Tuesday, February 8, 2011
Saturday, January 29, 2011
British Intelligence and the 1916 Mediation Mission of Colonel Edward M. House - Intelligence and National Security
British Intelligence and the 1916 Mediation Mission of Colonel Edward M. House - Intelligence and National Security
Abstract
Colonel Edward M. House, the close personal confidant of American President Woodrow Wilson, disembarked in Great Britain in January 1916 on a mission to bring the First World War to a close under the auspices of American mediation. Although his mission, which culminated in a secret pact between the United States and Great Britain known as the House-Grey Memorandum, has been studied by several scholars, the involvement of British intelligence with respect to that mission has never received more than cursory attention. Through a careful analysis of the surviving documents, this article reconstructs British intelligence's activities with respect to House's mission, examines the countermeasures that House employed as he attempted to protect the secrecy of his negotiations, delineates the role played by different British intelligence agencies and assesses their response to their findings.
Monday, January 3, 2011
The Golden Age of Soviet Espionage
Andrei Vandenko, Itogi 4:18PM GMT 02 Jan 2011 -- UK Telegraph
Yuri Kobaladze was a spy for Russia, and for seven years (1977 to 1984) he was based in London. He lifts the lid on his time as a Cold Warrior
Were you recruited to spy as soon as you entered the Moscow State Institute of International Relations?
Everything happened when I was working at TASS [the government-controlled news network]. From there I went to the third (English) section of the First Main Administration of the KGB.
When did your wife find out that your work in journalism was just a front?
I told her even before we were married, but after that I tried to let Alla know as little as possible. Only once did I ever ask her to help me – by making a phone call, that was all. Her hands were trembling, her face was streaming with sweat. After that, I promised myself never ever to do that again.
Where did you learn the craft of espionage?
At the Krasnoznamenny Institute of the KGB. The focus was on foreign languages and special disciplines. The craft of espionage hasn’t changed much in recent decades. The methods and approaches are the same, only the technical equipment has improved.
Did the English know you were a spy from the start?
It wasn’t difficult to figure out. All they had to do was compare my work schedule with Boris Kalyagin’s (a London correspondent), compare the frequency of visits to the embassy, notice a certain license in my behaviour and an abundance of contacts.
There were some amusing episodes. Kalyagin set up an interview with the editor of an influential paper. I acted as cameraman and I asked Kalyagin to pose questions that interested me. But he became so wrapped up in the conversation that he forgot all about my request. What to do? The interview was over and as I was gathering up the equipment, I asked the interviewee, by the way, as it were: “Mister Smith, what do you think about US-Chinese relations?” Mister Smith looked up for a second, grinned and said: “Russia is an invincible country if even the cameramen are interested in such questions.”
Some of our best sources were British journalists. The irony is that these reporters thought the real Soviet correspondents were the spies, not us. We would travel all over the country in search of information, then be up all night getting pickled in pubs with our British colleagues.
I had some real friends among those English reporters, despite the fact that the years when I was based in England were not the easiest in terms of relations between our countries. Those were the years of Margaret Thatcher, her relationship with America, missiles aimed at the “evil empire”, and Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Every day was so tense.
I’ll never forget the scene with [theatre director] Yuri Lyubimov when he was invited to London to stage Crime and Punishment . On the eve of his arrival, we received a telegram saying that the director, famous for his anti-Soviet remarks, should be watched carefully. He was indeed very forthright; Yuri called a spade a spade.
He became the subject of a heated debate at a Party meeting an the embassy. What should be done about this man who publicly insulted the Motherland? In the end, the decision was taken to send a messenger to the theatre to give Lyubimov a stern talking-to and ask him to come to the embassy “for a conversation”.
Pasha, the cultural attaché, was nominated for this task, the sweetest and quietest of men. The day of the premiere, the press and their photographers were jostling backstage. Pasha, feeling horribly nervous, walked up to Lyubimov and was at pains to choose the right words: “The ambassador would like to see you since certain remarks of yours…” Lyubimov didn’t let him finish and began shouting: “They’ve sent a KGB agent in here! He’s threatening me with reprisals!”
By then Lyubimov had decided to remain in the West. He needed an excuse to create a public scandal, and here it was. Poor Pasha couldn’t get out of the theatre fast enough. The last thing he said to Lyubimov in his panic was: “Watch out, Yuri Petrovich! There’s been a crime, beware the punishment!” The phrase was splashed across the front pages with commentary to match. The editors claimed that the bony arm of the KGB was at the maestro’s throat. That’s how legends are born. It all happened before my eyes; but the “office” had nothing to do with it.
Did Britain try to recruit you?
The British knew very well with whom it made sense to ingratiate themselves, and with whom it was useless.
No one came near me, but they did try to lure a friend of mine.
They promised him a house, a car, a job and half a million pounds in expenses – a colossal sum. I guess they had some compromising information about him, although even now my friend won’t tell me what it was.
At the time he said to his would-be recruiters: “How will I be able to look my father in the eye?” They gave up… it’s not everyone who can live with a sin on his soul, though traitors try to justify their treason.
Oleg Gordievsky cultivated the image of a Soviet Kim Philby who, in essence, was a traitor. Philby first chose the path of serving communism and only then entered into contact with Soviet intelligence and, at its request, went to work for British intelligence. Oleg, too, tries to give the impression that he went over to the enemy not because of money, but for reasons of ideology.
