Tuesday, February 8, 2011
Saturday, January 29, 2011
British Intelligence and the 1916 Mediation Mission of Colonel Edward M. House - Intelligence and National Security
British Intelligence and the 1916 Mediation Mission of Colonel Edward M. House - Intelligence and National Security
Abstract
Colonel Edward M. House, the close personal confidant of American President Woodrow Wilson, disembarked in Great Britain in January 1916 on a mission to bring the First World War to a close under the auspices of American mediation. Although his mission, which culminated in a secret pact between the United States and Great Britain known as the House-Grey Memorandum, has been studied by several scholars, the involvement of British intelligence with respect to that mission has never received more than cursory attention. Through a careful analysis of the surviving documents, this article reconstructs British intelligence's activities with respect to House's mission, examines the countermeasures that House employed as he attempted to protect the secrecy of his negotiations, delineates the role played by different British intelligence agencies and assesses their response to their findings.
Monday, January 3, 2011
The Golden Age of Soviet Espionage
Andrei Vandenko, Itogi 4:18PM GMT 02 Jan 2011 -- UK Telegraph
Yuri Kobaladze was a spy for Russia, and for seven years (1977 to 1984) he was based in London. He lifts the lid on his time as a Cold Warrior
Were you recruited to spy as soon as you entered the Moscow State Institute of International Relations?
Everything happened when I was working at TASS [the government-controlled news network]. From there I went to the third (English) section of the First Main Administration of the KGB.
When did your wife find out that your work in journalism was just a front?
I told her even before we were married, but after that I tried to let Alla know as little as possible. Only once did I ever ask her to help me – by making a phone call, that was all. Her hands were trembling, her face was streaming with sweat. After that, I promised myself never ever to do that again.
Where did you learn the craft of espionage?
At the Krasnoznamenny Institute of the KGB. The focus was on foreign languages and special disciplines. The craft of espionage hasn’t changed much in recent decades. The methods and approaches are the same, only the technical equipment has improved.
Did the English know you were a spy from the start?
It wasn’t difficult to figure out. All they had to do was compare my work schedule with Boris Kalyagin’s (a London correspondent), compare the frequency of visits to the embassy, notice a certain license in my behaviour and an abundance of contacts.
There were some amusing episodes. Kalyagin set up an interview with the editor of an influential paper. I acted as cameraman and I asked Kalyagin to pose questions that interested me. But he became so wrapped up in the conversation that he forgot all about my request. What to do? The interview was over and as I was gathering up the equipment, I asked the interviewee, by the way, as it were: “Mister Smith, what do you think about US-Chinese relations?” Mister Smith looked up for a second, grinned and said: “Russia is an invincible country if even the cameramen are interested in such questions.”
Some of our best sources were British journalists. The irony is that these reporters thought the real Soviet correspondents were the spies, not us. We would travel all over the country in search of information, then be up all night getting pickled in pubs with our British colleagues.
I had some real friends among those English reporters, despite the fact that the years when I was based in England were not the easiest in terms of relations between our countries. Those were the years of Margaret Thatcher, her relationship with America, missiles aimed at the “evil empire”, and Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Every day was so tense.
I’ll never forget the scene with [theatre director] Yuri Lyubimov when he was invited to London to stage Crime and Punishment . On the eve of his arrival, we received a telegram saying that the director, famous for his anti-Soviet remarks, should be watched carefully. He was indeed very forthright; Yuri called a spade a spade.
He became the subject of a heated debate at a Party meeting an the embassy. What should be done about this man who publicly insulted the Motherland? In the end, the decision was taken to send a messenger to the theatre to give Lyubimov a stern talking-to and ask him to come to the embassy “for a conversation”.
Pasha, the cultural attaché, was nominated for this task, the sweetest and quietest of men. The day of the premiere, the press and their photographers were jostling backstage. Pasha, feeling horribly nervous, walked up to Lyubimov and was at pains to choose the right words: “The ambassador would like to see you since certain remarks of yours…” Lyubimov didn’t let him finish and began shouting: “They’ve sent a KGB agent in here! He’s threatening me with reprisals!”
By then Lyubimov had decided to remain in the West. He needed an excuse to create a public scandal, and here it was. Poor Pasha couldn’t get out of the theatre fast enough. The last thing he said to Lyubimov in his panic was: “Watch out, Yuri Petrovich! There’s been a crime, beware the punishment!” The phrase was splashed across the front pages with commentary to match. The editors claimed that the bony arm of the KGB was at the maestro’s throat. That’s how legends are born. It all happened before my eyes; but the “office” had nothing to do with it.
