Friday, October 29, 2010
Turkish Espionage, Sex and Blackmail
9 Military Officers Arrested on Espionage Charges
Nine military officers, out of 13 who had been referred to court by the İstanbul Prosecutor's Office, were in court on Wednesday on charges of blackmail and espionage, while four others were released.
A total of 16 suspects had been taken to the Beşiktaş Courthouse in İstanbul yesterday, including one civilian and 15 military officers. Prosecutor Fikret Seçen then referred the 13 officers to court, demanding their arrest. The other three were released by the prosecution after questioning. The suspects testified at the İstanbul 13th High Criminal court until after midnight on Wednesday.
The officers were arrested on charges of membership in a criminal organization; destroying, damaging and falsifying documents relating to state security; illegally obtaining documents related to state security and illegally acquiring confidential documents for political or military espionage purposes.”
Eight suspects, including four other military officers and four Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) members and a higher ranking bureaucrat inside the Defense Ministry, were taken to the courthouse yesterday. Their interrogation before the judge continued well into the late evening.
The Taraf daily yesterday reported that the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) was assisting in the search for three foreign women under the names of İnesa, Lia Rahmatova and Nona Burduli. According to the paper, these foreigners, who are believed to still be in Turkey, are suspected of liaising between the suspects and foreign military services to whom the stolen information was sold.
The arrests are a culmination of investigations that began in August this year into a gang inside the Naval Forces which had arranged prostitutes for senior military, police officers and bureaucrats for the purposes of using recorded footage to blackmail their victims. As the operation expanded, it turned into an espionage investigation that included highly confidential and strategic military documents.
There are 49 suspects in the investigation, most of whom are military officers on active duty, including four cryptology experts from TÜBİTAK. In coming days, two admirals, five senor colonels and six other members of the military are also expected to be brought for their testimonies. The prosecution yesterday said an arrest warrant had been issued for four other soldiers who are currently abroad.
In August police had seized documents with sensitive information at the houses of those who at the time were thought to be prostitution and blackmail suspects, which they then relayed to the MİT for advice on whether these documents could have been sent to foreign intelligence units. This is how the investigation expanded to reveal the espionage.
29 October 2010, Friday
TODAY’S ZAMAN İSTANBUL
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-225725-101-9-military-officers-arrested-on-espionage-charges.htmlSphere: Related Content
Thursday, October 28, 2010
MI6 Chief: 1st Ever Public Speech - Transcript
Sir John Sawers's Speech – full text - The Guardian
Transcript of today's [28 October 2010] first public speech by a serving MI6 chief:
The Times published a reader's letter earlier this year. It read: "Sir – is it not bizarre that MI5 and MI6, otherwise known as the secret services, currently stand accused of being – er – secretive?"
I may be biased. But I think that reader was on to something rather important and most government work these days is done by conventional and transparent processes. But not all.
Britain's foreign intelligence effort was first organised in 1909, when the Secret Intelligence Service was formed.
We have just published an official history of our first 40 years. I'm sure you will all have read all 800 pages of it.
The first chief, Mansfield Cumming, used to pay the salaries of SIS officials out of his private income, dispensed in cash from a desk drawer. I'm glad to say that, even after the chancellor's statement last week, I'm not in the same position.
SIS's existence was admitted only in 1994. We British move slowly on such things.
And this, I believe, is the first public speech given by a serving chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service.
"Why now?" might you ask. Well, intelligence features prominently in the National Security Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review, published last week.
We often appear in the news. Our popular name – MI6 – is an irresistible draw. We have a website, and we've got versions in Arabic and Russian. We recruit our staff openly, with adverts in the national press.
But debate on SIS's role is not well informed, in part because we have been so determined to protect our secrets.
In today's open society, no government institution is given the benefit of the doubt all the time. There are new expectations of public – and legal – accountability that have developed. In short, in 2010 the context for the UK's secret intelligence work is very different from 1994.I am not going to use today to tantalise you with hints of sensitive operations or intelligence successes.
Instead, I want to answer two important questions: what value do we get from a secret overseas intelligence effort in the modern era? How can the public have confidence that work done in secret is lawful, ethical, and in their interests?
First, how do we all fit in? The Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, operates abroad, dealing with threats overseas and gathering intelligence mainly from human sources. The security service, MI5, works here in the UK, protecting the homeland from terrorist attack and other threats.
GCHQ produces intelligence from communications, and takes the lead in the cyber world.
These three specialised services form the UK intelligence community, and we operate in what the foreign secretary has called a networked world. Technology plays an ever growing part in our work, for SIS as well as GCHQ, and the boundary line between home and abroad is increasingly blurred.
So the three agencies work increasingly closely together, and the next five years will see us intensifying our collaboration to improve our operational impact and to save money. Yes, even the intelligence services have to make savings.
Secret intelligence is important information that others wish you not to know; it's information that deepens our understanding of a foreign country or grouping, or reveals their true intentions. It's information that gives us new opportunities for action.
We at SIS obtain our intelligence from secret agents. These are people are nearly all foreign nationals, who have access to secret information and who choose to work with us.
Our agents are the true heroes of our work. They have their own motivations and hopes. Many of them show extraordinary courage and idealism, striving in their own countries for the freedoms that we in Britain take for granted.
Our agents are working today in some of the most dangerous and exposed places, bravely and to hugely valuable effect, and we owe a debt to countless more whose service is over.
Agents take serious risks and make sacrifices to help our country. In return, we give them a solemn pledge: that we shall keep their role secret.
The information we get from agents is put into an intelligence report. The source is described in general terms. It is just that – a report. It tells us something new or corroborates what we suspect.
A report's value can be overplayed if it tells us what we want to hear, or it can be underplayed if it contains unwelcome news or runs against received wisdom.
It is a part of the picture, and may not be even wholly accurate, even if the trusted agent who gave it to us is sure that it is.
So sources of intelligence have to be rigorously evaluated, and their reports have to be honestly weighed alongside all other information. Those who produce it, and those who want to use it, have to put intelligence in a wider context. The Joint Intelligence Committee plays a crucial role.
The Butler Review following Iraq was a clear reminder, to both the agencies and the centre of government, politicians and officials alike, of how intelligence needs to be handled. The SIS board recently reviewed our implementation of Lord Butler's recommendations, to make sure we've implemented them fully, in spirit as well as in substance.
I am confident that they have been. And we will look at the wider issues again once the Chilcott Inquiry reports.
So why do we need secret intelligence? Well, let's start with the terrorist problem.
