm's activities in Australia involved technicians and executives with direct links to China's military. An Indian communications ministry placed limitations on Huawei's operations in India's telecommunications networks, also on national security grounds.

The U.S. should similarly be concerned over any deal for Huawei to supply equipment to Sprint Nextel. The Chinese military has a well-developed doctrine for computer network exploitation and attack. Other entities in China, likely with support from the government, actively engage in computer-related espionage activities. If Huawei were to provide infrastructure for U.S. telecommunications networks, actors within China could gain unparalleled access to multitudes of potentially sensitive U.S. communications information, including cellular telephone calls, email, text messages and browsing activities.

Some observers might assume that the quantity of data transmitted by U.S. networks would be sufficient to protect privacy and confidentiality—there would simply be too much for snoops to sift through—but this is not the case. Chinese telecommunications firms have perfected technologies to intercept, sort and evaluate staggering volumes of telecommunications data, as demonstrated in the "Great Firewall" censorship regime on the Internet. China has also perfected disruptive technologies, such as the outright blocking of text messages in western China for months following unrest in Xinjiang province in 2009.

Huawei has sought to counter concerns that the deal with Sprint Nextel would enable malicious network activities in America. Specifically, Huawei has proposed to submit source code for its equipment's operating systems to an independent third party to certify that the software is benign. In parallel, Huawei reportedly would allow other third-party firms to service the equipment.

These solutions are absolutely inadequate to counter the risk. Networked systems offer numerous attack vectors. Some look legitimate, such as those that are designed to offer remote diagnostics and support. Other vulnerabilities could be introduced by patches or updates once the basic software is already in place. Chain-of-custody principles introduce a whole other set of problems: It would be difficult to guarantee that a piece of software evaluated by a third party would share the exact characteristics of the software installed on the machines that ultimately operate U.S. telecommunications networks.

Even if a firm could somehow certify the harmlessness of a piece of equipment's operating system, and ensure that no new vulnerabilities were introduced after the fact, and maintain proper chain-of-custody principles, a malicious actor could still potentially gain access to systems. "Back doors" could be built into a piece of equipment's firmware or hardware components. The technology to discover these potential access points remains limited at best.

Given that the U.S. is already at great risk of cyber attacks, making our communications networks more vulnerable by using technology developed by a company with close ties to China's military would be a grave mistake. In this case, there are a number of competitive alternative suppliers of advanced telecommunications technology. Sprint Nextel should take national security concerns into consideration when selecting partners. Moreover, the U.S. government has an obligation to use every available means to ensure safe and secure telecommunications infrastructure.

"National security" has too often been a recourse for protectionists. But remaining open to foreign investment in general does not mean abandoning caution. Telecommunications is one industry that warrants a careful approach.

Mr. Wessel, president of the Wessel Group, is a commissioner of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Mr. Wortzel, a former U.S. Army colonel and intelligence officer, is also a commissioner of the Commission.

Any Differences with Today's Russian Army?

2010-10-15T17:39:00.005-04:00

From Steven Aftergood's Project on Government Secrecy

A LOOK BACK AT THE SOVIET ARMY

"The Soviet Army is the best prepared force in the world to conduct both offensive and defensive NBC [nuclear, biological and chemical] operations," according to a 1984 U.S. Army manual (large pdf) that is newly available online.

The three-part manual, based on Soviet military literature and other open sources, provides a dauntingly detailed account of almost every aspect of Soviet military structure and operations.

So, for example: "The Soviets recognize three basic types of smoke screens: blinding, camouflaging, and decoy. Each type is classified as being frontal, oblique, or flank in nature, depending on the placement of the screen."

Perhaps of equal or greater importance, the manual implicitly documents the U.S. Army's perception of the Soviet military late in the Cold War.

"In the Soviet view, the correlation of forces has been shifting in favor of the socialist camp since the Soviet defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II. Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology requires the correlation to shift continuously in favor of socialism. The correlation of forces may be advanced by both violent and nonviolent means. When it is advanced by violent means, the military component of the correlation is the dominant factor."

The first volume of the manual, originally "for official Government use only," has not previously been published online. See "The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics," Field Manual 100-2-1, July 16, 1984 (203 pages, large pdf).

The second volume is "The Soviet Army: Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support," FM 100-2-2, July 16, 1984 (100 pages, pdf).

The third volume is "The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization, and Equipment," FM 100-2-3, June 1991 (456 pages, large pdf).

In February 1957, the Army produced an extremely detailed "Glossary of Soviet Military and Related Abbreviations" (pdf), Army Technical Manual TM 30-546.

Atomic Bomb Secrets Espionage Courier

2010-10-15T17:05:00.005-04:00

The usual apologetic treatment . . .

The Wall Street Journal
BOOKSHELF -- OCTOBER 16, 2010

The Invisible Harry Gold
By Allen M. Hornblum
Yale University Press, 446 pages, $32.50

"Another Quiet American"

By Michael J. Ybarra
On May 23, 1950, the FBI arrested Harry Gold, a 49-year-old chemist who lived with his father in Philadelphia. The FBI accused him of being a Soviet espionage agent—the man who, as a courier, literally gave the Russians the secrets of the atomic bomb. Though other Soviet spies from that era—Alger Hiss, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg—remain notorious to this day, Gold has faded from the story. Allen M. Hornblum offers a welcome corrective with the biography "The Invisible Harry Gold."

Gold was the son of Russian Jewish immigrants—he was born in Switzerland in 1910 before his parents made their way to America. While studying chemical engineering at Drexel University in the mid-1930s, he was recruited as a Soviet spy. Thus began a 15-year espionage career that began with the theft of industrial secrets—Gold later said that he just wanted to make life easier for the Soviet people—and ended with his passing information from the Manhattan Project, provided by physicist Klaus Fuchs, to the Soviet Union. Gold confessed to his crimes, and his testimony would help convict the Rosenbergs.

Gold has long been a riddle. To his supporters, he was a shy, decent man whose total being seemed at odds with his secret life. To his critics— not a few of them on the left—he was a liar and a psychopath who sought fame as a government witness. Mr. Hornblum calls him "one of the most denounced, slandered, and demonized figures in twentieth-century America," which may be excessive, but Harry Gold was certainly loathed by many.

Mr. Hornblum presents us with a balanced portrait, tracing Gold's hardscrabble young life, his slow entanglement with the Soviet espionage network and the many unhappy years he spent working on Moscow's behalf. Gold was never much of an ideologue but was grateful for a job that a communist friend helped him to land. He was naïve enough to believe that the Soviet Union was actually fighting anti-Semitism, and he was easily bullied into continuing to work with the Soviets whenever he tried to return to a normal life. During World War II he could even convince himself that he was sharing secrets with America's wartime partner—and thus not undermining his own country's security.

Gold didn't confess until the FBI tracked him down, but shortly after his arrest he began cooperating fully. Sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment (a longer sentence than the government had requested), he was paroled in 1965. He went to work at a hospital, where Gold was, according to Mr. Hornblum, a beloved employee with many friends. When Gold died in 1972, he had kept such a low profile that a year would pass before newspapers noticed.

"I have never intended any harm to the United States," Gold wrote from prison. "For I have always steadfastly considered that first and finally I am an American citizen. This is my country and I love it." If Gold had not cooperated with authorities, Mr. Hornblum writes, it is unlikely that he could have been convicted: Fuchs, the physicist, had confessed, too, but he was being held by the British and would probably not have been allowed to testify. If Gold had not implicated other spies, the author notes, they might well have escaped.

"How did such a gentle, apolitical person," Mr. Hornblum asks, "get caught up in the 'crime of the century'?" This finely crafted biography gives us the most complete answer we are ever likely to have.

—Mr. Ybarra writes about art, literature and extreme sports for the Journal.

Jordan Trains Afghans

2010-10-12T19:39:00.004-04:00

Jordanian Instructors Sent to Train Afghan Forces

(AFP) – Oct 4, 2010

AMMAN — A group of Jordanian military instructors was sent to Afghanistan on Sunday to help train the country's security forces, the official Petra news agency reported.

"Instructors from Jordan's armed forces and security service went on Sunday to Afghanistan where they will train Afghan forces in security methods, to help them do their duty in restoring law and order there," it said.

The agency did not report how many instructors were sent.

In March, Jordan said it had been asked by NATO to train Afghan police, and said it was studying the request.

In May, Information Minister Nabil Sharif told a news conference: "Jordan has trained 2,500 members of the Afghan special forces. This was in the past. The group has completed its training and there are no trainees now."

A Jordanian military source told AFP that training took place in 2007, but declined to elaborate.

Jordan's special forces chief Brigadier Ali Jaradat has said in published remarks that 1,500 servicemen, including anti-terror forces, from Afghanistan and Iraq have received training at the 200-million-dollar King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Centre, which was inaugurated in May last year.

The NATO alliance, facing waning public support for the war in Afghanistan, is anxious to begin a transition next year that would have Afghan army and police take over security from US-led troops in some parts of the country.

Jordan acknowledged it had a counterterrorism role in Afghanistan after the death in a January suicide bombing of a senior intelligence officer, who was also a member of the royal family.

His death along with seven US Central Intelligence Agency personnel spotlighted for the first time Jordan's role in the international coalition in the war-hit country.

Vickers, DoD Intel Chief

2010-10-05T16:43:00.002-04:00

SpecOps Vet Vickers Tapped as DoD Intel Chief

By Andrew Tilghman - Army Times Staff writer
Posted : Monday Oct 4, 2010 5:28:02 EDT

The White House has nominated Michael Vickers, a former Special Forces soldier and Central Intelligence Agency paramilitary operations officer, to be undersecretary of defense for intelligence.

Since July 2007, Vickers has served as assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict. During his 13 years in Special Forces, he said he served on both the “black” and “white” — covert and overt — sides of special operations, Vickers told Congress.

According to his Defense Department biography, during his Special Forces and CIA years Vickers had operational and combat experience in Central America and the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Central and South Asia, spanning covert action and espionage, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism (including hostage rescue operations), counterinsurgency, and foreign internal defense.

His tenure as a CIA operative included serving as a “principal strategist” of the largest covert action in CIA history, the arming of Muslim insurgents in Afghanistan in 1980s against the Soviet-backed government in Kabul. The paramilitary operation ended with the Soviet Union withdrawing from Afghanistan.

The undersecretary for intelligence, one of the most senior positions in the Defense Department, reports directly to the secretary of defense. If his nomination is approved by the Senate, Vickers would replaces James Clapper, who was recently appointed to serve as director of national intelligence, a job created in 2004 to oversee 16 intelligence agencies.

Vickers and Defense Secretary Robert Gates have a “long professional relationship” that dates back to their time together at the CIA, said Gates’ spokesman Geoff Morrell.

Army's New Reg on Espionage, Subversion, Terror . . .

2010-10-05T14:12:00.002-04:00

ARMY SEEKS INCREASED AWARENESS OF SUBVERSION, LEAKS
Steven Aftergood | The Project on Government Secrecy
October 5, 2010

A U.S. Army regulation (pdf) issued yesterday requires Army personnel to report any incident on a newly expanded list of possible indications of "espionage, international terrorism, sabotage, subversion" as well as "leaks to the media."

"The Army is a prime target for foreign intelligence and international terrorist elements... from within and OCONUS [outside the continental United States]," the regulation states. "The Army also faces threats from persons on the inside... who may compromise the ability of the organization to accomplish its mission through espionage, acts of terrorism, support to international terrorist organizations, or unauthorized release or disclosure of classified or sensitive information."

The regulation presents an extensive description of suspicious behaviors that are reportable to authorities, including "attempts to expand access to classified information by repeatedly volunteering for assignments or duties beyond the normal scope of responsibilities."

It also provides guidance on how to respond to the discovery of a clandestine surveillance device ("do not disturb the device") or an approach by a foreign intelligence officer ("remain noncommittal, neither refusing nor agreeing to cooperate"; also, "do not, under any circumstances, conduct your own investigation").

The regulation includes tables listing behavior that may be exhibited by a person engaged in espionage, indicators of insider threats of terrorism, and signs of extremist activity that may pose a threat to U.S. military facilities or operations. See "Threat Awareness and Reporting Program," U.S. Army Regulation 381-12, October 4, 2010. (The prior edition of this regulation, formerly titled "Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the U.S. Army (SAEDA)," dated January 15, 1993.

See: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ar381-12.pdf

First World War Officially Ends

2010-10-03T08:10:00.003-04:00

First World War Officially Ends

The First World War will officially end on Sunday, 92 years after the guns fell silent, when Germany pays off the last chunk of reparations imposed on it by the Allies.

By Allan Hall, Berlin
Published: 1:37PM BST 28 Sep 2010
London Telegraph

The final payment of £59.5 million, writes off the crippling debt that was the price for one world war and laid the foundations for another.

Germany was forced to pay the reparations at the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 as compensation to the war-ravaged nations of Belgium and France and to pay the Allies some of the costs of waging what was then the bloodiest conflict in history, leaving nearly ten million soldiers dead.

The initial sum agreed upon for war damages in 1919 was 226 billion Reichsmarks, a sum later reduced to 132 billion, £22 billion at the time.

The bill would have been settled much earlier had Adolf Hitler not reneged on reparations during his reign.

Hatred of the settlement agreed at Versailles, which crippled Germany as it tried to shape itself into a democracy following armistice, was of significant importance in propelling the Nazis to power.

"On Sunday the last bill is due and the First World War finally, financially at least, terminates for Germany," said Bild, the country's biggest selling newspaper.

Most of the money goes to private individuals, pension funds and corporations holding debenture bonds as agreed under the Treaty of Versailles, where Germany was made to sign the 'war guilt' clause, accepting blame for the war.

France, which had been ravaged by the war, pushed hardest for the steepest possible fiscal punishment for Germany.

The principal representative of the British Treasury at the Paris Peace Conference, John Maynard Keynes, resigned in June 1919 in protest at the scale of the demands.

"Germany will not be able to formulate correct policy if it cannot finance itself,' he warned.

When the Wall Street Crash came in 1929, the Weimar Republic spiraled into debt. Four years later, Hitler was elected Chancellor of Germany.

See: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/8029948/First-World-War-officially-ends.html

The Legacy of the OSS

2010-10-01T23:02:00.003-04:00

Group Preserves Legacy of OSS, Predecessor to CIA

By Gregg MacDonald
Fairfax County Times
Thursday, September 30, 2010; VA16

Art Reinhardt of Great Falls was in China on Aug. 6, 1945 -- the day the United States dropped the "Little Boy" atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan.

Although only 20 at the time, he already was keenly aware that his short service with World War II's Office of Strategic Services soon would be coming to an end.

The OSS -- the predecessor to the CIA and U.S. Special Operations Forces -- was formed in June 1942 by order of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

The agency's mission was to collect and analyze strategic intelligence requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to conduct "special" operations outside the scope of other agencies.

"The OSS was the first centralized foreign intelligence agency in U.S. history and was organized along the lines of some of the chief responsibilities of CIA today: analysis, collection, counterintelligence and covert action," CIA spokeswoman Donna Weiss said.

Reinhardt, 85, was recruited by the OSS in May 1944, shortly after joining the U.S. Army Air Corps at 17.

After being recruited, Reinhardt received advanced OSS training as a radio operator and cryptographer at "Area C" in Prince William County -- a one-square-mile tract of heavily wooded land about five miles west of Quantico where the OSS trained its agents from 1942 to 1945. Today the training area is preserved as part of Prince William Forest National Park and is open to the public.

"From 1942 to 1945, the communications branch of the OSS used the area as a training facility for about 1,500 communications personnel learning international Morse code, ciphering, weapons, demolition, self-defense and physical training," Reinhardt said.

After three months of training, Reinhardt was deployed to China to provide intelligence targets for Air Force bombers attempting to disrupt the Japanese occupying forces that had taken control of key Chinese railways and seaports.

While in China, Reinhardt lived the life of a secret agent. He spent much of his time in remote forested areas, living off the land and being sure not to draw much attention from locals.

"As American agents in China, we had a bounty on our heads," he recalled. "It was rumored that Japanese soldiers were offered the equivalent of $50,000 to capture one of us."

Reinhardt decoded incoming communications and encoded outgoing messages, transmitting them from his portable SSTR-1 "suitcase" radio.

"One of my daily duties from the field was to give hourly weather reports for the B-29 bombers," Reinhardt said. He soon discovered he was on his own in terms of scrounging up food and supplies.

"I ate a lot of rice," he said.

Once, after discovering he had no antennae wire, he improvised by scavenging materials from a discarded B-24 bomber and made his own.

"I was a free spirit," he recalled. "I had no uniform, and often no orders. It was very easy to forget that I was in the military."

Reinhardt left China not long after the Hiroshima bombing. The OSS was disbanded the following month -- September 1945.

In 1947, Reinhardt joined the ranks of the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency.

"When the CIA was created in 1947, it built on the solid foundation of the OSS, and many of our officers drew on their OSS experience to build the new agency and meet the new postwar challenges," Weiss said. "The agency inherited its very DNA from the OSS, an organization of courageous men and women who made decisive contributions during and after the war."

Reinhardt retired in 1976. Today, he is treasurer of the McLean-based OSS Society, which lists President H.W. Bush, Ross Perot and James R. Schlesinger as honorary chairmen. The nonprofit organization will honor Perot at its annual award dinner Saturday.

"At its peak, there were nearly 13,000 active OSS agents and operatives," said OSS Society President Charles Pinck, 46. "Today, there are about 200 [to] 300 left."

Pinck, the son of legendary OSS agent Dan Pinck, said the original organization, founded in 1947 as Veterans of the OSS, changed its name in 1998 to the OSS Society.

The elder Pinck also served behind enemy lines in China and wrote a memoir, "Journey to Peking: A Secret Agent in Wartime China," about his time in the OSS.

"It's sad, but we basically had to prepare for a time when the organization would have to continue on with no actual OSS veterans left," Charles Pinck said. The group today includes CIA and Special Operations Forces members.

Reinhardt recently donated his rare suitcase radio to the society.