Did Britain try to recruit you?
The British knew very well with whom it made sense to ingratiate themselves, and with whom it was useless.
No one came near me, but they did try to lure a friend of mine.
They promised him a house, a car, a job and half a million pounds in expenses – a colossal sum. I guess they had some compromising information about him, although even now my friend won’t tell me what it was.
At the time he said to his would-be recruiters: “How will I be able to look my father in the eye?” They gave up… it’s not everyone who can live with a sin on his soul, though traitors try to justify their treason.
Oleg Gordievsky cultivated the image of a Soviet Kim Philby who, in essence, was a traitor. Philby first chose the path of serving communism and only then entered into contact with Soviet intelligence and, at its request, went to work for British intelligence. Oleg, too, tries to give the impression that he went over to the enemy not because of money, but for reasons of ideology.
I consider myself a fortunate person. It’s through my work that I came to know people whom I would never have met otherwise – people who became my friends.
I feel nostalgic for Britain.By means of natural selection I have come to the conclusion that there is nothing better than a 16-year-old Lagavulin whisky, which I first tried in England. Later, in the Nineties in Moscow, everyone became interested in whisky, and I was regularly called in as an expert.
By the way, I once beat the owners of a London pub in their traditional beer-drinking contest: a yard of ale. The Englishmen were disgraced. They didn’t realise that here was a Georgian able to drink from a horn!
In short, I left a bright trail in the history of Britain, and when my tour was over Margaret Thatcher’s press secretary was at my farewell party. I doubt he knew I worked for Soviet intelligence, he wouldn’t have come if he had, but I was pleased.
Curriculum Vitae: Yuri Kobaladze
NATIONALITY:
Georgian
AGE:
61
STATUS:
Married, with two daughters
EDUCATION:
Moscow Institute of International Relations, graduating in International Journalism (1972).
EXPERIENCE:
• Foreign Intelligence Service of the KGB (1972-1999)
• Soviet news agency TASS
• British correspondent, Gosteleradio
• Central office of PGU, KGB
• Director, press bureau of the Foreign Intelligence Service
• First deputy director, news agency ITAR-TASS
• Since 2000: executive director of investment bank Renaissance Capital; later managing director of retail group X5.
Yuri Kobaladze was a spy for Russia, and for seven years (1977 to 1984) he was based in London. He lifts the lid on his time as a Cold Warrior
Were you recruited to spy as soon as you entered the Moscow State Institute of International Relations?
Everything happened when I was working at TASS [the government-controlled news network]. From there I went to the third (English) section of the First Main Administration of the KGB.
When did your wife find out that your work in journalism was just a front?
I told her even before we were married, but after that I tried to let Alla know as little as possible. Only once did I ever ask her to help me – by making a phone call, that was all. Her hands were trembling, her face was streaming with sweat. After that, I promised myself never ever to do that again.
Where did you learn the craft of espionage?
At the Krasnoznamenny Institute of the KGB. The focus was on foreign languages and special disciplines. The craft of espionage hasn’t changed much in recent decades. The methods and approaches are the same, only the technical equipment has improved.
Did the English know you were a spy from the start?
It wasn’t difficult to figure out. All they had to do was compare my work schedule with Boris Kalyagin’s (a London correspondent), compare the frequency of visits to the embassy, notice a certain license in my behaviour and an abundance of contacts.
There were some amusing episodes. Kalyagin set up an interview with the editor of an influential paper. I acted as cameraman and I asked Kalyagin to pose questions that interested me. But he became so wrapped up in the conversation that he forgot all about my request. What to do? The interview was over and as I was gathering up the equipment, I asked the interviewee, by the way, as it were: “Mister Smith, what do you think about US-Chinese relations?” Mister Smith looked up for a second, grinned and said: “Russia is an invincible country if even the cameramen are interested in such questions.”
Some of our best sources were British journalists. The irony is that these reporters thought the real Soviet correspondents were the spies, not us. We would travel all over the country in search of information, then be up all night getting pickled in pubs with our British colleagues.
I had some real friends among those English reporters, despite the fact that the years when I was based in England were not the easiest in terms of relations between our countries. Those were the years of Margaret Thatcher, her relationship with America, missiles aimed at the “evil empire”, and Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Every day was so tense.