I consider myself a fortunate person. It’s through my work that I came to know people whom I would never have met otherwise – people who became my friends.
I feel nostalgic for Britain.By means of natural selection I have come to the conclusion that there is nothing better than a 16-year-old Lagavulin whisky, which I first tried in England. Later, in the Nineties in Moscow, everyone became interested in whisky, and I was regularly called in as an expert.
By the way, I once beat the owners of a London pub in their traditional beer-drinking contest: a yard of ale. The Englishmen were disgraced. They didn’t realise that here was a Georgian able to drink from a horn!
In short, I left a bright trail in the history of Britain, and when my tour was over Margaret Thatcher’s press secretary was at my farewell party. I doubt he knew I worked for Soviet intelligence, he wouldn’t have come if he had, but I was pleased.
Curriculum Vitae: Yuri Kobaladze
NATIONALITY:
Georgian
AGE:
61
STATUS:
Married, with two daughters
EDUCATION:
Moscow Institute of International Relations, graduating in International Journalism (1972).
EXPERIENCE:
• Foreign Intelligence Service of the KGB (1972-1999)
• Soviet news agency TASS
• British correspondent, Gosteleradio
• Central office of PGU, KGB
• Director, press bureau of the Foreign Intelligence Service
• First deputy director, news agency ITAR-TASS
• Since 2000: executive director of investment bank Renaissance Capital; later managing director of retail group X5.
Yuri Kobaladze was a spy for Russia, and for seven years (1977 to 1984) he was based in London. He lifts the lid on his time as a Cold Warrior
Were you recruited to spy as soon as you entered the Moscow State Institute of International Relations?
Everything happened when I was working at TASS [the government-controlled news network]. From there I went to the third (English) section of the First Main Administration of the KGB.
When did your wife find out that your work in journalism was just a front?
I told her even before we were married, but after that I tried to let Alla know as little as possible. Only once did I ever ask her to help me – by making a phone call, that was all. Her hands were trembling, her face was streaming with sweat. After that, I promised myself never ever to do that again.
Where did you learn the craft of espionage?
At the Krasnoznamenny Institute of the KGB. The focus was on foreign languages and special disciplines. The craft of espionage hasn’t changed much in recent decades. The methods and approaches are the same, only the technical equipment has improved.
Did the English know you were a spy from the start?
It wasn’t difficult to figure out. All they had to do was compare my work schedule with Boris Kalyagin’s (a London correspondent), compare the frequency of visits to the embassy, notice a certain license in my behaviour and an abundance of contacts.
There were some amusing episodes. Kalyagin set up an interview with the editor of an influential paper. I acted as cameraman and I asked Kalyagin to pose questions that interested me. But he became so wrapped up in the conversation that he forgot all about my request. What to do? The interview was over and as I was gathering up the equipment, I asked the interviewee, by the way, as it were: “Mister Smith, what do you think about US-Chinese relations?” Mister Smith looked up for a second, grinned and said: “Russia is an invincible country if even the cameramen are interested in such questions.”
Some of our best sources were British journalists. The irony is that these reporters thought the real Soviet correspondents were the spies, not us. We would travel all over the country in search of information, then be up all night getting pickled in pubs with our British colleagues.
I had some real friends among those English reporters, despite the fact that the years when I was based in England were not the easiest in terms of relations between our countries. Those were the years of Margaret Thatcher, her relationship with America, missiles aimed at the “evil empire”, and Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Every day was so tense.
I’ll never forget the scene with [theatre director] Yuri Lyubimov when he was invited to London to stage Crime and Punishment . On the eve of his arrival, we received a telegram saying that the director, famous for his anti-Soviet remarks, should be watched carefully. He was indeed very forthright; Yuri called a spade a spade.
He became the subject of a heated debate at a Party meeting an the embassy. What should be done about this man who publicly insulted the Motherland? In the end, the decision was taken to send a messenger to the theatre to give Lyubimov a stern talking-to and ask him to come to the embassy “for a conversation”.
Pasha, the cultural attaché, was nominated for this task, the sweetest and quietest of men. The day of the premiere, the press and their photographers were jostling backstage. Pasha, feeling horribly nervous, walked up to Lyubimov and was at pains to choose the right words: “The ambassador would like to see you since certain remarks of yours…” Lyubimov didn’t let him finish and began shouting: “They’ve sent a KGB agent in here! He’s threatening me with reprisals!”
By then Lyubimov had decided to remain in the West. He needed an excuse to create a public scandal, and here it was. Poor Pasha couldn’t get out of the theatre fast enough. The last thing he said to Lyubimov in his panic was: “Watch out, Yuri Petrovich! There’s been a crime, beware the punishment!” The phrase was splashed across the front pages with commentary to match. The editors claimed that the bony arm of the KGB was at the maestro’s throat. That’s how legends are born. It all happened before my eyes; but the “office” had nothing to do with it.
Did Britain try to recruit you?
The British knew very well with whom it made sense to ingratiate themselves, and with whom it was useless.
No one came near me, but they did try to lure a friend of mine.
They promised him a house, a car, a job and half a million pounds in expenses – a colossal sum. I guess they had some compromising information about him, although even now my friend won’t tell me what it was.