"I am proud to have served in the OSS communications branch," he said. "Communications underpinned everything OSS ever did, and I dedicate my field radio to all the men and women who served in the communications branch during WWII."

For information about the U.S. Office of Strategic Services, including documents and books relate to its history, visit http://www.ossreborn.com.

Sarkozy's Watergate?

2010-09-25T12:28:00.003-04:00

Sarkozy Accused of Using Watergate-style Tricks to Muzzle the French Press
By John Lichfield in Paris

'Le Monde' launches legal action against President, claiming he used security services to find insider who leaked information to paper

In a scandal having many parallels with the Watergate affair, President Nicolas Sarkozy was accused by France's most prestigious newspaper yesterday of illegally using the counter-intelligence service to muzzle the press.

Le Monde said that the President's office had deployed France's equivalent of MI5 like a "cabinet noir", or dirty-tricks operation, to uncover the source of leaks in the L'Oréal family feud and political financing scandal. The newspaper said that it had started a legal action against "persons unknown" at the Elysée Palace for breaking a century-old French law which guarantees the secrecy of journalistic sources.

Le Monde said that the French security service, the DCRI, had tracked down a senior figure in the Justice Minister's office as the source of embarrassing leaks to the newspaper in July on the so-called "Bettencourt-Woerth" affair. The official, a long-term aide of the Justice Minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie, had been forced out of his post and sent on a minor legal mission to French Guyana.

The Elysée Palace flatly denied the accusation. It said "the presidency of the Republic has never given the slightest instruction to any (state) service" to investigate leaks in the L'Oréal affair. Other newspapers had already reported, however, that the official, David Sénat, had been punished for leaking witness interviews in the Bettencourt scandal to the press.

Mr Sarkozy's government was also accused yesterday of acting illegally in another great French political soap opera of the summer: the clampdown on Roma immigrants from Eastern Europe. From President Sarkozy's viewpoint, the "Mondegate" saga may prove to be the more damaging of the two.

In a front-page editorial yesterday, Le Monde said that the Elysée had tried to cover its embarrassment in the Bettencourt affair - and to intimidate the press - by misusing the counter-intelligence services whose mission was to "protect the state". Le Monde also said that the Elysée had broken a law protecting press sources which had been strengthened by Mr Sarkozy's government less than a year ago.

The alleged witch-hunt for sources of embarrassing leaks in the Bettencourt affair implies that Mr Sarkozy has been far more rattled by the scandal than he likes to admit. The saga began with a family feud over the alleged abuse of France's wealthiest woman, Liliane Bettencourt, 87, who gave €1bn in cash and art works to a playboy photographer who befriended her.

Secret tapes of her conversations with advisers and the photographer, François-Marie Banier, were handed to the police and leaked to the press in July. The tapes also implied that Ms Bettencourt, the largest shareholder in the cosmetics giant L'Oréal, had been sheltered from possible charges of tax evasion by her links with the Sarkozy government.

It appeared from the tapes that Mr Sarkozy's campaign treasurer in 2007, Eric Woerth - now Employment Minister - had sought campaign donations from Ms Bettencourt. Mr Woerth had also sought a job for his wife.

A former accountant for Ms Bettencourt then told the press, and police, that the billionairess had given illicitly large donations to Mr Woerth for the Sarkozy campaign.

Both President Sarkozy and Mr Woerth rejected the allegations. A preliminary investigation was begun by the public prosecutor for the suburbs west of Paris.

Ms Bettencourt's financial manager, Patrice de Maistre, was interviewed by investigators and contradicted parts of Mr Woerth's story. Details of his confidential testimony appeared on the front page of Le Monde the following day, 15 July.

The leaks so infuriated Mr Sarkozy, Le Monde said yesterday, that the Elysée ordered an investigation by the Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur. This is a new umbrella internal security organisation created by Mr Sarkozy two years ago because, he claimed, its predecessors had become too "politicised".

Sources in the DCRI told Le Monde that they checked the telephone records of all potential leakers inside government until they found the trace of a call from the reporter who wrote the story. The DCRI sources insisted that they had acted as part of their "mission to protect the state".

Opposition politicians said that this was a clear abuse of power. Aurélie Filippetti of the Parti Socialiste said that the misuse of security agencies and the muddling of state interests and personal interests were the hallmarks of the Watergate affair which brought down President Richard Nixon in the 1970s. Ms Filippetti said: "This is a new scandal worthy of Watergate, which we could perhaps call 'Woerthgate'."

Watergate, she might have recalled, was also a battle of wills between a right-wing President and a "liberal" newspaper.

French FBI: Agency at heart of accusations was created by Sarkozy

It is scarcely new for French governments to misuse the security services for political purposes. The accusation is, however, especially damaging for President Sarkozy.

Two years ago, he transformed the landscape of counter-intelligence and internal security in France by ordering a shotgun marriage between two competing agencies.

His official argument was that efficiency demanded a single organisation which would become a "French FBI". His real reason, it was said, was he suspected one or both of the old agencies had been used by his enemy and former mentor, President Jacques Chirac, pictured, to try to wreck his rise to power.

Mr Sarkozy suspected they had played a part in dirty tricks such as leaks about his failing second marriage in 2005 and the Clearstream scandal, an attempt to smear Mr Sarkozy as financially corrupt in 2004. Creating a new agency would, it was suggested, separate counter-intelligence from internal politics.

There were other arguments for reform. The old agencies had long fought each other as fiercely as they fought any of France's presumed enemies.

The Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire was in charge of counter-espionage. The Direction Central des Renseignement Généraux was a more shapeless agency in charge of everything from spying on French "subversives" to running private opinion polls and the control of horse racing.

From 1 July, 2008, the two agencies were merged into the Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur (DCRI) in a new building just north of Paris. The first director of the new agency is Bernard Squarcini, known as a Sarkozy loyalist.

The DCRI's mission is to fight against espionage, subversion, terrorism and "any act which seeks to weaken the authority of the state, national defence or the economic well-being of the nation."

Which one of those categories covers leaking embarrassing information to the press is unclear.

.

Norway's "Greatest Spy Case" Under Review

2010-09-24T14:17:00.003-04:00

24 September 2010 - 19H42

Norway's 'Greatest Spy Case' to be Re-examined

AFP - The case of former Norwegian diplomat Arne Treholt, who was sentenced during the Cold War in "Norway's greatest spy case" will be re-opened, a Norwegian judiciary authority said Friday.

The Norwegian Criminal Cases Review Commission decided to re-open Treholt's case after the publication of book called "Forfalskningen" (Counterfeit) in which two journalists charged Norwegian police fabricated evidence against Treholt.

The book's publication at the beginning of September was followed by testimonies in the press casting further doubts on the reliability of parts of the case against the diplomat.

Treholt, then a top official at the Norwegian foreign ministry's press department, was arrested at the Oslo airport in 1984 as he was boarding a plane to Vienna where he was going to meet a Soviet agent.

He was sentenced in 1985 to 20 years in jail for high treason and spying for the USSR and Iraqi intelligence. He was pardoned in 1992.

"It is an important first step in the right direction", said Treholt, 67, at press conference in Oslo following the decision.

Treholt has admitted to have supplied foreign powers with documents, which he said were without importance, in exchange for money, but has always maintained he was not a spy.

When Treholt got out of prison, he went on to live in Russia and Cyprus.

The Treholt affair is widely considered the "greatest spy case" of Norway's contemporary history.

Chief prosecutor Tor-Aksel Busch asked the commission earlier this week to re-examine the case.

It will determine if the new elements published in the book and in the press warrant holding a re-trial.

"If there is any substance to the new allegations, it implies that doubt can be casted on at least part of the basis for Arne Treholt's conviction," commission president Helen Saeter told reporters.

"These are extremely serious accusations that have to be examined and clarified as much for the sake of the accused as for the rule of law in Norway," she added.

NYPD Antiterror Unit

2010-09-19T13:27:00.003-04:00

The Terror Translators
By ALAN FEUER
Published: September 17, 2010

INSPIRE magazine, an English-language journal published by Al Qaeda, included in its summer edition what amounted to a “Friends and Foes” list. There, on Page 4, following the letter from the editor (“We survive through jihad and perish without it”), were pictures of, and quotations from, kindred spirits like Faisal Shahzad, who pleaded guilty in a plot to detonate a car bomb in Times Square, and, perhaps surprisingly, David Letterman, who was praised for recent criticism of former President George W. Bush.

Among the magazine’s “foes” were Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates; Nicolas Sarkozy, the president of France; and King Abdullah II of Jordan. Then there was Mitchell D. Silber, a studious and mild-mannered former financier who grew up in Atlantic Beach, N.Y.

Mr. Silber (“I guess I was flattered in a strange way”) may seem an unlikely choice to occupy that space with a terrorist, a television star, a cabinet secretary, a European head of state and an Arab potentate. He is not, after all, a boldface name. Rather, he is a 40-year-old father with a master’s degree in international affairs from Columbia University who says his main hobby is reading deeply on the Middle East.

What landed Mr. Silber on that list was his leadership of a little-known counterterrorism team deep within the crime-fighting structure of the New York Police Department.

Formally known as the Analytic Unit of the department’s Intelligence Division, the team was created in 2002 as part of the city’s response to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. It stands as a unique experiment in breaking traditional law-enforcement boundaries, comprising two dozen civilian experts — lawyers, academics, corporate consultants, investment bankers, alumni of the World Bank and the Council on Foreign Relations and even a former employee of the Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan.

The team serves as the Police Department’s terrorism reference arm: available on demand to explain Islamic law or Pakistani politics to detectives in the field.

“We have found that conducting terrorism investigations is more art than science and requires a breadth of complementary skill sets,” Mr. Silber said during one of several interviews this summer. “Our detectives tend to have a very narrow focus. But the analysts have 360-degree visibility. They focus on the bigger picture, and they sometimes see things detectives don’t see.”

To bolster counterterrorism operations after 9/11, the Police Department expanded its Intelligence Division — run by David Cohen, a 30-year veteran of the C.I.A. — with detectives who had mainly spent their careers chasing street gangs, drug lords and violent Mafiosi. Such trained investigators brought with them specific skills the department thought would translate into the fight against terror: the ability to read a suspect’s manner and the talent for managing secret informants.

What they needed, in turn, were people to help them translate their skills to new terrain, people with a firm cultural grasp of the suspects they were meant to be pursuing. Over the years, a gang detective in the Bronx will probably have developed a radar able to determine at a glance the meaning of a hand gesture or a prison tattoo. But, as one former intelligence detective said of potential Islamic extremists, “when we first started, we didn’t even know they prayed on Fridays.”

Enter the Analytic Unit, which Samuel J. Rascoff, who ran it from 2006 to 2008 and is now a law professor at New York University, described as an attempt to bring “the culturally exotic world of the ivory tower to bear on the gritty problems of counterterrorism as experienced by beat cops and seasoned detectives.”

Consider the time a detective was investigating an Afghan immigrant suspected of involvement in terror activities. The detective found it helpful when an analyst informed him that the United States military had attacked the man’s hometown three months earlier with a drone strike. Sometimes, analysts walk detectives through Google Earth images of Pakistani villages — the mosque is here, the bazaar is there — so the detectives sound more informed and enhance their credibility when dealing with potential covert sources.

“Say a detective is doing surveillance on a cabdriver and he pulls over and goes into a mosque,” Mr. Silber said. “Is this a secret meeting or is it Ramadan and the driver is simply going to pray? The detective is just unlikely to be familiar with that kind of thing, but the analyst can put it in context.”

Mr. Silber’s analysts earn $55,000 to $95,000 a year working daily shifts at their offices in Manhattan and at the Brooklyn Army Terminal, but are available to put things into context around the clock, at the ring of a cellphone. Their assistance can be as complicated as explaining the interlocking network of Afghan tribes or the nuances of the Koran, or as simple as keeping current with New York’s foreign-language newspapers.

As one detective from the Intelligence Division’s Priority Targeting Unit, which focuses on the highest-profile cases, said: “I’m not reading that stuff. I’m reading Sports Illustrated.”

LESS than an hour after a Nissan Pathfinder was found spewing smoke and rigged with a car bomb on West 45th Street on May 1, several members of the Analytic Unit had gathered at their secret office on the West Side of Manhattan trying to assess what, by all accounts, was the most severe terror threat to face the city in years.

For the next 24 hours, as detectives in the field scoured the car for clues, pulled apart the bomb and began tracking down witnesses, their civilian counterparts helped them, by brainstorming leads to be pursued. In which stores, they asked themselves, could the fireworks and propane tanks that had made up the bomb be obtained? And what did that Arab-language sticker on its timing device — a cheap alarm clock — say?

The unit’s linguists monitored jihadist Web sites for useful hints or boastful chatter. Others searched the Internet — sometimes using methods as basic as typing “Times Square car bomb” into Google, but filtering the results through eyes trained to see obscure tidbits. Eventually, they came across a YouTube video posted by the Pakistani Taliban, claiming responsibility for the plot.

Cyber specialists were able to determine that the YouTube account had been set up less than 24 hours before the attack occurred. The video was analyzed by the unit’s Pakistan expert, who knew, for instance, that a leader of the group, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, or T.T.P., had posted videos during the previous month, announcing that commandoes had “penetrated” the United States and were poised to strike.

By 9 p.m. on May 2, a Sunday, the Analytic Unit had prepared an eight-page report for Mr. Cohen, the Police Department’s deputy commissioner for intelligence, suggesting that an “evolving, highly dynamic” terrorist group, T.T.P., was probably behind the failed attack. Officials in Washington announced the same conclusion days later. (Mr. Shahzad eventually acknowledged that the group had trained him for the operation.)

No other municipal police force in the country has a team similar in scope and sophistication to the Analytic Unit. Its specialists speak Urdu, Farsi, Russian, Arabic and Hebrew, and “cover” subjects including South Asia, Somalia, Yemen, Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, Iran and homegrown terrorist groups.

The unit began with five analysts working for a police captain. When Mr. Rascoff, its first civilian leader, was tapped four years ago to enhance the team — quadrupling its size to 20 — he described his mission as finding people who “combined very solid analytic and cultural skills with the ability to make it in a world of cops where the coin of the realm is not whether your degree came from Harvard or Columbia.”

As an Ivy Leaguer himself who once clerked for a Supreme Court justice, Mr. Rascoff understood it would be difficult having “pointy-headed youngsters” interacting with veteran cops and wanted analysts with what he called “a low jerk quotient.”

Mr. Silber, who was hired to run the team in 2008 and has further expanded it to 24 analysts, spent nine years in the financial world with the Carson Group and Evolution Capital, but left because, as he put it, 9/11 made him want “to get into the fight.” At Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs, he specialized in Saudi Arabia’s laws regulating the flow of terrorist money. “I went from corporate finance to terrorist finance,” he said.

The analysts he has brought in are mostly in their 20s and 30s and have worked at the United Nations, the State Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the New America Foundation, a research group in Washington.

“We come into this with a couple of years’ experience in a region, or with a law degree or master’s degree,” said one analyst, Jennifer, who, like most, spoke on the condition that her last name not be used, for security reasons. “We’re not like the street cops. But it’s the blending of those worlds that’s the best part of the job.”

Mr. Rascoff said this “blending” was his goal. Analysts sometimes accompany detectives into the field, where they offer what Sgt. Steven Hines called “another set of eyes.” Those eyes are often attuned to what police eyes may not see: a poster in Pashto for a local demonstration against drone strikes; or a collection box on a deli counter seeking spare change for a charity suspected of having terrorist ties.

Mr. Rascoff said the working relationship between the civilian and sworn counterterrorism officials in New York was better than the parallel relationships in the Federal Bureau of Investigation because federal agents, unlike the local detectives, were often as highly educated as the analysts they work with.

“F.B.I. agents sometimes look at their analysts and say, ‘So, basically, we do the same job, but I carry a gun and kick down doors while you sit at your desk all day,’ ” said Mr. Rascoff, who has been working in intelligence since 2003, when he was a consultant to L. Paul Bremer, the special envoy to Iraq.

In the C.I.A., Mr. Rascoff added, the relationship between operatives and analysts is often the chilly one between “an author of cables and a reader of cables.”

In the Police Department, he said, there is an “educational, experiential but not intellectual” gulf that can, paradoxically, bring the sides together.

“While it’s sometimes hard to harness those conflicting energies,” Mr. Rascoff said, “when it succeeds, it succeeds wildly.”

The police officers agree, noting that academics versed in the culture of the region are able to seize upon investigative subtleties that they themselves might miss.

“An analyst once pointed out an individual on the street I thought was Afghan, but was actually Pakistani,” said the detective from the Priority Targeting Unit. “She knew because of the henna in his beard, the lack of a mustache and the pants length.

“They’re from a different world,” he added. “They’re educated; I’m not. My education is locking up bad guys.”

Another detective, sounding a bit like a Woody Allen character, put it this way: “Whenever I have problems, I call my analyst.”

THE history of domestic intelligence in the United States has, to say the least, a checkered record. From Cointelpro, a series of F.B.I. counterintelligence programs, to the New York Police Department’s own spying at the Republican National Convention in 2004, there are enough instances of the authorities’ inappropriately surveilling their own citizens to make even the firmest law-and-order advocate wince.

Christopher Dunn, a lawyer for the New York Civil Liberties Union who has criticized the Police Department’s surveillance of political groups, expressed some concern about the arrangement.

“This is yet another step toward the N.Y.P.D. being able to operate entirely outside of the larger law-enforcement community,” he said. “This type of lone-wolf approach, which we saw during the convention, is a recipe for abuse, or worse.”

But if civilian analysts help bring intellectual rigor to terrorism investigations, if the police “are more sophisticated and less stereotypical in their work,” Mr. Dunn added, “that’s all to the good.”

Investigations undertaken by the Analytic Unit, like those of the Intelligence Division over all, are governed by legal controls put in place in 1985 as a result of a 1971 class-action lawsuit, Handschu v. Special Services Division, that concerned harassment of political groups by the department’s so-called Red Squad.

