Friday, October 30, 2009

China Is Trying a Tibetan Filmmaker for Subversion

China Is Trying a Tibetan Filmmaker for Subversion

By Andrew Jacobs
The New York Times
October 31, 2009

[Comment: We should all consider the incremental (or abrupt) shifts wherein peaceful political expression and petition are criminalized.]

EXCERPT:

CHONGQING, China — A self-taught filmmaker who spent five months interviewing Tibetans about their hopes and frustrations living under Chinese rule is facing charges of state subversion after the footage was smuggled abroad and distributed on the Internet and at film festivals around the world.

The filmmaker, Dhondup Wangchen, who has been detained since March 2008, just weeks after deadly rioting broke out in Tibet, managed to sneak a letter out of jail last month saying that his trial had begun.

“There is no good news I can share with you,” he wrote in the letter, which was provided by a cousin in Switzerland. “It is unclear what the sentence will be.”

As President Obama prepares for his first trip to China next month, rights advocates are clamoring for his attention in hopes that he will raise the plight of individuals like Mr. Wangchen or broach such thorny topics as free speech, democracy and greater religious freedom.

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Thursday, October 29, 2009

Pentagon Propaganda & "Retired Military Analysts"

The left-of-center news blog, Raw Story, has published Part III in a series of stories detailing the controversial propaganda activities of the Defense Department under the Bush Administration -- and now apparently continuing under Obama & Co.

Reporting focuses on“responsible senior officials” that are still employed by the Defense Department, including Bryan Whitman, who remains a chief Pentagon spokesman and head of all media operations, and Roxie Merritt, who is head of the Pentagon’s community relations office.

The documents produced/cited in the reporting are of particular interest:

With respect to the Pentagon and news media reporting, there's a very dangerous intersection where Information Operations, PsyOps, and Public Affairs all come together. There are laws governing how that's done ~ but, not very much analysis or discussion. If you're interested in reading more, allow me to recommend the following articles and the links embedded therein:







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Monday, October 26, 2009

China's Military Threat to U.S. (Who? Us?) [Annotated]

Chinese Military Backs Closer U.S. Ties
Mon Oct 26, 2009 5:25pm EDT
By Adam Entous | Reuters

[Blogger's annotations in Maoist Red]

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - China's military sought to assure [whew, thanks!] the United States on Monday that its arms buildup was not a threat and said Beijing wanted to expand cooperation with the Pentagon to reduce the risk of future conflicts.

At the start of a visit to Washington, Xu Caihou, vice chairman of the People's Liberation Army Central Military Commission, said military ties were generally moving in a "positive direction" and defended China's fast-paced military development as purely "defensive" and "limited" in scope.

"We are now predominantly committed to peaceful development and we will not and could not challenge or threaten any other country" and "certainly not the United States," [Read: You are the Main Enemy] Xu told a Washington think tank ahead of talks with Defense Secretary Robert Gates.

Xu described China's development of advanced weapons systems, including cruise and ballistic missiles, as "entirely for self-defense" and justified "given the vast area of China, the severity of the challenges facing us."

"As you know, China has yet to realize complete unification," Xu said, in an apparent reference to Taiwan, which China considers a renegade province. "So I believe it is simply necessary for the PLA to have an appropriate level of modernity in terms of our weapons and equipment."

Xu's visit, which will include a tour of major U.S. military bases, including U.S. Strategic Command, was meant to give a boost to military-to-military dialogue, which Beijing resumed this year after halting it in 2008 to protest a $6.5 billion U.S. arms sale to Taiwan.

NAVAL INCIDENTS

U.S. officials have expressed alarm about what they see as China's unprecedented military expansion over the past year. Last week, Gates said better dialogue was needed to avoid "mistakes and miscalculations."

"I want to make clear that the limited weapons and equipment of China is entirely to meet the minimum requirements for meeting national security," Xu said through a translator.

He said military mechanization was still at an early stage. "China's defense policy remains defensive" and was designed to repel attacks, not initiate attacks, he said. "We will never seek hegemony ... military expansion." ["Baloney" -- a technical term]

Chinese vessels have confronted U.S. surveillance ships in Asian waters repeatedly this year and Beijing has called on the United States to reduce and eventually halt air and sea military surveillance close to its shores. [Expect us to comply. If not literally, we'll phase down.]

Xu said those U.S. missions "infringed upon Chinese interests," adding: "It is encouraging to see that both sides have recognized that we should not allow such incidents to damage our ... mil-to-mil relations."

Xu said U.S.-Chinese military relations have improved since President Barack Obama took office in January and can be expanded further. [Mmm, mmm, mmm . . .]

"The military-to-military relationship constitutes an important part of overall bilateral relations. It is important not only to strategic trust ... but also to regional stability," he said. "The Chinese military is positive toward developing mil-to-mil relations with the U.S. military." [Of course they are -- they're not morons.]

Last month, U.S. intelligence agencies singled out China as a challenge to the United States because of its "increasing natural resource-focused diplomacy and military modernization." [Duh.]

(Reporting by Adam Entous; editing by Stacey Joyce)

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Saturday, October 24, 2009

Mexican Zetas and Other Private Armies




A "New" Dynamic in the Western Hemisphere Security Environment: The Mexican Zetas and Other Private Armies
Authored by Dr. Max G. Manwaring. September 2009

EXCERPTED SUMMARY:

Summary
A new and dangerous dynamic has been introduced into the Mexican internal security environment. That new dynamic involves the migration of power from traditional state and nonstate adversaries to nontraditional nonstate private military organizations such as the Zetas, enforcer gangs like the Aztecas, Negros, and Polones, and paramilitary triggermen. Moreover, the actions of these irregular nonstate actors tend to be more political-psychological than military, and further move the threat from hard power to soft power solutions.

In this connection, we examine the macro "what, why, who, how, and so what?" questions concerning the resultant type of conflict that has been and is being fought in Mexico. A useful way to organize these questions is to adopt a matrix approach. The matrix may be viewed as having four sets of elements: (1) The Contextual Setting, (the "what?" and beginning "why" questions); (2) The Protagonist’s Background, Organization, Operations, Motives, and Linkages (the fundamental "who? why?" and "how" questions); (3) The Strategic-Level Outcomes and Consequences (the basic "so what?" question; and (4) Recommendations that address the salient implications. These various elements are mutually influencing and constitute the political-strategic level cause and effect dynamics of a given case.

More . . .
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Friday, October 23, 2009

Iran & China Stealing U.S. Technology & Equipment



Iran, China Lead the World in Stealing U.S. Military Technology According to Documents Uncovered by Judicial Watch
Washington, DC -- October 21, 2009

EXCERPT: Iran and China lead the world in stealing sensitive U.S. military equipment and technology according to documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) from the Justice Department's National Security Division. The documents include a report entitled, "Significant Export Control Cases Since September 2001," which was prepared by the Counter Espionage Section (CES), and includes the charges, investigative agency, defendants and disposition of each case.

According to the Justice Department report, which was labeled "For Official Use Only," Iran and China were cited for 31 and 20 violations respectively between September 29, 2001 and May 16, 2008. Among the "significant" cases listed by the CES:

•U.S. v. Eugene Hsu, et al. (9/21/01): Eugene Hsu, David Chang and Wing Chang were charged with "Conspiracy and an attempt to export military encryption units to China through Singapore." All received guilty verdicts however Wing Chang is still listed as a fugitive.

•U.S. v. Avassapian (12/03): Sherzhik Avassapian was a Tehran-based broker working for the Iranian Ministry of Defense when he attempted to "solicit and inspect F-14 fighter components, military helicopters and C-130 aircraft which he intended to ship to Iran via Italy." Avassapian pleaded guilty to issuing false statements.