At the time he said to his would-be recruiters: “How will I be able to look my father in the eye?” They gave up… it’s not everyone who can live with a sin on his soul, though traitors try to justify their treason.
Oleg Gordievsky cultivated the image of a Soviet Kim Philby who, in essence, was a traitor. Philby first chose the path of serving communism and only then entered into contact with Soviet intelligence and, at its request, went to work for British intelligence. Oleg, too, tries to give the impression that he went over to the enemy not because of money, but for reasons of ideology.
I consider myself a fortunate person. It’s through my work that I came to know people whom I would never have met otherwise – people who became my friends.
I feel nostalgic for Britain.By means of natural selection I have come to the conclusion that there is nothing better than a 16-year-old Lagavulin whisky, which I first tried in England. Later, in the Nineties in Moscow, everyone became interested in whisky, and I was regularly called in as an expert.
By the way, I once beat the owners of a London pub in their traditional beer-drinking contest: a yard of ale. The Englishmen were disgraced. They didn’t realise that here was a Georgian able to drink from a horn!
In short, I left a bright trail in the history of Britain, and when my tour was over Margaret Thatcher’s press secretary was at my farewell party. I doubt he knew I worked for Soviet intelligence, he wouldn’t have come if he had, but I was pleased.
Curriculum Vitae: Yuri Kobaladze
NATIONALITY:
Georgian
AGE:
61
STATUS:
Married, with two daughters
EDUCATION:
Moscow Institute of International Relations, graduating in International Journalism (1972).
EXPERIENCE:
• Foreign Intelligence Service of the KGB (1972-1999)
• Soviet news agency TASS
• British correspondent, Gosteleradio
• Central office of PGU, KGB
• Director, press bureau of the Foreign Intelligence Service
• First deputy director, news agency ITAR-TASS
• Since 2000: executive director of investment bank Renaissance Capital; later managing director of retail group X5.
###
Sphere: Related Content
Saturday, January 1, 2011
The End of German Military Counterintelligence?
German Co-ruling Party Urges Disbanding of Army Spy Agency: Report
IRNA - Islamic Republic News Agency
Berlin, Dec 31, IRNA -- A leading lawmaker of the co-governing Free Democratic Party (FDP) called for abolishing the country's military counter-intelligence agency MAD.
Talking to the daily Luebecker Nachrichten on Friday, Christian Ahrendt said Germany's security could be boosted, if MAD's 1,300-strong workforce could be used for other tasks like thwarting cyber attacks.
He also cited cost factors such as MAD's annual budget of 73 million euros as another reason for permanently closing the doors of the German army's counter-intelligence unit.
Ahrendt stressed that Germany domestic secret service, Verfassungschutz, and its foreign counterpart, Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), could jointly assume MAD's duties.
Based in the western city of Cologne, MAD has around 12 regional offices throughout the country, including Hanover, Munich, Stuttgart, Leipzig, Mainz, Kiel, Koblenz, Rostock, Kiel and Wilhelmshaven.
Established during the Cold War in 1956, MAD is under the control of the German defense ministry.
OT**1420
Islamic Republic News Agency/IRNA NewsCode: 30162484
###Sphere: Related Content
Tuesday, December 28, 2010
Intelligence Applications of Hypnosis
Docs Detail CIA’s Cold War Hypnosis Push
By Spencer Ackerman December 28, 2010 7:00 am Wired
Excerpt: It was an innocent time, the mid-1950s. America wasn’t yet cynical about its geopolitical games in the Cold War. Case in point: In order to maintain its spying edge over the Russkies, the CIA considered the benefits of hypnosis.
Two memos from 1954 and 1955 dredged up by Cryptome show the CIA thinking through post-hypnotic suggestion in extensive, credulous detail. How, for instance, to pass a secret message to a field operative without danger of interception?
Encode it in a messenger’s brain, an undisclosed author wrote in 1954, so he’ll have “no memory whatsoever in the waking state as to the nature and contents of the message.” Even if a Soviet agent gets word of the messenger’s importance, “no amount of third-party tactics” can pry the message loose, “for he simply does not have it in his conscious mind.” Pity the poor waterboarded captive.
But the counterintelligence benefits of hypnosis are even greater. . .
See: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/12/cia-hypnosis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+wired%2Findex+%28Wired%3A+Index+3+%28Top+Stories+2%29%29
By Spencer Ackerman December 28, 2010 7:00 am Wired
Excerpt: It was an innocent time, the mid-1950s. America wasn’t yet cynical about its geopolitical games in the Cold War. Case in point: In order to maintain its spying edge over the Russkies, the CIA considered the benefits of hypnosis.
Two memos from 1954 and 1955 dredged up by Cryptome show the CIA thinking through post-hypnotic suggestion in extensive, credulous detail. How, for instance, to pass a secret message to a field operative without danger of interception?
Encode it in a messenger’s brain, an undisclosed author wrote in 1954, so he’ll have “no memory whatsoever in the waking state as to the nature and contents of the message.” Even if a Soviet agent gets word of the messenger’s importance, “no amount of third-party tactics” can pry the message loose, “for he simply does not have it in his conscious mind.” Pity the poor waterboarded captive.
But the counterintelligence benefits of hypnosis are even greater. . .