I’ll never forget the scene with [theatre director] Yuri Lyubimov when he was invited to London to stage Crime and Punishment . On the eve of his arrival, we received a telegram saying that the director, famous for his anti-Soviet remarks, should be watched carefully. He was indeed very forthright; Yuri called a spade a spade.
He became the subject of a heated debate at a Party meeting an the embassy. What should be done about this man who publicly insulted the Motherland? In the end, the decision was taken to send a messenger to the theatre to give Lyubimov a stern talking-to and ask him to come to the embassy “for a conversation”.
Pasha, the cultural attaché, was nominated for this task, the sweetest and quietest of men. The day of the premiere, the press and their photographers were jostling backstage. Pasha, feeling horribly nervous, walked up to Lyubimov and was at pains to choose the right words: “The ambassador would like to see you since certain remarks of yours…” Lyubimov didn’t let him finish and began shouting: “They’ve sent a KGB agent in here! He’s threatening me with reprisals!”
By then Lyubimov had decided to remain in the West. He needed an excuse to create a public scandal, and here it was. Poor Pasha couldn’t get out of the theatre fast enough. The last thing he said to Lyubimov in his panic was: “Watch out, Yuri Petrovich! There’s been a crime, beware the punishment!” The phrase was splashed across the front pages with commentary to match. The editors claimed that the bony arm of the KGB was at the maestro’s throat. That’s how legends are born. It all happened before my eyes; but the “office” had nothing to do with it.
Did Britain try to recruit you?
The British knew very well with whom it made sense to ingratiate themselves, and with whom it was useless.
No one came near me, but they did try to lure a friend of mine.
They promised him a house, a car, a job and half a million pounds in expenses – a colossal sum. I guess they had some compromising information about him, although even now my friend won’t tell me what it was.
At the time he said to his would-be recruiters: “How will I be able to look my father in the eye?” They gave up… it’s not everyone who can live with a sin on his soul, though traitors try to justify their treason.
Oleg Gordievsky cultivated the image of a Soviet Kim Philby who, in essence, was a traitor. Philby first chose the path of serving communism and only then entered into contact with Soviet intelligence and, at its request, went to work for British intelligence. Oleg, too, tries to give the impression that he went over to the enemy not because of money, but for reasons of ideology.
I consider myself a fortunate person. It’s through my work that I came to know people whom I would never have met otherwise – people who became my friends.
I feel nostalgic for Britain.By means of natural selection I have come to the conclusion that there is nothing better than a 16-year-old Lagavulin whisky, which I first tried in England. Later, in the Nineties in Moscow, everyone became interested in whisky, and I was regularly called in as an expert.
By the way, I once beat the owners of a London pub in their traditional beer-drinking contest: a yard of ale. The Englishmen were disgraced. They didn’t realise that here was a Georgian able to drink from a horn!
In short, I left a bright trail in the history of Britain, and when my tour was over Margaret Thatcher’s press secretary was at my farewell party. I doubt he knew I worked for Soviet intelligence, he wouldn’t have come if he had, but I was pleased.
Curriculum Vitae: Yuri Kobaladze
NATIONALITY:
Georgian
AGE:
61
STATUS:
Married, with two daughters
EDUCATION:
Moscow Institute of International Relations, graduating in International Journalism (1972).
EXPERIENCE:
• Foreign Intelligence Service of the KGB (1972-1999)
• Soviet news agency TASS
• British correspondent, Gosteleradio
• Central office of PGU, KGB
• Director, press bureau of the Foreign Intelligence Service
• First deputy director, news agency ITAR-TASS
• Since 2000: executive director of investment bank Renaissance Capital; later managing director of retail group X5.
###
Sphere: Related Content
Saturday, January 1, 2011
The End of German Military Counterintelligence?
German Co-ruling Party Urges Disbanding of Army Spy Agency: Report
IRNA - Islamic Republic News Agency
Berlin, Dec 31, IRNA -- A leading lawmaker of the co-governing Free Democratic Party (FDP) called for abolishing the country's military counter-intelligence agency MAD.
Talking to the daily Luebecker Nachrichten on Friday, Christian Ahrendt said Germany's security could be boosted, if MAD's 1,300-strong workforce could be used for other tasks like thwarting cyber attacks.