•U.S. v. Kwonhwan Park (11/04): Kwonhwan Park was charged with "Exporting Black Hawk engine parts and other military items to China." Pleaded guilty and sentenced to 32 months in prison.

•U.S. v. Ghassemi, et al. (10/06): Iranian national Jamshid Ghassemi and Aurel Fratila were charged with "Conspiracy to export munition list items &emdash; including accelerometers and gyroscopes for missiles and spacecraft &emdash; to Iran without a license." Ghassemi and Fratila are at large in Thailand and Romania respectively. Justice is currently seeking their deportation.

In October 2008, the Department of Justice announced that criminal charges had been issued against more than 145 defendants in the previous fiscal year. Approximately 43% of these cases involved munitions or other restricted technology bound for Iran or China.

More . . .

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Thursday, October 22, 2009

PsyOps and the American Public -- Unlawful Manipulation?

Comment: A favorite topic of mine is government manipulation of the media for propaganda purposes. It's often subtle and ubiquitous. Occasionally it's ham-handed and coarse. When the Department of Defense is involved and the target audience is the American public it's illegal.

I've covered the cartoonishly simplistic and amateurish (some would say dangerous and over-priced) work of The Rendon Group in earlier posts. Others, such as USAF COL Sam Gardiner, have written about the very dangerous intersection where Public Affairs, PsyOps and Information Warfare all meet. A few years ago I collaborated with Congressman Walter Jones (R-NC) to expose Rendon. Here's some new reporting from The Left -- "The Raw Story" -- who seem to have uncovered additional possible violations of the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948.

Pentagon Used Psychological Operation on US Public, Documents Show

By Brad Jacobson
Wednesday, October 21st, 2009 -- 10:12 am
The Raw Story

Figure in Bush propaganda operation remains Pentagon spokesman

In Part I of this series, Raw Story revealed that Bryan Whitman, the current deputy assistant secretary of defense for media operations, was an active senior participant in a Bush administration covert Pentagon program that used retired military analysts to generate positive wartime news coverage.

A months-long review of documents and interviews with Pentagon personnel has revealed that the Bush Administration's military analyst program -- aimed at selling the Iraq war to the American people -- operated through a secretive collaboration between the Defense Department's press and community relations offices.

Raw Story has also uncovered evidence that directly ties the activities undertaken in the military analyst program to an official US military document’s definition of psychological operations -- propaganda that is only supposed to be directed toward foreign audiences.

The investigation of Pentagon documents and interviews with Defense Department officials and experts in public relations found that the decision to fold the military analyst program into community relations and portray it as “outreach” served to obscure the intent of the project as well as that office’s partnership with the press office. It also helped shield its senior supervisor, Bryan Whitman, assistant secretary of defense for media operations, whose role was unknown when the original story of the analyst program broke.

In a nearly hour-long phone interview, Whitman asserted that since the program was not run from his office, he was neither involved nor culpable. Exposure of the collaboration between the Pentagon press and community relations offices on this program, however, as well as an effort to characterize it as a mere community outreach project, belie Whitman’s claim that he bears no responsibility for the program’s activities.

These new revelations come in addition to the evidence of Whitman’s active and extensive participation in the program, as Raw Story documented in part one of this series. Whitman remains a spokesman for the Pentagon today.

Whitman said he stood by an earlier statement in which he averred “the intent and purpose of the [program] is nothing other than an earnest attempt to inform the American public.”

In the interview, Whitman sought to portray his role as peripheral, noting that his position naturally demands he speak on a number of subjects in which he isn’t necessarily directly involved.

The record, however, suggests otherwise.

In a January 2005 memorandum to active members of both offices from then-Pentagon press office director, Navy Captain Roxie Merritt, who now leads the community relations office, emphasized the necessary “synergy of outreach shop and media ops working together” on the military analyst program. [p. 18-19]

Merritt recommended that both the press and community relations offices develop a “hot list” of analysts who could dependably “carry our water” and provide them with ultra-exclusive access that would compel the networks to “weed out the less reliably friendly analysts” on their own.

“Media ops and outreach can work on a plan to maximize use of the analysts and figure out a system by which we keep our most reliably friendly analysts plugged in on everything from crisis response to future plans,” Merritt remarked. “As evidenced by this analyst trip to Iraq, the synergy of outreach shop and media ops working together on these types of projects is enormous and effective. Will continue to examine ways to improve processes.”

In response, Lawrence Di Rita, then Pentagon public affairs chief, agreed. He told Merritt and both offices in an email, “I guess I thought we already were doing a lot of this.”

Several names on the memo are redacted. Those who are visible read like a who’s who of the Pentagon press and community relations offices: Whitman, Merritt, her deputy press office director Gary Keck (both of whom reported directly to Whitman) and two Bush political appointees, Dallas Lawrence and Allison Barber, then respectively director and head of community relations.

Merritt became director of the office, and its de facto chief until the appointment of a new deputy assistant secretary of defense, after the departures of Barber and Lawrence, the ostensible leaders of the military analyst program. She remains at the Defense Department today.

When reached through email, Merritt attempted to explain the function of her office's outreach program and what distinguishes it from press office activities.

“Essentially,” Merritt summarized, “we provide another avenue of communications for citizens and organizations wanting to communicate directly with DoD.”

Asked to clarify, she said that outreach’s purpose is to educate the public in a one-to-one manner about the Defense Department and military’s structure, history and operations. She also noted her office "does not handle [the] news media unless they have a specific question about one of our programs."

Merritt eventually admitted that it is not a function of the outreach program to provide either information or talking points to individuals or a group of individuals -- such as the retired military analysts -- with the intention that those recipients use them to directly engage with traditional news media and influence news coverage.

Asked directly if her office provides talking points for this purpose, she replied, “No. The talking points are developed for use by DoD personnel.”

Experts in public relations and propaganda say Raw Story's findings reveal the program itself was "unwise" and "inherently deceptive." One expressed surprise that one of the program's senior figures was still speaking for the Pentagon.

“Running the military analyst program from a community relations office is both surprising and unwise,” said Nicholas Cull, a professor of public diplomacy at USC’s Annenberg School and an expert on propaganda. “It is surprising because this is not what that office should be doing [and] unwise because the element of subterfuge is always a lightening rod for public criticism.”

Diane Farsetta, a senior researcher at the Center for Media and Democracy, which monitors publics relations and media manipulation, said calling the program “outreach” was “very calculatedly misleading” and another example of how the project was “inherently deceptive.”

“This has been their talking point in general on the Pentagon pundit program,” Farsetta explained. “You know, ‘We’re all just making sure that we’re sharing information.’”

Farsetta also said that it’s “pretty stunning” that no one, including Whitman, has been willing to take any responsibility for the program and that the Pentagon Inspector General’s office and Congress have yet to hold anyone accountable.

“It’s hard to think of a more blatant example of propaganda than this program,” Farsetta said.

Cull said the revelations are “just one more indication that the entire apparatus of the US government’s strategic communications -- civilian and military, at home and abroad -- is in dire need of review and repair.”

A PSYOPS Program Directed at American Public

When the military analyst program was first revealed by The New York Times in 2008, retired US Army Col. Ken Allard described it as “PSYOPS on steroids.”

It turns out this was far from a casual reference. Raw Story has discovered new evidence that directly exposes this stealth media project and the activities of its participants as matching the US government’s own definition of psychological operations, or PSYOPS.

The US Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command fact sheet, which states that PSYOPS should be directed “to foreign audiences” only, includes the following description:

“Used during peacetime, contingencies and declared war, these activities are not forms of force, but are force multipliers that use nonviolent means in often violent environments.”

Pentagon public affairs officials referred to the military analysts as “message force multipliers” in documented communications.

A prime example is a May 2006 memorandum from then community relations chief Allison Barber in which she proposes sending the military analysts on another trip to Iraq:

“Based on past trips, I would suggest limiting the group to 10 analysts, those with the greatest ability to serve as message force multipliers.”