Mr. Silber argued that, by nature, a team of academics trained in Islamic law and mores mitigated abuse. “The unit helps detectives dealing with sources and suspects to be more sophisticated,” he said, “and to develop a nuanced understanding of doctrines, ideology and historical and cultural references.”

NEW YORK seems an ideal place to practice this theory of intellectual investigation, and the unit has managed over the years to attract people who have worked in the Washington bureaucracy and seem to prefer the city.

“We had people leaving jobs with the C.I.A. and military intelligence to come work for us,” Mr. Rascoff said. “Why were they doing that? Part of it was the noir quality of being within the confines of an institution like the N.Y.P.D. There is an emotional, even an aesthetic, immediacy in being in New York rather than sitting in a cubicle in some fluorescent-lit office in Langley.”

To Mr. Silber, the attraction is the opportunity to work at street level on terrorism cases.

This year, analysts used their knowledge of cultural and political trends in Somalia to help prepare an undercover officer in his dealings with two New Jersey men, Mohamed Mahmood Alessa and Carlos Eduardo Almonte, arrested in June just before they traveled to Somalia to join Al Shabab, a group that claims kinship with Al Qaeda. Last year, an analyst provided unique advice to detectives investigating Najibullah Zazi, an Afghan immigrant who has pleaded guilty in a plot to detonate a bomb on the subway. The analyst, who served in Afghanistan with the elite Army Rangers, drew upon his knowledge of local tribes in Waziristan to create a flow chart of the numerous suspects in the Zazi case, highlighting those that shared hometowns and family affiliations.

The Zazi case, Mr. Silber said, was the largest surveillance effort the Police Department ever mounted in a terrorism investigation, and the unit’s analysts worked around the clock at covert locations, debriefing detectives as they came in off the street, then analyzing and sharing the information with the next shift before it went into the field.

“We’re very much in the weeds of investigations,” Mr. Silber said. “We’re looking at the threat to New York, in New York, so there’s a feeling of grittiness in a sense.”

He said that working in Washington, where the focus is often on events and people thousands of miles away, can feel “a little antiseptic.”

“Here we’re all in the same domain — the suspects and the analysts,” he said. “You might hear that yesterday, at 3 o’clock, people gathered at this street corner or in this cafe. We’re all in the same fishbowl together. It makes for an odd, exciting dynamic.”

Further Reporting on the Censorship Idiocy

2010-09-19T13:17:00.004-04:00

U.S. Secrets in Plain Sight in Censored Book’s Reprint
By SCOTT SHANE
Published: September 17, 2010
The Pentagon blacked out hundreds of supposed secrets in a new, censored edition of an Afghan war memoir.
MORE . . .

Desperately Trying to Silence Tony Shaffer (unsuccessfully)

2010-09-18T10:17:00.005-04:00

Operation Silence Shaffer | Harper's Magazine
September 14, 2010

By Scott Horton

A fascinating new chapter in the story of the intelligence community’s obsessive secrecy is the Pentagon’s duel with St Martin’s Press over Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer’s book, Operation Dark Heart. Chris McGreal gives a run-down in The Guardian:

The US defence department is scrambling to dispose of what threatens to be a highly embarrassing exposé by the former intelligence officer of secret operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and of how the US military top brass missed the opportunity to win the war against the Taliban. The department of defence is in talks with St Martin’s Press to purchase the entire first print run on the grounds of national security. The publisher is content to sell the books but the two sides are in a grinding dispute over what should appear in a censored version and when it should be released.

Now St Martin’s Press says it will put the partly redacted manuscript on sale next week whether or not the defence department likes it—and there doesn’t appear much the authorities can do. The army had cleared the book by Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer, about “black ops” in the Afghan war when he was based at Bagram in 2003, for publication after relatively minor changes. But when the intelligence services and defence department officials saw it they were alarmed.

This account leaves a key player in the shadows. JSOC, the Joint Special Operations Command, has become a power unto itself within the Pentagon. In essence, Shaffer’s book went through the regular review and clearance process, was approved for publication, and then JSOC had a temper tantrum. The thrust of their objection was simple: “Our people don’t talk about JSOC operations, period.” In their view, special forces officers are subject to a code of silence. This view would seem to clash with the U.S. Constitution, and the notion of a duty to be silent also seems odd in a Pentagon headed by Robert Gates, who built his Washington comeback on a tell-all bestseller, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story.

According to an individual involved in negotiations between St Martin’s and the Pentagon, the publishers plan to have the book in bookstores around the country within a fortnight. St Martin’s is proposing to black out all passages about which the Pentagon raised questions—a process that of course reveals the Pentagon’s concerns to the reader. The Pentagon has replied that it would then insist on striking whole paragraphs, even where most of the text raises no questions of sensitivity. The publisher and author believe that many of the questions raised at this late stage have no bona fide basis, and they will insist on review of claims and subsequent disclosure if their challenge is sustained. This mirrors the process following Matthew Alexander’s book How to Break a Terrorist, where extensive censorship efforts by the Pentagon also failed when put to the test before a classifications review board.

Throughout the war on terror, JSOC has succeeded in keeping the wraps on its black ops in a way the CIA has not. That’s a key reason why Colonel Shaffer’s book is so eagerly anticipated. Nothing sells a book like an effort to suppress it. The Pentagon’s belated and ham-handed efforts to silence Colonel Shaffer’s book may be a blessing in disguise for St Martin’s Press.

Russia's Security State IS the New Nobility

2010-09-18T09:45:00.002-04:00

From Steven Aftergood's "Project on Government Secrecy" . . .

THE NEW NOBILITY: RUSSIA'S SECURITY STATE

"The Soviet police state tried to control every citizen in the country. The new, more sophisticated Russian [security] system is far more selective than its Soviet-era counterpart; it targets only those individuals who have political ambitions or strong public views." That's what Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan discover in "The New Nobility," their impressive new book on the resurgence of Russia's security services in the post-Cold War era.

Soldatov and Borogan, Russian journalists who have produced some of the boldest reporting on the subject over the past decade, are also the creators and editors of Agentura.ru, a pioneering web site devoted to public interest research on Russian intelligence policy and related matters.

In "The New Nobility," they present many of the decisive episodes in the recent history of the FSB, the primary Russian security service, from the 2002 Moscow theater siege, to the 2004 Beslan school massacre, the war in Chechnya, and more. Overall they present a picture of a security service of increasing power and influence, uneven competence -- but virtually no accountability to parliament or the public.

"The Soviet KGB was all-powerful," Soldatov and Borogan write, "but it was also under the control of the political structure: The Communist Party presided over every KGB section, department, and division. In contrast, the FSB is a remarkably independent entity, free of party control and parliamentary oversight...."

The book is based on the authors' original reporting, which itself is a demonstration of unusual courage and commitment. A reader soon loses track of the number of times their computers are seized by authorities, how often their papers' web servers are confiscated, and how many times they are summoned for interrogation or even charged with crimes based on their reporting. Yet they persist.

Their book is full of remarkable observations. For example:

* In 2006, the FSB organized a competition "for the best literary and artistic works about state security operatives."

* The history of Moscow's Lefortovo prison has never been documented. "Even the prison's design [in the shape of the letter K] remains a mystery."

* The Russian security services in Chechnya have made extensive use of the tactic known as "counter-capture," which involves seizing the relatives of suspected terrorists in order to induce them to surrender.

Fundamentally, the authors contend, Russia's FSB has gone astray by acting as an agent of state authority instead of representing the rule of law. "In today's Russia,... the security services appear to have concluded that their interests, and those of the state they are guarding, remain above the law." An American reader may ponder the similarities and differences presented by U.S. security services.

"The New Nobility: The Restoration of Russia's Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB" by Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan is being published this month by Public Affairs Books.

"To those following the increasingly hostile environment for journalists in Russia, Soldatov's career is a curiosity," according to an internal profile of him prepared by the DNI Open Source Center in 2008. "Despite being questioned and charged by the FSB on several occasions, Soldatov has continued to cover hot-button issues such as corruption, security service defectors, and the increasing role of the special services in limiting free speech in Russia."

The New York Times featured Agentura.ru in "A Web Site That Came in From the Cold to Unveil Russian Secrets" by Sally McGrane, December 14, 2000.

The New York Times has also published Above the Law, a continuing series of stories by Clifford J. Levy on "corruption and abuse of power in Russia two decades after the end of Communism."

Reassuring that Some Things Never Change

2010-09-15T14:49:00.002-04:00

Analysis: Spycraft, Contacts Still Key in Espionage World

By Peter Apps, Political Risk Correspondent

LONDON | Wed Sep 15, 2010 7:36am EDT

(Reuters) - Smartphones and e-mail might be revolutionizing espionage, but old-style personal spycraft is as important as ever when it comes to protecting -- or breaking -- state and corporate secrets.

The rise of "state capitalist" economies that may use government intelligence agencies to win commercial advantage for official-linked companies could pose a growing threat to their Western corporate rivals, experts say.

China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and India either have or are all pushing for security agency access to encrypted BlackBerry smart phones, which they say they need to monitor dangerous militants.

But while the skills of electronic snooping are important, where information ends up can come down just as much to private deals put together in anonymous offices by spy chiefs, companies and powerful individuals.

"In somewhere like the UAE, if I was the CIA or MI6 station chief I might go to the head of local intelligence and ask for help in following or monitoring someone," said Fred Burton, a former U.S. counterterrorism agent now vice president for U.S. political risk consultancy Stratfor.

"If the Chinese station chief comes to him and makes a similar request, you want to be in a position where he is going to tip you off about it. A lot comes down to these personal relationships. Whoever has the best liaison relationship obtains the information."

What technology has revolutionized, of course, is how much can be stolen. Electronic hacking can lift truckloads of documents with barely a trace. But older tradecraft continues.

In some countries, hotel rooms are bugged and some local staff -- particularly cleaners and drivers -- may be being paid extra to keep an eye on their employers.

Local intelligence agencies -- from small sub-Saharan African countries to global powers -- may also have particularly close relationships with other powers. Many are legacies of the big power's Cold War practice of cultivating local proxies.

SHADOWY RELATIONSHIPS

How much support Western corporates received from their national intelligence services is similarly opaque -- but once again, personal contacts look likely to be key. Some firms have a reputation for being particularly well-connected.

Officials from Britain's MI6 spy agency and Foreign Office, for example, have previously gone on to work for U.K. firms such as energy giant BP after leaving public service.

The MI6 website publicly acknowledges that the service acts in the interests of the economic well-being of the U.K., as well as on national security, defense and crime.

In more opaque emerging economies, it is generally accepted that intelligence and security officials may sell information or security access to the private sector for personal gain.

In Western economies, that is much less widespread -- but Burton says it is far from unheard of.

"People using intelligence resources for their own private ends?" he said. "I'd love to say it doesn't happen. Doing someone a favor, maybe getting yourself a nice position on a board when you go into the private sector? It happens. Even in the United States."

Analysts say help provided by Western intelligence officers to personal contacts in companies more often will involve giving additional protective advice or tipoffs to firms that might be targeted by criminals or foreign intelligence agencies, rather than using government spy assets to snoop on rivals.

Alastair Newton, who worked for Britain's foreign office on both cyberwarfare and trade and is now senior political analyst for Japanese bank Nomura, says maintaining a good relationship with your embassy and government has its advantages.

"If you're on a trip to Ruritania organized by UK Trade and Industry (department) and you get a briefing from the High Commissioner on business opportunities, you won't ask exactly where he got his information from," he says -- deliberately choosing an imaginary country.

"You just assume he knows what he's talking about."

Austro-Hungarian Empire Framework for Today

2010-08-26T12:05:00.002-04:00

WORLD FOCUS: Second oldest profession
FRANK SHATZ
POSTED: August 26, 2010

While I was doing research for my recent column in the Lake Placid News and The Virginia Gazette about the Russian spy ring, whose members lived in “deep cover” across the United States, and were instructed to “embed themselves, in American society, and infiltrate U. S. policy making circles,” the name of Col. Alfred Redl repeatedly came up.

Redl was once one of the most powerful and ruthless counter-intelligence chiefs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. At the same time, he was himself Czarist Russia’s leading spy. Before World War I, he sold to the Russians, Plan III, the entire Austrian invasion plan for Serbia, its mobilization plans and the description of Austria’s fortifications. He also sold out to the Russians many Austrian agents, some of them within the Russian Imperial Staff.

He conducted his spy activities on behalf of Russia from 1903 to 1913. Even after having been rotated out from the post of counter-intelligence chief, and made Chief of Staff of the Austro-Hungarian Imperial Army stationed in the Czech lands, he continued to deliver secret messages to his paymasters in Russia.

On May 25, 1913, Col. Redl, was found shot to death in a Vienna hotel room, an apparent suicide. An elaborate effort was made by the government of Emperor Franz-Joseph to cover up the reason for the suicide. The cover-up may have succeeded, if not for the perseverance of a young reporter.

I learned about the details while interviewing Egon Ervin Kisch, by than a famous globe-trotting journalist whose reports have been published in newspapers across Europe.

Kisch recalled that while working as a young reporter for the Prager Loyd, the leading German language newspaper in Prague, he read the short official notice, announcing the death of Col. Redl, but paid scant attention to it.

All this changed, however, when he learned why the star player of his football team, who was a locksmiths by trade, didn’t show up at the Sunday afternoon game He justified his absence by explaining that he was summoned to the headquarters of the military counter-intelligence service, and pressed into service to open the locks in Col. Redl’s luxurious Prague apartment. “The officers conducting the search were astonished at what they found and talked about high treason,” the locksmith revealed. His curiosity spiked, Kisch sprung into action.

Not unlike Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward during the Watergate scandal, Kisch also used confidential sources to gain information, and the “Redl Affair” slowly unraveled.

It was revealed that Czarist Russian agents caught Redl, a homosexual, in a compromising position. They blackmailed him and provided generous payments to finance his lavish lifestyle.

After he left the counter-intelligence service, Redl was not aware that a new system was put into place that checked suspicious mail. He received payments from the Russians through poste restante mail sent to the main post office, in Vienna.

When on May 25, 1913, Redl appeared at the post office to pick up the mail posted to a cover name, he was observed by two police detectives assigned to monitor the mail. Redl left in a taxi, and was shadowed. The driver of the taxi noticed that Redl opened the letter, stuffed with banknotes, with a pen-knife. The detectives found the knife, left inadvertently, on the upholstered seat.

In the lobby of hotel “Klomser,” one of the detectives approached Redl, holding the silver pen-knife, and asked whether he had lost it. Redl, readily admitted ownership. Then his face turned pale. As an experienced former intelligence chief, he realized immediately that he had made a fatal mistake.

According to Kisch, Redl’s interrogation was conducted in accordance with the rules of “chivalry” customary among officers of the Austro-Hungarian Imperial Army. He made a detailed confession, and was spared a humiliating public trial. He was escorted back to his hotel, was given a pistol and was allowed to commit suicide.

It is not clear what harm the members of the Russian spy ring would have caused if they would have not been unmasked. Redl, certainly did a lot of harm. Historians tend to consider him one of history’s greatest traitors. His actions were responsible for the death of half a million of his countrymen.

Frank Shatz lives in Williamsburg, Va. and Lake Placid. His column was reprinted with permission from The Virginia Gazette.

Cover for Status Can Be Fun!

2010-08-09T12:15:00.003-04:00

Busted Russian Spy Wants Old Life Back

By RICHARD BOUDREAUX | WSJ

MOSCOW—He operated under cover with a single false name on two continents for 34 years, through part of the Cold War and beyond. He served spymasters in Moscow who reward such steel-jawed endurance with quiet adulation.

In Peru he was Juan Lazaro the karate black belt, the news photographer, the guy who married the star TV reporter. After the couple moved to New York, he became Juan Lazaro Ph.D. and adjunct professor of political science. At home in suburban Yonkers, he was the doting father of Juan Lazaro Jr., a talented young pianist.

No one suspected until he was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, unmasked as Mikhail Vasenkov and sent home in the much-publicized U.S.-Russia spy swap a month ago.

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin feted the 10 deported agents, including femme fatale Anna Chapman, led them in patriotic Soviet songs and promised them decent jobs and a "bright life" in the motherland.

But the senior spy among them says no thanks. In a plot twist rare in the annals of espionage, he wants his Juan Lazaro fake identity back.

There's only one problem. The real Juan Lazaro died 63 years ago in Uruguay at age 3, a relative says. The spy used the dead toddler's birth certificate to build a persona.

From a Moscow apartment where Russia's government has him lodged out of public view, the veteran agent has sent word that he and his wife, deported together in the spy swap and separated from their 17-year-old son, want to use their Peruvian passports to return to Peru in the coming weeks and rebuild their lives as the Lazaros.

"He doesn't want to stay in Russia," says his American lawyer, Genesis Peduto, who talks to him on the phone.

"He says he's Juan Lazaro and he's not from Russia and doesn't speak Russian. He wants to be where his wife is going, to her native country, where it will be easier for Juan Jr. to visit" from New York. "His family comes first."

Ms. Peduto says she has no knowledge of the dead Juan Lazaro and won't comment. Her client declines to be interviewed. Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service refuses to comment on any of the 10 deported agents.

The spy ring puzzled Americans and tested U.S.-Russian relations. It was an odd group: They included four couples with children living suburban lives while secretly sending radiograms, exchanging bags of cash in "brush passes" and delivering messages in invisible ink.

They seemed to be looking in hidden places for data that were largely available on the Internet. Watched for a decade by the FBI, they managed to obtain no classified data, U.S. officials say.

The Juan Lazaro story is a peculiar footnote. The spy's early life remains a mystery. But his paper trail through Spain, Uruguay, Peru and New York offers a glimpse into the world of Moscow's "illegals," or deep-cover agents, and its Hispanic pipeline to America. In that realm of forgery, identity theft and deception within families, it remains unclear whether the spy's wife and collaborator, Vicky Pelaez, even knew of his other name.

Soviet and Russian deep-cover agents have spent years at a time in the U.S. since early in the Cold War, operating without diplomatic cover or immunity from prosecution. Many lived in Peru during the country's rule by Moscow-friendly military officers in the 1970s, building fake identities before infiltrating the U.S., former KGB officials say.