He also cited cost factors such as MAD's annual budget of 73 million euros as another reason for permanently closing the doors of the German army's counter-intelligence unit.
Ahrendt stressed that Germany domestic secret service, Verfassungschutz, and its foreign counterpart, Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), could jointly assume MAD's duties.
Based in the western city of Cologne, MAD has around 12 regional offices throughout the country, including Hanover, Munich, Stuttgart, Leipzig, Mainz, Kiel, Koblenz, Rostock, Kiel and Wilhelmshaven.
Established during the Cold War in 1956, MAD is under the control of the German defense ministry.
OT**1420
Islamic Republic News Agency/IRNA NewsCode: 30162484
###Sphere: Related Content
Tuesday, December 28, 2010
Intelligence Applications of Hypnosis
Docs Detail CIA’s Cold War Hypnosis Push
By Spencer Ackerman December 28, 2010 7:00 am Wired
Excerpt: It was an innocent time, the mid-1950s. America wasn’t yet cynical about its geopolitical games in the Cold War. Case in point: In order to maintain its spying edge over the Russkies, the CIA considered the benefits of hypnosis.
Two memos from 1954 and 1955 dredged up by Cryptome show the CIA thinking through post-hypnotic suggestion in extensive, credulous detail. How, for instance, to pass a secret message to a field operative without danger of interception?
Encode it in a messenger’s brain, an undisclosed author wrote in 1954, so he’ll have “no memory whatsoever in the waking state as to the nature and contents of the message.” Even if a Soviet agent gets word of the messenger’s importance, “no amount of third-party tactics” can pry the message loose, “for he simply does not have it in his conscious mind.” Pity the poor waterboarded captive.
But the counterintelligence benefits of hypnosis are even greater. . .
See: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/12/cia-hypnosis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+wired%2Findex+%28Wired%3A+Index+3+%28Top+Stories+2%29%29
By Spencer Ackerman December 28, 2010 7:00 am Wired
Excerpt: It was an innocent time, the mid-1950s. America wasn’t yet cynical about its geopolitical games in the Cold War. Case in point: In order to maintain its spying edge over the Russkies, the CIA considered the benefits of hypnosis.
Two memos from 1954 and 1955 dredged up by Cryptome show the CIA thinking through post-hypnotic suggestion in extensive, credulous detail. How, for instance, to pass a secret message to a field operative without danger of interception?
Encode it in a messenger’s brain, an undisclosed author wrote in 1954, so he’ll have “no memory whatsoever in the waking state as to the nature and contents of the message.” Even if a Soviet agent gets word of the messenger’s importance, “no amount of third-party tactics” can pry the message loose, “for he simply does not have it in his conscious mind.” Pity the poor waterboarded captive.
But the counterintelligence benefits of hypnosis are even greater. . .
See: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/12/cia-hypnosis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+wired%2Findex+%28Wired%3A+Index+3+%28Top+Stories+2%29%29
For a number of fascinating records, be sure to visit Cryptome!
Sphere: Related Content
Monday, December 27, 2010
1917 -- Spies & Saboteurs!
The Hidden History of the Espionage Act
The much-maligned 1917 law had a real purpose—stopping spies and saboteurs.
By David Greenberg
Slate
Posted Monday, Dec. 27, 2010, at 8:47 AM ET
On July 24, 1915, the World War was raging in Europe and the belligerents were vying for the sympathy of the neutral United States. In Lower Manhattan, on a Sixth Avenue elevated train, Secret Service agents were tailing George Sylvester Viereck, a German propagandist and a mysterious companion of his—who was, unbeknown to the agents, Heinrich F. Albert, an attaché in the German Embassy. When Viereck got off at 23rd Street, one agent followed him; Albert continued on to 50th Street, where he suddenly looked up from his newspaper, noticed he had reached his stop, and hurried off the car, leaving behind a brown briefcase that the second agent promptly seized. A chase ensued, but the purloined bag ultimately made it to Treasury Secretary William McAdoo, who shared it with President Woodrow Wilson.