See: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/12/cia-hypnosis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+wired%2Findex+%28Wired%3A+Index+3+%28Top+Stories+2%29%29
For a number of fascinating records, be sure to visit Cryptome!
Sphere: Related Content
Monday, December 27, 2010
1917 -- Spies & Saboteurs!
The Hidden History of the Espionage Act
The much-maligned 1917 law had a real purpose—stopping spies and saboteurs.
By David Greenberg
Slate
Posted Monday, Dec. 27, 2010, at 8:47 AM ET
On July 24, 1915, the World War was raging in Europe and the belligerents were vying for the sympathy of the neutral United States. In Lower Manhattan, on a Sixth Avenue elevated train, Secret Service agents were tailing George Sylvester Viereck, a German propagandist and a mysterious companion of his—who was, unbeknown to the agents, Heinrich F. Albert, an attaché in the German Embassy. When Viereck got off at 23rd Street, one agent followed him; Albert continued on to 50th Street, where he suddenly looked up from his newspaper, noticed he had reached his stop, and hurried off the car, leaving behind a brown briefcase that the second agent promptly seized. A chase ensued, but the purloined bag ultimately made it to Treasury Secretary William McAdoo, who shared it with President Woodrow Wilson.
The documents that Wilson and McAdoo beheld detailed a sweeping secret campaign, linked to high-ranking German officials, of espionage, sabotage, and propaganda. There were plans to take over American newspapers, bankroll films, send hired lecturers on the Chautauqua circuit, and create pseudo-indigenous movements to agitate on behalf of pro-German policies. More disturbing were schemes to provoke strikes in armaments factories; to corner the supply of liquid chlorine, an ingredient in poison gas, in order to keep it from Allied hands; even to acquire the Wright Brothers' Aeroplane Company and use its patents on Germany's behalf. American officials also learned of sabotage plans hatched by a different German spy, Franz Rintelen von Kleist, who was plotting to destroy American munitions plants and blow up the Welland Canal, a Canadian waterway of vital importance to the United States. It was no wonder that Wilson wrote to his adviser Edward House that summer that the country was "honeycombed with German intrigue and infested with German spies."
Although these plots are omitted from most discussions of the 1917 Espionage Act—the law now being invoked by those who would prosecute WikiLeaks mastermind Julian Assange—they go a long way toward explaining (but not excusing) that unfortunate piece of wartime legislation. When Wilson made the case for entering the world war, he warned that "if there should be disloyalty, it will be dealt with with a firm hand of stern repression." Contrary to some interpretations, the president wasn't perversely touting his intention to trample civil liberties; he was grimly cautioning would-be saboteurs, like those who had blown up the supply depot at Black Tom, New Jersey, the year before, not to undermine the combat effort.
The Espionage Act had a legitimate purpose: to try to stop the real threat of subversion, sabotage, and malicious interference with the war effort, including the controversial reinstatement of the draft. It's context that's worth recalling as Democrats and Republicans alike clamor to use the law against Assange
On April 6, 1917, Congress declared war on Germany and for the next nine weeks it engaged in robust, contentious debate about the proper scope of an espionage bill. Some elements were struck from the first drafts. Originally, the White House wanted to censor the press, but Congress—reflecting fierce resistance in the newspapers—killed the provision. A provision to let the postmaster general regulate the mails remained, but was narrowed to restrict suppressible materials to those urging treason or lawbreaking that would hinder the war effort. A ban on efforts to "cause disaffection" in the military was replaced with a more closely tailored prohibition on efforts to cause insubordination, mutiny, or disloyalty—that last word used, as it was in Wilson's speech, to mean disloyal action, not private sentiment. Overall, the act wasn't meant, as it has often been represented, to stifle antiwar dissent, but to address particular wartime problems that officials had good reason to worry about: draft avoidance, sabotage, espionage.
Nonetheless, the Espionage Act was deeply problematic. Above all, its wording, even in its softer version, left far too much room for aggressive prosecutors and overzealous patriots to interpret it as they wished. (Things got worse the next year when Congress passed more draconian amendments that came to be called the Sedition Act; that law outlawed statements during war that were "disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive … about the form of government of the United States." Unlike the Espionage Act proper, though, the Sedition Act was repealed when World War I ended.)
The resulting crackdown on antiwar groups under the Espionage Act—and the shame it brought to Wilson and the nation—is widely known. Postmaster General Albert Burleson, a reactionary and intolerant Texan considered by Edward House to be "the most belligerent member of the cabinet," denied use of the mails to publications like the left-wing Masses and scared many others into silence. Around the country, meanwhile, the U.S. attorneys in Thomas Gregory's Justice Department prosecuted socialists, pacifists, and German-Americans on flimsy grounds. Many people were arrested for crimes of mere speech. Filmmaker Robert Goldstein was prosecuted for making a movie about the American Revolution that depicted the British—now a U.S. ally—in an unfavorable light. The socialist leader Eugene Debs was thrown in jail for a speech that defended freedom of speech. Of 1,500 arrests under the law, only 10 involved actual sabotage. To the dismay of progressives, moreover, not even the Supreme Court stopped the prosecutions. In March 1919, the liberal icon Oliver Wendell Holmes, coining his famous "clear and present danger" standard, led the court in upholding three dubious Espionage Act verdicts, including the conviction of Debs.