Successful illegals return to waiting families, Kremlin rewards and prior Russian identities.The Lazaro case appears to be that of a loyal but ineffectual agent who operated so long under cover that he became his fictional self—a make-believe Latino who went native.

"He ceased being Russian, it seems, and began thinking of himself as Juan Lazaro," says Boris Volodarsky, a former Soviet intelligence officer who works in London as an independent analyst.

The persona took shape on March 13, 1976, as a man with a droopy mustache flew from Madrid to Lima, Peru, on a Uruguayan passport in the name of Juan Jose Lazaro Fuentes.

He bore a letter on a Spanish tobacco company's stationery saying he had been hired for a market survey in Peru, according to a file kept by the Peruvian Interior Ministry on his citizenship application.

Two years later, he submitted copies of the passport and a 1943 Uruguayan birth certificate with a letter asking Peru's military dictator to make him a citizen of "the most humanist country" in Latin America. The letter, short on detail, said he lived in Uruguay until age 7, then left to study and work in Spain.

Mr. Lazaro spoke Spanish with a Slavic accent but "never talked about his past," recalls Delfina Prieto, a journalist who worked with him in Peru. After a cursory background check, Peru gave him citizenship in 1979.

In 1983, he married Ms. Pelaez. Two years later they moved to New York with her son from a previous relationship. She became a columnist for El Diario, New York's Spanish-language daily, got U.S. citizenship and gave birth to Juan Jr. At home they spoke Spanish. Juan Sr., a legal U.S. resident, earned a doctorate in political science at the New School.

"I didn't detect anything odd," says Thomas Halper, who hired him to teach at Baruch College, of the City University of New York. "His preoccupation was with his son. He seemed so dedicated to his son, so proud of him."

His story unraveled after the couple's June 27 arrest.

The FBI reported a bugged conversation in the Lazaros' Yonkers home in which Mr. Lazaro said his family moved to Siberia about the time he was born.

The FBI alleged that the couple traveled from New York to South America several times over the past decade to receive cash from Russian operatives and deliver messages, although it recorded Mr. Lazaro complaining, "They say my information is of no value."

He, his wife and the eight others pleaded guilty as part of the spy-swap deal. Defense lawyers say he gave the name Russian officials told him to give—Vasenkov—reading it in court from notes.

And who is Vasenkov? Former KGB officials say that name may be no more genuine than Lazaro is. A search of Russian directories and websites turns up no Vasenkov fitting the profile. "The guy may have had several names," says Oleg Kalugin, a former general who once ran KGB operations in the U.S.

Whatever his real name, the spy apparently forged that tobacco company assignment letter. Altadis SA, the company's current owner in Madrid, says it found no record of a Juan Lazaro in its files.

The spy left one trace of his Lazaro identity in Spain: a brief stay on a three-month visa in early 1976 on his way to Peru, according to stamps in his Uruguayan passport.

Peru is investigating whether he committed fraud to obtain citizenship. Uruguayan officials aiding the probe say anyone with knowledge of the real Juan Lazaro's identity could have appropriated his birth record.

That's apparently what happened in this case. In Uruguay, Elida Panizza Fuentes told the Journal that Juan Lazaro was her half-brother. She says he died of respiratory failure in 1947.

Eva Irene Fuentes is listed as the child's mother on the birth certificate used by the spy. A widow, she remarried and gave birth to Ms. Panizza in 1948. Before her death, the mother told Ms. Panizza the story of the sickly boy the family remembered as "Juancito."

"She couldn't help crying whenever she spoke of the child," Ms. Panizza says. She says it saddened her to learn a spy had taken his identity. "How could they do something like that?"

Ms. Pelaez asked her own pointed question. She confronted her husband in a holding cell as they awaited deportation and, according two lawyers present, demanded: "What's your name? Your real name."

Carlos Moreno, her lawyer, says her husband laughed and replied, "My name is Juan Lazaro." The lawyer said the two are standing by each other and the Lazaro name. He added: "My guess is she didn't know him as anyone else."

—Robert Kozak and Sophie Kevany in Lima, Peru; Santiago Perez in Madrid; Diego Fischer in Montevideo, Uruguay; and Jonnelle Marte in Yonkers, New York, contributed to this article.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703309704575413600124475346.html?mod=WSJ_hps_InDepthCarousel_2#dummy

Obama Justice Contaminates UK MoD

2010-08-08T18:11:00.004-04:00

Britain's special forces are at the centre of a criminal investigation following allegations soldiers from a covert unit tortured and abused suspected insurgents in Iraq.

By Sean Rayment, Defence Correspondent
Published: 9:00PM BST 07 Aug 2010

Hundreds of members of the SAS, military interrogators and agent handlers who served with Task Force Black, a counter terrorist organisation that operated in Iraq during the insurgency, are to be questioned as part of a major inquiry into alleged breaches of the Geneva Convention.

The investigation is examining claims that British soldiers used death threats, intimidation and physical violence, as well as sleep, food and water deprivation to obtain intelligence from suspects.

The Sunday Telegraph has learnt that at least six military interrogators who worked closely with members of the task force have already been interviewed under caution by the special investigation branch of the Royal Military Police.

However, senior defence sources have strongly criticised the inquiry, claiming that it is a "witch hunt" motivated by "political correctness". It is understood that the allegations include a soldier "hitting" a suspect on the arm with a rolled up piece of A4 paper.

Those questioned under caution include a captain, as well as senior and junior non-commissioned officers. All of the soldiers deny the charges.

Dozens more interrogators are expected to be interviewed in the coming months as investigators examine hundreds of hours of videotaped interrogations.

The inquiry was launched following allegations that British troops systematically abused hundreds of Iraqis during the war. The probe is being led by the Iraq Historic Allegations Team, which was established to investigate claims of abuse by soldiers. The inquiry has already cost £6 million.

One senior defence source, who has seen video recordings of interrogations supposedly revealing abuse by British interrogators, described the allegations as "laughable" and said they were "entirely without foundation".

The source said: "When I saw the videos of the alleged abuse – my reaction was 'you've got to be joking'. I was dumbfounded. The military police just looked embarrassed."

One interrogator is accused of using death threats when he tells a suspected killer of British soldiers: "If I had my way, you would be taken outside and shot."

Another soldier stands accused of mental torture after he reduced a prisoner to tears when he said: "If you don't co-operate with us, it will be years before you see your children."

The source added: "The interrogators were dealing with violent terrorists responsible for the deaths of British soldiers. They were trying to extract intelligence to save the lives of other soldiers. Those who were compliant were offered the chance of working as agents for the British. This is what interrogators do.

"If we are now going to question their actions then we shouldn't have interrogators. We were fighting a war, they have done nothing wrong. The situation is laughable. Whole sections of special forces are grinding to a halt because someone is accused of hitting a terrorist suspect with a piece of A4 paper."

The interrogators face trial by court martial and a possible prison sentence if the allegations against them are upheld.

Senior officers do not deny that some British troops committed war crimes in Iraq but deny that the abuse was systematic.

Military interrogators and agent handlers are recruited from all three services and are trained by the Defence Human Intelligence Unit.

The troops worked closely with the SAS, especially in Baghdad, where Task Force Black was praised by General David Petraeus for the impact the unit had.

The SAS were responsible for arresting and killing hundreds of insurgents, while working alongside their US equivalent Delta Force. Many of the soldiers now facing investigation took part in "hard knock" operations, where force is used to seize and subdue a suspect.

Senior defence sources now fear that the military police will begin to focus on the activity of troops operating in Afghanistan.

In a separate investigation, a soldier serving with the Special Forces Support Group in Afghanistan has been accused of assaulting a suspected Taliban gunmen believed to have been involved in an attack on a British base in Sangin.

In a follow-up operation, two Afghan men were seen behaving suspiciously and were ordered to stop.

One drew a weapon and was shot and injured while the other suspect was taken prisoner. He was allegedly punched to the ground when he tried to escape and later complained that he was beaten up by the soldier.

A report of the incident was passed to the Royal Military Police and the soldier was removed from operational duty in Helmand, where sources indicate he was a vital part of an intelligence gathering team. The soldier has effectively been placed on "gardening leave" until the investigation is complete but he is now understood to be considering his future in the Army.

A Ministry of Defence spokesperson said: "An investigation is under way into allegations of detainee abuse. It would be inappropriate to comment further at this time."

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/7931821/Special-forces-under-investigation-for-abuse-of-Iraqi-prisoners.html

Russians Penetrate Czech Generals' Offices

2010-07-27T12:04:00.003-04:00

Russian Spy Reaches Czech Generals' Offices - Report
PRAGUE | Tue Jul 27, 2010 4:46pm IST

(Reuters) - Three Czech generals, including a presidential staff member and a NATO representative, were forced to leave the army in 2009 after a Russian spy's contact with their offices, a Czech newspaper reported on Tuesday.

Czech military and counter-intelligence agents have increasingly highlighted Russian agents' presence in the central European NATO and European Union member, and this has been the biggest reported case of infiltration into the military.

Citing an unnamed source, daily Mlada Fronta Dnes said the Russian agent, a Czech state-employed psychologist known as Robert R., befriended a female army major, who had also studied psychology and worked successively as head of staff for the three army generals.

The generals, respectively, worked as head of President Vaclav Klaus's Military Office, the Czechs' NATO representative in Europe, and a deputy general for the Chief of Staff.

The newspaper said it was not clear whether the army major worked for the Russian agent knowingly, nor what information was passed on and if it posed a security threat. Military intelligence agents followed the two for at least five years.

The agent fled to Russia and the major finished in the army.

Josef Sedlak, the general who lost his position as NATO representative, told Mlada Fronta Dnes he felt he had been unfairly treated.

"If some information existed showing one of my colleagues was connected to a spy, then the agency should have told me to protect me. And not follow me like some villain," he was quoted as saying.

The newspaper said another of the generals quit over a disagreement about changes being made in the military, while the third general could not be reached by the newspaper.

The Defence Ministry and counter-intelligence agency BIS declined to comment.

BIS reported last month that Russian spies were increasingly active in the Czech Republic and turning their attention to the energy sector.

BIS said the presence of Russian intelligence operatives among academics and students posed a potential problem for the former Soviet satellite state.

The Czechs are also wary of their dependence on their Cold War master Russia in the energy sector. Russia's Atomstroyexport is among three bidders to enlarge the country's largest nuclear power plant in Temelin.

Last year, the Czech Republic expelled two Russian diplomats, including a deputy to the military attache, on suspicions of spying.

Germany commemorates failed anti-Hitler plot - The Local

2010-07-21T09:36:00.002-04:00

Germany on Tuesday marked the 66th anniversary of a failed attempt by army officers to assassinate Adolf Hitler in his "Wolf's Lair" military headquarters in a daring bid to end World War II.

Defence Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, who had a relative with links to the resistance, led a wreath-laying ceremony at a memorial in his ministry's Bendlerblock courtyard, where some of the conspirators were executed.

Later Tuesday, he and Chancellor Angela Merkel were to observe the swearing-in in front of the Reichstag parliament building of about 420 recruits to the military, which has carefully tended the memory of the July 20 plotters.

"The women and men of the resistance set ethical standards with their actions and became role models," Mayor Klaus Wowereit said at the Bendlerblock ceremony.

The July 20 plot, as it has come to be known, was led by an aristocratic army officer called Count Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg, who wore a patch to cover an eye lost in battle.

Stauffenberg placed a bomb under a table in Hitler's eastern headquarters in East Prussia, in modern-day Poland. But the Nazi leader escaped with slight injuries because the briefcase carrying the explosives was moved by chance behind a sturdy oak leg of the table.

Confusion reigned 700 kilometres (435 miles) away in Berlin, with conflicting information about whether Hitler had survived the attack, but it soon became clear that the plot had failed.

Co-conspirator Philipp von Boeselager was meant to return from the Eastern Front with 1,200 men and overthrow the clique at the head of the Third Reich, which had unleashed the catastrophic war and the Holocaust.

Stauffenberg and several others were executed the same evening in the Bendlerblock courtyard, part of a complex of buildings where the plot was hatched.

The episode was turned into a recent movie called "Valkyrie" with Tom Cruise playing the part of Stauffenberg.

Historian Fritz Stern said at the Bendlerblock ceremony Tuesday the assassination attempt had been unique in German history.

"Never before had there been such an uprising for liberation, justice and human dignity in Germany," he said.

That the plot failed is seen as one of the tragedies of World War II as millions more people were killed on the battlefield and in the gas chambers before Hitler was defeated in 1945.

Germany commemorates failed anti-Hitler plot - The Local

American Leftist Spies Won't Enjoy Castro Treatment

2010-07-16T12:29:00.002-04:00

A sympathetic treatment from the Washington Post of a story of treason by delusional American Leftist traitors. It's a shame they won't be jailed under the same conditions the Castro brothers have held their enemies since '59.

U.S. Analyst Spying for Cuba Gets Life in Prison; Wife Gets More Than 6 Years

By Spencer S. Hsu
Washington Post
Friday, July 16, 2010; 12:27 PM

A retired State Department intelligence analyst was sentenced to life in prison and his wife got more than six years on Friday for spying for Cuba for nearly 30 years in a screenplay-ready tale of romance and espionage.

Walter Kendall Myers, 73, and Gwendolyn Steingraber Myers, 72, agreed to forfeit $1.7 million in cash and property, including all of Kendall Myers's federal salary over the years. He did not have to give up 38-foot sailboat he once said they might use in retirement to sail to the communist country.

"If someone despises the American government to the extent that appears to be the case, you can pack your bags and leave," U.S. District Judge Reggie B. Walton said, "and it doesn't seem to me you continue to bear the benefits this country manages to provide and seek to undermine it."

It was a grim ending to the Myerses' idealistic embrace of the Cuban revolution, with one slight comfort. Handing down punishment for Walter Myers's guilty plea in November to conspiracy to commit espionage and two counts of wire fraud, Walton endorsed the couple's request to be incarcerated near each other with easier access to their siblings, children and grandchildren.

The judge's sentence for Gwen Myers fell halfway between the 72 months to 90 months she had agreed to in her deal with prosecutors, for gathering and transmitting national defense information. Her lawyers cited her age, failing health -- including a heart attack since her June 2009 arrest -- and secondary role in the scheme. The couple, wearing blue jumpsuits over long-sleeved white shirts, held hands while the sentence was read.

"We did not act out of anger toward the United States or from any thought of anti-Americanism," Myers said in at 10-minute statement in seeking leniency for his wife. "We did not intend to hurt any individual American. Our only objective was to help the Cuban people defend their revolution. We only hoped to forestall conflict" between the countries.

The sentencing continues Washington's summer of serial spy intrigues. Barely a week after the United States and Russia completed the exchange of 14 agents allegedly planted in each other's country in a diplomatic maneuver reminiscent of the Cold War, the Washington couple's sentencing cast a reminder of unresolved tensions across the 90-mile-wide Straits of Florida.

Myers, an Ivy League-educated Europe specialist who made his home in Northwest Washington's diplomat-friendly precincts, began working for the State Department as a contract instructor in 1977 before joining full time in 1985 and becoming a senior analyst with a top-secret clearance in the department's sensitive bureau of intelligence and research.

Starting in 1978, however, the recently divorced Myers visited Cuba for two weeks and was soon recruited by a Cuban intelligence agent. When Myers spent a two-year-long sabbatical in South Dakota, where he was living with then-Gwendolyn Trebilcock, a former aide to senator James Abourezk, the agent met Myers again, an he agreed to become a spy.

Over the next three decades, the couple would communicate with their Cuban handlers via shortwave radio, exchanging shopping carts in a grocery store and sending encrypted e-mails from Internet cafes. Traveling overseas, they met clandestine Cuban operatives in Brazil, Ecuador, Jamaica, Italy and Cuba via Mexico.

Myers, code-named "202," and his wife -- "123" -- never accepted money but would pass along secret information that he later said earned him several medals and a trip to meet Fidel Castro himself in 1995.

"Everything I hear about Fidel suggests that he is a brilliant and charismatic leader," Myers wrote in his journal in his 1978 Cuba visit, where he also rued the "systematic and regular murdering of revolutionary leaders" by the United States. His enthusiasm seemed undimmed 31 years later, when he confided to an FBI agent posing a Cuban contact, "Fidel is wonderful, just wonderful."

Tipped off to the presence of a Cuban spy in 2006, U.S. investigators by April 2009 tracked down Myers outside Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, where he was a part-time faculty member. It was Myers's 72nd birthday, and an undercover FBI agent posing as a Cuban intelligence emissary gave him a cigar. The gift led to a string of recorded meetings, revelations and the couple's ultimate confession and sentencing Friday, which happened to fall on Gwen Myers's 72nd birthday.

The State Department and intelligence community officials have not publicly assessed the damage done by Myers to the U.S. government, but experts said he would have had years of access to intelligence reports from the U.S. and its allies, as well as to databases with information from the CIA, the National Security Agency, the military and U.S. embassies. In the last 15 months before his retirement in 2007, Myers amassed more than 200 sensitive or classified intelligence reports in his computer.

After the couple's arrest, Castro was quoted in a Cuban media report stating his admiration for "their disinterested and courageous conduct."

The FBI said that although Myers generally was cooperative in more than 100 debriefing sessions, he at times gave inconsistent answers or withheld information, adding that the "limited value of defendants' cooperation" did not warrant lighter sentencing of Gwen Myers.

"For nearly 30 years, Kendall and Gwendolyn Myers committed one of the worst crimes a citizen can perpetrate against his or her own country -- espionage on behalf of a long-standing foreign adversary," Ronald C. Machen Jr., U.S. attorney for the District, said in a brief urging the judge against leniency.

The Myerses felt no remorse, motivated by communist sympathies and a "rose-colored picture" of Cuba, Machen said.

"Kendall Myers was born into this world with every conceivable advantage," Machen wrote, describing the son of a heart surgeon, grandson of the National Geographic Society's head and great-grandson of inventor Alexander Graham Bell as a child of privilege. Machen added, "Kendall Myers could have been anything he wanted to be. He chose to be a Cuban spy."