The documents that Wilson and McAdoo beheld detailed a sweeping secret campaign, linked to high-ranking German officials, of espionage, sabotage, and propaganda. There were plans to take over American newspapers, bankroll films, send hired lecturers on the Chautauqua circuit, and create pseudo-indigenous movements to agitate on behalf of pro-German policies. More disturbing were schemes to provoke strikes in armaments factories; to corner the supply of liquid chlorine, an ingredient in poison gas, in order to keep it from Allied hands; even to acquire the Wright Brothers' Aeroplane Company and use its patents on Germany's behalf. American officials also learned of sabotage plans hatched by a different German spy, Franz Rintelen von Kleist, who was plotting to destroy American munitions plants and blow up the Welland Canal, a Canadian waterway of vital importance to the United States. It was no wonder that Wilson wrote to his adviser Edward House that summer that the country was "honeycombed with German intrigue and infested with German spies."
Although these plots are omitted from most discussions of the 1917 Espionage Act—the law now being invoked by those who would prosecute WikiLeaks mastermind Julian Assange—they go a long way toward explaining (but not excusing) that unfortunate piece of wartime legislation. When Wilson made the case for entering the world war, he warned that "if there should be disloyalty, it will be dealt with with a firm hand of stern repression." Contrary to some interpretations, the president wasn't perversely touting his intention to trample civil liberties; he was grimly cautioning would-be saboteurs, like those who had blown up the supply depot at Black Tom, New Jersey, the year before, not to undermine the combat effort.
The Espionage Act had a legitimate purpose: to try to stop the real threat of subversion, sabotage, and malicious interference with the war effort, including the controversial reinstatement of the draft. It's context that's worth recalling as Democrats and Republicans alike clamor to use the law against Assange
On April 6, 1917, Congress declared war on Germany and for the next nine weeks it engaged in robust, contentious debate about the proper scope of an espionage bill. Some elements were struck from the first drafts. Originally, the White House wanted to censor the press, but Congress—reflecting fierce resistance in the newspapers—killed the provision. A provision to let the postmaster general regulate the mails remained, but was narrowed to restrict suppressible materials to those urging treason or lawbreaking that would hinder the war effort. A ban on efforts to "cause disaffection" in the military was replaced with a more closely tailored prohibition on efforts to cause insubordination, mutiny, or disloyalty—that last word used, as it was in Wilson's speech, to mean disloyal action, not private sentiment. Overall, the act wasn't meant, as it has often been represented, to stifle antiwar dissent, but to address particular wartime problems that officials had good reason to worry about: draft avoidance, sabotage, espionage.
Nonetheless, the Espionage Act was deeply problematic. Above all, its wording, even in its softer version, left far too much room for aggressive prosecutors and overzealous patriots to interpret it as they wished. (Things got worse the next year when Congress passed more draconian amendments that came to be called the Sedition Act; that law outlawed statements during war that were "disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive … about the form of government of the United States." Unlike the Espionage Act proper, though, the Sedition Act was repealed when World War I ended.)
The resulting crackdown on antiwar groups under the Espionage Act—and the shame it brought to Wilson and the nation—is widely known. Postmaster General Albert Burleson, a reactionary and intolerant Texan considered by Edward House to be "the most belligerent member of the cabinet," denied use of the mails to publications like the left-wing Masses and scared many others into silence. Around the country, meanwhile, the U.S. attorneys in Thomas Gregory's Justice Department prosecuted socialists, pacifists, and German-Americans on flimsy grounds. Many people were arrested for crimes of mere speech. Filmmaker Robert Goldstein was prosecuted for making a movie about the American Revolution that depicted the British—now a U.S. ally—in an unfavorable light. The socialist leader Eugene Debs was thrown in jail for a speech that defended freedom of speech. Of 1,500 arrests under the law, only 10 involved actual sabotage. To the dismay of progressives, moreover, not even the Supreme Court stopped the prosecutions. In March 1919, the liberal icon Oliver Wendell Holmes, coining his famous "clear and present danger" standard, led the court in upholding three dubious Espionage Act verdicts, including the conviction of Debs.
It has been common to view the Espionage Act as the product of a paroxysm of wartime hysteria. There's obviously some truth to that view. In 1917 and 1918, war fever drove many politicians, in all three branches of government, to lose sight of basic rights—just as during other wars a sense of urgency led Abraham Lincoln to wrongfully suspend the habeas corpus writ and subject civilians to military trials, and Franklin Roosevelt to approve the internment of Japanese-Americans. But just as the presence of real communist spies during the early Cold War years helps to explain (but, again, not excuse) the witch hunts that followed, so the legitimate fears of German saboteurs constitute an important piece of the context in which the Espionage Act became law.