Nicholas Cull, who also directs the public diplomacy master’s program at USC and has written extensively on propaganda and media history, found the Pentagon public affairs officials’ use of such terms both incriminating and reckless.

“[Their] use of psyop terminology is an ‘own goal,’” Cull explained in an email, “as it speaks directly to the American public’s underlying fear of being brainwashed by its own government.”

This new evidence provides further perspective on an incident cited by the Times.

Pentagon records show that the day after 14 marines died in Iraq on August 3, 2005, James T. Conway, then director of operations for the Joint Chiefs, instructed military analysts during a briefing to work to prevent the incident from weakening public support for the war. Conway reminded the military analysts assembled, “The strategic target remains our population.” [p. 102]

Same Strategy, Different Program

Bryan Whitman was also involved in a different Pentagon public affairs project during the lead-up to the war in Iraq: embedding reporters.

The embed and military analyst programs shared the same underlying strategy of “information dominance,” the same objective of selling Bush administration war policies by generating favorable news coverage and were directed at the same target -- the American public.

Torie Clarke, the first Pentagon public affairs chief, is often credited for conceiving both programs. But Clarke and Whitman have openly acknowledged his deep involvement in the embed project.

Clarke declined to be interviewed for this article.

Whitman said he was “heavily involved in the process” of the embed program's development, implementation and supervision.

Before embedding, reporters and media organizations were forced to sign a contract whose ground rules included allowing military officials to review articles for release, traveling with military personnel escorts at all times or remaining in designated areas, only conducting on-the-record interviews, and agreeing that the government may terminate the contract “at any time and for any reason.”

In May 2002, with planning for a possible invasion of Iraq already in progress, Clarke appointed Whitman to head all Pentagon media operations. Prior to that, he had served since 1995 in the Pentagon press office, both as deputy director for press operations and as a public affairs specialist.

The timing of Whitman’s appointment coincided with the development stages of the embed and military analyst programs. He was the ideal candidate for both projects.

Whitman had a military background, having served in combat as a Special Forces commander and as an Army public affairs officer with years of experience in messaging from the Pentagon. He also had experience in briefing and prepping civilian and military personnel.

Whitman's background provided him with a facility and familiarity in navigating military and civilian channels. With these tools in hand, he was able to create dialogue between the two and expedite action in a sprawling and sometimes contentious bureaucracy.

Buried in an obscure April 2008 online New York Times Q&A with readers, reporter David Barstow disclosed:

“As Lawrence Di Rita, a former senior Pentagon official told me, they viewed [the military analyst program] as the ‘mirror image’ of the Pentagon program for embedding reporters with units in the field. In this case, the military analysts were in effect ‘embedded’ with the senior leadership through a steady mix of private briefings, trips and talking points.”

Di Rita denied the conversation had occurred in a telephone interview.

“I don’t doubt that’s what he heard, but that’s not what I said,” Di Rita asserted.

Whitman said he'd never heard Di Rita make any such comparison between the programs.

Barstow, however, said he stood behind the veracity of the quote and the conversation he attributed to Di Rita.

Di Rita, who succeeded Clarke, also declined to answer any questions related to Whitman’s involvement in the military analyst program, including whether he had been involved in its creation.

Clarke and Whitman have both discussed information dominance and its role in the embed program.

In her 2006 book Lipstick on a Pig, Clarke revealed that “most importantly, embedding was a military strategy in addition to a public affairs one” (p. 62) and that the program’s strategy was “simple: information dominance” (p. 187). To achieve it, she explained, there was a need to circumvent the traditional news media “filter” where journalists act as “intermediaries.”

The goal, just as with the military analyst program, was not to spin a story but to control the narrative altogether.

At the 2003 Military-Media conference in Chicago, Whitman told the audience, “We wanted to take the offensive to achieve information dominance” because “information was going to play a major role in combat operations.” [pdf link p. 2] One of the other program’s objectives, he said, was “to build and maintain support for U.S. policy.” [pdf link, p. 16 – quote sourced in 2005 recap of 2003 mil-media conference]

At the March 2004 “Media at War” conference at UC Berkeley, Lt. Col. Rick Long, former head of media relations for the US Marine Corps, offered a candid view of the Pentagon’s engagement in “information warfare” during the Bush administration.

“Our job is to win, quite frankly,” said Long. “The reason why we wanted to embed so many media was we wanted to dominate the information environment. We wanted to beat any kind of propaganda or disinformation at its own game.”

“Overall,” he told the audience, “we’re happy with the outcome.”

The Appearance of Transparency

On a national radio program just before the invasion of Iraq, Whitman claimed that embedded reporters would have a firsthand perspective of “the good, the bad and the ugly.”

But veteran foreign correspondent Reese Erlich told Raw Story that the embed program was “a stroke of genius by the Bush administration” because it gave the appearance of transparency while “in reality, they were manipulating the news.”

In a phone interview, Erlich, who is currently covering the war in Afghanistan as a “unilateral” (which allows reporters to move around more freely without the restrictions of embed guidelines), also pointed out the psychological and practical influence the program has on reporters.

“You’re traveling with a particular group of soldiers,” he explained. “Your life literally depends on them. And you see only the firefights or slog that they’re involved in. So you’re not going to get anything close to balanced reporting.”

At the August 2003 Military-Media conference in Chicago, Jonathan Landay, who covered the initial stages of the war for Knight Ridder Newspapers, said that being a unilateral “gave me the flexibility to do my job.” [pdf link p. 2]

He added, “Donald Rumsfeld told the American people that what happened in northern Iraq after [the invasion] was a little ‘untidiness.’ What I saw, and what I reported, was a tsunami of murder, looting, arson and ethnic cleansing.”

Paul Workman, a journalist with over thirty years at CBC News, including foreign correspondent reporting on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, wrote of the program in April 2003, “It is a brilliant, persuasive conspiracy to control the images and the messages coming out of the battlefield and they've succeeded colossally.”

Erlich said he thought most mainstream US reporters have been unwilling to candidly discuss the program because they “weren’t interested in losing their jobs by revealing what they really thought about the embed process.”

Now embedded with troops in Afghanistan for McClatchy, Landay told Raw Story it’s not that reporters shouldn’t be embedded with troops at all, but that it should be only one facet of every news outlet’s war coverage.

Embedding, he said, offers a “soda-straw view of events.” This isn't necessarily negative “as long as a news outlet has a number of embeds and unilaterals whose pictures can be combined” with civilian perspectives available from international TV outlets such as Reuters TV, AP TV, and al Jazeera, he said.

Landay placed more blame on US network news outlets than on the embed program itself for failing to show a more balanced and accurate picture.

But when asked if the Pentagon and the designers of the embed program counted as part of their embedding strategy on the dismal track record of US network news outlets when it came to including international TV footage from civilian perspectives, he replied, “I will not second guess the Pentagon’s motives.”

Brad Jacobson is a contributing investigative reporter for Raw Story. Additional research was provided by Ron Brynaert.
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Friday, October 16, 2009

Zapruder 313 -- Back & to the Left

C.I.A. Is Still Cagey About Oswald Mystery
By SCOTT SHANE
Published: October 16, 2009

WASHINGTON — Is the Central Intelligence Agency covering up some dark secret about the assassination of John F. Kennedy?

Probably not. But you would not know it from the C.I.A.’s behavior.

For six years, the agency has fought in federal court to keep secret hundreds of documents from 1963, when an anti-Castro Cuban group it paid clashed publicly with the soon-to-be assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald. The C.I.A. says it is only protecting legitimate secrets. But because of the agency’s history of stonewalling assassination inquiries, even researchers with no use for conspiracy thinking question its stance.