In their behalf, the Myers presented statements from relatives, colleagues and friends describing them as kind and deeply idealistic.

Myers's offense, his lawyers wrote, "was born not of hatred, greed, vengeance or desire for power, but of compassion for a struggling people desperately seeking to throw off the legacy of a brutal and corrupt dictatorship and chart an independent path to social justice."

His lawyers asked that Myers be allowed to teach inmates and continue his writings, including a biography of former British prime minister Neville Chamberlain. Whether misunderstood or misguided, Myers told the undercover FBI agent in 2009 that the couple missed their spying days. "You, speaking collectively, have been a really important part of our lives, and we have felt incomplete," Myers said, according to the government. "I mean, we really love your country."

With Russia, Little Ever Really Changes

2010-06-28T17:02:00.003-04:00

US Charges 11 in Russian Spy Case

By EVAN PEREZ

The Wall Street Journal -- JUNE 28, 2010, 4:47 P.M. ET

WASHINGTON—U.S. authorities charged 11 people Monday with being part of a Russian spy program to plant long-term undercover agents inside the U.S.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation alleged the Russian intelligence service known as the SVR provided extensive training, including in foreign languages and the use of codes and ciphers, to the alleged agents before dispatching them to the U.S. over the past decade.

Once inside the U.S., the alleged agents took on aliases and "deep cover" assignments to become Americanized in order to gather information about the U.S., and possibly recruit sources inside American "policy-making circles," an FBI affidavit filed in New York federal court alleged.

U.S. authorities arrested 10 of the 11 people in New York, Boston and northern Virginia in recent days.

The case grew from a years-long FBI investigation focused on Russian espionage capabilities in the U.S. since the breakup of the formidable spying operation of the former Soviet Union.

Write to Evan Perez at evan.perez@wsj.com

Espionage or Globalism?

2010-06-24T14:28:00.002-04:00

Agents of Influence

The Ottawa Citizen -- June 24, 2010

Canadians are shocked to hear that some of their elected representatives are acting as agents of foreign governments, but no one should be shocked that foreign governments are after Canadian secrets in the first place.

Canada is not much of a military power, so foreign governments are likely not snooping for blueprints of futuristic weapons. Canada is, however, an economic power, a major exporter and manufacturer. It is trade secrets that our global competitors desire. The Cold War may be over but espionage -- economic espionage -- is still very much a growth industry.

Richard Fadden, director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, revealed this week that a number of Canadian public officials are suspected to be working on behalf of foreign interests. At least two of the suspected "agents of influence" hold cabinet posts at the provincial level.

It's a sensational claim, to be sure. But as many security experts quickly noted, the source is impeccable: Richard Fadden himself. Fadden is an accomplished and respected public servant. His willingness to come out from the shadows, so to speak, and talk about foreign penetration of the political class, on the eve of Canada's hosting the G8 and G20 summits, suggests just how real a threat the security establishment deems this to be.

Fadden wasn't reckless. He didn't name names or identify the countries that have been poking around in our business. He didn't have to. China openly specializes in economic espionage, as Canadian companies such as aerospace giant Bombardier have discovered. There have been recent reports of Chinese technicians stealing secrets at one of Bombardier's Montreal plants, and of Bombardier negotiators being spied upon during trips to China.

While Fadden didn't name names, he did suggest that the problem of foreign influence is particularly conspicuous in British Columbia. The province is part of the Pacific Rim and is the Canadian epicentre of Asian immigration. As the University of Victoria political scientist Norman Ruff told the Canadian Press, "There are influences on public policy in British Columbia both on the local and provincial level which aren't solely in the interests of British Columbians."

Although communist China tops Canada's list of countries targeting us for economic espionage, democratic countries and even allies will spy on each other. In the 1990s, some business travellers stopped flying on Air France following reports French intelligence officers were bugging airline seats. Japan has been accused of recruiting technology workers to penetrate U.S.-based tech firms.

It might even be that, in some quarters, economic espionage is viewed simply as a form of government assistance to domestic businesses. In one reported case, a French and American firm were competing for a billion-dollar contract with the Indian government. The French government surreptitiously obtained information about the American bid and passed it on to the French firm, which then won the contract.

The danger of Fadden's warning is that it might be used, not by CSIS but others, as an argument against multiculturalism and immigration. That would be a mistake. Canada's diversity is a source of national strength, and has produced far more benefits, economic and otherwise, than costs.

Canada is right to welcome talent wherever it can be found. The integration of new and recent Canadians into the highest ranks of economic and political life is what makes us a successful country. Unfortunately, in a few instances, that integration might not be as thorough as was hoped.

Agents of influence

Forgotten Heroes of Military Intelligence

2010-06-16T08:57:00.002-04:00

Military Intelligence Fatalities Twice CIA's

They have no somber wall to represent personnel who have died on secret missions.

But military intelligence personnel are taking far greater -- and far less recognized -- casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan than the CIA, whose latest dead were honored in a headquarters ceremony last week.

In all, 22 CIA personnel have been killed in action since Sept. 11, 2001, not all of them in terrorism-related incidents, according to an agency official. Twelve stars, seven of them representing officers and contractors killed by a double-agent suicide bomber in Khost, Afghanistan, on Dec. 30, were added to the CIA's memorial wall last week.

Meanwhile, 41 military spy-handlers and other MI personnel have died in Iraq and Afghanistan since the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, according to figures supplied by the U.S. Army Intelligence Command at Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

Five of them were women.

In addition, the Defense Intelligence Agency, which has deployed analysts and other personnel to the war zones, has suffered 45 wounded from mortar attacks and other causes since March 2003, the bulk of them in Iraq.

The DIA has recorded no fatalities in the war zones, but it lost seven civilian personnel in one fell swoop on Sept. 11, 2001, when one of the hijacked airliners crashed into the Pentagon. Eight more DIA personnel, all but one civilians, were wounded, a spokesman said. A Patriot’s Memorial wall at Bolling Air Force Base honors the DIA's 21 fallen, by name, going back to 1970.

Presumably, the main reason MI casualties are so far greater than the CIA's is that military intelligence personnel are far more numerous in the war zones (although the agency had roughly 500 personnel assigned to Baghdad alone by 2005).

But the large number of MI casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan also suggests the conflicts are far more dangerous for military spies and support personnel than the last major counterinsurgency war, in Vietnam, where some never saw a bullet fired in anger.

In Afghanistan especially, there are no front lines. Nor are there safe havens in cities and towns, as was largely the case in South Vietnam, where many a military agent in slacks and Hawaiian shirts could dine in a local restaurant, go out for a drink and sleep on clean sheets.

In sharp contrast, MI personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan rarely stray far from their bases or units, and never unarmed. And like their uniformed brethren, they are mostly dying in Humvees from roadside bombs.

Such was the case of Cari A. Gasiewicz, 28, an Army counterintelligence agent and Arabic interpreter who died when two roadside bombs detonated near her convoy in Baqubah, Iraq, on Dec. 4, 2004.

“She was in the final weeks of her year-long deployment and the convoy was headed to Kuwait to prepare for redeployment in January,” according to Fort Huachuca.

In 2005, the 202nd MI Battalion at Fort Gordon, Ga., dedicated its headquarters building in her honor. Three years later, the Defense Language Institute also memorialized a building in her name.

Likewise in 2006, the Military Intelligence Library at Fort Huachuca was memorialized in honor of Warrant Officer Christopher G. Nason, a voice intercept technician and Arabic linguist who died in a vehicular accident near Mosul in November 2003.

Nason, 39, was the first MI soldier from the fort to die in Iraq.

Specialist Farid Elazzouzi, an MI interpreter-translator born in Morocco, who was killed by a roadside bomb in Kirkuk only two years after obtaining a U.S. visa in 2005, has no building named for him, but he was was posthumously awarded American citizenship.

The first MI agent to die in Afghanistan was Staff Sgt. Brian “Cody” Prosser, a 10-year veteran of military operations in Somalia, Haiti, Jordon, Kuwait, Kosovo, and "throughout Southwest Asia," according to Fort Huachuca.

Assigned to the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Prosser was killed by friendly fire in Afghanistan, 150 miles behind enemy lines, in December 2001.

The citation for Prosser’s Bronze Star for valor stated that “his actions leading up to the battle on the night of 3 December were key in allowing the advance team to move to and destroy an enemy strong point at Sayad Alma Kalay with complete success” while “outnumbered 50 to 1.”

Fort Huachuca renamed its academic complex Prosser Village in his honor.

A new spy-handler training site at the Army intelligence school will also be named for a fallen MI soldier, later this year.

Sgt. Nicholas Casey, a human intelligence collector, died on Oct, 28, 2008, when a suicide bomber detonated explosives while he and his team "were preparing to conduct operations in a police station in Baghlan, Afghanistan,” according to the base’s public affairs office.

“The suicide bomber, disguised as an Afghan police officer, walked unhindered into the police station and detonated himself, killing SGT Casey and SGT Kevin D. Grieco,” the announcement said. “SGT Casey was assigned to 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina.”

Beside Casey, eight other MI personnel have died in Afghanistan, including an intelligence analyst and three others involved with communications.

The 33 Iraq fatalities included two women listed as cryptologic linguists, two as signals intelligence analysts, and one as a “HUMINT Collector,” or spy handler.

Figures for Vietnam War MI casualties could not be readily obtained and may not be available in one place, authorities said.

One official history said “casualties among Military Intelligence personnel were not restricted to members of the Army Security Agency,” which eavesdropped on enemy communications.

“During the [1968] Tet offensive, the Hue detachment of the 525th MI Group was overrun and its members killed or captured,” it said.

“The first Medal of Honor ever granted to a Military Intelligence officer," it added, "was awarded posthumously to 1st Lt. George Sisler, assistant intelligence officer of a Special Forces team.”

By Jeff Stein | June 15, 2010; 6:30 AM ET
http://blog.washingtonpost.com/spy-talk/2010/06/military_intelligence_casualti.html

2010-06-08T16:13:00.002-04:00

German Left-Wing Crime Increase Adds to Public Security Concerns
An increase in crime and attacks on police officers by German left-wing extremists in 2009 was centered in Berlin and Hamburg, cities which also have seen conflicts with immigrants. Despite initial preventative measures by federal and regional authorities, calls for stronger action continue. -- 27 April 2010

Left-Wing Crime Increase Compounds Concern About Right-Wing, Immigrant Groups
German security authorities reported a substantial increase in crime and attacks on police in 2009 related to left-wing political groups and individuals, whom German counterintelligence agencies number at approximately 6,600. This increase in left-wing crime represents an additional concern alongside Germany's perceived problems with right-wing extremist and immigrant crime (dw-world.de, 19 January).

According to Germany's Interior Ministry, more extremist crimes and acts of violence occurred in 2009 than in any year since 2001. The ministry reported that in 2009, leftwing extremist crimes increased by almost 40% to 9,375. Violent crimes by these individuals and groups, meanwhile, increased by more than 50% to 1,822, and the number of leftist attacks on police officers increased by 120% to 1,3503 (Bild, 23 March; bild.de, 30 January).
Interior Ministry statistics indicate that although violent crimes tied to right-wing groups decreased by 14% to 959, overall crime by these groups is still twice as frequent as that committed by their left-wing counterparts. The Federal Office of Criminal Investigation (BKA) also reported that rightist attacks on police officers increased by almost 75% to 5305 (Bild, 23 March; bild.de, 30 January).
Germany lacks publicly available official data on immigrant crime, but media reports reflect increasing concern about integration problems.a For example, media have cited statistics -- probably drawn from a controversial lecture by Senior Public Prosecutor Roman Reusch, former head of the Berlin Department for Multiple Offenders -- indicating that 80% of young multiple offenders in Berlin have a migration background (meideu.de, 16 October 2009; Focus, 12 October 2009).

More: http://www.fas.org/irp/world/germany/crime.pdf

Main Wikileaks Source Outed - Politics - The Atlantic

2010-06-07T12:17:00.000-04:00

Main Wikileaks Source Outed - Politics - The Atlantic

500 Top Secret CIA Documents on Interrogation Briefings to Congress

2010-06-05T09:19:00.004-04:00

Top Secret Records Detailing Congressional Briefings of CIA Enhanced Interrogation Techniques -- Released Friday Afternoon (of course) -- June 4, 2010

2010-06-02T10:41:00.002-04:00

French Secret Service Fear Russian Cathedral a Spying Front
The French secret service has reportedly expressed alarm over plans for a Russian Orthodox cathedral in Paris, fearing it will be used by Moscow as a front for spies.

Henry Samuel in Paris
Published: 12:58AM BST 28 May 2010

The go-ahead for the onion-domed cathedral – the first to be built in the French capital in more than a century – by the Eiffel Tower was considered a brilliant diplomatic coup in Russia as at least two other countries were vying for the prized property by the Seine.

But it sparked deep reservations at the Quai d'Orsay, France's foreign ministry, and the DCRI, its MI6, because the building is a stone's throw from a sensitive diplomatic compound.

As well as housing France's supreme magistrates' council, the Palais de l'Alma – Napoleon III's former stables – contains the Elysée postal service and above all, the 16 private apartments of top presidential aides. Chief among these is Jean-David Levitte, President Nicolas Sarkozy's top diplomatic adviser, who wields more power than the foreign minister, as well as his chief of staff.

French counterespionage was particularly concerned, according to Le Nouvel Observateur, the weekly magazine, as Vladimir Kozhin, the Russian in charge of trying to buy the 8,400 square metre (90,400 sq foot) plot, is a former KGB agent. Mr Kozhin is head of the hugely powerful Kremlin property department, which has 50,000 employees, an empire of hotels and manages all state property, including Russian churches overseas.

French intelligence concerns were compounded by the fact that it had detected a significant rise in Russian spy activity since the election of President Sarkozy in 2007, reaching heights not seen since the mid-1980s.

Mr Kozhin is a close associate of Vladimir Putin, the Russian prime minister and a former KGB officer, who was the property department's number two in the 1990s.

Mr Putin and President Dmitri Medvedev are said to have considered the construction of the Paris cathedral a key step in regaining control over the Russian Diaspora and legitimising their administration, as well as a spectacular display of Russian power in western Europe.

Such was the importance of the acquisition that it was reportedly the first subject President Medvedev broached with his French counterpart in December at the Copenhagen climate summit.

According to several sources, after the conversation Mr Sarkozy immediately phoned his budget minister who a few days later summoned Mr Kozhin to his office. Ten days later when the various tenders for the plot were examined, Russia's was top of the pile which included bids from Saudi Arabia and Canada – with an above-market offer of 70 million euros (£60 million).

The cathedral, which still needs final planning permission from Paris' town hall, stands to be the first Russian monument built in Paris since the Alexander III bridge in 1896, and is due to be built within the next three years.

Ukranians Roll Over for Russia's FSB

2010-05-29T12:24:00.004-04:00

Ukraine Ends Counterintelligence Work on Russian FSB Officials - Paper
29/05/201011:57
KIEV, May 29 (RIA Novosti)

Ukrainian counterintelligence services have stopped monitoring Russian Security Service (FSB) officials stationed in Ukraine, a Ukrainian weekly paper said on Saturday.

Relations between Russia and Ukraine have dramatically improved since President Viktor Yanukovych was elected in February on a platform to roll back the pro-Western policies of his predecessor, Viktor Yushchenko, and heal damaged ties with Moscow.

"As a gesture of goodwill and to demonstrate new policies, the counterintelligence department ended all work on Russian security services in Ukraine," Zerkalo Nedeli said.

The Ukrainian security services have so far not made an official comment on this report.

A cooperation agreement was signed by the heads of the Ukrainian and Russian Security Services on May 19. The agreement includes a decision to return Russian security service officials to Crimea, where Russia has a naval base. The Russian security services were ordered to leave the territory at the end of 2009.

See: http://en.rian.ru/world/20100529/159209138.html

Naxalite's Winning?

2010-05-28T09:49:00.003-04:00

Are India's Maoist rebels winning the war?

BBC News . . .
Friday's train crash in India has been blamed on "sabotage" by Maoist rebels. It was the latest in a series of rebel attacks after the government launched an offensive against them. The BBC's Soutik Biswas asks whether the rebels are gaining the upper hand.

It is not surprising that Maoist rebels are being blamed for the derailment of an express train in India's West Bengal state, in which 71 passengers were killed.

The police claim they have found posters signed by a local Maoist militia claiming responsibility for removing part of the track, which led to the train skidding off and colliding with a freight train coming in the opposite direction.

West Midnapore district, where the incident happened, is the hotbed of Maoist rebellion in West Bengal, one of the states where the rebels have a presence.

Tribespeople dominate the district, especially the forested Junglemahal region bordering Jharkhand state.

They feel ignored and deprived by the Communist government which has been ruling the state since 1977. Most live in abject poverty. The only visible signs of "development" I spotted during a trip to the area some years ago were cheap liquor shops.

Strong support

Fed up with the state of affairs, Junglemahal's tribespeople even agitated for a separate state.

When neighbouring Jharkhand was carved out as a separate state, their alienation grew and they were quick to welcome to Maoists, who wield most influence in areas which are poor and dominated by tribespeople.

The Lalgarh area in Junglemahal is the rebels' most formidable stronghold.

In February, they stormed a police camp in Lalgarh, killing 24 policemen.

Rebels love to describe Lalgarh as a "liberated zone" where the state has withered away - schools have closed down because teachers are afraid to attend, and policemen have deserted police stations fearing reprisals.

Friday's incident in West Midnapore demonstrates how the rebels are taking the battle to their enemies ever since the federal government launched an offensive in what is known as India's "red corridor" earlier this year.

This comprises 223 of India's 636 districts in 20 states which the government says are "Maoist affected", up from 55 districts in nine states six years ago.

Ninety of these affected districts, the government says, are experiencing "consistent violence."

The rebels have been carrying out attacks with impunity in recent months - two major attacks Dantewada in Chhattisgarh state left more than 100 people dead, including 75 paramilitary troops.

But there are also theories that in this case the Maoist script went slightly awry.