The real problem occurred not in its drafting but in its application. All laws are enforced selectively. Discretion always shapes which possible violations of a law are prosecuted and which are deemed unwise to pursue. In deciding whether to indict Assange, President Obama—who has already endorsed the worst of George W. Bush's civil-liberties violations, the indefinite jailing of suspects without trial—might do well to consider how his decision will look in the light of history. Wilson's greatness is sullied today because of the license he granted to Gregory and Burleson to abuse the act; conversely, Richard Nixon's reputation as our worst president is only enhanced by his attempt to use the law to retaliate against Pentagon Papers leaker Daniel Ellsberg.
Assange's case is different, of course, from Ellsberg's, but it's still far from clear that his posting and sharing of classified government documents—as embarrassing and frustrating to diplomats as their publication may be—amounts to the kind of sabotage or espionage that the law was intended to punish. A former professor who taught his students ably about the Constitution, Woodrow Wilson would fare better in the history books today had he instructed his Cabinet officials more emphatically that laws on the books are only as wise as the people who enforce them.
The much-maligned 1917 law had a real purpose—stopping spies and saboteurs.
By David Greenberg
Slate
Posted Monday, Dec. 27, 2010, at 8:47 AM ET
On July 24, 1915, the World War was raging in Europe and the belligerents were vying for the sympathy of the neutral United States. In Lower Manhattan, on a Sixth Avenue elevated train, Secret Service agents were tailing George Sylvester Viereck, a German propagandist and a mysterious companion of his—who was, unbeknown to the agents, Heinrich F. Albert, an attaché in the German Embassy. When Viereck got off at 23rd Street, one agent followed him; Albert continued on to 50th Street, where he suddenly looked up from his newspaper, noticed he had reached his stop, and hurried off the car, leaving behind a brown briefcase that the second agent promptly seized. A chase ensued, but the purloined bag ultimately made it to Treasury Secretary William McAdoo, who shared it with President Woodrow Wilson.
The documents that Wilson and McAdoo beheld detailed a sweeping secret campaign, linked to high-ranking German officials, of espionage, sabotage, and propaganda. There were plans to take over American newspapers, bankroll films, send hired lecturers on the Chautauqua circuit, and create pseudo-indigenous movements to agitate on behalf of pro-German policies. More disturbing were schemes to provoke strikes in armaments factories; to corner the supply of liquid chlorine, an ingredient in poison gas, in order to keep it from Allied hands; even to acquire the Wright Brothers' Aeroplane Company and use its patents on Germany's behalf. American officials also learned of sabotage plans hatched by a different German spy, Franz Rintelen von Kleist, who was plotting to destroy American munitions plants and blow up the Welland Canal, a Canadian waterway of vital importance to the United States. It was no wonder that Wilson wrote to his adviser Edward House that summer that the country was "honeycombed with German intrigue and infested with German spies."
Although these plots are omitted from most discussions of the 1917 Espionage Act—the law now being invoked by those who would prosecute WikiLeaks mastermind Julian Assange—they go a long way toward explaining (but not excusing) that unfortunate piece of wartime legislation. When Wilson made the case for entering the world war, he warned that "if there should be disloyalty, it will be dealt with with a firm hand of stern repression." Contrary to some interpretations, the president wasn't perversely touting his intention to trample civil liberties; he was grimly cautioning would-be saboteurs, like those who had blown up the supply depot at Black Tom, New Jersey, the year before, not to undermine the combat effort.
The Espionage Act had a legitimate purpose: to try to stop the real threat of subversion, sabotage, and malicious interference with the war effort, including the controversial reinstatement of the draft. It's context that's worth recalling as Democrats and Republicans alike clamor to use the law against Assange
On April 6, 1917, Congress declared war on Germany and for the next nine weeks it engaged in robust, contentious debate about the proper scope of an espionage bill. Some elements were struck from the first drafts. Originally, the White House wanted to censor the press, but Congress—reflecting fierce resistance in the newspapers—killed the provision. A provision to let the postmaster general regulate the mails remained, but was narrowed to restrict suppressible materials to those urging treason or lawbreaking that would hinder the war effort. A ban on efforts to "cause disaffection" in the military was replaced with a more closely tailored prohibition on efforts to cause insubordination, mutiny, or disloyalty—that last word used, as it was in Wilson's speech, to mean disloyal action, not private sentiment. Overall, the act wasn't meant, as it has often been represented, to stifle antiwar dissent, but to address particular wartime problems that officials had good reason to worry about: draft avoidance, sabotage, espionage.