The files in question, some released under direction of the court and hundreds more that are still secret, involve the curious career of George E. Joannides, the case officer who oversaw the dissident Cubans in 1963. In 1978, the agency made Mr. Joannides the liaison to the House Select Committee on Assassinations — but never told the committee of his earlier role.

That concealment has fueled suspicion that Mr. Joannides’s real assignment was to limit what the House committee could learn about C.I.A. activities. The agency’s deception was first reported in 2001 by Jefferson Morley, a journalist and author who has doggedly pursued the files ever since, represented by James H. Lesar, a Washington lawyer specializing in Freedom of Information Act lawsuits.

“The C.I.A.’s conduct is maddening,” said Mr. Morley, 51, a former Washington Post reporter and the author of a 2008 biography of a former C.I.A. station chief in Mexico. After years of meticulous reporting on Mr. Joannides, who died at age 68 in 1990, he is convinced that there is more to learn.

“I know there’s a story here,” Mr. Morley said. “The confirmation is that the C.I.A. treats these documents as extremely sensitive.”

Mr. Morley’s quest has gained prominent supporters, including John R. Tunheim, a federal judge in Minnesota who served in 1994 and 1995 as chairman of the Assassination Records Review Board, created by Congress to unearth documents related to the case.

“I think we were probably misled by the agency,” Judge Tunheim said, referring to the Joannides records. “This material should be released.”

Gerald Posner, the author of an anti-conspiracy account of the J.F.K. assassination, “Case Closed,” said the C.I.A.’s withholding such aged documents was “a perfect example of why nobody trusts the agency.”

“It feeds the conspiracy theorists who say, ‘You’re hiding something,” ’ Mr. Posner said.

After losing an appeals court decision in Mr. Morley’s lawsuit, the C.I.A. released material last year confirming Mr. Joannides’s deep involvement with the anti-Castro Cubans who confronted Oswald. But the agency is withholding 295 specific documents from the 1960s and ’70s, while refusing to confirm or deny the existence of many others, saying their release would cause “extremely grave damage” to national security.

“The methods of defeating or deterring covert action in the 1960s and 1970s can still be instructive to the United States’ current enemies,” a C.I.A. official wrote in a court filing.

An agency spokesman, Paul Gimigliano, said the C.I.A. had opened all files relevant to the assassination to Judge Tunheim’s review board and denied that it was trying to avoid embarrassment. “The record doesn’t support that, any more than it supports conspiracy theories, offensive on their face, that the C.I.A. had a hand in President Kennedy’s death,” Mr. Gimigliano said.

C.I.A. secrecy has been hotly debated this year, with agency officials protesting the Obama administration’s decision to release legal opinions describing brutal interrogation methods. The House speaker, Nancy Pelosi, came under attack from Republicans after she accused the C.I.A. of misleading Congress about waterboarding, adding, “They mislead us all the time.”

On the Kennedy assassination, the deceptions began in 1964 with the Warren Commission. The C.I.A. concealed its unsuccessful schemes to kill Fidel Castro and its ties to the anti-Castro D.R.E., the Directorio Revolucionario Estudantil, or Cuban Student Directorate, which received $50,000 a month in C.I.A. support during 1963.

In August 1963, Oswald visited a New Orleans shop owned by a D.R.E. official, feigning sympathy with the group’s goal of overthrowing Castro. A few days later, D.R.E. members found Oswald handing out pro-Castro pamphlets and got into a brawl with him. Later that month, Oswald debated the anti-Castro Cubans on a local radio station.

In the years since Oswald was named as the assassin, speculation about who might have been behind him has never ended, with various theories focusing on Castro, the mob, rogue government agents or myriad combinations of the above. Mr. Morley, one of many writers to become entranced by the story, insists that he has no theory and is seeking only the facts.

His lawsuit has uncovered the central role in overseeing D.R.E. activities of Mr. Joannides, the deputy director for psychological warfare at the C.I.A.’s Miami station, code-named JM/WAVE. He worked closely with D.R.E. leaders, documents show, corresponding with them under pseudonyms, paying their travel expenses and achieving an “important degree of control” over the group, as a July 1963 agency fitness report put it.

Fifteen years later, Mr. Joannides turned up again as the agency’s representative to the House assassinations committee. Dan Hardway, then a law student working for the committee, recalled Mr. Joannides as “a cold fish,” thin and bespectacled, who firmly limited access to documents. Once, Mr. Hardway remembered: “he handed me a thin file and just stood there. I blew up, and he said, ‘This is all you’re going to get.’ ”

But neither Mr. Hardway nor the committee’s staff director, G. Robert Blakey, had any idea that Mr. Joannides had played a role in the very anti-Castro activities from 1963 that the committee was scrutinizing.

When Mr. Morley first informed him about it a decade ago, Mr. Blakey was flabbergasted. “If I’d known his role in 1963, I would have put Joannides under oath — he would have been a witness, not a facilitator,” said Mr. Blakey, a law professor at Notre Dame. “How do we know what he didn’t give us?”

After Oliver Stone’s 1991 film “J.F.K.” fed wild speculation about the Kennedy case, Congress created the Assassination Records Review Board to release documents. But because the board, too, was not told of Mr. Joannides’s 1963 work, it did not peruse his records, said Judge Tunheim, the chairman.

“If we’d known of his role in Miami in 1963, we would have pressed for all his records,” Judge Tunheim said. No matter what comes of Mr. Morley’s case in the United States District Court in Washington, he said he might ask the current C.I.A. director, Leon E. Panetta, to release the records, even if the names of people who are still alive must be redacted for privacy.

What motive could C.I.A. officials have to bury the details of Mr. Joannides’s work for so long? Did C.I.A. officers or their Cuban contacts know more about Oswald than has been revealed? Or was the agency simply embarrassed by brushes with the future assassin — like the Dallas F.B.I. officials who, after the assassination, destroyed a handwritten note Oswald had previously left for an F.B.I. agent?

Or has Mr. Morley spent a decade on a wild goose chase?

Max Holland, who is writing a history of the Warren Commission, said the agency might be trying to preserve the principle of secrecy.

“If you start going through the files of every C.I.A. officer who had anything to do with anything that touched the assassination, that would have no end,” Mr. Holland said.

Mr. Posner, the anti-conspiracy author, said that if there really were something explosive involving the C.I.A. and President Kennedy, it wouldn’t be in the files — not even in the documents the C.I.A. has fought to keep secret.

“Most conspiracy theorists don’t understand this,” Mr. Posner said. “But if there really were a C.I.A. plot, no documents would exist.”

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20 Years After The Wall


10/16/2009 01:16 PM

The End of East

West German Secret Service Opens GDR Files

By Klaus Wiegrefe

EXCERPT:

Germany's foreign intelligence agency recently released some of its files from the run-up to the collapse of East Germany. The papers show that West German spies had conflicting information. At times they were well sourced, but they failed to see that the Berlin Wall was about to collapse.

It could have been a real coup: Erich Honecker escapes to the West, and the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), Germany's foreign intelligence agency, is the first to know. It was Nov. 7, 1989, two days before the fall of the Berlin Wall. The BND notified the Chancellery that the leader of the East German Communist Party, who had been overthrown only a few weeks earlier, "visited his sister in Wiebelskirchen in the Saarland region on 11/6" and then "traveled to Switzerland for medical treatment."

The sobering correction of the story came later. Not only was the BND the first to know about Honecker's supposed escape, but it was apparently the only one to know. The report had turned out to be incorrect. In reality, Honecker was at his home in Wandlitz near Berlin, and he wasn't taking the fall of East Germany in stride.

The story of Honecker and the BND is one of hearsay, knowledge and false information. In September 1989, for example, BND agents sent an "express message" to the Chancellery in Bonn to announce that Honecker had died on the 13th of the month, and that the funeral was planned for the 24th. The information had come from the Americans and was reported in the tabloid Bild, but the BND was responsible for spreading the supposedly sensational story, even though it noted that there were "considerable doubts" as to the veracity of the report. Those doubts were correct. Honecker would remain alive until 1994.