Maoists frequently tamper with railway lines and often these lead to minor derailments; a number of such attempts have been caught well in time. There have been hijackings but no major attacks on civilian transport with such a death toll.

In the past year, Maoists have carried out 32 attacks on railways, mainly in Jharkhand, West Bengal, Orissa, Chhattisgarh - but no major casualties have been reported.

Support for the Maoist cause across India generally will be dented by such an attack, just as it was after the assault on troops in Dantewada.

Following the twin Dantewada attacks, the government said it was reviewing its strategy for fighting the rebels, who have refused to respond to repeated government offers for talks.

Analysts say that the strategy of "clearing, holding and developing" rebel-affected areas evidently inspired by the US strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan is not working.

'Visible retreat'

One reason, they say, is that the surge of security forces and resources on the ground are not sufficient enough to take on the rebels who are spread over a vast swathe of remote mineral-rich forest lands.

The government is now in a "visible retreat" after a spree of rebel attacks, says security analyst Ajai Sahni.

He believes that a lack of adequate forces, training and intelligence is leading to these "disasters".

"Unless local capacities for intelligence and operations are enormously augmented, this [offensive] can go nowhere, and lot of lives are going to be lost for no useful purpose," Mr Sahni says.

But the under-equipped local police and intelligence-gathering networks remain Indian security' s weakest link, and there no visible efforts to bolster them.

The government appears to be confused over how the rebels should be tackled - there are differences in the ruling Congress party itself on whether the state should strike hard against it's own people.

Recently federal home minister P Chidambaram requested wider powers to deal with the rebels, saying that he had been given a "limited mandate."

He said the chief ministers of some of the worst affected states have asked for air power to be used against the rebels - a measure that the government has refused to sanction.

Analysts believe that many states are not doing enough to take on the rebels, leading to a "centralisation" of the problem.

"The principal responsibility for dealing with the Maoists remain that of the states; the first responders, the local police stations, have to be strengthened and equipped to deal with the task on their own."

Till that happens, the rebels will be seen to have an upper hand in what promises to be long drawn out and bloody conflict, the like of which India has never seen.
Story from BBC NEWS:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/8710747.stm

Interrogation Facility at Bagram

2010-05-15T17:42:00.003-04:00

Inside the Secret Interrogation Facility at Bagram

By Marc Ambinder

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) runs a classified interrogation facility for high-value detainees inside Bagram Air Field in Afghanistan, defense and administration officials said, and prisoners there are sometimes subject to tougher interrogation methods than those used elsewhere.

Both the New York Times and the BBC reported that prisoners who passed through the facility reported abuse, like beatings and sexual humiliation, to the Red Cross, which is not allowed access. The commander in charge of detention operations in Afghanistan, Vice Admiral Robert Harward, has insisted that all detainees under his purview have regular Red Cross access and are not mistreated.

It has been previously reported that the facility, beige on the outside with a green gate, was operated by members of a Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) group, allegedly outside of Harward's jurisdiction. But JSOC, a component command made up of highly secret special mission units and task forces, does not operate the facility.

Instead, it is manned by intelligence operatives and interrogators who work for the DIA's Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center (DCHC). They perform interrogations for a sub-unit of Task Force 714, an elite counter-terrorism brigade.

Called the "black jail" by some of those who have transited through it, it is a way-point for detainees who are thought to possess actionable information about the Taliban or Al Qaeda.

Intelligence gleaned from these interrogations has often led to some of the military's highest profile captures. Usually, captives are first detained at one of at least six classified Field Interrogation Sites in Afghanistan, and then dropped off at the DIA facility -- and, when the interrogators are finished, transferred to the main prison population at the Bagram Theater Internment Facility.

"DoD does operate some temporary screening detention facilities which are classified to preserve operational security; however, both the [Red Cross] and the host nation have knowledge of these facilities," said Bryan Whitman, a Pentagon spokesperson. "Screening facilities help military officials determine if an individual should be detained further and assists military forces with timely information vital to ongoing operations." Whitman would not say who ran the facility or provide any details. A DIA spokesperson declined to comment, as did the White House, which referred questions to the Pentagon.

Under a directive issued by the commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, those captured on the battlefield can be detained for only 96 hours unless they are deemed to possess intelligence value. In practice, military units can unofficially transfer detainees they pick up to other field units before they arrive at interrogation sites, giving American and Afghan interrogators more time to ferret out useful information.

According to other officials, personnel at the facility are supposed to follow the Army Field Manual's guidelines for interrogations. When he took office, President Obama signed an executive order banning the Central Intelligence Agency and the military from using techniques not listed in the manual. But he has a task force studying whether the expressly manual-approved tactics are sufficient.

However, under secret authorization, the DIA interrogators use methods detailed in an appendix to the Field Manual, Appendix M, which spells out "restricted" interrogation techniques.

Under certain circumstances, interrogators can deprive prisoners of sleep (four hours at a time, for up to 30 days), to confuse their senses, and to keep them separate from the rest of the prison population. The Red Cross is now notified if the captives are kept at the facility for longer than two weeks.

When interrogators are using Appendix M measures, the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, Gen.James Clapper (Ret.) is the man on the hook. Detainees designated as prisoners of war cannot be subjected to Appendix M measures.

The DCHC is a relatively new organization. It has several branches and has absorbed staff from the the now largely disbanded Strategic Support Branch, which provided CIA-like intelligence services to ground combat units. The DCHC also performs some of the work that the Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA), which was accused of spying on American political groups, used to do. Many of the staff, civilian and military, as well as many contractors, previously worked with CIFA.

Defense officials said that the White House is kept appraised of the methods used by interrogators at the site. The reason why the Red Cross hasn't been invited to tour it, officials said, was because the U.S. does not believe it to be a detention facility, classifying it instead as an intelligence gathering facility.

A Defense official said that the agency's inspector general had launched an internal investigation into reports in the Washington Post that several teenagers were beaten by the interrogators, but Whitman disputes this.

When the Obama Administration took over, it forbade the DIA from keeping prisoners in the facility longer than 30 days, although it is not clear how that dictum is enforced. It is also not clear how much Congress knows about the DIA's interrogation procedures, which have largely escaped public scrutiny.

"In all our facilities the standard is humane treatment and all DoD detention facilities are required to be compliant with Common Article III, The Detainee Treatment Act, the Executive Order signed by the President last year, and the DoD Detainee Directive and the Army Field Manual," Whitman said.

Although the CIA's enhanced interrogation program was investigated and a Justice Department prosecutor is currently reviewing those files, the Defense Department's parallel activities have been given little scrutiny. To this day, the Department denies the existence of a "special access program," codenamed "Copper Green," which allegedly authorized military interrogators to use extremely harsh methods, including the infliction of sexual humiliation, on high-value terrorists.

Only about 200 military and civilian personnel were aware of Copper Green's existence before it was disclosed by the New Yorker's Seymour Hersh. The CIA's program, known internally by the acronym "GST," has been discontinued. Although "Copper Green" was disbanded, the Defense Department's detainee affairs section has set up a new special access program under which the rules for battlefield interrogations are established. It is classified Top Secret.

Bagram is in the middle of a major expansion, and the DIA facility is being renovated, officials said.

Harward, a former special operations squadron commander, has said he hopes to turn the base over to the Afghan military by 2011.

This article available online at:

http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/05/inside-the-secret-interrogation-facility-at-bagram/56678/

Inside the Secret Interrogation Facility at Bagram - International - The Atlantic

U.S. Soldier Opiate Abuse Skyrockets

2010-05-07T10:21:00.005-04:00

Original Pentagon email record stated:
Question: Any and all reports on US military members returning to the U.S.
from Afghanistan & requiring rehabilitation or other treatment for opium (and/or derivatives) use.

Answer: Based on enrollments figures from the Army Substance Abuse Program
(ASAP) counseling program, below data represents the total number of all Army Component Soldiers who were enrolled in ASAP counseling with a primary enrollment basis of Opiates Misuse:

2004: 89
2005: 135
2006: 122
2007: 170
2008: 353
2009: 529

*Note: The above enrollment figures with a basis of Opiates Misuse is for the total Army, the ASAP does not have the granularity to break out above enrollment data by those Soldiers who deployed and returned from Afghanistan.

* * *

Number of Soldiers Seeking Opiate Abuse Treatment Skyrockets
Judson Berger ~ FOXNews.com, May 06, 2010

The number of American soldiers seeking treatment for opiate abuse has skyrocketed over the past five years, at a time when the U.S. military has been surging forces into the heart of the world's leading opium producer.

Pentagon statistics obtained by FoxNews.com show that the number of Army soldiers enrolled in Substance Abuse Program counseling for opiates has soared nearly 500 percent -- from 89 in 2004 to 529 last year. The number showed a steady increase almost every year in that time frame -- but it leaped 50 percent last year when the U.S. began surging troops into Afghanistan. Army troop levels in Afghanistan went from 14,000 as of the end of 2004 to 46,400 as of the end of 2009.

The Army did not break down the opiate-use data to show how many of the soldiers had been deployed to Afghanistan or what specific opiates they were using; opiate drugs include morphine, codeine and heroin.

Lt. Col. Christopher Garver, a U.S. Army spokesman, said the military has been monitoring the uptick and is "concerned about it." He said the numbers reflect use not only of heroin, but of prescription drugs, that the abuse may not be "directly correlated to previous deployments," and that the increase could reflect an increase in reporting abuse -- not just drug use itself.

But the abundance and accessibility of heroin in Afghanistan surely account for part of the jump, said Lt. Col. Tony Shaffer, an Army Reserve officer who served in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2004.

Shaffer said heroin abuse had "started to get out of hand" when he was in the country. He said a "black market" existed where troops on U.S. bases would trade goods to local Afghans in exchange for heroin.

"It sounds like it kind of went way beyond that," he said after learning about the statistics. "It's inevitable. ... It's available. It's right there."

Shaffer, who now works with the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, said the availability of the product combined with high stress levels from multiple tours of duty amounts to a dangerous mix that can lead to hard drug abuse.

As a potential measure of Army stress levels, suicides have steadily climbed in recent years. The Army reported there were 160 possible suicides among active-duty soldiers in 2009, up from 140 the year before.

The opiate-use statistics were first obtained by the watchdog group Judicial Watch, which requested them through a Freedom of Information Act inquiry and provided them to FoxNews.com. The Army confirmed the authenticity of the report.

Chris Farrell, director of investigation with Judicial Watch and a former Army intelligence officer, said he sought the data to see what kind of impact Afghanistan's locally produced drug supply may be having on U.S. troops.

"This whole situation detracts, obviously, from mission readiness," he said, noting that actual hard drug use is probably far higher than the numbers show. "It's a public interest issue."

David Rittgers, a former Special Forces officer who served in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2004, said he didn't see opiate abuse among U.S. forces while he was in the war zone, though it was "rampant" in the Afghan forces. But he said the abuse of drugs ranging from painkillers to heroin could also occur after soldiers return home from deployment and have trouble readjusting to life in the States.

"This is an outlet, just as alcohol abuse is an outlet," said Rittgers, who is a reserve JAG officer and clarified that he is not a Pentagon spokesman.

While the number of soldiers seeking treatment has risen dramatically, urinalysis drug tests in Afghanistan do not reflect the trend. According to the Army data, soldiers tested positive for heroin use just twice in the past three years.

Western forces have given mixed signals about how heavily they are targeting opium drug production in Afghanistan, a major source of funding for the Taliban. The DEA said last month that opium seizures rose 924 percent in 2009. But recent reports have said the military is focusing far more on fighting the Taliban than in cutting off the opium supply at the source.

While some say going after opium farming worsens relations between Western forces and the local population, others say eradication is critical.

Gen. Barry McCaffrey, the former U.S. drug czar, said during a speech to the National Association of Addiction Treatment Providers last year that the military risks exposing its troops to drug abuse problems if it doesn't destroy the opium crops.

"I'd be astonished if we don't see soldiers who find 10 kilograms of heroin and pack it up in a birthday cake and send it home to their mother with a note that says, 'Don't open this package until I'm home,'" he said, according to an article on the speech in the Palm Beach Post

See:

FOXNews.com - Number of Soldiers Seeking Opiate Abuse Treatment Skyrockets

Blueprint for CIA's Future Unveiled

2010-05-05T11:00:00.001-04:00

CIA Director Leon E. Panetta Unveils Blueprint for Agency’s Future

April 26, 2010

In remarks this morning to the Agency workforce, Director Leon E. Panetta unveiled CIA 2015, his blueprint for the organization’s future. CIA 2015 is an aggressive plan that builds on outstanding work done since 9/11. Its goal is to ensure that the Agency continues to act decisively on today’s national security challenges—such as terrorism, the proliferation of dangerous technology, cyber threats, and the actions of rogue states—while pivoting more easily toward emerging priorities.

“There’s something I’ve often said about government, but it applies to every organization,” said Director Panetta. “We govern either by leadership or by crisis. Leadership means making tough choices and planning ahead. That’s why we’re taking a hard look at future challenges, and what we want our Agency to look like five years from now. It’s our responsibility to get out in front of any problems, and CIA 2015 will help us do that.”

Director Panetta outlined CIA 2015’s three pillars. The first is investing in people. The CIA will recruit, train, and retain a highly talented and diverse workforce with the strengths to tackle any mission that arises. Bolstering the Agency’s foreign language capabilities is essential to that objective. The plan doubles the number of clandestine officers—and triples the number of analysts—enrolled in language training.

The CIA will enhance its use of more flexible and innovative deployments overseas—including new approaches to cover—paving the way for even better intelligence collection. More co-location of analysts and operators at home and abroad will both enrich the information provided to policymakers and lead to even more operational success in the field. This sort of fusion has more than proved its value over the years, and has been key to victories in counterterrorism and counterproliferation, among other disciplines.

The second pillar is investing in technology to extend the CIA’s operational and analytic reach and become more efficient. Agency personnel must be able to operate effectively and securely in a rapidly changing global information environment. The plan boosts the CIA’s potential for human-enabled technical collection and provides advanced software tools to help Agency officers tackle the huge volume of data they encounter in their work.

The third pillar is to achieve a new level of agility in maintaining the Agency’s global presence and surging for emergencies. The Agency will transform its support platforms around the world and consolidate certain business functions. Director Panetta commended the Agency’s tradition of minimal bureaucracy, a key ingredient in its responsiveness and impact. “When we’re told to get a job done, we can do it,” he said. “But we can’t take anything for granted. As good as we are, we can be better. As capable as we are, we can do more. As smart as we are, we can be tougher.”

He closed by paying tribute to the men and women of the CIA. Noting the bravery that Agency officers so often show—including in situations overseas like natural disasters that go beyond their intelligence charter—Director Panetta said, “You reflect not only America’s strength, but its ingenuity and decency, too.”

“During the course of my career, I’ve come to appreciate the people who truly focus on doing what’s right for the nation. I’m honored to lead this Agency and to be part of its amazing mission. My goal is to build on the strengths of the CIA and keep it the very best intelligence agency in the 21st century. Every generation has dedicated itself to the American dream of giving our children a better life. The test of our success is whether we can give our children a safer world.”

The Director’s session with employees, held in the Headquarters Auditorium, was also broadcast to CIA personnel in the Washington area and overseas.

Operation Mincemeat and Spycraft in World War Two

2010-05-04T16:43:00.003-04:00

Pandora’s Briefcase
It was a dazzling feat of wartime espionage. But does it argue for or against spying?
by Malcolm Gladwell

On April 30, 1943, a fisherman came across a badly decomposed corpse floating in the water off the coast of Huelva, in southwestern Spain. The body was of an adult male dressed in a trenchcoat, a uniform, and boots, with a black attaché case chained to his waist. His wallet identified him as Major William Martin, of the Royal Marines. The Spanish authorities called in the local British vice-consul, Francis Haselden, and in his presence opened the attaché case, revealing an official-looking military envelope. The Spaniards offered the case and its contents to Haselden. But Haselden declined, requesting that the handover go through formal channels—an odd decision, in retrospect, since, in the days that followed, British authorities in London sent a series of increasingly frantic messages to Spain asking the whereabouts of Major Martin’s briefcase.

It did not take long for word of the downed officer to make its way to German intelligence agents in the region. Spain was a neutral country, but much of its military was pro-German, and the Nazis found an officer in the Spanish general staff who was willing to help. A thin metal rod was inserted into the envelope; the documents were then wound around it and slid out through a gap, without disturbing the envelope’s seals. What the officer discovered was astounding. Major Martin was a courier, carrying a personal letter from Lieutenant General Archibald Nye, the vice-chief of the Imperial General Staff, in London, to General Harold Alexander, the senior British officer under Eisenhower in Tunisia. Nye’s letter spelled out what Allied intentions were in southern Europe. American and British forces planned to cross the Mediterranean from their positions in North Africa, and launch an attack on German-held Greece and Sardinia. Hitler transferred a Panzer division from France to the Peloponnese, in Greece, and the German military command sent an urgent message to the head of its forces in the region: “The measures to be taken in Sardinia and the Peloponnese have priority over any others.”

The Germans did not realize—until it was too late—that “William Martin” was a fiction. The man they took to be a high-level courier was a mentally ill vagrant who had eaten rat poison; his body had been liberated from a London morgue and dressed up in officer’s clothing. The letter was a fake, and the frantic messages between London and Madrid a carefully choreographed act. When a hundred and sixty thousand Allied troops invaded Sicily on July 10, 1943, it became clear that the Germans had fallen victim to one of the most remarkable deceptions in modern military history.

The story of Major William Martin is the subject of the British journalist Ben Macintyre’s brilliant and almost absurdly entertaining “Operation Mincemeat” (Harmony; $25.99). The cast of characters involved in Mincemeat, as the caper was called, was extraordinary, and Macintyre tells their stories with gusto. The ringleader was Ewen Montagu, the son of a wealthy Jewish banker and the brother of Ivor Montagu, a pioneer of table tennis and also, in one of the many strange footnotes to the Mincemeat case, a Soviet spy. Ewen Montagu served on the so-called Twenty Committee of the British intelligence services, and carried a briefcase full of classified documents on his bicycle as he rode to work each morning.