Most people go about their daily work not worrying about the risk of a terrorist attack. That a bomb may have been planted on their route, or hostages might be seized. I'm glad they don't worry about those sorts of things: part of our job is to make people feel safe.
But those threats exist, as we're recalling now with the 7/7 inquest. That said, on any given day the chances that a terrorist attack will happen on our streets, even in central London, feel small enough to be safely ignored by the public.
You, and millions of people like you, go about your business in our cities and towns free of fear because the British government works tirelessly, out of the public eye, to stop terrorists and would-be terrorists in their tracks.
The most draining aspect of my job is reading, every day, intelligence reports describing the plotting of terrorists who are bent on maiming and murdering people in this country.
It's an enormous tribute to the men and women of our intelligence and security agencies, and to our cooperation with partner services around the world, that so few of these appalling plots develop into real terrorist attacks.
Some of these terrorists are British citizens, trained in how to use weapons, how to make bombs. Others are foreign nationals who want to attack us to undermine our support for forces of moderation around the world.
Many of the reports I read describe the workings of the al-Qaida network, rooted in a nihilistic version of Islam.
Al-Qaida have ambitious goals. Weakening the power of the west. Toppling moderate Islamic regimes. Seizing the holy places of Islam to give them moral authority. Taking control of the Arab world's oil reserves. They're unlikely to achieve these goals, but they remain set on trying, and are ready to use extreme violence.
Jonathan Evans, the head of MI5, recently described how the threat is intensifying. Precisely because we are having some success in closing down the space for terrorist recruitment and planning in the UK, the extremists are increasingly preparing their attacks against British targets from abroad.
It's not just the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al-Qaida affiliates in Yemen, Somalia and North Africa pose real threats to the UK.
From his remote base in Yemen, Al-Qaida leader and US national Anwar al-Awlaki broadcasts propaganda and terrorist instruction in fluent English over the internet.
Our intelligence effort needs to go where the threat is. One of the advantages of the way we in SIS work is that we are highly adaptable and flexible. We don't get pinned in one place.
There is no one reason for the terrorist phenomenon. Some blame political issues like Palestine or Kashmir or Iraq. Others cite economic disadvantage. Distortions of the Islamic faith. Male supremacy. The lack of the normal checks and balances in some countries. There are many theories.
I've worked a lot in the Islamic world. I agree with those who say we need to be steady and stand by our friends.
Over time, moving to a more open system of government in these countries, one more responsive to people's grievances, will help. But if we demand an abrupt move to the pluralism that we in the west enjoy, we may undermine the controls that are now in place and terrorists would end up with new opportunities.
Whatever the cause or causes of so-called Islamic terrorism, there is little prospect of it fading away soon.
SIS deals with the realities, the threats as they are. We work to minimise the risks. Our closest partners include many in the Muslim world who are concerned at the threat Al-Qaida and their like poses to Islam itself.
In the UK, the security service, MI5, leads our counter-terrorism effort. They do a superb job and SIS's work starts with the priorities that the security service sets.
It's not enough to intercept terrorists here, at the very last minute. They need to be identified and stopped well before then, which means action far beyond our own borders.
This is where SIS comes in. Over one-third of SIS resources are directed against international terrorism. It's the largest single area of SIS's work.
We get inside terrorist organisations to see where the next threats are coming from. We work to disrupt terrorist plots aimed against the UK, and against our friends and allies. What we do is not seen. Few know about the terrorist attacks we help stop.
It scarcely needs saying, but I'll say it anyway: working to tackle terrorism overseas is complex and often dangerous. Our agents, and sometimes our staff, risk their lives.
Much intelligence is partial, fragmentary. We have to build up a picture. It's like a jigsaw, but with key sections missing, and pieces from other jigsaws mixed in.
SIS officers round the world make judgements at short notice with potentially life or death consequences.
Say an agent warns us of a planned attack. We may need to meet that agent fast and securely, to understand his intelligence more fully. To work with GCHQ who look for other signs. To work with MI5 and the police to act on that intelligence here in the UK.
Ministers and lawyers need to be briefed and consulted on next steps. We need partner agencies abroad to pool information, to monitor individuals or to detain them where there are clear, specific concerns.
Disrupting the terrorists is a painstaking process with much careful preparation, and then sudden rapid activity. Details have to be got right. It all has to be tackled fast and securely. There is little margin for error.
All this goes on 24 hours a day, every day of the year. And it keeps us far safer than we would be without it.
Proliferation terrorism is difficult enough and, despite our collective efforts, an attack may well get through. The human cost would be huge. But our country, our democratic system, will not be brought down by a typical terrorist attack.
The dangers of proliferation of nuclear weapons – and chemical and biological weapons – are more far-reaching. It can alter the whole balance of power in a region.
States seeking to build nuclear weapons against their international legal obligations are obsessively secretive about it. SIS's role is to find out what these states are doing and planning, and identify ways to slow down their access to vital materials and technology.
The revelations around Iran's secret enrichment site at Qom were an intelligence success. They led to diplomatic pressure on Iran intensifying, with tougher UN and EU sanctions which are beginning to bite. The Iranian regime must think hard about where its best interests lie.
The risks of failure in this area are grim. Stopping nuclear proliferation cannot be addressed purely by conventional diplomacy. We need intelligence-led operations to make it more difficult for countries like Iran to develop nuclear weapons.
The longer international efforts delay Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons technology, the more time we create for a political solution to be found.
Long-range strategic intelligence: the National Security Strategy which the prime minister published last week sets out the strategic direction for foreign, defence and security policy for the years ahead. Intelligence is at the heart of that strategy.
SIS has the responsibility to gather long-range strategic intelligence, to track military and economic power in other countries, and find out what they going to do with it. We try to see inside the minds of potential policy adversaries and predict their behaviour.
We have expertise on states that operate opaquely and without public accountability. We provide early warning of new weapons systems, or of major changes in policy.
Machiavelli said that "surprise is the essential factor in victory". A lot of SIS work is about making sure that the British government does not face unwelcome surprises. And that some of our adversaries do.
Cyber: My colleague Iain Lobban at GCHQ recently described the cyber threats we face in the modern world.
Attacks on government information and commercial secrets of our companies are happening all the time. Electricity grids, our banking system, anything controlled by computers, could possibly be vulnerable. For some, cyber is becoming an instrument of policy as much as diplomacy or military force.
As Iain is the first to recognise, there isn't a purely technological solution. We need to invest in technology to defend ourselves, and the government has allocated funds for that purpose in the Spending Round.