It has been common to view the Espionage Act as the product of a paroxysm of wartime hysteria. There's obviously some truth to that view. In 1917 and 1918, war fever drove many politicians, in all three branches of government, to lose sight of basic rights—just as during other wars a sense of urgency led Abraham Lincoln to wrongfully suspend the habeas corpus writ and subject civilians to military trials, and Franklin Roosevelt to approve the internment of Japanese-Americans. But just as the presence of real communist spies during the early Cold War years helps to explain (but, again, not excuse) the witch hunts that followed, so the legitimate fears of German saboteurs constitute an important piece of the context in which the Espionage Act became law.
The real problem occurred not in its drafting but in its application. All laws are enforced selectively. Discretion always shapes which possible violations of a law are prosecuted and which are deemed unwise to pursue. In deciding whether to indict Assange, President Obama—who has already endorsed the worst of George W. Bush's civil-liberties violations, the indefinite jailing of suspects without trial—might do well to consider how his decision will look in the light of history. Wilson's greatness is sullied today because of the license he granted to Gregory and Burleson to abuse the act; conversely, Richard Nixon's reputation as our worst president is only enhanced by his attempt to use the law to retaliate against Pentagon Papers leaker Daniel Ellsberg.
Assange's case is different, of course, from Ellsberg's, but it's still far from clear that his posting and sharing of classified government documents—as embarrassing and frustrating to diplomats as their publication may be—amounts to the kind of sabotage or espionage that the law was intended to punish. A former professor who taught his students ably about the Constitution, Woodrow Wilson would fare better in the history books today had he instructed his Cabinet officials more emphatically that laws on the books are only as wise as the people who enforce them.
The much-maligned 1917 law had a real purpose—stopping spies and saboteurs.
By David Greenberg
Slate
Posted Monday, Dec. 27, 2010, at 8:47 AM ET
On July 24, 1915, the World War was raging in Europe and the belligerents were vying for the sympathy of the neutral United States. In Lower Manhattan, on a Sixth Avenue elevated train, Secret Service agents were tailing George Sylvester Viereck, a German propagandist and a mysterious companion of his—who was, unbeknown to the agents, Heinrich F. Albert, an attaché in the German Embassy. When Viereck got off at 23rd Street, one agent followed him; Albert continued on to 50th Street, where he suddenly looked up from his newspaper, noticed he had reached his stop, and hurried off the car, leaving behind a brown briefcase that the second agent promptly seized. A chase ensued, but the purloined bag ultimately made it to Treasury Secretary William McAdoo, who shared it with President Woodrow Wilson.
The documents that Wilson and McAdoo beheld detailed a sweeping secret campaign, linked to high-ranking German officials, of espionage, sabotage, and propaganda. There were plans to take over American newspapers, bankroll films, send hired lecturers on the Chautauqua circuit, and create pseudo-indigenous movements to agitate on behalf of pro-German policies. More disturbing were schemes to provoke strikes in armaments factories; to corner the supply of liquid chlorine, an ingredient in poison gas, in order to keep it from Allied hands; even to acquire the Wright Brothers' Aeroplane Company and use its patents on Germany's behalf. American officials also learned of sabotage plans hatched by a different German spy, Franz Rintelen von Kleist, who was plotting to destroy American munitions plants and blow up the Welland Canal, a Canadian waterway of vital importance to the United States. It was no wonder that Wilson wrote to his adviser Edward House that summer that the country was "honeycombed with German intrigue and infested with German spies."
Although these plots are omitted from most discussions of the 1917 Espionage Act—the law now being invoked by those who would prosecute WikiLeaks mastermind Julian Assange—they go a long way toward explaining (but not excusing) that unfortunate piece of wartime legislation. When Wilson made the case for entering the world war, he warned that "if there should be disloyalty, it will be dealt with with a firm hand of stern repression." Contrary to some interpretations, the president wasn't perversely touting his intention to trample civil liberties; he was grimly cautioning would-be saboteurs, like those who had blown up the supply depot at Black Tom, New Jersey, the year before, not to undermine the combat effort.
The Espionage Act had a legitimate purpose: to try to stop the real threat of subversion, sabotage, and malicious interference with the war effort, including the controversial reinstatement of the draft. It's context that's worth recalling as Democrats and Republicans alike clamor to use the law against Assange
On April 6, 1917, Congress declared war on Germany and for the next nine weeks it engaged in robust, contentious debate about the proper scope of an espionage bill. Some elements were struck from the first drafts. Originally, the White House wanted to censor the press, but Congress—reflecting fierce resistance in the newspapers—killed the provision. A provision to let the postmaster general regulate the mails remained, but was narrowed to restrict suppressible materials to those urging treason or lawbreaking that would hinder the war effort. A ban on efforts to "cause disaffection" in the military was replaced with a more closely tailored prohibition on efforts to cause insubordination, mutiny, or disloyalty—that last word used, as it was in Wilson's speech, to mean disloyal action, not private sentiment. Overall, the act wasn't meant, as it has often been represented, to stifle antiwar dissent, but to address particular wartime problems that officials had good reason to worry about: draft avoidance, sabotage, espionage.
Nonetheless, the Espionage Act was deeply problematic. Above all, its wording, even in its softer version, left far too much room for aggressive prosecutors and overzealous patriots to interpret it as they wished. (Things got worse the next year when Congress passed more draconian amendments that came to be called the Sedition Act; that law outlawed statements during war that were "disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive … about the form of government of the United States." Unlike the Espionage Act proper, though, the Sedition Act was repealed when World War I ended.)