MORE . . .
Operation Mincemeat and spycraft in World War Two: newyorker.com

Cui Bono? ~ The Unasked Q of the Anthrax Attacks

2010-04-27T13:14:00.004-04:00

The Wrong Man - Magazine - The Atlantic
By David Freed
May 2010

In the fall of 2001, a nation reeling from the horror of 9/11 was rocked by a series of deadly anthrax attacks. As the pressure to find a culprit mounted, the FBI, abetted by the media, found one. The wrong one. This is the story of how federal authorities blew the biggest anti-terror investigation of the past decade—and nearly destroyed an innocent man. Here, for the first time, the falsely accused, Dr. Steven J. Hatfill, speaks out about his ordeal.

America's Third War Front: Mexico

2010-04-09T14:03:00.006-04:00

The unacknowledged Third War Front that America faces . . . Mexico.

Sheriff To Texas Border Town: 'Arm Yourselves'

AP Exclusive: Sinaloa cartel wins Juarez turf war

As agents clear out Mexican gangs, more brutal ones move in Drug cartels warn: 'Shut up,' or heads will roll

Israel's EMP Weapon Over Iran?

2010-04-09T10:11:00.002-04:00

Friday, April 9, 2010
DEBORCHGRAVE: Of Arms and Armchair Warriors

Arnaud de Borchgrave

It is becoming increasingly difficult to sort fact from fiction between legacy media and the new media of libel-proof blogs sans editors. Blogomocracy is a time-consuming exercise in democracy. Media-watchers say to be well-informed and up to speed, one must scan at least 100 blogs. There's also Wikileaks, a Web-based investigative journalism outfit that recently released a video showing a U.S. Apache helicopter opening fire on a group of men, killing 12, including two Reuters news agency employees on July 12, 2007. The Apache carried a gun camera. WikiLeaks posted 38 minutes of what the gun was doing.

Few have time to keep up with more than one or two blogs. Thus, the one-paragraph scan of the print media online, coupled with the television news scroll, is how many stay "informed."

Debka, a news agency plugged in to Israeli intelligence, with a mixed track record of information frequently coupled with disinformation, reported last month that 387 supersmart bunker-busters originally earmarked for the Israeli air force were diverted en route to Israel to Diego Garcia, a U.S. coral atoll base in the Indian Ocean. This supposedly reflected President Obama's tetchiness over continued Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories, which he sees, correctly, as a major roadblock to the erection of a Palestinian state.

In Israel, and among American Jews, a large segment of opinion sees Iran's nuclear ambitions as an existential threat and would favor pre-emptive air strikes by the Israeli air force. But the leading armchair strategists among them are now saying the U.S. Air Force and Navy are best-equipped to bring the military mullahs to heel. There was a slight hiccup in the facile patter of the warriors who have never heard a weapon fired in anger.

Mr. Obama is dead set against starting something that almost inevitably triggers another war, even though most Gulf Arab leaders would secretly welcome anything that would deprive archrival Iran from becoming a de facto member of the nuclear club. For Mr. Obama, the Iraq war cost the U.S. $1 trillion, and the Afghan war, by the time we're done, another $1 trillion. A military showdown with Iran, and coping with the Revolutionary Guards' retaliatory capabilities up and down the Gulf, in Iraq, in Afghanistan and throughout the Middle Eastern region, would easily cost another trillion.

Three former U.S. Central Command chiefs, now retired, with expert knowledge of the Middle East and all the key players, have said that learning to live with Iran as a nuclear power is wiser than bombing Iran. In their view, it would have to be part of a regional geopolitical deal that would involve the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany.

The former commanders also echo current chief Gen. David H. Petraeus' statement to a Senate hearing that the Arab-Israeli conflict "foments anti-American sentiment" because of the "perception of U.S. favoritism for Israel." Israel's Yediot Aharonot reported Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr., angry over the announcement of 1,600 more housing units in Arab East Jerusalem, saying to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, "This is starting to get dangerous for us. What you're doing here undermines the security of our troops now fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan."

Islamist extremists, from al Qaeda's Osama bin Laden to radical imams in Pakistan's madrassas and in mosques throughout the world, invariably couple the U.S. and Israel in the same sentence.

Mr. Obama already has more problems with Afghanistan than he anticipated when he came out in favor of the war during the presidential campaign. He told us that's where al Qaeda is hiding, so we are still threatened by another Sept. 11. Al Qaeda's Arabs and Pakistanis bugged out of Afghanistan to Pakistan during the battle of Tora Bora in December 2001. Their Uzbek and Tajik fellow terrorists went straight home.

Clearly, Mr. Obama didn't anticipate that America's client-president of the client-state of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, would turn against the United States rather than clean house of embarrassingly rampant corruption.

No sooner had Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates left Kabul than Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad flew in to a warm welcome by Mr. Karzai. Two days later, Mr. Obama flew all the way to Kabul and back (26 hours of flying) for a six-hour visit designed to take Mr. Karzai to the woodshed. The time for cracking down hard on massive corruption in his government was long overdue. For Mr. Karzai, that would be mission impossible. Corruption is an integral part of the Afghan body politic. A backlash was inevitable.

No sooner was Mr. Obama back in the U.S. than Mr. Karzai went so far as to suggest he was prepared to join forces with the Taliban, the enemy, reborn as a resistance movement fighting U.S.-NATO occupation. That, he said, would be preferable to the yoke of American imperialism. He accused the U.S., U.N. and NATO countries of committing fraud in the presidential primary in August and described the Western coalition as "invaders" who are giving the Taliban legitimacy as a "resistance movement." Before week's end, he denied everything. Wow!

Welcome to the high-stakes game of geopolitical poker. As there is no institutional memory in the capital of the world's most powerful nation, no one remembers that throughout the Vietnam War, various presidents, selected covertly by the United States and totally dependent on it, turned on their protector to demonstrate their mythical independence.

The United States and Russia signed a new "landmark" nuclear arms treaty on Thursday designed to create an incentive for North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons and for Iran not to produce any. Both America and Russia will still possess several thousand nuclear-tipped missiles and bombs, and neither Pyongyang nor Tehran is likely to scrap their nuclear plans.

This leaves the Obama administration with a pledged military withdrawal from Iraq this summer as suicide bombers return to sectarian and ethnic bloodletting, threatening to destroy a U.S.-engineered experiment in democracy; an Afghan ally threatening to join forces with the Taliban enemy; and the painful dilemma of Iran, against which draconian sanctions are no longer possible.

If Israel decided to explode an electromagnetic pulse weapon over Iran, the latest hot rumor in the blogosphere, and fry all electric appliances, including those at 27 nuclear sites, would Mr. Obama disown America's closest ally? Such a high-altitude nuclear explosion would, inevitably, cause collateral electrical damage in neighboring countries, e.g., Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and Afghanistan. The answer: a loud yes.

Arnaud de Borchgrave is editor-at-large of The Washington Times and of United Press International.

Israeli Espionage Charges Over Targeted Killings of Palestinians

2010-04-08T11:35:00.004-04:00

Israel Lifts Gag Order in Ex-Soldier Spy Case
Associated Press

JERUSALEM—Israel lifted a months-long gag order on a military espionage case Thursday, confirming the house arrest of a former female soldier charged with leaking more than 2,000 military documents to a newspaper.

Anat Kamm, 23 years old, has been under house arrest since December, but the case was kept under wraps by a court-imposed gag order. The restrictions were eased Thursday after details of the case were reported by foreign media, including The Associated Press.

The indictment was released with some parts still censored and it revealed new details on the case, including allegations that Ms. Kamm copied more than 2,000 classified military documents and relayed them to the Haaretz newspaper. Some 700 were classified as "top secret."

The indictment charges Ms. Kamm with passing information with the intent of harming national security. Her lawyer, Eitan Lehman, denied this.

"At no stage of this affair was Israel's security damaged. Certainly, there was no intent to do so," he said.

The Justice Ministry said the gag order was necessary for security reasons and to allow officials to try to recover the classified documents. Only some of the documents were recovered, it said, in part because the Haaretz journalist who allegedly got them has left the country.

The gag order drew harsh criticism from local media because the foreign reports were easily accessible over the Internet. In some cases, local newspapers published Web sites with the reports, or even copies of foreign reports, with all relevant names and details blacked out.

Prosecutors allege Ms. Kamm was the source for a Haaretz story accusing the military of killing Palestinian militants in violation of a Supreme Court ruling.

Israel's targeted killing policy was one of its most contentious in its years of bloody battle against a Palestinian uprising that began in 2000. Critics charged it to be illegal extrajudicial killing, while supporters credit it with quashing the Palestinian campaign of suicide bombings and shooting attacks.

In late 2006, Israel's Supreme Court set strict restrictions on assassinations in the West Bank, limiting them to extraordinary cases. Officially, the military stopped the practice following the ruling.

The Haaretz report cited a document from March 2007 that included an order from Maj. Gen. Yair Naveh, then the top Israeli commander in the West Bank, permitting firing upon three top Palestinian militants even if they didn't pose clear and present dangers.

That summer, one of the men, Ziad Malaisha of Islamic Jihad, was killed in Jenin. Experts interviewed by Haaretz said the order was illegal. Gen. Naveh told Haaretz at the time that the killing was justified and didn't violate the court ruling. Gen. Naveh is now retired and refused comment.

At the time of the memos, Ms. Kamm served in Gen. Naveh's office. "All the newspaper stories were published with the consent of the (military) censor. If she posed a threat to national security, she would not have been allowed to stay home and continue working," Ms. Kamm's lawyer Mr. Lehman said.

Israel requires reporters to submit stories to a military censor that can block publication of information deemed damaging to national security. The gag order in the case was issued by a court, not the military censor.

The Haaretz reporter who wrote the story, Uri Blau, recently was assigned to London and believed to be in possession of some of the sensitive documents. Neither Mr. Blau nor Haaretz officials were immediately available for comment.

Ms. Kamm became a media columnist for the Walla Web site after completing her mandatory military service. The charges against her don't relate to her journalistic activities.

PENTAGON: Replace HUMINT with "GuardDog"

2010-03-30T09:32:00.004-04:00

PENTAGON: Replace HUMINT with "GuardDog"

By Katie Drummond
March 29, 2010 |
2:15 pm |
Categories: DarpaWatch

U.S troops operating overseas face insurgent threats and affiliations that are constantly changing. Not to mention the language barriers and cultural differences that can make even minor interactions — let alone intelligence and interrogation — more difficult.

Now Darpa, the Pentagon’s blue-sky research arm, wants to develop a foolproof system that analyzes social networks and cultural tendencies using graphs, complex algorithms and new advances in computing, to interpret and predict human actions.

The agency is hosting a proposal workshop for Graph Understanding and Analysis for Rapid Detection - Deployed on the Ground (priceless acronym: GUARD-DOG). Ideally, Darpa wants a replacement for current war-zone human intelligence, called HUMINT, which involves putting trained interrogators on the ground, identifying and tracking sources, and compiling data on relevant social networks. HUMINT is effective, but it can be dogged by slow turnaround: As Darpa notes, the lag between data collection and analysis can be 48 hours. And that means more than 80 percent of information may be irrelevant by the time troops take action.

A computerized intel analysis system, however, could rapidly grasp the size and complexity of the “human terrain,” and create new scenarios based on constantly-updated inputs. The real-world social networks in which troops operate have thousands of variables: people, locations, social affiliations, and organizations, to name a few. Spotting one small, hard-to-detect change in that landscape can be significant.

And Darpa wants more than just mind-bendingly fast analysis: the new programs should also be able to fill in the blanks. “Real-world social networks are likely to contain conflicting information and have missing data,” the agency’s proposal reads. “Patrols are also likely to be given false or misleading information.” So where human intel collectors might not pick up on inconsistencies, algorithmic interpreters somehow will. (Good luck with that — Ed.)

Having real-time access to the ins-and-outs of communities, whether friendly or hostile — not to mention accurate predictions of how those communities are apt to evolve — would be invaluable to troops operating among foreign cultures. Not to mention that it might teach them how to win friends and influence people.

“GUARD DOG will provid[e] dismounted soldiers with real-time assessments of the human networks relevant to their local battlespace, including threats, vulnerabilities, and uncertainties; and cues on engaging the people they encounter.”

China Exposes US Power Grid Vulnerability

2010-03-22T16:26:00.003-04:00

Academic Paper in China Sets Off Alarms in U.S.
By JOHN MARKOFF and DAVID BARBOZA
The New York Times
March 20, 2010

It came as a surprise this month to Wang Jianwei, a graduate engineering student in Liaoning, China, that he had been described as a potential cyberwarrior before the United States Congress.

Larry M. Wortzel, a military strategist and China specialist, told the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 10 that it should be concerned because “Chinese researchers at the Institute of Systems Engineering of Dalian University of Technology published a paper on how to attack a small U.S. power grid sub-network in a way that would cause a cascading failure of the entire U.S.”

When reached by telephone, Mr. Wang said he and his professor had indeed published “Cascade-Based Attack Vulnerability on the U.S. Power Grid” in an international journal called Safety Science last spring. But Mr. Wang said he had simply been trying to find ways to enhance the stability of power grids by exploring potential vulnerabilities.

“We usually say ‘attack’ so you can see what would happen,” he said. “My emphasis is on how you can protect this. My goal is to find a solution to make the network safer and better protected.” And independent American scientists who read his paper said it was true: Mr. Wang’s work was a conventional technical exercise that in no way could be used to take down a power grid.

The difference between Mr. Wang’s explanation and Mr. Wortzel’s conclusion is of more than academic interest. It shows that in an atmosphere already charged with hostility between the United States and China over cybersecurity issues, including large-scale attacks on computer networks, even a misunderstanding has the potential to escalate tension and set off an overreaction.

“Already people are interpreting this as demonstrating some kind of interest that China would have in disrupting the U.S. power grid,” said Nart Villeneuve, a researcher with the SecDev Group, an Ottawa-based cybersecurity research and consulting group. “Once you start interpreting every move that a country makes as hostile, it builds paranoia into the system.”

Mr. Wortzel’s presentation at the House hearing got a particularly strong reaction from Representative Ed Royce, Republican of California, who called the flagging of the Wang paper “one thing I think jumps out to all of these Californians here today, or should.”

He was alluding to concerns that arose in 2001 when The Los Angeles Times reported that intrusions into the network that controlled the electrical grid were traced to someone in Guangdong Province, China. Later reports of other attacks often included allegations that the break-ins were orchestrated by the Chinese, although no proof has been produced.

In an interview last week about the Wang paper and his testimony, Mr. Wortzel said that the intention of these particular researchers almost did not matter.

“My point is that now that vulnerability is out there all over China for anybody to take advantage of,” he said.

But specialists in the field of network science, which explores the stability of networks like power grids and the Internet, said that was not the case.

“Neither the authors of this article, nor any other prior article, has had information on the identity of the power grid components represented as nodes of the network,” Reka Albert, a University of Pennsylvania physicist who has conducted similar studies, said in an e-mail interview. “Thus no practical scenarios of an attack on the real power grid can be derived from such work.”

The issue of Mr. Wang’s paper aside, experts in computer security say there are genuine reasons for American officials to be wary of China, and they generally tend to dismiss disclaimers by China that it has neither the expertise nor the intention to carry out the kind of attacks that bombard American government and computer systems by the thousands every week.

The trouble is that it is so easy to mask the true source of a computer network attack that any retaliation is fraught with uncertainty. This is why a war of words, like the high-pitched one going on these past months between the United States and China, holds special peril, said John Arquilla, director of the Information Operations Center at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif.

“What we know from network science is that dense communications across many different links and many different kinds of links can have effects that are highly unpredictable,” Mr. Arquilla said. Cyberwarfare is in some ways “analogous to the way people think about biological weapons — that once you set loose such a weapon it may be very hard to control where it goes,” he added.

Tension between China and the United States intensified earlier this year after Google threatened to withdraw from doing business in China, saying that it had evidence of Chinese involvement in a sophisticated Internet intrusion. A number of reports, including one last October by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, of which Mr. Wortzel is vice chairman, have used strong language about the worsening threat of computer attacks, particularly from China.

“A large body of both circumstantial and forensic evidence strongly indicates Chinese state involvement in such activities, whether through the direct actions of state entities or through the actions of third-party groups sponsored by the state,” that report stated.

Mr. Wang’s research subject was particularly unfortunate because of the widespread perception, particularly among American military contractors and high-technology firms, that adversaries are likely to attack critical infrastructure like the United States electric grid.

Mr. Wang said in the interview that he chose the United States grid for his study basically because it was the easiest way to go. China does not publish data on power grids, he said. The United States does and had had several major blackouts; and, as he reads English, it was the only country he could find with accessible, useful data. He said that he was an “emergency events management” expert and that he was “mainly studying when a point in a network becomes ineffective.”

“I chose the electricity system because the grid can best represent how power currents flow through a network,” he said. “I just wanted to do theoretical research.”

The paper notes the vulnerability of different types of computer networks to “intentional” attacks. The authors suggest that certain types of attacks may generate a domino-style cascading collapse of an entire network. “It is expected that our findings will be helpful for real-life networks to protect the key nodes selected effectively and avoid cascading-failure-induced disasters,” the authors wrote.

Mr. Wang’s paper cites the network science research of Albert-Laszlo Barabasi, a physicist at Northeastern University. Dr. Barabasi has written widely on the potential vulnerability of networks to so-called engineered attacks.

“I am not well vested in conspiracy theories,” Dr. Barabasi said in an interview, “but this is a rather mainstream topic that is done for a wide range of networks, and, even in the area of power transmission, is not limited to the U.S. system — there are similar studies for power grids all over the world.”

NATO's New HUMINT Center in Romania

2010-03-18T16:20:00.002-04:00

Inauguration of NATO HUMINT Centre in Oradea
Date: 17-03-2010
Posted: http://www.actmedia.eu/2010/03/17/top+story/inauguration+of+nato+humint+centre+in+oradea/26263

Romania's President Traian Basescu on Tuesday told the opening ceremony in the western city of Oradea of a HUMINT human intelligence Excellence Centre that the emergence of this institution will significantly contribute toward the development of the operational capabilities and the grounding of the NATO policy in the area of human intelligence gathering.