Even high technology threats have that crucial human dimension, and SIS will be gathering intelligence on individuals and states launching cyber attacks against us, to find out how they organise themselves and to develop ways to counter them.
We have already set to work. It's a big task of the future.
Supporting the military, and building security where the military are involved in a conflict, you will find SIS and GCHQ alongside them.
In Afghanistan, our people provide tactical intelligence that guides military operations and saves our soldiers' lives. Our strategic intelligence helps map the political way forward.
We are building up the Afghan security service, already probably the most capable of the Afghan security institutions, to help the Afghans take responsibility for their own security.
Capacity building is not limited to Afghanistan. We offer training and support to partner services around the world. It wins their cooperation, it improves the quality of their work, and it builds respect for human rights.
Our government expects SIS to maintain a global reach, collecting intelligence in all areas of major British interest to reduce the risk of unpleasant surprises.
And we have our network of partners which provides us a discreet channel of communication to other governments on the most sensitive issues.
So we are a very special part of government. SIS exists to give the UK advantage. We are a sovereign national asset. We are the secret frontline of our national security.
How can the public have confidence that work done by us in secret is lawful, ethical and in their interests?
Let me explain how it all works in practice.
SIS does not choose what it does. The 1994 Intelligence Services Act sets the legal framework for what we do. Ministers tell us what they want to know, what they want us to achieve. We take our direction from the National Security Council.
As chief of SIS, I am responsible for SIS operations. I answer directly to the foreign secretary.
When our operations require legal authorisation or entail political risk, I seek the foreign secretary's approval in advance. If a case is particularly complex, he can consult the attorney general. In the end, the foreign secretary decides what we do.
Submissions for operations go to the foreign secretary all the time. He approves most, but not all, and those operations he does not approve do not happen. It's as simple as that.
There is oversight and scrutiny by parliamentarians and by judges.
The Intelligence and Security committee is chaired by Sir Malcolm Rifkind, and includes other senior politicians, many of them former ministers. They hold us to account and can investigate areas of our activity.
And two former judges have full access to our files, as intelligence commissioner and interception commissioner. They make sure our procedures are proper and lawful.
These processes of control and accountability are as robust as you will find anywhere. SIS fully supports them. We want to enjoy public confidence.
We don't operate on our own. Intelligence is a team game. If we need to track a British terrorist in another country, or stop a shipment of components for a secret nuclear programme, we need to work with services abroad.
We work with over 200 partner services around the world, with hugely constructive results. And our intelligence partnership with the United States is an especially powerful contributor to UK security.
No intelligence service risks compromising its sources. So we have a rule called the control principle – the service who first obtains the intelligence has the right to control how it is used, who else it can be shared with, and what action can be taken on it.
It's rule number one of intelligence sharing. We insist on it with our partners, and they insist on it with us. Because whenever intelligence is revealed, others try to hunt down the source. Agents can get identified, arrested, tortured and killed by the very organisations who are working against us.
So if the control principle is not respected, the intelligence dries up. That's why we have been so concerned about the possible release of intelligence material in recent court cases.
We can't do our job if we work only with friendly democracies. Dangerous threats usually come from dangerous people in dangerous places. We have to deal with the world as it is.
Suppose we receive credible intelligence that might save lives, here or abroad. We have a professional and moral duty to act on it. We will normally want to share it with those who can save those lives.
We also have a duty to do what we can to ensure that a partner service will respect human rights. That is not always straightforward.
Yet if we hold back, and don't pass that intelligence, out of concern that a suspect terrorist may be badly treated, innocent lives may be lost that we could have saved.
These are not abstract questions for philosophy courses or searching editorials. They are real, constant, operational dilemmas.
Sometimes there is no clear way forward. The more finely-balanced judgments have to be made by Ministers themselves. I welcome the publication of the consolidated guidance on detainee issues. It reflects the detailed guidance issued to SIS staff in the field and the training we give them.
Torture is illegal and abhorrent under any circumstances, and we have nothing whatsoever to do with it. If we know or believe action by us will lead to torture taking place, we're required by UK and international law to avoid that action. And we do, even though that allows the terrorist activity to go ahead.
Some may question this, but we are clear that it's the right thing to do. It makes us strive all the harder to find different ways, consistent with human rights, to get the outcome we want.
Other countries respect our approach on these issues. Even where we find deep differences of culture and tradition, we can make progress, slowly but surely, by seeking careful assurances and providing skilled training.
I also welcome the prime minister's initiative in setting up the Gibson Inquiry into the detainee issue. If there are more lessons to be learned, we want to learn them.
And, after 9/11, the terrorist threat was immediate and paramount. We are accused by some people not of committing torture ourselves but of being too close to it in our efforts to keep Britain safe.
Let me say this: SIS is a Service that reflects our country. Integrity is the first of the service's values.
I am confident that, in their efforts to keep Britain safe, all SIS staff acted with the utmost integrity, and with a close eye on basic decency and moral principles.
So, back to that reader's letter in The Times.
The recent debate about secrecy reflects two concerns. First, national security, and the need for the intelligence and security agencies to work in secret to protect British interests and our way of life from those who threaten it.
And second, the need for justice – the rights of citizens to raise complaint against the government and get a fair hearing.
As a public servant, and as a citizen, I devoutly want both objectives upheld, and not to have one undermine the other.
The judges have to determine what constitutes a fair trial.
We in the intelligence and security agencies have to make sure that our secrets don't become available to those who are threatening our country. And we have to protect our partners secrets.
As the prime minister said in parliament, at present we're unable to use secret material in court with confidence that the material will be protected.
The government has promised a green paper to set out some better options for dealing with national security issues in the courts, and I look forward to that.
Part of sustaining public confidence in the intelligence services is debate about the principles and value of intelligence work.
And the purpose of today is to explain what we in SIS do and why we do it. Why our work is important, and why we can't work in the open. A lot is at stake.
Secret organisations need to stay secret, even if we present an occasional public face, as I am doing today. If our operations and methods become public, they won't work.
Agents take risks. They will not work with SIS, will not pass us the secrets they hold, unless they can trust us not to expose them.
Foreign partners need to have certainty that what they tell us will remain secret – not just most of the time, but always.
Without the trust of agents, the anonymity of our staff, the confidence of partners, we would not get the intelligence. The lives of everyone living here would be less safe. The United Kingdom would be more vulnerable to the unexpected, the vicious and the extreme.