Was it just bad luck, incompetence or just another of the usual scrapes anyone working undercover in unknown territory is likely to get into? How effective is the BND? This has been a hotly debated question ever since it was founded. And not even insiders would venture to guess how efficient West German intelligence gathering was on East German territory. This makes it all the more astonishing that the BND, responding to a request from SPIEGEL, has now, for the first time, declassified large numbers of documents relating to a landmark even in postwar history: the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of German Democratic Republic (GDR).


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Thursday, October 15, 2009

Speaking of Italy . . .

How Mussolini Once Worked for British Intelligence
Wed, Oct 14 14:52 PM EDT
By Georgina Cooper | Reuters

LONDON (Reuters) - He formed part of the Nazi axis that nearly brought Britain to its knees in World War Two, but historical papers have revealed that Italian dictator Benito Mussolini was once on the payroll of British intelligence.

During World War One, the then socialist journalist was running popular newspaper Il Popolo d'Italia in Milan and Italy was allied with Britain and France in the fight against Germany.

British secret services desperately needed Mussolini to print pro-war propaganda to keep Italy on board, said Cambridge historian Peter Martland, who uncovered details of weekly payments of 100 pounds by MI5 to Mussolini in 1917.

"British intelligence is subsidizing his newspaper and it's cheap. But it's a part of this broader campaign to get a lid on things to keep Italy in the war," Martland told Reuters.

Martland said payments were authorized by Sir Samuel Hoare, an MP who headed a 100-strong British intelligence team based in Italy covertly working to keep the country on the side of the allies.

Although 100 pounds a week was a lot of money 92 years ago, it was a drop in the ocean compared to what Britain was spending on the war effort.

"It's a lot of money, but this war is costing 4 million pounds a day, nearly 13 million pounds a week, so 100 pounds a week is not even petty cash," said Martland.

Mussolini recruited thugs to beat up poverty-stricken peace protesters, downtrodden by the war, to prevent them from agitating against it -- a precursor to his fascist Blackshirts, Martland believes.

"He's a nasty piece of work and he's using violence on the streets. He's a street fighter and he's mobilizing veterans. One of the definers of fascism is that violence is a legitimate political tool, so this is the beginnings of seeing the Mussolini of the Blackshirts era," said Martland.

While Martland said it was a "shrewd" move for MI5 to recruit Mussolini, he doubts very much whether "Il Duce" actually spent much of his British earnings on the war campaign.

"Part of the money went to subsidize his newspaper, but we know Mussolini and we know he is a womanizer. He thinks he is Mr Super Stud, so it's not unreasonable to speculate that a lot of that money went on his mistresses," he said.




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Wednesday, October 14, 2009

Blowback in CIA's "Italian Job" (Annotated)

Lawyers in CIA Trial Argue for Immunity
By Colleen Barry (AP) – October 14, 2009

MILAN — Lawyers for two high-ranking former CIA operatives in Italy charged in the 2003 kidnapping of an Egyptian cleric argued on Wednesday that their clients should be granted diplomatic immunity.

They also said evidence against the two, who were allegedly acting as part of the agency's extraordinary renditions program, was insufficient for a conviction.

Jeffrey Castelli, identified as the former head of the CIA in Rome, is the highest-level American defendant among the 26 charged in what prosecutors argue was a CIA-led extraordinary rendition of a terror suspect.

Prosecutors are seeking 13 years in jail for Castelli, citing his alleged role in orchestrating the abduction along with the former head of the Italian military intelligence, and 12 years for Robert Seldon Lady, the Milan station chief at the time.

It is the first trial anywhere in the world scrutinizing extraordinary renditions, which human rights advocates say were the CIA's way of outsourcing the torture of suspected terrorists to countries where it was practiced.

The CIA has declined to comment on the case, and Italy's government has denied involvement. Lawyers have entered innocent pleas for the Americans, who are considered fugitives and risk arrest in Italy. Seven Italians also are charged.

Matilde Sansalone argued that Castelli enjoys immunity because he was an accredited diplomat at the U.S. Embassy in Rome at the time of the disappearance on Feb. 17, 2003 of Osama Moustafa Hassan Nasr, an Egyptian cleric who at the time was under investigation as a terror suspect by Italian authorities.

Another lawyer, Arianna Barbazza, argued that Lady too should be granted immunity, and said that evidence linking him to the cleric's disappearance is insufficient.

Sansalone and Barbazza are both court-appointed lawyers, and have had no contact with their clients.

The judge in the preliminary hearing phase already has ruled out immunity for the U.S. defendants because of the severity of the charges.

Sansalone also said during her closing arguments that much of the testimony presented against Castelli was no longer admissible, due to a ruling by Italy's Constitutional Court striking any evidence referring to the workings of the Italian or American secret services. This includes testimony indicating a meeting between Castelli and the head of Italian military intelligence, Nicolo Pollari.

Even if it were admitted, Sansalone argued that the evidence in no way proves her client's involvement. She also argued there was no evidence indicating he orchestrated the kidnapping, saying that responsibility was assigned only because of his high-level position at the embassy.

Barbazza, who represents half of the American defendants, said her remaining 12 clients have been identified on the basis of such evidence as poor quality passport photographs or cell phone records. She argued the evidence does not meet standards for positively identifying defendants charged with a crime as serious as kidnapping.

"They need to be acquitted because we don't have certain and physical identification," she told the court.

Prosecutors say Nasr was taken in broad daylight from a Milan street on Feb. 17, 2003, transferred in a van to the Aviano Air Base in northern Italy, then flown to the Ramstein Air Base in southern Germany before being flown onward to Egypt — where he was allegedly tortured.

Barbazza and another court-appointed lawyer, Alessia Sorgato, also said that if the judge determined there was indeed a CIA order for Nasr's kidnapping, the defendants would be innocent because they were subordinates following orders.

"They were the last link of a long chain," Barbazza said.

Defense arguments continue next week. A verdict is expected in November.

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Friday, October 9, 2009

You Should Know About the Naxalites -- But, I Bet You Don't


Naxalites -- I'll let The Economist explain.

Published: October 9, 2009
The ambush, which killed 17 police commandos in western India, came two days after the rebels beheaded an officer in a different region. . .

* * *

More than 200 Maoist rebels lurking in a remote part of western India’s Maharashtra State ambushed 45 police commandos on Thursday, killed 17 of them and ran off with their weapons, officials announced. The ambush was one of the bloodiest attacks by the Maoists at a time when India’s central government is preparing for a major paramilitary offensive against them.

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Thursday, October 8, 2009

Our New Master is Angry with US



Comment: The Chinese could pretty much demand that we "coordinate" our operations with them [that means "get their permission" in plain English] -- and we would have to accede to their demands. What options do we have? Their financial/economic control over us is their trump card. They "own" us. In the article, a PRC embassy spokesman is quoted as saying, " . . . under the current complex and changeable international situation, China and U.S. share expanding common interests . . . " That's a threat. It's very subtle -- but, it's a threat. Don't kid yourself. My, how things have changed.


EXCLUSIVE: Chinese spymaster complains about news leak - Washington Times


Originally published 04:45 a.m., October 8, 2009, updated 05:44 a.m., October 8, 2009

Bill Gertz INSIDE THE RING

Chinese spymaster

China's most senior military intelligence official, a veteran of spy operations in Europe and cyberspace, recently made a secret visit to the United States and complained to the Pentagon about the press leak on the Chinese submarine that secretly shadowed the USS Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier in 2006.

Maj. Gen. Yang Hui said senior Chinese leaders suspected the Pentagon deliberately disclosed the encounter as part of a U.S. effort to send a political message of displeasure to China's military. The Song-class submarine surfaced undetected near the carrier, and Gen. Yang said the Chinese believed the leak was timed to coincide with the visit of a senior U.S. admiral.