Basescu said the establishment of the centre is supporting the process of transformation which the Alliance has pledged to carry through, a process that is deemed vital to its adjusting to the new security threats, which, given the complex and modern profile of it, is generating real interest among the future beneficiaries, that is the NATO structures and the allies.

'I want to voice satisfaction over the fact that during all this time Romania has enjoyed the partnership of Greece, Hungary, Slovenia and Turkey. They will be joined in by the US and Slovakia, both countries where internal procedures for accession are at a final stage now. The contribution of all these allies underscores the world profile and the idea of joint efforts being put to the service of achieving the NATO's objectives,' the President said.

President Basescu on Tuesday cut the ribbon to the NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence, an elite institution dealing with training NATO intelligence and counterintelligence officers. Also attending the opening ceremony were Defence Minister Gabriel Oprea; Chief of the Romanian Army Staff Gheorghe Marin and officials of the sponsor countries - Greece, Slovenia, Turkey and Hungary - all of which have contributed toward the opening of the centre.

The NATO Excellence Centre in Oradea has 80 military staff, 16 of whom come from the four sponsor nations. They are expected to move in to Oradea with their family in the near future. The centre will offer various courses of between five and 3-4 weeks , according to the educational models to be adopted by the Alliance. Commander Simion mentioned that the number of the non-commissioned and commissioned officers that will attend the training courses in Oradea will run into hundreds and even thousands in one year.

The main mission of the centre in Oradea is to provide a one-stop reference point that will take care of the trainingtg, policy making and standardisation of the intelligence expertise of NATO and help the Alliance prefigure the future developments in its HUMINT capabilities.

Besides Romania, which is a founding country, Greece, Slovenia, Turkey and Hungary have signed a memorandum of understanding with Romania, will provide its own staff to the centre until mid-year. Two more nations, the US and Slovakia, are expected to sign the documents that will allow them to join the project as soon as possible.

The centre was accredited this February by a NATO board. The establishment of the HUMINT&CI Centre in Oradea was unanimously approved by the Romanian Parliament at a plenary session of its two chambers in June 2008.There are currently 18 NATO centres of excellence, five of which are now undergoing accreditation.

US Army Re: Wikileaks & Secrets

2010-03-16T14:16:00.003-04:00

U.S. Army Worried about Wikileaks in Secret Report
by Declan Mccullagh
CNET
March 15, 2010 11:43 AM PDT

A leaked US Army intelligence report, classified as secret, says the Wikileaks Web site poses a significant "operational security and information security" threat to military operations.

Classified U.S. military information appearing on Wikileaks could "influence operations against the U.S. Army by a variety of domestic and foreign actors," says the report, prepared in 2008 by the Army Counterintelligence Center and apparently disclosed in its entirety on Monday.

The embarrassing twist: It was Wikileaks that published the 32-page document, but not before editor Julian Assange prepended a critique saying some details in the Army report were inaccurate and its recommendations flawed.

One section of the original document says "criminal prosecution" of anyone leaking sensitive information could "deter others considering similar actions from using the Wikileaks.org Web site." Another speculates that Wikileaks--which boasts that it is "uncensorable"--is "knowingly encouraging criminal activities," including violation of national security laws regarding sedition and espionage.

Lt. Col Lee Packnett, a spokesman for the U.S. Army on intelligence topics, said he was not familiar with the Wikileaks disclosure and would not immediately be able to comment. The National Ground Intelligence Center, which provides the Army with information about enemy weapons system and was mentioned in the report, did not immediately respond to a query from CNET.

Under the federal Espionage Act, it is a crime to disclose "information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States" (18 USC 793(e)). Another section says even indirect disclosures of national defense information to foreign citizens can be punished, in certain cases, by death (18 USC 794(a)).

Some First Amendment scholars have argued that those portions of the federal code cannot survive legal scrutiny--otherwise, as a few conservative commentators have claimed, The New York Times' disclosure of Bush-era warrantless wiretapping would have been a crime. In a since-abandoned prosecution of two former pro-Israel lobbyists charged with disclosing classified U.S. defense information, however, a federal judge had ruled that the balance struck by the Espionage Act "is constitutionally permissible."

Wikileaks has disclosed classified U.S. Defense Department information before. A 2004 report about Fallujah also marked secret was highlighted repeatedly as an example of damaging disclosure in the document released Monday.

The document no longer appears to exist on Wikileaks' Web site. A previous location now returns the error message: "The resource you are looking for has been removed, had its name changed, or is temporarily unavailable." (Wikileaks' Assange did not immediately reply when asked for an explanation.)

Wikileaks previously disclosed thousands of pages of pager logs from September 11, 2001, and won a case in federal court in San Francisco, after a Swiss bank attempted to pull the plug on the entire Web site. It shut down briefly last month because of lack of funds.

"While we will not comment on whether this is, in fact, an official document, we do consider the deliberate release of what Wikileaks believes to be a classified document is irresponsible and, if valid, could put U.S. military personnel at risk," Rear Adm. Gregory J. Smith, a spokesman for American military command in Baghdad, told The New York Times after Wikileaks posted a classified 2005 document about rules of engagement in that country.

Sex & Spies

2010-03-13T21:44:00.003-05:00

The History of the Honey Trap
Five lessons for would-be James Bonds and Bond girls -- and the men and women who would resist them.
Foreign Policy
BY PHILLIP KNIGHTLEY | MARCH 12, 2010

MI5 is worried about sex. In a 14-page document distributed last year to hundreds of British banks, businesses, and financial institutions, titled "The Threat from Chinese Espionage," the famed British security service described a wide-ranging Chinese effort to blackmail Western businesspeople over sexual relationships. The document, as the London Times reported in January, explicitly warns that Chinese intelligence services are trying to cultivate "long-term relationships" and have been known to "exploit vulnerabilities such as sexual relationships ... to pressurise individuals to co-operate with them."This latest report on Chinese corporate espionage tactics is only the most recent installment in a long and sordid history of spies and sex. For millennia, spymasters of all sorts have trained their spies to use the amorous arts to obtain secret information.

The trade name for this type of spying is the "honey trap." And it turns out that both men and women are equally adept at setting one -- and equally vulnerable to tumbling in. Spies use sex, intelligence, and the thrill of a secret life as bait. Cleverness, training, character, and patriotism are often no defense against a well-set honey trap. And as in normal life, no planning can take into account that a romance begun in deceit might actually turn into a genuine, passionate affair. In fact, when an East German honey trap was exposed in 1997, one of the women involved refused to believe she had been deceived, even when presented with the evidence. "No, that's not true," she insisted. "He really loved me."

Those who aim to perfect the art of the honey trap in the future, as well as those who seek to insulate themselves, would do well to learn from honey trap history. Of course, there are far too many stories -- too many dramas, too many rumpled bedsheets, rattled spouses, purloined letters, and ruined lives -- to do that history justice here. Yet one could begin with five famous stories and the lessons they offer for honey-trappers, and honey-trappees, everywhere.

1. Don't Follow That Girl

In 1986, Mordechai Vanunu, an Israeli technician who had worked in Israel's Dimona nuclear facility, went to the British newspapers with his claim that Israel had developed atomic bombs. His statement was starkly at odds with Israel's official policy of nuclear ambiguity -- and he had photos to prove it.

The period of negotiation among the newspapers was tense, and at one point the London Sunday Times was keeping Vanunu hidden in a secret location in suburban London while it attempted to verify his story. But Vanunu got restless. He announced to his minders at the paper that he had met a young woman while visiting tourist attractions in London and that they were planning a romantic weekend in Rome.

The newspaper felt it had no right to prevent Vanunu from leaving. It was a huge mistake: Soon after arriving in Rome with his lady friend, Vanunu was seized by Mossad officers, forcibly drugged, and smuggled out of Italy by ship to Israel, where he was eventually put on trial for treason. Vanunu served 18 years in jail, 11 years of it in solitary confinement. Released in 2004, he is still confined to Israel under tight restrictions, which include not being allowed to meet with foreigners or talk about his experiences. Britain has never held an inquiry into the affair.

The woman who set the honey trap was a Mossad officer, Cheryl Ben Tov, code-named "Cindy." Born in Orlando, Fla., she was married to an officer of the Israeli security service. After the operation, she was given a new identity to prevent reprisals, and eventually she left Israel to return to the United States. But her role in the Vanunu affair was vital. The Mossad could not have risked a diplomatic incident by kidnapping Vanunu from British soil, so he had to be lured abroad -- an audacious undertaking, but in this case a successful one.

2. Take Favors from No One

One of the best-known honey traps in spy history involves Mata Hari, a Dutch woman who had spent some years as an erotic dancer in Java. (Greta Garbo played her in a famous 1931 film.) During World War I, the French arrested her on charges of spying for the Germans, based on their discovery through intercepted telegrams that the German military attaché in Spain was sending her money. The French claimed that the German was her control officer and she was passing French secrets to him, secrets she had obtained by seducing prominent French politicians and officers.

During the trial, Mata Hari defended herself vigorously, claiming that she was the attaché's mistress and he was sending her gifts. But her arguments did not convince her judges. She died by firing squad on Oct. 15, 1917, refusing a blindfold.

After the war, the French admitted that they had no real evidence against her. The conclusion by most modern historians has been that she was shot not because she was running a honey trap operation, but to send a powerful message to any women who might be tempted to follow her example. The lesson here, perhaps, is that resembling a honey trap can be as dangerous as actually being one.

3. Beware the Media

Sometimes a country's entire journalism corps can fall into an apparent honey trap. Yevgeny Ivanov was a Soviet attaché in London in the early 1960s. He was a handsome, personable officer and a popular figure on the British diplomatic and social scene, a frequent guest at parties given by society osteopath Stephen Ward.

Ward was famous for inviting the pick of London's beautiful young women to his gatherings. One of them was Christine Keeler, a scatterbrained '60s "good-time girl" who supposedly became Ivanov's mistress. Unfortunately for everyone involved, Keeler was the lover of the married British MP and Secretary of State for War John Profumo, who was then working on plans with the United States to station cruise missiles in Germany.

In 1963, Profumo's affair with Keeler was exposed in the press. Britain's famed scandal sheets also blew up the Soviet spy/honey trap angle, for which there was no evidence. Profumo was forced to resign for lying about the affair to the House of Commons. His wife forgave him, but his career was ruined.

Ivanov was recalled to Moscow, where he lived out his days pouring ridicule on the whole story: "It is ludicrous to think that Christine Keeler could have said to John Profumo in bed one night, 'Oh, by the way, darling, when are the cruise missiles going to arrive in Germany?'" He was probably right: When the media gets hold of a potential honey trap, the truth is easily lost.

4. The Deadliest of Honey Traps

Not all honey traps are heterosexual ones. In fact, during less tolerant eras, a homosexual honey trap with a goal of blackmail could be just as effective as using women as bait.

Take the tragic story of Jeremy Wolfenden, the London Daily Telegraph's correspondent in Moscow in the early 1960s. Wolfenden was doubly vulnerable to KGB infiltration: He spoke Russian, and he was gay. Seizing its opportunity, the KGB ordered the Ministry of Foreign Trade's barber to seduce him and put a man with a camera in Wolfenden's closet to take compromising photos. The KGB then blackmailed Wolfenden, threatening to pass on the photographs to his employer if he did not spy on the Western community in Moscow.

Wolfenden reported the incident to his embassy, but the official British reaction was not what he expected. On his next visit to London, he was called to see an officer from the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) who asked him to work as a double agent, leading the KGB along but continuing to report back to SIS.

The stress led Wolfenden into alcoholism. He tried to end his career as a spy, marrying a British woman he had met in Moscow, arranging a transfer from Moscow to the Daily Telegraph's Washington bureau, and telling friends he had put his espionage days behind him.

But the spy life was not so easily left behind. After encountering his old SIS handler at a British Embassy party in Washington in 1965, Wolfenden was again pulled back into the association. His life fell into a blur of drunkenness. On Dec. 28, 1965, when he was 31, he died, apparently from a cerebral hemorrhage caused by a fall in the bathroom. His friends believed, no matter what the actual cause of death, that between them, the KGB and the SIS had sapped his will to live.

Ironically, his time as a spy probably produced little useful material for either side. His colleagues weren't giving him any information because they were warned that he was talking to the KGB, and the Soviets weren't likely to give him anything either. In this case, the honey pot proved deadly -- with little purpose for anyone.

5. All the Single Ladies

The broadest honey trap in intelligence history was probably the creation of the notorious East German spymaster, Markus Wolf. In the early 1950s, Wolf recognized that, with marriageable German men killed in large numbers during World War II and more and more German women turning to careers, the higher echelons of German government, commerce, and industry were now stocked with lonely single women, ripe -- in his mind -- for the temptations of a honey trap.

Wolf set up a special department of the Stasi, East Germany's security service, and staffed it with his most handsome, intelligent officers. He called them "Romeo spies." Their assignment was to infiltrate West Germany, seek out powerful, unmarried women, romance them, and squeeze from them all their secrets.

Thanks to the Romeo spies and their honey traps, the Stasi penetrated most levels of the West German government and industry. At one stage, the East Germans even had a spy inside NATO who was able to give information on the West's deployment of nuclear weapons. Another used her connections to become a secretary in the office of the West German chancellor, Helmut Schmidt.

The scheme lost its usefulness when the West German counterintelligence authorities devised a simple way of identifying the Stasi officers as soon as they arrived in West Germany: They sported distinctly different haircuts -- the practical "short back and sides" variety instead of the fashionable, elaborate West German style. Alerted by train guards, counterintelligence officers would follow the Romeo spies and arrest them at their first wrong move.

Three of the women were caught and tried, but in general the punishment was lenient. One woman who managed to penetrate West German intelligence was sentenced to only six and a half years in prison, probably because ordinary West Germans had some sympathy with the women. Wolf himself faced trial twice after the collapse of communism but received only a two-year suspended sentence, given the confusion of whether an East German citizen could be guilty of treachery to West Germany.

Unlike most spymasters, Wolf preserved his own thoughts on his experience for posterity in his autobiography, Man Without a Face. Wolf denied that he put pressure on his officers to use die Liebe to do their jobs; it was up to the officers themselves: "They were sharp operators who realized that a lot can be done with sex. This is true in business and espionage because it opens up channels of communication more quickly than other approaches."

How about the morality of it all? Wolf replied for all spymasters when he wrote, "As long as there is espionage, there will be Romeos seducing unsuspecting [targets] with access to secrets." Yet he maintains: "I was running an intelligence service, not a lonely-hearts club."

Subversion & Espionage

CIA's Panetta Shakes up His Spy Corps - Washington Whispers (usnews.com)

British Intelligence and the 1916 Mediation Mission of Colonel Edward M. House - Intelligence and National Security

Abstract

The Golden Age of Soviet Espionage

The End of German Military Counterintelligence?

Intelligence Applications of Hypnosis

1917 -- Spies & Saboteurs!

Help Wanted -- CIA & NSA

Turkish "Surprise"? Um, I don't think so . . .

Comment re: WikiLeaks

Espionage Case Breaks at Fort Bragg

Army Stonewalls on Probe of Spying on US Civilians

Mexican-American Intel Center Profiled

Nordic Govts Supposedly Bristle @ CIA Ops

Shcherbakov's Defection

Nicholson & Son Espionage Services, Inc.

For Once, Security Trumps (Chinese) $$$

CIA Control of SF?

Shin Bet Counter-Terror Strategy Outline

Yet More Chinese Espionage

Chinese Espionage (again)

Turkish Espionage, Sex and Blackmail

MI6 Chief: 1st Ever Public Speech - Transcript

Another Hess Theory Involving MI6

China's Efforts to Control US Telecom

Any Differences with Today's Russian Army?

Atomic Bomb Secrets Espionage Courier

Jordan Trains Afghans

Vickers, DoD Intel Chief

Army's New Reg on Espionage, Subversion, Terror . . .

First World War Officially Ends

The Legacy of the OSS

Sarkozy's Watergate?

Norway's "Greatest Spy Case" Under Review

NYPD Antiterror Unit

Further Reporting on the Censorship Idiocy

Desperately Trying to Silence Tony Shaffer (unsuccessfully)

Russia's Security State IS the New Nobility

Reassuring that Some Things Never Change

Austro-Hungarian Empire Framework for Today

Cover for Status Can Be Fun!

Obama Justice Contaminates UK MoD

Britain's special forces are at the centre of a criminal investigation following allegations soldiers from a covert unit tortured and abused suspected insurgents in Iraq.

Russians Penetrate Czech Generals' Offices

Germany commemorates failed anti-Hitler plot - The Local

American Leftist Spies Won't Enjoy Castro Treatment

With Russia, Little Ever Really Changes

By EVAN PEREZ

Espionage or Globalism?

Forgotten Heroes of Military Intelligence

Main Wikileaks Source Outed - Politics - The Atlantic

500 Top Secret CIA Documents on Interrogation Briefings to Congress

Ukranians Roll Over for Russia's FSB

Naxalite's Winning?

Interrogation Facility at Bagram

Inside the Secret Interrogation Facility at Bagram

By Marc Ambinder

U.S. Soldier Opiate Abuse Skyrockets

Blueprint for CIA's Future Unveiled

Operation Mincemeat and Spycraft in World War Two

Cui Bono? ~ The Unasked Q of the Anthrax Attacks

America's Third War Front: Mexico

Israel's EMP Weapon Over Iran?

Israeli Espionage Charges Over Targeted Killings of Palestinians

PENTAGON: Replace HUMINT with "GuardDog"

PENTAGON: Replace HUMINT with "GuardDog"

By Katie Drummond March 29, 2010 | 2:15 pm | Categories: DarpaWatch

China Exposes US Power Grid Vulnerability

NATO's New HUMINT Center in Romania

US Army Re: Wikileaks & Secrets

Sex & Spies

By Katie Drummond
March 29, 2010 |
2:15 pm |
Categories: DarpaWatch