Secrecy is not a dirty word. Secrecy is not there as a cover up. Secrecy plays a crucial part in keeping Britain safe and secure.
And without secrecy, there would be no intelligence services, or indeed other national assets like our Special Forces. Our nation would be more exposed as a result.
Without secrecy, we can't tackle threats at source. We would be forced to defend ourselves on the goal-line, on our borders. And it's more than obvious that the dangers of terrorism, nuclear proliferation and cyber attack are not much impressed by international borders.
Ladies and gentlemen, the remarkable men and women who make up the staff of SIS are among the most loyal, dedicated and innovative in the entire public service.
We ask more of them than we do of any other public servants not in uniform. Exceptional people, doing extraordinary things for their country.
Our people can't and don't talk about what they do. They receive recognition for their achievements only within the confines of the service.
You don't know them, but I do. It is an honour to lead them.
###
See: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/oct/28/sir-john-sawers-speech-full-textSphere: Related Content
Another Hess Theory Involving MI6
Rudolf Hess 'was lured to Britain by MI6 plot'
Rudolf Hess was lured to Britain in an elaborate MI6 sting, according to a new book that claims to solve one of the most enduring mysteries of the Second World War.
Published: 11:00PM BST 25 Oct 2010 -- UK Telegraph
The reason for Hitler's deputy making his solo flight to Scotland in May 1941 has kept conspiracy theorists busy for decades. He was arrested in Renfrewshire and spent the rest of his life in prison.
Nearly 70 years on, a fresh theory has emerged. Author John Harris claims that Hess was lured to Britain in an MI6 plot led by Tancred Borenius, a Finnish art historian who was working as an agent for the British secret service.
Borenius travelled to Geneva in January 1941 and convinced Hess that members of the Royal Family were willing to broker a peace deal with Germany, according to Harris. "Tancred was key in giving Hitler hope that Britain was interested in joining an alliance," he said.
Harris claims that Borenius's son, Lars, gave him the information shortly before he died. The theory is expounded in a book, Rudolf Hess: The British Illusion of Peace.
However, historians cast doubt on the theory. Roger Moorhouse, author of Berlin at War, said: "MI6 would have little to gain from luring Hess to Britain. Although nominally important, he was actually a peripheral figure by 1941. The most likely theory is that he came over of his own volition."
See: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/world-war-2/8086418/Rudolf-Hess-was-lured-to-Britain-by-MI6-plot.htmlSphere: Related Content
Sunday, October 17, 2010
China's Efforts to Control US Telecom
The Wall Street Journal
* OPINION ASIA * OCTOBER 17, 2010
The Huawei Security Threat
There is a genuine national security need to block a Chinese investment in U.S. telecommunications.
By MICHAEL R. WESSEL
AND LARRY M. WORTZEL
All signs point to a new round of Chinese investment attempts in America on the horizon, in industries ranging from oil to finance. The vast majority of these deals should be welcomed, but some raise genuine security worries that require careful attention from policy makers. Huawei's bid to provide telecommunications equipment to Sprint Nextel is a prime example of the latter.
A functional, reliable, resilient telecommunications network is a fundamental American national interest. Connectivity facilitates virtually all U.S. economic activity. Sound communications capabilities also serve as the basis of many other dimensions of national security, playing a key role in everything from emergency response to the transmission of sensitive information between government entities. Access to U.S. information and communications technology infrastructure could enable a motivated adversary to commit a range of malicious activities, including espionage, disinformation campaigns and disruption of service.
Any foreign investment in this sector should thus be carefully studied to ensure American regulators understand who is making the investment and why. Huawei raises many questions: While it claims that it is a fully independent and employee-owned company, it has strong connections to the Chinese military, Communist Party and government.
Retired General Ren Zhengfei, the company's founder and current president, was formerly the director of the People's Liberation Army General Staff Department's Information Engineering Academy, an entity responsible for telecommunications research for the military. The Communist Party and government remain extremely influential in China's large businesses in leadership placement and in directing funding. This is especially the case for firms in what China considers "strategic industries," which include the telecommunications sector.
That makes this deal very different from the scenario if a major publicly listed telecom from a democratic American ally were to invest in an American company. Indeed, Verizon Wireless started as a joint venture between America's Verizon and Britain's Vodafone with minimal controversy over the foreign company's role.
The U.S. government has voiced concerns over Huawei's attempts to enter the American market on previous occasions. In 2008, Huawei dropped plans to acquire 3Com after the U.S. Committee on Foreign Investment indicated that it would block the deal, and last year, the National Security Agency reportedly voiced concerns to AT&T over the firm's plans to buy Huawei equipment.
Several other nations have grappled with the same issues. Last year British intelligence officials warned of potential infrastructure threats from Huawei's communications equipment on networks operated by British Telecom, citing concerns that the equipment might allow attackers to "remotely disrupt or even permanently disable" critical communications networks. The Australian Security Intelligence Organization investigated claims by former employees that Huawei had engaged in cyber espionage against Australian interests and that the firm's activities in Australia involved technicians and executives with direct links to China's military. An Indian communications ministry placed limitations on Huawei's operations in India's telecommunications networks, also on national security grounds.
The U.S. should similarly be concerned over any deal for Huawei to supply equipment to Sprint Nextel. The Chinese military has a well-developed doctrine for computer network exploitation and attack. Other entities in China, likely with support from the government, actively engage in computer-related espionage activities. If Huawei were to provide infrastructure for U.S. telecommunications networks, actors within China could gain unparalleled access to multitudes of potentially sensitive U.S. communications information, including cellular telephone calls, email, text messages and browsing activities.
Some observers might assume that the quantity of data transmitted by U.S. networks would be sufficient to protect privacy and confidentiality—there would simply be too much for snoops to sift through—but this is not the case. Chinese telecommunications firms have perfected technologies to intercept, sort and evaluate staggering volumes of telecommunications data, as demonstrated in the "Great Firewall" censorship regime on the Internet. China has also perfected disruptive technologies, such as the outright blocking of text messages in western China for months following unrest in Xinjiang province in 2009.
Huawei has sought to counter concerns that the deal with Sprint Nextel would enable malicious network activities in America. Specifically, Huawei has proposed to submit source code for its equipment's operating systems to an independent third party to certify that the software is benign. In parallel, Huawei reportedly would allow other third-party firms to service the equipment.