Nonetheless, the Espionage Act was deeply problematic. Above all, its wording, even in its softer version, left far too much room for aggressive prosecutors and overzealous patriots to interpret it as they wished. (Things got worse the next year when Congress passed more draconian amendments that came to be called the Sedition Act; that law outlawed statements during war that were "disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive … about the form of government of the United States." Unlike the Espionage Act proper, though, the Sedition Act was repealed when World War I ended.)
The resulting crackdown on antiwar groups under the Espionage Act—and the shame it brought to Wilson and the nation—is widely known. Postmaster General Albert Burleson, a reactionary and intolerant Texan considered by Edward House to be "the most belligerent member of the cabinet," denied use of the mails to publications like the left-wing Masses and scared many others into silence. Around the country, meanwhile, the U.S. attorneys in Thomas Gregory's Justice Department prosecuted socialists, pacifists, and German-Americans on flimsy grounds. Many people were arrested for crimes of mere speech. Filmmaker Robert Goldstein was prosecuted for making a movie about the American Revolution that depicted the British—now a U.S. ally—in an unfavorable light. The socialist leader Eugene Debs was thrown in jail for a speech that defended freedom of speech. Of 1,500 arrests under the law, only 10 involved actual sabotage. To the dismay of progressives, moreover, not even the Supreme Court stopped the prosecutions. In March 1919, the liberal icon Oliver Wendell Holmes, coining his famous "clear and present danger" standard, led the court in upholding three dubious Espionage Act verdicts, including the conviction of Debs.
It has been common to view the Espionage Act as the product of a paroxysm of wartime hysteria. There's obviously some truth to that view. In 1917 and 1918, war fever drove many politicians, in all three branches of government, to lose sight of basic rights—just as during other wars a sense of urgency led Abraham Lincoln to wrongfully suspend the habeas corpus writ and subject civilians to military trials, and Franklin Roosevelt to approve the internment of Japanese-Americans. But just as the presence of real communist spies during the early Cold War years helps to explain (but, again, not excuse) the witch hunts that followed, so the legitimate fears of German saboteurs constitute an important piece of the context in which the Espionage Act became law.
The real problem occurred not in its drafting but in its application. All laws are enforced selectively. Discretion always shapes which possible violations of a law are prosecuted and which are deemed unwise to pursue. In deciding whether to indict Assange, President Obama—who has already endorsed the worst of George W. Bush's civil-liberties violations, the indefinite jailing of suspects without trial—might do well to consider how his decision will look in the light of history. Wilson's greatness is sullied today because of the license he granted to Gregory and Burleson to abuse the act; conversely, Richard Nixon's reputation as our worst president is only enhanced by his attempt to use the law to retaliate against Pentagon Papers leaker Daniel Ellsberg.
Assange's case is different, of course, from Ellsberg's, but it's still far from clear that his posting and sharing of classified government documents—as embarrassing and frustrating to diplomats as their publication may be—amounts to the kind of sabotage or espionage that the law was intended to punish. A former professor who taught his students ably about the Constitution, Woodrow Wilson would fare better in the history books today had he instructed his Cabinet officials more emphatically that laws on the books are only as wise as the people who enforce them.
###
Wednesday, December 15, 2010
Help Wanted -- CIA & NSA
A Glimpse at Positions at the CIA and NSA
Washington Post -- December 12, 2010
It is hard to keep up with the ever-changing global developments in technology, but that is the mission of those who work for such government agencies as the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.
The classified work these agencies undertake means there are a multitude of positions in the fields of science, engineering and technology that hold the nation's security as their utmost goal.
"We're always looking for engineers, computer scientists and other technically qualified applicants who can advance our vital mission of keeping America safe," CIA spokeswoman Paula Weiss said. "Anyone with a scientific or technical background who would like to apply his or her skills to our intelligence mission should check out our Web site to see the wide range of opportunities we offer. It's helpful to have an interest in world affairs, overseas experience or language skills, but it's not necessary."
Not surprisingly, the CIA is on the cutting edge of technological developments, and it develops and implements many state-of-the-art technologies in order to help the agency fulfill its mission of gathering foreign intelligence.