Gen. Yang made the remarks during a military exchange visit in early September, according to two defense officials. The officials discussed the talks on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the contents of the private meetings.

Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman confirmed that Gen. Yang was hosted by Defense Intelligence Agency Director Lt. Gen. Ronald L. Burgess Jr. but declined to provide details of the discussions. The visit included meetings at the DIA, Pentagon and State Department and within the intelligence community, he said, noting that Gen. Yang invited Gen. Burgess to visit China.

The U.S. visit by the senior spymaster was unusual. The Chinese service has been linked to two spy rings that operated against the United States, including the case of California defense contractor Chi Mak, who was sentenced to 24 years in prison last year for supplying China with military technology.

Chinese military intelligence also was behind the cases of two Pentagon officials recently convicted of spying. James W. Fondren Jr., a Pacific Command official, was convicted of espionage Sept. 25 for his role in supplying secrets as part of a spy ring directed by Tai Shen Kuo, a Taiwanese-born naturalized U.S. citizen who court papers said was an agent for Beijing. The second Pentagon official linked to the ring was Gregg Bergersen of the Pentagon's Defense Security Cooperation Agency, who was convicted along with Kuo last year for supplying defense technology for China's military.

Both that spy ring and the Chi Mak case were linked through a Chinese official in Guangzhou, identified in court papers as Pu Pei-liang, who worked as a researcher at the Chinese-military-funded Center for Asia Pacific Studies and received the defense secrets from the spies.

According to defense officials, Gen. Yang is an experienced clandestine operative who speaks English fluently and worked undercover in Europe.

Gen. Yang told U.S. officials during meetings that Chinese leaders were so angered by the disclosure of the Chinese submarine maneuver that they considered canceling the visit at the time by Adm. Gary Roughead, then-Pacific Fleet commander who has since been promoted to chief of naval operations.

The disclosure first appeared in The Washington Times and embarrassed Navy officials, who had to explain how defenses were breached against one of the military's most important power projection capabilities.

Gen. Yang brought up the incident during talks in Washington and said his intelligence service, known in U.S. intelligence circles as 2PLA, carried out an investigation. He said the service informed senior Chinese communist leaders that they had determined that the press disclosure was not an officially sanctioned leak.

The Chinese Song-class diesel submarine surfaced near the Kitty Hawk on Oct. 26, 2006, and was spotted by one of the ship's aircraft.

Current and former U.S. officials said Chinese intelligence cooperation, the reason for Gen. Yang's visit, has been mixed, focusing mainly on large numbers of Chinese reports on Muslim Uighurs in western Xinjiang province. Some of them are linked to Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda, but many are dissident Chinese Muslims seeking independence from communist rule.

Former State Department China affairs specialist John J. Tkacik Jr. said Gen. Yang is an expert in cyberwarfare and once headed the PLA's electronic intelligence section.

"His success as a cyberwarrior led to his promotion from senior colonel to major general and chief of the PLA's prestigious Second Department, which is not only responsible for military human intelligence collection, but also collates and analyzes all-source intelligence for the PLA," Mr. Tkacik said.

"I have no doubt that he has been directing the Chinese military's vast, industrial-vacuum-cleaner cyber-intelligence campaign that has penetrated not just U.S. military computer systems, but just about every U.S. business, university and research institute's computer systems as well."

Mr. Tkacik said it is not clear why the Pentagon is seeking to increase transparency with Gen. Yang and his intelligence collectors. "They certainly aren't going to reciprocate," he said.

Larry M. Wortzel, a former military intelligence specialist, said he found his past liaison and exchange meetings with the 2PLA to be professional and productive. "I'm pleased the contacts are still going on," he said.

"As for terrorism reports, the foreign, non-Chinese contacts I had as an attache in China convinced me that at that time, in the late 1990s, a violent separatist movement was active in Xinjiang committing acts of terror," Mr. Wortzel said.

Wang Baodong, a Chinese Embassy spokesman, had no direct comment on Gen. Yang's visit but said enhanced military exchanges between the United States and China are mutually beneficial and promote peace and stability.

"We believe that under the current complex and changeable international situation, China and U.S. share expanding common interests in handling various global issues, such as challenging climate change, alleviation of natural disaster, counterterrorism and nonproliferation," he said.

On the Chinese military spying cases, Mr. Wang said "allegations of China conducting espionage in the U.S. are false and unhelpful for increasing mutual trust between the two countries."


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Tuesday, October 6, 2009

Turkey, Israel, The FBI -- & The Translator


Who’s Afraid of Sibel Edmonds?
The gagged whistleblower goes on the record.

BY SIBEL EDMONDS AND PHILIP GIRALDI

Sibel Edmonds has a story to tell. She went to work as a Turkish and Farsi translator for the FBI five days after 9/11. Part of her job was to translate and transcribe recordings of conversations between suspected Turkish intelligence agents and their American contacts. She was fired from the FBI in April 2002 after she raised concerns that one of the translators in her section was a member of a Turkish organization that was under investigation for bribing senior government officials and members of Congress, drug trafficking, illegal weapons sales, money laundering, and nuclear proliferation. She appealed her termination, but was more alarmed that no effort was being made to address the corruption that she had been monitoring.

A Department of Justice inspector general’s report called Edmonds’s allegations “credible,” “serious,” and “warrant[ing] a thorough and careful review by the FBI.” Ranking Senate Judiciary Committee members Pat Leahy (D-Vt.) and Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) have backed her publicly. “60 Minutes” launched an investigation of her claims and found them believable. No one has ever disproved any of Edmonds’s revelations, which she says can be verified by FBI investigative files.

John Ashcroft’s Justice Department confirmed Edmonds’s veracity in a backhanded way by twice invoking the dubious State Secrets Privilege so she could not tell what she knows. The ACLU has called her “the most gagged person in the history of the United States of America.”

But on Aug. 8, she was finally able to testify under oath in a court case filed in Ohio and agreed to an interview with The American Conservative based on that testimony. What follows is her own account of what some consider the most incredible tale of corruption and influence peddling in recent times. As Sibel herself puts it, “If this were written up as a novel, no one would believe it.”

PHILIP GIRALDI: We were very interested to learn of your four-hour deposition in the case involving allegations that Congresswoman Jean Schmidt accepted money from the Turkish government in return for political favors. You provided many names and details for the first time on the record and swore an oath confirming that the deposition was true.

Basically, you map out a corruption scheme involving U.S. government employees and members of Congress and agents of foreign governments. These agents were able to obtain information that was either used directly by those foreign governments or sold to third parties, with the proceeds often used as bribes to breed further corruption. Let’s start with the first government official you identified, Marc Grossman, then the third highest-ranking official at the State Department.

SIBEL EDMONDS: During my work with the FBI, one of the major operational files that I was transcribing and translating started in late 1996 and continued until 2002, when I left the Bureau. Because the FBI had had no Turkish translators, these files were archived, but were considered to be very important operations. As part of the background, I was briefed about why these operations had been initiated and who the targets were.

Grossman became a person of interest early on in the investigative file while he was the U.S. ambassador to Turkey [1994-97], when he became personally involved with operatives both from the Turkish government and from suspected criminal groups. He also had suspicious contact with a number of official and non-official Israelis. Grossman was removed from Turkey short of tour during a scandal referred to as “Susurluk” by the media. It involved a number of high-level criminals as well as senior army and intelligence officers with whom he had been in contact.

Another individual who was working for Grossman, Air Force Major Douglas Dickerson, was also removed from Turkey and sent to Germany. After he and his Turkish wife Can returned to the U.S., he went to work for Douglas Feith and she was hired as an FBI Turkish translator. My complaints about her connection to Turkish lobbying groups led to my eventual firing.