These solutions are absolutely inadequate to counter the risk. Networked systems offer numerous attack vectors. Some look legitimate, such as those that are designed to offer remote diagnostics and support. Other vulnerabilities could be introduced by patches or updates once the basic software is already in place. Chain-of-custody principles introduce a whole other set of problems: It would be difficult to guarantee that a piece of software evaluated by a third party would share the exact characteristics of the software installed on the machines that ultimately operate U.S. telecommunications networks.
Even if a firm could somehow certify the harmlessness of a piece of equipment's operating system, and ensure that no new vulnerabilities were introduced after the fact, and maintain proper chain-of-custody principles, a malicious actor could still potentially gain access to systems. "Back doors" could be built into a piece of equipment's firmware or hardware components. The technology to discover these potential access points remains limited at best.
Given that the U.S. is already at great risk of cyber attacks, making our communications networks more vulnerable by using technology developed by a company with close ties to China's military would be a grave mistake. In this case, there are a number of competitive alternative suppliers of advanced telecommunications technology. Sprint Nextel should take national security concerns into consideration when selecting partners. Moreover, the U.S. government has an obligation to use every available means to ensure safe and secure telecommunications infrastructure.
"National security" has too often been a recourse for protectionists. But remaining open to foreign investment in general does not mean abandoning caution. Telecommunications is one industry that warrants a careful approach.
Mr. Wessel, president of the Wessel Group, is a commissioner of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Mr. Wortzel, a former U.S. Army colonel and intelligence officer, is also a commissioner of the Commission.Sphere: Related Content
Friday, October 15, 2010
Any Differences with Today's Russian Army?
A LOOK BACK AT THE SOVIET ARMY
"The Soviet Army is the best prepared force in the world to conduct both offensive and defensive NBC [nuclear, biological and chemical] operations," according to a 1984 U.S. Army manual (large pdf) that is newly available online.
The three-part manual, based on Soviet military literature and other open sources, provides a dauntingly detailed account of almost every aspect of Soviet military structure and operations.
So, for example: "The Soviets recognize three basic types of smoke screens: blinding, camouflaging, and decoy. Each type is classified as being frontal, oblique, or flank in nature, depending on the placement of the screen."
Perhaps of equal or greater importance, the manual implicitly documents the U.S. Army's perception of the Soviet military late in the Cold War.
"In the Soviet view, the correlation of forces has been shifting in favor of the socialist camp since the Soviet defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II. Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology requires the correlation to shift continuously in favor of socialism. The correlation of forces may be advanced by both violent and nonviolent means. When it is advanced by violent means, the military component of the correlation is the dominant factor."
The first volume of the manual, originally "for official Government use only," has not previously been published online. See "The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics," Field Manual 100-2-1, July 16, 1984 (203 pages, large pdf).
The second volume is "The Soviet Army: Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support," FM 100-2-2, July 16, 1984 (100 pages, pdf).
The third volume is "The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization, and Equipment," FM 100-2-3, June 1991 (456 pages, large pdf).
In February 1957, the Army produced an extremely detailed "Glossary of Soviet Military and Related Abbreviations" (pdf), Army Technical Manual TM 30-546.
Sphere: Related Content
"The Soviet Army is the best prepared force in the world to conduct both offensive and defensive NBC [nuclear, biological and chemical] operations," according to a 1984 U.S. Army manual (large pdf) that is newly available online.
The three-part manual, based on Soviet military literature and other open sources, provides a dauntingly detailed account of almost every aspect of Soviet military structure and operations.
So, for example: "The Soviets recognize three basic types of smoke screens: blinding, camouflaging, and decoy. Each type is classified as being frontal, oblique, or flank in nature, depending on the placement of the screen."
Perhaps of equal or greater importance, the manual implicitly documents the U.S. Army's perception of the Soviet military late in the Cold War.
"In the Soviet view, the correlation of forces has been shifting in favor of the socialist camp since the Soviet defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II. Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology requires the correlation to shift continuously in favor of socialism. The correlation of forces may be advanced by both violent and nonviolent means. When it is advanced by violent means, the military component of the correlation is the dominant factor."
The first volume of the manual, originally "for official Government use only," has not previously been published online. See "The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics," Field Manual 100-2-1, July 16, 1984 (203 pages, large pdf).
The second volume is "The Soviet Army: Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support," FM 100-2-2, July 16, 1984 (100 pages, pdf).
The third volume is "The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization, and Equipment," FM 100-2-3, June 1991 (456 pages, large pdf).
In February 1957, the Army produced an extremely detailed "Glossary of Soviet Military and Related Abbreviations" (pdf), Army Technical Manual TM 30-546.
Atomic Bomb Secrets Espionage Courier
The usual apologetic treatment . . .
The Wall Street Journal
BOOKSHELF -- OCTOBER 16, 2010
The Invisible Harry Gold
By Allen M. Hornblum
Yale University Press, 446 pages, $32.50
"Another Quiet American"
By Michael J. Ybarra
On May 23, 1950, the FBI arrested Harry Gold, a 49-year-old chemist who lived with his father in Philadelphia. The FBI accused him of being a Soviet espionage agent—the man who, as a courier, literally gave the Russians the secrets of the atomic bomb. Though other Soviet spies from that era—Alger Hiss, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg—remain notorious to this day, Gold has faded from the story. Allen M. Hornblum offers a welcome corrective with the biography "The Invisible Harry Gold."
Gold was the son of Russian Jewish immigrants—he was born in Switzerland in 1910 before his parents made their way to America. While studying chemical engineering at Drexel University in the mid-1930s, he was recruited as a Soviet spy. Thus began a 15-year espionage career that began with the theft of industrial secrets—Gold later said that he just wanted to make life easier for the Soviet people—and ended with his passing information from the Manhattan Project, provided by physicist Klaus Fuchs, to the Soviet Union. Gold confessed to his crimes, and his testimony would help convict the Rosenbergs.
Gold has long been a riddle. To his supporters, he was a shy, decent man whose total being seemed at odds with his secret life. To his critics— not a few of them on the left—he was a liar and a psychopath who sought fame as a government witness. Mr. Hornblum calls him "one of the most denounced, slandered, and demonized figures in twentieth-century America," which may be excessive, but Harry Gold was certainly loathed by many.
Mr. Hornblum presents us with a balanced portrait, tracing Gold's hardscrabble young life, his slow entanglement with the Soviet espionage network and the many unhappy years he spent working on Moscow's behalf. Gold was never much of an ideologue but was grateful for a job that a communist friend helped him to land. He was naïve enough to believe that the Soviet Union was actually fighting anti-Semitism, and he was easily bullied into continuing to work with the Soviets whenever he tried to return to a normal life. During World War II he could even convince himself that he was sharing secrets with America's wartime partner—and thus not undermining his own country's security.