The resulting crackdown on antiwar groups under the Espionage Act—and the shame it brought to Wilson and the nation—is widely known. Postmaster General Albert Burleson, a reactionary and intolerant Texan considered by Edward House to be "the most belligerent member of the cabinet," denied use of the mails to publications like the left-wing Masses and scared many others into silence. Around the country, meanwhile, the U.S. attorneys in Thomas Gregory's Justice Department prosecuted socialists, pacifists, and German-Americans on flimsy grounds. Many people were arrested for crimes of mere speech. Filmmaker Robert Goldstein was prosecuted for making a movie about the American Revolution that depicted the British—now a U.S. ally—in an unfavorable light. The socialist leader Eugene Debs was thrown in jail for a speech that defended freedom of speech. Of 1,500 arrests under the law, only 10 involved actual sabotage. To the dismay of progressives, moreover, not even the Supreme Court stopped the prosecutions. In March 1919, the liberal icon Oliver Wendell Holmes, coining his famous "clear and present danger" standard, led the court in upholding three dubious Espionage Act verdicts, including the conviction of Debs.
It has been common to view the Espionage Act as the product of a paroxysm of wartime hysteria. There's obviously some truth to that view. In 1917 and 1918, war fever drove many politicians, in all three branches of government, to lose sight of basic rights—just as during other wars a sense of urgency led Abraham Lincoln to wrongfully suspend the habeas corpus writ and subject civilians to military trials, and Franklin Roosevelt to approve the internment of Japanese-Americans. But just as the presence of real communist spies during the early Cold War years helps to explain (but, again, not excuse) the witch hunts that followed, so the legitimate fears of German saboteurs constitute an important piece of the context in which the Espionage Act became law.
The real problem occurred not in its drafting but in its application. All laws are enforced selectively. Discretion always shapes which possible violations of a law are prosecuted and which are deemed unwise to pursue. In deciding whether to indict Assange, President Obama—who has already endorsed the worst of George W. Bush's civil-liberties violations, the indefinite jailing of suspects without trial—might do well to consider how his decision will look in the light of history. Wilson's greatness is sullied today because of the license he granted to Gregory and Burleson to abuse the act; conversely, Richard Nixon's reputation as our worst president is only enhanced by his attempt to use the law to retaliate against Pentagon Papers leaker Daniel Ellsberg.
Assange's case is different, of course, from Ellsberg's, but it's still far from clear that his posting and sharing of classified government documents—as embarrassing and frustrating to diplomats as their publication may be—amounts to the kind of sabotage or espionage that the law was intended to punish. A former professor who taught his students ably about the Constitution, Woodrow Wilson would fare better in the history books today had he instructed his Cabinet officials more emphatically that laws on the books are only as wise as the people who enforce them.
###
Wednesday, December 15, 2010
Help Wanted -- CIA & NSA
A Glimpse at Positions at the CIA and NSA
Washington Post -- December 12, 2010
It is hard to keep up with the ever-changing global developments in technology, but that is the mission of those who work for such government agencies as the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.
The classified work these agencies undertake means there are a multitude of positions in the fields of science, engineering and technology that hold the nation's security as their utmost goal.
"We're always looking for engineers, computer scientists and other technically qualified applicants who can advance our vital mission of keeping America safe," CIA spokeswoman Paula Weiss said. "Anyone with a scientific or technical background who would like to apply his or her skills to our intelligence mission should check out our Web site to see the wide range of opportunities we offer. It's helpful to have an interest in world affairs, overseas experience or language skills, but it's not necessary."
Not surprisingly, the CIA is on the cutting edge of technological developments, and it develops and implements many state-of-the-art technologies in order to help the agency fulfill its mission of gathering foreign intelligence.
Among the positions the CIA is currently recruiting for are electrical engineer, materials engineer, mechanical engineer, programs management engineer and systems engineer. In the science, technology and weapons areas, positions are open for research scientist; science, technology and weapons analyst; technical/targeting analyst; machinist; and technical operations officer.
CIA employees come from a variety of academic and professional disciplines and experiences. The agency's recruitment Web site lists various career paths. In addition to science, engineering and technology positions, there are jobs in areas such as National Clandestine Service, languages and support services, to name a few.
Requirements for CIA jobs include U.S. citizenship as well as successful results from a thorough medical exam, polygraph test and background investigation.
If you are considering a job in the intelligence field, the CIA offers undergraduate student internships or co-ops as well as graduate studies. The programs combine educational and practical work experiences that complement students' preferred academic fields. Students receive a salary and benefits.
Another of the country's foremost intelligence agencies, the National Security Agency, is also actively recruiting for students, professionals and transitioning military.
The NSA Web site notes that "intelligence and imaginative critical thinking skills" are important attributes for applicants. In the technology fields, positions are available in computer science, computer/electrical engineering, information assurance and security, among others. Posted on the NSA's Web site under "Hot Jobs" are computer scientists, software developers and software engineers.
"For diverse, technologically savvy people looking to work in cutting-edge areas of IT, it really doesn't get much better than the National Security Agency," Lori Weltmann, NSA recruitment marketing manager, said. NSA is a leader in the intelligence community in areas such as network management and compliance, cyber defense, biometrics and wireless mobility.