Grossman and Dickerson had to leave the country because a big investigation had started in Turkey. Special prosecutors were appointed, and the case was headlined in England, Germany, Italy, and in some of the Balkan countries because the criminal groups were found to be active in all those places. A leading figure in the scandal, Mehmet Eymür, led a major paramilitary group for the Turkish intelligence service. To keep him from testifying, Eymür was sent by the Turkish government to the United States, where he worked for eight months as head of intelligence at the Turkish Embassy in Washington. He later became a U.S. citizen and now lives in McLean, Virginia. The central figure in this scandal was Abdullah Catli. In 1989, while “most wanted” by Interpol, he came to the U.S., was granted residency, and settled in Chicago, where he continued to conduct his operations until 1996.

GIRALDI: So Grossman at this point comes back to the United States. He’s rewarded with the third-highest position at the State Department, and he allegedly uses this position to do favors for “Turkish interests”—both for the Turkish government and for possible criminal interests. Sometimes, the two converge. The FBI is aware of his activities and is listening to his phone calls. When someone who is Turkish calls Grossman, the FBI monitors that individual’s phone calls, and when the Turk calls a friend who is a Pakistani or an Egyptian or a Saudi, they monitor all those contacts, widening the net.

EDMONDS: Correct.

GIRALDI: And Grossman received money as a result. In one case, you said that a State Department colleague went to pick up a bag of money…

EDMONDS: $14,000

GIRALDI: What kind of information was Grossman giving to foreign countries? Did he give assistance to foreign individuals penetrating U.S. government labs and defense installations as has been reported? It’s also been reported that he was the conduit to a group of congressmen who become, in a sense, the targets to be recruited as “agents of influence.”

EDMONDS: Yes, that’s correct. Grossman assisted his Turkish and Israeli contacts directly, and he also facilitated access to members of Congress who might be inclined to help for reasons of their own or could be bribed into cooperation. The top person obtaining classified information was Congressman Tom Lantos. A Lantos associate, Alan Makovsky worked very closely with Dr. Sabri Sayari in Georgetown University, who is widely believed to be a Turkish spy. Lantos would give Makovsky highly classified policy-related documents obtained during defense briefings for passage to Israel because Makovsky was also working for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).

GIRALDI: Makovsky is now working for the Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy, a pro-Israeli think tank.

EDMONDS: Yes. Lantos was at the time probably the most outspoken supporter of Israel in Congress. AIPAC would take out the information from Lantos that was relevant to Israel, and they would give the rest of it to their Turkish associates. The Turks would go through the leftovers, take what they wanted, and then try to sell the rest. If there were something relevant to Pakistan, they would contact the ISI officer at the embassy and say, “We’ve got this and this, let’s sit down and talk.” And then they would sell it to the Pakistanis.

GIRALDI: ISI—Pakistani intelligence—has been linked to the Pakistani nuclear proliferation program as well as to al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

So the FBI was monitoring these connections going from a congressman to a congressman’s assistant to a foreign individual who is connected with intelligence to other intelligence people who are located at different embassies in Washington. And all of this information is in an FBI file somewhere?

EDMONDS: Two sets of FBI files, but the AIPAC-related files and the Turkish files ended up converging in one. The FBI agents believed that they were looking at the same operation. It didn’t start with AIPAC originally. It started with the Israeli Embassy. The original targets were intelligence officers under diplomatic cover in the Turkish Embassy and the Israeli Embassy. It was those contacts that led to the American Turkish Council and the Assembly of Turkish American Associations and then to AIPAC fronting for the Israelis. It moved forward from there.

GIRALDI: So the FBI was monitoring people from the Israeli Embassy and the Turkish Embassy and one, might presume, the Pakistani Embassy as well?

EDMONDS: They were the secondary target. They got leftovers from the Turks and Israelis. The FBI would intercept communications to try to identify who the diplomatic target’s intelligence chief was, but then, in addition to that, there are individuals there, maybe the military attaché, who had their own contacts who were operating independently of others in the embassy.

GIRALDI: So the network starts with a person like Grossman in the State Department providing information that enables Turkish and Israeli intelligence officers to have access to people in Congress, who then provide classified information that winds up in the foreign embassies?

EDMONDS: Absolutely. And we also had Pentagon officials doing the same thing. We were looking at Richard Perle and Douglas Feith. They had a list of individuals in the Pentagon broken down by access to certain types of information. Some of them would be policy related, some of them would be weapons-technology related, some of them would be nuclear-related. Perle and Feith would provide the names of those Americans, officials in the Pentagon, to Grossman, together with highly sensitive personal information: this person is a closet gay; this person has a chronic gambling issue; this person is an alcoholic. The files on the American targets would contain things like the size of their mortgages or whether they were going through divorces. One Air Force major I remember was going through a really nasty divorce and a child custody fight. They detailed all different kinds of vulnerabilities.

GIRALDI: So they had access to their personnel files and also their security files and were illegally accessing this kind of information to give to foreign agents who exploited the vulnerabilities of these people to recruit them as sources of information?

EDMONDS: Yes. Some of those individuals on the list were also working for the RAND Corporation. RAND ended up becoming one of the prime targets for these foreign agents.

GIRALDI: RAND does highly classified research for the U.S. government. So they were setting up these people for recruitment as agents or as agents of influence?

EDMONDS: Yes, and the RAND sources would be paid peanuts compared to what the information was worth when it was sold if it was not immediately useful for Turkey or Israel. They also had sources who were working in some midwestern Air Force bases. The sources would provide the information on CD’s and DVD’s. In one case, for example, a Turkish military attaché got the disc and discovered that it was something really important, so he offered it to the Pakistani ISI person at the embassy, but the price was too high. Then a Turkish contact in Chicago said he knew two Saudi businessmen in Detroit who would be very interested in this information, and they would pay the price. So the Turkish military attaché flew to Detroit with his assistant to make the sale.

GIRALDI: We know Grossman was receiving money for services.

EDMONDS: Yes. Sometimes he would give money to the people who were working with him, identified in phone calls on a first-name basis, whether it’s a John or a Joe. He also took care of some other people, including his contact at the New York Times. Grossman would brag, “We just fax to our people at the New York Times. They print it under their names.”

GIRALDI: Did Feith and Perle receive any money that you know of?

EDMONDS: No.

GIRALDI: So they were doing favors for other reasons. Both Feith and Perle were lobbyists for Turkey and also were involved with Israel on defense contracts, including some for Northrop Grumman, which Feith represented in Israel.

EDMONDS: They had arrangements with various companies, some of them members of the American Turkish Council. They had arrangements with Kissinger’s group, with Northrop Grumman, with former secretary of state James Baker’s group, and also with former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft.

The monitoring of the Turks picked up contacts with Feith, Wolfowitz, and Perle in the summer of 2001, four months before 9/11. They were discussing with the Turkish ambassador in Washington an arrangement whereby the U.S. would invade Iraq and divide the country. The UK would take the south, the rest would go to the U.S. They were negotiating what Turkey required in exchange for allowing an attack from Turkish soil. The Turks were very supportive, but wanted a three-part division of Iraq to include their own occupation of the Kurdish region. The three Defense Department officials said that would be more than they could agree to, but they continued daily communications to the ambassador and his defense attaché in an attempt to convince them to help.

Meanwhile Scowcroft, who was also the chairman of the American Turkish Council, Baker, Richard Armitage, and Grossman began negotiating separately for a possible Turkish protectorate. Nothing was decided, and then 9/11 took place.

Scowcroft was all for invading Iraq in 2001 and even wrote a paper for the Pentagon explaining why the Turkish northern front would be essential. I know Scowcroft came off as a hero to some for saying he was against the war, but he was very much for it until his client’s conditions were not met by the Bush administration.