Gold didn't confess until the FBI tracked him down, but shortly after his arrest he began cooperating fully. Sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment (a longer sentence than the government had requested), he was paroled in 1965. He went to work at a hospital, where Gold was, according to Mr. Hornblum, a beloved employee with many friends. When Gold died in 1972, he had kept such a low profile that a year would pass before newspapers noticed.
"I have never intended any harm to the United States," Gold wrote from prison. "For I have always steadfastly considered that first and finally I am an American citizen. This is my country and I love it." If Gold had not cooperated with authorities, Mr. Hornblum writes, it is unlikely that he could have been convicted: Fuchs, the physicist, had confessed, too, but he was being held by the British and would probably not have been allowed to testify. If Gold had not implicated other spies, the author notes, they might well have escaped.
"How did such a gentle, apolitical person," Mr. Hornblum asks, "get caught up in the 'crime of the century'?" This finely crafted biography gives us the most complete answer we are ever likely to have.
—Mr. Ybarra writes about art, literature and extreme sports for the Journal.
Sphere: Related Content
BOOKSHELF -- OCTOBER 16, 2010
The Invisible Harry Gold
By Allen M. Hornblum
Yale University Press, 446 pages, $32.50
"Another Quiet American"
By Michael J. Ybarra
On May 23, 1950, the FBI arrested Harry Gold, a 49-year-old chemist who lived with his father in Philadelphia. The FBI accused him of being a Soviet espionage agent—the man who, as a courier, literally gave the Russians the secrets of the atomic bomb. Though other Soviet spies from that era—Alger Hiss, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg—remain notorious to this day, Gold has faded from the story. Allen M. Hornblum offers a welcome corrective with the biography "The Invisible Harry Gold."
Gold was the son of Russian Jewish immigrants—he was born in Switzerland in 1910 before his parents made their way to America. While studying chemical engineering at Drexel University in the mid-1930s, he was recruited as a Soviet spy. Thus began a 15-year espionage career that began with the theft of industrial secrets—Gold later said that he just wanted to make life easier for the Soviet people—and ended with his passing information from the Manhattan Project, provided by physicist Klaus Fuchs, to the Soviet Union. Gold confessed to his crimes, and his testimony would help convict the Rosenbergs.
Gold has long been a riddle. To his supporters, he was a shy, decent man whose total being seemed at odds with his secret life. To his critics— not a few of them on the left—he was a liar and a psychopath who sought fame as a government witness. Mr. Hornblum calls him "one of the most denounced, slandered, and demonized figures in twentieth-century America," which may be excessive, but Harry Gold was certainly loathed by many.
Mr. Hornblum presents us with a balanced portrait, tracing Gold's hardscrabble young life, his slow entanglement with the Soviet espionage network and the many unhappy years he spent working on Moscow's behalf. Gold was never much of an ideologue but was grateful for a job that a communist friend helped him to land. He was naïve enough to believe that the Soviet Union was actually fighting anti-Semitism, and he was easily bullied into continuing to work with the Soviets whenever he tried to return to a normal life. During World War II he could even convince himself that he was sharing secrets with America's wartime partner—and thus not undermining his own country's security.
Gold didn't confess until the FBI tracked him down, but shortly after his arrest he began cooperating fully. Sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment (a longer sentence than the government had requested), he was paroled in 1965. He went to work at a hospital, where Gold was, according to Mr. Hornblum, a beloved employee with many friends. When Gold died in 1972, he had kept such a low profile that a year would pass before newspapers noticed.
"I have never intended any harm to the United States," Gold wrote from prison. "For I have always steadfastly considered that first and finally I am an American citizen. This is my country and I love it." If Gold had not cooperated with authorities, Mr. Hornblum writes, it is unlikely that he could have been convicted: Fuchs, the physicist, had confessed, too, but he was being held by the British and would probably not have been allowed to testify. If Gold had not implicated other spies, the author notes, they might well have escaped.
"How did such a gentle, apolitical person," Mr. Hornblum asks, "get caught up in the 'crime of the century'?" This finely crafted biography gives us the most complete answer we are ever likely to have.
—Mr. Ybarra writes about art, literature and extreme sports for the Journal.
Tuesday, October 12, 2010
Jordan Trains Afghans
Jordanian Instructors Sent to Train Afghan Forces
(AFP) – Oct 4, 2010
AMMAN — A group of Jordanian military instructors was sent to Afghanistan on Sunday to help train the country's security forces, the official Petra news agency reported.
"Instructors from Jordan's armed forces and security service went on Sunday to Afghanistan where they will train Afghan forces in security methods, to help them do their duty in restoring law and order there," it said.
The agency did not report how many instructors were sent.
In March, Jordan said it had been asked by NATO to train Afghan police, and said it was studying the request.
In May, Information Minister Nabil Sharif told a news conference: "Jordan has trained 2,500 members of the Afghan special forces. This was in the past. The group has completed its training and there are no trainees now."
A Jordanian military source told AFP that training took place in 2007, but declined to elaborate.
Jordan's special forces chief Brigadier Ali Jaradat has said in published remarks that 1,500 servicemen, including anti-terror forces, from Afghanistan and Iraq have received training at the 200-million-dollar King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Centre, which was inaugurated in May last year.
The NATO alliance, facing waning public support for the war in Afghanistan, is anxious to begin a transition next year that would have Afghan army and police take over security from US-led troops in some parts of the country.
Jordan acknowledged it had a counterterrorism role in Afghanistan after the death in a January suicide bombing of a senior intelligence officer, who was also a member of the royal family.
His death along with seven US Central Intelligence Agency personnel spotlighted for the first time Jordan's role in the international coalition in the war-hit country.Sphere: Related Content
Tuesday, October 5, 2010
Vickers, DoD Intel Chief
SpecOps Vet Vickers Tapped as DoD Intel Chief
By Andrew Tilghman - Army Times Staff writer
Posted : Monday Oct 4, 2010 5:28:02 EDT
The White House has nominated Michael Vickers, a former Special Forces soldier and Central Intelligence Agency paramilitary operations officer, to be undersecretary of defense for intelligence.
Since July 2007, Vickers has served as assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict. During his 13 years in Special Forces, he said he served on both the “black” and “white” — covert and overt — sides of special operations, Vickers told Congress.