"And we're not new to any of this," Weltmann continued. "We've been leaders for years. Given the increasingly complex and rapidly changing world of global communication, our need for qualified people with technology skills continues to grow. In fiscal year 2011, we plan to hire more than 1,500 new workers-¿more than half of whom will have skills in areas such as computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering and mathematics. A career at NSA offers the opportunity to work with the best and brightest, shape the course of the world and secure your own future."
As at the CIA, U.S. citizenship and a thorough background investigation are required for prospective NSA employees.
Professional development is an important aspect of working at NSA, and career development programs are available in numerous disciplines including computer science, information assurance, business and others. There is also the opportunity to pursue your education at outside educational institutions, as well as at the NSA's own National Cryptologic School.
For more information on career opportunities at the CIA or NSA, visit cia.gov or nsa.gov.
###
Sphere: Related Content
Washington Post -- December 12, 2010
It is hard to keep up with the ever-changing global developments in technology, but that is the mission of those who work for such government agencies as the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.
The classified work these agencies undertake means there are a multitude of positions in the fields of science, engineering and technology that hold the nation's security as their utmost goal.
"We're always looking for engineers, computer scientists and other technically qualified applicants who can advance our vital mission of keeping America safe," CIA spokeswoman Paula Weiss said. "Anyone with a scientific or technical background who would like to apply his or her skills to our intelligence mission should check out our Web site to see the wide range of opportunities we offer. It's helpful to have an interest in world affairs, overseas experience or language skills, but it's not necessary."
Not surprisingly, the CIA is on the cutting edge of technological developments, and it develops and implements many state-of-the-art technologies in order to help the agency fulfill its mission of gathering foreign intelligence.
Among the positions the CIA is currently recruiting for are electrical engineer, materials engineer, mechanical engineer, programs management engineer and systems engineer. In the science, technology and weapons areas, positions are open for research scientist; science, technology and weapons analyst; technical/targeting analyst; machinist; and technical operations officer.
CIA employees come from a variety of academic and professional disciplines and experiences. The agency's recruitment Web site lists various career paths. In addition to science, engineering and technology positions, there are jobs in areas such as National Clandestine Service, languages and support services, to name a few.
Requirements for CIA jobs include U.S. citizenship as well as successful results from a thorough medical exam, polygraph test and background investigation.
If you are considering a job in the intelligence field, the CIA offers undergraduate student internships or co-ops as well as graduate studies. The programs combine educational and practical work experiences that complement students' preferred academic fields. Students receive a salary and benefits.
Another of the country's foremost intelligence agencies, the National Security Agency, is also actively recruiting for students, professionals and transitioning military.
The NSA Web site notes that "intelligence and imaginative critical thinking skills" are important attributes for applicants. In the technology fields, positions are available in computer science, computer/electrical engineering, information assurance and security, among others. Posted on the NSA's Web site under "Hot Jobs" are computer scientists, software developers and software engineers.
"For diverse, technologically savvy people looking to work in cutting-edge areas of IT, it really doesn't get much better than the National Security Agency," Lori Weltmann, NSA recruitment marketing manager, said. NSA is a leader in the intelligence community in areas such as network management and compliance, cyber defense, biometrics and wireless mobility.
"And we're not new to any of this," Weltmann continued. "We've been leaders for years. Given the increasingly complex and rapidly changing world of global communication, our need for qualified people with technology skills continues to grow. In fiscal year 2011, we plan to hire more than 1,500 new workers-¿more than half of whom will have skills in areas such as computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering and mathematics. A career at NSA offers the opportunity to work with the best and brightest, shape the course of the world and secure your own future."
As at the CIA, U.S. citizenship and a thorough background investigation are required for prospective NSA employees.
Professional development is an important aspect of working at NSA, and career development programs are available in numerous disciplines including computer science, information assurance, business and others. There is also the opportunity to pursue your education at outside educational institutions, as well as at the NSA's own National Cryptologic School.
For more information on career opportunities at the CIA or NSA, visit cia.gov or nsa.gov.
###
Friday, December 10, 2010
Turkish "Surprise"? Um, I don't think so . . .
Mysterious Cache Found at Turkish Naval Base
ISTANBUL - Huerriet Daily News with wires
Friday, December 10, 2010
The confiscation of nine sacks of documents that were hidden at a Turkish naval base is expected to intensify investigations into alleged anti-government activity. The files are said to provide detailed information about coup plots.
The documents were confiscated Tuesday from a hidden location under the floor of the office of the head of intelligence at Gölcük Navy Command in the northwestern province of Kocaeli.
The confiscated documents include data on plans to be implemented after a military coup, including where to keep 167 special figures incarcerated; special dossiers on 46 high-level government officials; charts pointing to hidden locations of ammunition; data gathered on the wives of admirals; documents that appear to be a continuation of the “Kafes” (Cage) and “Action Plan for the Fight against Fundamentalism” plots; a list of military personnel who would be deported after a coup; secret documents from crucial state organizations; a Navy fleet command navigation logbook; and 34 voice recording tapes.
The operation was conducted by Fikret Seçen and Ali Haydar, both public prosecutors with special authority, as part of an ongoing espionage investigation into Turkish naval forces.