GIRALDI: Armitage was deputy secretary of state at the time Scowcroft and Baker were running their own consulting firms that were doing business with Turkey. Grossman had just become undersecretary, third in the State hierarchy behind Armitage.

You’ve previouly alluded to efforts by Grossman, as well as high-ranking officials at the Pentagon, to place Ph.D. students. Can you describe that in more detail?

EDMONDS: The seeding operation started before Marc Grossman arrived at the State Department. The Turkish agents had a network of Turkish professors in various universities with access to government information. Their top source was a Turkish-born professor of nuclear physics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He was useful because MIT would place a bunch of Ph.D. or graduate-level students in various nuclear facilities like Sandia or Los Alamos, and some of them were able to work for the Air Force. He would provide the list of Ph.D. students who should get these positions. In some cases, the Turkish military attaché would ask that certain students be placed in important positions. And they were not necessarily all Turkish, but the ones they selected had struck deals with the Turkish agents to provide information in return for money. If for some reason they had difficulty getting a secuity clearance, Grossman would ensure that the State Department would arrange to clear them.

In exchange for the information that these students would provide, they would be paid $4,000 or $5,000. And the information that was sold to the two Saudis in Detroit went for something like $350,000 or $400,000.

GIRALDI: This corruption wasn’t confined to the State Department and the Pentagon—it infected Congress as well. You’ve named people like former House Speaker Dennis Hastert, now a registered agent of the Turkish government. In your deposition, you describe the process of breaking foreign-originated contributions into small units, $200 or less, so that the source didn’t have to be reported. Was this the primary means of influencing congressmen, or did foreign agents exploit vulnerabilities to get what they wanted using something like blackmail?

EDMONDS: In early 1997, because of the information that the FBI was getting on the Turkish diplomatic community, the Justice Department had already started to investigate several Republican congressmen. The number-one congressman involved with the Turkish community, both in terms of providing information and doing favors, was Bob Livingston. Number-two after him was Dan Burton, and then he became number-one until Hastert became the speaker of the House. Bill Clinton’s attorney general, Janet Reno, was briefed on the investigations, and since they were Republicans, she authorized that they be continued.

Well, as the FBI developed more information, Tom Lantos was added to this list, and then they got a lot on Douglas Feith and Richard Perle and Marc Grossman. At this point, the Justice Department said they wanted the FBI to only focus on Congress, leaving the executive branch people out of it. But the FBI agents involved wanted to continue pursuing Perle and Feith because the Israeli Embassy was also connected. Then the Monica Lewinsky scandal erupted, and everything was placed on the back burner.

But some of the agents continued to investigate the congressional connection. In 1999, they wiretapped the congressmen directly. (Prior to that point they were getting all their information secondhand through FISA, as their primary targets were foreigners.) The questionably legal wiretap gave the perfect excuse to the Justice Department. As soon as they found out, they refused permission to monitor the congressmen and Grossman as primary targets. But the inquiry was kept alive in Chicago because the FBI office there was pursuing its own investigation. The epicenter of a lot of the foreign espionage activity was Chicago.

GIRALDI: So the investigation stopped in Washington, but continued in Chicago?

EDMONDS: Yes, and in 2000, another representative was added to the list, Jan Schakowsky, the Democratic congresswoman from Illinois. Turkish agents started gathering information on her, and they found out that she was bisexual. So a Turkish agent struck up a relationship with her. When Jan Schakowsky’s mother died, the Turkish woman went to the funeral, hoping to exploit her vulnerability. They later were intimate in Schakowsky’s townhouse, which had been set up with recording devices and hidden cameras. They needed Schakowsky and her husband Robert Creamer to perform certain illegal operational facilitations for them in Illinois. They already had Hastert, the mayor, and several other Illinois state senators involved. I don’t know if Congresswoman Schakowsky ever was actually blackmailed or did anything for the Turkish woman.

GIRALDI: So we have a pattern of corruption starting with government officials providing information to foreigners and helping them make contact with other Americans who had valuable information. Some of these officials, like Marc Grossman, were receiving money directly. Others were receiving business favors: Pentagon associates like Doug Feith and Richard Perle had interests in Israel and Turkey. The stolen information was being sold, and the money that was being generated was used to corrupt certain congressmen to influence policy and provide still more information—in many cases information related to nuclear technology.

EDMONDS: As well as weapons technology, conventional weapons technology, and Pentagon policy-related information.

GIRALDI: You also have information on al-Qaeda, specifically al-Qaeda in Central Asia and Bosnia. You were privy to conversations that suggested the CIA was supporting al-Qaeda in central Asia and the Balkans, training people to get money, get weapons, and this contact continued until 9/11…

EDMONDS: I don’t know if it was CIA. There were certain forces in the U.S. government who worked with the Turkish paramilitary groups, including Abdullah Çatli’s group, Fethullah Gülen.

GIRALDI: Well, that could be either Joint Special Operations Command or CIA.

EDMONDS: Maybe in a lot of cases when they said State Department, they meant CIA?

GIRALDI: When they said State Department, they probably meant CIA.

EDMONDS: Okay. So these conversations, between 1997 and 2001, had to do with a Central Asia operation that involved bin Laden. Not once did anybody use the word “al-Qaeda.” It was always “mujahideen,” always “bin Laden” and, in fact, not “bin Laden” but “bin Ladens” plural. There were several bin Ladens who were going on private jets to Azerbaijan and Tajikistan. The Turkish ambassador in Azerbaijan worked with them.

There were bin Ladens, with the help of Pakistanis or Saudis, under our management. Marc Grossman was leading it, 100 percent, bringing people from East Turkestan into Kyrgyzstan, from Kyrgyzstan to Azerbaijan, from Azerbaijan some of them were being channeled to Chechnya, some of them were being channeled to Bosnia. From Turkey, they were putting all these bin Ladens on NATO planes. People and weapons went one way, drugs came back.

GIRALDI: Was the U.S. government aware of this circular deal?

EDMONDS: 100 percent. A lot of the drugs were going to Belgium with NATO planes. After that, they went to the UK, and a lot came to the U.S. via military planes to distribution centers in Chicago and Paterson, New Jersey. Turkish diplomats who would never be searched were coming with suitcases of heroin.

GIRALDI: And, of course, none of this has been investigated. What do you think the chances are that the Obama administration will try to end this criminal activity?

EDMONDS: Well, even during Obama’s presidential campaign, I did not buy into his slogan of “change” being promoted by the media and, unfortunately, by the naïve blogosphere. First of all, Obama’s record as a senator, short as it was, spoke clearly. For all those changes that he was promising, he had done nothing. In fact, he had taken the opposite position, whether it was regarding the NSA’s wiretapping or the issue of national-security whistleblowers. We whistleblowers had written to his Senate office. He never responded, even though he was on the relevant committees.

As soon as Obama became president, he showed us that the State Secrets Privilege was going to continue to be a tool of choice. It’s an arcane executive privilege to cover up wrongdoing—in many cases, criminal activities. And the Obama administration has not only defended using the State Secrets Privilege, it has been trying to take it even further than the previous terrible administration by maintaining that the U.S. government has sovereign immunity. This is Obama’s change: his administration seems to think it doesn’t even have to invoke state secrets as our leaders are emperors who possess this sovereign immunity. This is not the kind of language that anybody in a democracy would use.

The other thing I noticed is how Chicago, with its culture of political corruption, is central to the new administration. When I saw that Obama’s choice of chief of staff was Rahm Emanuel, knowing his relationship with Mayor Richard Daley and with the Hastert crowd, I knew we were not going to see positive changes. Changes possibly, but changes for the worse. It was no coincidence that the Turkish criminal entity’s operation centered on Chicago.
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Sibel Edmonds is a former FBI translator and the founder of the National Security Whistleblowers Coalition. Philip Giraldi is a former CIA officer and The American Conservative’s Deep Background columnist.Sphere: Related Content