According to his Defense Department biography, during his Special Forces and CIA years Vickers had operational and combat experience in Central America and the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Central and South Asia, spanning covert action and espionage, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism (including hostage rescue operations), counterinsurgency, and foreign internal defense.
His tenure as a CIA operative included serving as a “principal strategist” of the largest covert action in CIA history, the arming of Muslim insurgents in Afghanistan in 1980s against the Soviet-backed government in Kabul. The paramilitary operation ended with the Soviet Union withdrawing from Afghanistan.
The undersecretary for intelligence, one of the most senior positions in the Defense Department, reports directly to the secretary of defense. If his nomination is approved by the Senate, Vickers would replaces James Clapper, who was recently appointed to serve as director of national intelligence, a job created in 2004 to oversee 16 intelligence agencies.
Vickers and Defense Secretary Robert Gates have a “long professional relationship” that dates back to their time together at the CIA, said Gates’ spokesman Geoff Morrell.Sphere: Related Content
Army's New Reg on Espionage, Subversion, Terror . . .
ARMY SEEKS INCREASED AWARENESS OF SUBVERSION, LEAKS
Steven Aftergood | The Project on Government Secrecy
October 5, 2010
A U.S. Army regulation (pdf) issued yesterday requires Army personnel to report any incident on a newly expanded list of possible indications of "espionage, international terrorism, sabotage, subversion" as well as "leaks to the media."
"The Army is a prime target for foreign intelligence and international terrorist elements... from within and OCONUS [outside the continental United States]," the regulation states. "The Army also faces threats from persons on the inside... who may compromise the ability of the organization to accomplish its mission through espionage, acts of terrorism, support to international terrorist organizations, or unauthorized release or disclosure of classified or sensitive information."
The regulation presents an extensive description of suspicious behaviors that are reportable to authorities, including "attempts to expand access to classified information by repeatedly volunteering for assignments or duties beyond the normal scope of responsibilities."
It also provides guidance on how to respond to the discovery of a clandestine surveillance device ("do not disturb the device") or an approach by a foreign intelligence officer ("remain noncommittal, neither refusing nor agreeing to cooperate"; also, "do not, under any circumstances, conduct your own investigation").
The regulation includes tables listing behavior that may be exhibited by a person engaged in espionage, indicators of insider threats of terrorism, and signs of extremist activity that may pose a threat to U.S. military facilities or operations. See "Threat Awareness and Reporting Program," U.S. Army Regulation 381-12, October 4, 2010. (The prior edition of this regulation, formerly titled "Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the U.S. Army (SAEDA)," dated January 15, 1993.
See: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ar381-12.pdfSphere: Related Content
Sunday, October 3, 2010
First World War Officially Ends
First World War Officially Ends
The First World War will officially end on Sunday, 92 years after the guns fell silent, when Germany pays off the last chunk of reparations imposed on it by the Allies.
By Allan Hall, Berlin
Published: 1:37PM BST 28 Sep 2010
London Telegraph
The final payment of £59.5 million, writes off the crippling debt that was the price for one world war and laid the foundations for another.
Germany was forced to pay the reparations at the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 as compensation to the war-ravaged nations of Belgium and France and to pay the Allies some of the costs of waging what was then the bloodiest conflict in history, leaving nearly ten million soldiers dead.
The initial sum agreed upon for war damages in 1919 was 226 billion Reichsmarks, a sum later reduced to 132 billion, £22 billion at the time.
The bill would have been settled much earlier had Adolf Hitler not reneged on reparations during his reign.
Hatred of the settlement agreed at Versailles, which crippled Germany as it tried to shape itself into a democracy following armistice, was of significant importance in propelling the Nazis to power.
"On Sunday the last bill is due and the First World War finally, financially at least, terminates for Germany," said Bild, the country's biggest selling newspaper.
Most of the money goes to private individuals, pension funds and corporations holding debenture bonds as agreed under the Treaty of Versailles, where Germany was made to sign the 'war guilt' clause, accepting blame for the war.
France, which had been ravaged by the war, pushed hardest for the steepest possible fiscal punishment for Germany.
The principal representative of the British Treasury at the Paris Peace Conference, John Maynard Keynes, resigned in June 1919 in protest at the scale of the demands.
"Germany will not be able to formulate correct policy if it cannot finance itself,' he warned.
When the Wall Street Crash came in 1929, the Weimar Republic spiraled into debt. Four years later, Hitler was elected Chancellor of Germany.
See: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/8029948/First-World-War-officially-ends.htmlSphere: Related Content
Friday, October 1, 2010
The Legacy of the OSS
Group Preserves Legacy of OSS, Predecessor to CIA
By Gregg MacDonald
Fairfax County Times
Thursday, September 30, 2010; VA16
Art Reinhardt of Great Falls was in China on Aug. 6, 1945 -- the day the United States dropped the "Little Boy" atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan.
Although only 20 at the time, he already was keenly aware that his short service with World War II's Office of Strategic Services soon would be coming to an end.
The OSS -- the predecessor to the CIA and U.S. Special Operations Forces -- was formed in June 1942 by order of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
The agency's mission was to collect and analyze strategic intelligence requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to conduct "special" operations outside the scope of other agencies.
"The OSS was the first centralized foreign intelligence agency in U.S. history and was organized along the lines of some of the chief responsibilities of CIA today: analysis, collection, counterintelligence and covert action," CIA spokeswoman Donna Weiss said.
Reinhardt, 85, was recruited by the OSS in May 1944, shortly after joining the U.S. Army Air Corps at 17.
After being recruited, Reinhardt received advanced OSS training as a radio operator and cryptographer at "Area C" in Prince William County -- a one-square-mile tract of heavily wooded land about five miles west of Quantico where the OSS trained its agents from 1942 to 1945. Today the training area is preserved as part of Prince William Forest National Park and is open to the public.
"From 1942 to 1945, the communications branch of the OSS used the area as a training facility for about 1,500 communications personnel learning international Morse code, ciphering, weapons, demolition, self-defense and physical training," Reinhardt said.
After three months of training, Reinhardt was deployed to China to provide intelligence targets for Air Force bombers attempting to disrupt the Japanese occupying forces that had taken control of key Chinese railways and seaports.
While in China, Reinhardt lived the life of a secret agent. He spent much of his time in remote forested areas, living off the land and being sure not to draw much attention from locals.
"As American agents in China, we had a bounty on our heads," he recalled. "It was rumored that Japanese soldiers were offered the equivalent of $50,000 to capture one of us."