The search began after an unidentified person called in a tip to prosecutors, saying some documents regarding the espionage case would soon be destroyed.
Seçen said Thursday the operation was not a police raid as mentioned in the press but was instead conducted with the military in his presence.
The confiscated documents were transferred to Istanbul for inspection and were opened in the presence of an Army colonel assigned by the Chief of General Staff. The presence of the colonel, who videotaped the process and the search for DNA, hair samples and fingerprints on the documents, is to prevent allegations of the planting of suspicious evidence, as has happened in past investigations.
The espionage investigation, which began in August with blackmail charges against members of the Navy following claims of running a prostitution ring, was initially referred to as the “prostitution gang investigation” in the press. The prosecution later dropped the charges of prostitution after evidence of espionage emerged.
A number of military secrets and issues concerning national defense has allegedly been leaked by the alleged gang.
The alleged “action plan” features strategies to end both Justice and Development Party, or AKP, rule and the activities of the Fethullah Gülen religious community by planting fake evidence and weaponry in various locations. “Cage,” meanwhile, is an alleged anti-government plan to target non-Muslim communities in Turkey so as to bring heat upon the AKP from the West.
ISTANBUL - Huerriet Daily News with wires
Friday, December 10, 2010
The confiscation of nine sacks of documents that were hidden at a Turkish naval base is expected to intensify investigations into alleged anti-government activity. The files are said to provide detailed information about coup plots.
The documents were confiscated Tuesday from a hidden location under the floor of the office of the head of intelligence at Gölcük Navy Command in the northwestern province of Kocaeli.
The confiscated documents include data on plans to be implemented after a military coup, including where to keep 167 special figures incarcerated; special dossiers on 46 high-level government officials; charts pointing to hidden locations of ammunition; data gathered on the wives of admirals; documents that appear to be a continuation of the “Kafes” (Cage) and “Action Plan for the Fight against Fundamentalism” plots; a list of military personnel who would be deported after a coup; secret documents from crucial state organizations; a Navy fleet command navigation logbook; and 34 voice recording tapes.
The operation was conducted by Fikret Seçen and Ali Haydar, both public prosecutors with special authority, as part of an ongoing espionage investigation into Turkish naval forces.
The search began after an unidentified person called in a tip to prosecutors, saying some documents regarding the espionage case would soon be destroyed.
Seçen said Thursday the operation was not a police raid as mentioned in the press but was instead conducted with the military in his presence.
The confiscated documents were transferred to Istanbul for inspection and were opened in the presence of an Army colonel assigned by the Chief of General Staff. The presence of the colonel, who videotaped the process and the search for DNA, hair samples and fingerprints on the documents, is to prevent allegations of the planting of suspicious evidence, as has happened in past investigations.
The espionage investigation, which began in August with blackmail charges against members of the Navy following claims of running a prostitution ring, was initially referred to as the “prostitution gang investigation” in the press. The prosecution later dropped the charges of prostitution after evidence of espionage emerged.
A number of military secrets and issues concerning national defense has allegedly been leaked by the alleged gang.
The alleged “action plan” features strategies to end both Justice and Development Party, or AKP, rule and the activities of the Fethullah Gülen religious community by planting fake evidence and weaponry in various locations. “Cage,” meanwhile, is an alleged anti-government plan to target non-Muslim communities in Turkey so as to bring heat upon the AKP from the West.
###
Sunday, December 5, 2010
Comment re: WikiLeaks
I've deliberately ignored it until now, but after a couple of emails from readers . . .
Here's my assessment of the impact of the latest WikiLeaks release: So what?
Is there anything major that you didn't really already "know" or suspect? The only persons surprised by anything Mr. Assange pumped out into the Internet are naive or uninformed generally. Embarrassing? Awkward? Sure.
Next.
###Sphere: Related Content
Here's my assessment of the impact of the latest WikiLeaks release: So what?
Is there anything major that you didn't really already "know" or suspect? The only persons surprised by anything Mr. Assange pumped out into the Internet are naive or uninformed generally. Embarrassing? Awkward? Sure.
Next.
###Sphere: Related Content
Saturday, December 4, 2010
Espionage Case Breaks at Fort Bragg
Espionage Case Unfolding at Ft. Bragg
Saturday, December 04, 2010
FORT BRAGG, N.C. (WTVD) -- A man with high-level military security clearance is under arrest, accused of trying to sell access to classified military computers.
The suspect is Bryan Martin, who is enlisted in the Navy, and assigned to the Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg.
According to federal documents obtained by the I-Team, Martin told an undercover F-B-I agent he had access to military computer systems, and said he was seeking long-term financial reimbursement.
The undercover agent paid Martin $3500 for documents labeled "Top Secret."
The I-Team has learned Martin thought he was selling U.S. military secrets to China.
According to the court documents, he also told the FBI agent that over his 15-20 year career, he could be very valuable because of his access to military secrets.
"These cases are rare," said Frank Perry, who used to run the Raleigh FBI office. "For a case like this to have been made in Raleigh or certainly in North Carolina - this area - is quite significant."
The undercover sting operation to arrest Martin happened at three different hotels - one on post, and two in Spring Lake.
The FBI says none of the Joint Special Operations Command secrets were ever compromised by the sting.
###Sphere: Related Content
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