Reinhardt decoded incoming communications and encoded outgoing messages, transmitting them from his portable SSTR-1 "suitcase" radio.
"One of my daily duties from the field was to give hourly weather reports for the B-29 bombers," Reinhardt said. He soon discovered he was on his own in terms of scrounging up food and supplies.
"I ate a lot of rice," he said.
Once, after discovering he had no antennae wire, he improvised by scavenging materials from a discarded B-24 bomber and made his own.
"I was a free spirit," he recalled. "I had no uniform, and often no orders. It was very easy to forget that I was in the military."
Reinhardt left China not long after the Hiroshima bombing. The OSS was disbanded the following month -- September 1945.
In 1947, Reinhardt joined the ranks of the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency.
"When the CIA was created in 1947, it built on the solid foundation of the OSS, and many of our officers drew on their OSS experience to build the new agency and meet the new postwar challenges," Weiss said. "The agency inherited its very DNA from the OSS, an organization of courageous men and women who made decisive contributions during and after the war."
Reinhardt retired in 1976. Today, he is treasurer of the McLean-based OSS Society, which lists President H.W. Bush, Ross Perot and James R. Schlesinger as honorary chairmen. The nonprofit organization will honor Perot at its annual award dinner Saturday.
"At its peak, there were nearly 13,000 active OSS agents and operatives," said OSS Society President Charles Pinck, 46. "Today, there are about 200 [to] 300 left."
Pinck, the son of legendary OSS agent Dan Pinck, said the original organization, founded in 1947 as Veterans of the OSS, changed its name in 1998 to the OSS Society.
The elder Pinck also served behind enemy lines in China and wrote a memoir, "Journey to Peking: A Secret Agent in Wartime China," about his time in the OSS.
"It's sad, but we basically had to prepare for a time when the organization would have to continue on with no actual OSS veterans left," Charles Pinck said. The group today includes CIA and Special Operations Forces members.
Reinhardt recently donated his rare suitcase radio to the society.
"I am proud to have served in the OSS communications branch," he said. "Communications underpinned everything OSS ever did, and I dedicate my field radio to all the men and women who served in the communications branch during WWII."
For information about the U.S. Office of Strategic Services, including documents and books relate to its history, visit http://www.ossreborn.com.Sphere: Related Content
By Gregg MacDonald
Fairfax County Times
Thursday, September 30, 2010; VA16
Art Reinhardt of Great Falls was in China on Aug. 6, 1945 -- the day the United States dropped the "Little Boy" atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan.
Although only 20 at the time, he already was keenly aware that his short service with World War II's Office of Strategic Services soon would be coming to an end.
The OSS -- the predecessor to the CIA and U.S. Special Operations Forces -- was formed in June 1942 by order of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
The agency's mission was to collect and analyze strategic intelligence requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to conduct "special" operations outside the scope of other agencies.
"The OSS was the first centralized foreign intelligence agency in U.S. history and was organized along the lines of some of the chief responsibilities of CIA today: analysis, collection, counterintelligence and covert action," CIA spokeswoman Donna Weiss said.
Reinhardt, 85, was recruited by the OSS in May 1944, shortly after joining the U.S. Army Air Corps at 17.
After being recruited, Reinhardt received advanced OSS training as a radio operator and cryptographer at "Area C" in Prince William County -- a one-square-mile tract of heavily wooded land about five miles west of Quantico where the OSS trained its agents from 1942 to 1945. Today the training area is preserved as part of Prince William Forest National Park and is open to the public.
"From 1942 to 1945, the communications branch of the OSS used the area as a training facility for about 1,500 communications personnel learning international Morse code, ciphering, weapons, demolition, self-defense and physical training," Reinhardt said.
After three months of training, Reinhardt was deployed to China to provide intelligence targets for Air Force bombers attempting to disrupt the Japanese occupying forces that had taken control of key Chinese railways and seaports.
While in China, Reinhardt lived the life of a secret agent. He spent much of his time in remote forested areas, living off the land and being sure not to draw much attention from locals.
"As American agents in China, we had a bounty on our heads," he recalled. "It was rumored that Japanese soldiers were offered the equivalent of $50,000 to capture one of us."
Reinhardt decoded incoming communications and encoded outgoing messages, transmitting them from his portable SSTR-1 "suitcase" radio.
"One of my daily duties from the field was to give hourly weather reports for the B-29 bombers," Reinhardt said. He soon discovered he was on his own in terms of scrounging up food and supplies.
"I ate a lot of rice," he said.
Once, after discovering he had no antennae wire, he improvised by scavenging materials from a discarded B-24 bomber and made his own.
"I was a free spirit," he recalled. "I had no uniform, and often no orders. It was very easy to forget that I was in the military."
Reinhardt left China not long after the Hiroshima bombing. The OSS was disbanded the following month -- September 1945.
In 1947, Reinhardt joined the ranks of the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency.
"When the CIA was created in 1947, it built on the solid foundation of the OSS, and many of our officers drew on their OSS experience to build the new agency and meet the new postwar challenges," Weiss said. "The agency inherited its very DNA from the OSS, an organization of courageous men and women who made decisive contributions during and after the war."
Reinhardt retired in 1976. Today, he is treasurer of the McLean-based OSS Society, which lists President H.W. Bush, Ross Perot and James R. Schlesinger as honorary chairmen. The nonprofit organization will honor Perot at its annual award dinner Saturday.
"At its peak, there were nearly 13,000 active OSS agents and operatives," said OSS Society President Charles Pinck, 46. "Today, there are about 200 [to] 300 left."
Pinck, the son of legendary OSS agent Dan Pinck, said the original organization, founded in 1947 as Veterans of the OSS, changed its name in 1998 to the OSS Society.
The elder Pinck also served behind enemy lines in China and wrote a memoir, "Journey to Peking: A Secret Agent in Wartime China," about his time in the OSS.
"It's sad, but we basically had to prepare for a time when the organization would have to continue on with no actual OSS veterans left," Charles Pinck said. The group today includes CIA and Special Operations Forces members.
Reinhardt recently donated his rare suitcase radio to the society.
"I am proud to have served in the OSS communications branch," he said. "Communications underpinned everything OSS ever did, and I dedicate my field radio to all the men and women who served in the communications branch during WWII."
For information about the U.S. Office of Strategic Services, including documents and books relate to its history, visit http://www.ossreborn.com.Sphere: Related Content
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