Among the positions the CIA is currently recruiting for are electrical engineer, materials engineer, mechanical engineer, programs management engineer and systems engineer. In the science, technology and weapons areas, positions are open for research scientist; science, technology and weapons analyst; technical/targeting analyst; machinist; and technical operations officer.
CIA employees come from a variety of academic and professional disciplines and experiences. The agency's recruitment Web site lists various career paths. In addition to science, engineering and technology positions, there are jobs in areas such as National Clandestine Service, languages and support services, to name a few.
Requirements for CIA jobs include U.S. citizenship as well as successful results from a thorough medical exam, polygraph test and background investigation.
If you are considering a job in the intelligence field, the CIA offers undergraduate student internships or co-ops as well as graduate studies. The programs combine educational and practical work experiences that complement students' preferred academic fields. Students receive a salary and benefits.
Another of the country's foremost intelligence agencies, the National Security Agency, is also actively recruiting for students, professionals and transitioning military.
The NSA Web site notes that "intelligence and imaginative critical thinking skills" are important attributes for applicants. In the technology fields, positions are available in computer science, computer/electrical engineering, information assurance and security, among others. Posted on the NSA's Web site under "Hot Jobs" are computer scientists, software developers and software engineers.
"For diverse, technologically savvy people looking to work in cutting-edge areas of IT, it really doesn't get much better than the National Security Agency," Lori Weltmann, NSA recruitment marketing manager, said. NSA is a leader in the intelligence community in areas such as network management and compliance, cyber defense, biometrics and wireless mobility.
"And we're not new to any of this," Weltmann continued. "We've been leaders for years. Given the increasingly complex and rapidly changing world of global communication, our need for qualified people with technology skills continues to grow. In fiscal year 2011, we plan to hire more than 1,500 new workers-¿more than half of whom will have skills in areas such as computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering and mathematics. A career at NSA offers the opportunity to work with the best and brightest, shape the course of the world and secure your own future."
As at the CIA, U.S. citizenship and a thorough background investigation are required for prospective NSA employees.
Professional development is an important aspect of working at NSA, and career development programs are available in numerous disciplines including computer science, information assurance, business and others. There is also the opportunity to pursue your education at outside educational institutions, as well as at the NSA's own National Cryptologic School.
For more information on career opportunities at the CIA or NSA, visit cia.gov or nsa.gov.
###
Sphere: Related Content
Washington Post -- December 12, 2010
It is hard to keep up with the ever-changing global developments in technology, but that is the mission of those who work for such government agencies as the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.
The classified work these agencies undertake means there are a multitude of positions in the fields of science, engineering and technology that hold the nation's security as their utmost goal.
"We're always looking for engineers, computer scientists and other technically qualified applicants who can advance our vital mission of keeping America safe," CIA spokeswoman Paula Weiss said. "Anyone with a scientific or technical background who would like to apply his or her skills to our intelligence mission should check out our Web site to see the wide range of opportunities we offer. It's helpful to have an interest in world affairs, overseas experience or language skills, but it's not necessary."
Not surprisingly, the CIA is on the cutting edge of technological developments, and it develops and implements many state-of-the-art technologies in order to help the agency fulfill its mission of gathering foreign intelligence.
Among the positions the CIA is currently recruiting for are electrical engineer, materials engineer, mechanical engineer, programs management engineer and systems engineer. In the science, technology and weapons areas, positions are open for research scientist; science, technology and weapons analyst; technical/targeting analyst; machinist; and technical operations officer.
CIA employees come from a variety of academic and professional disciplines and experiences. The agency's recruitment Web site lists various career paths. In addition to science, engineering and technology positions, there are jobs in areas such as National Clandestine Service, languages and support services, to name a few.
Requirements for CIA jobs include U.S. citizenship as well as successful results from a thorough medical exam, polygraph test and background investigation.
If you are considering a job in the intelligence field, the CIA offers undergraduate student internships or co-ops as well as graduate studies. The programs combine educational and practical work experiences that complement students' preferred academic fields. Students receive a salary and benefits.
Another of the country's foremost intelligence agencies, the National Security Agency, is also actively recruiting for students, professionals and transitioning military.
The NSA Web site notes that "intelligence and imaginative critical thinking skills" are important attributes for applicants. In the technology fields, positions are available in computer science, computer/electrical engineering, information assurance and security, among others. Posted on the NSA's Web site under "Hot Jobs" are computer scientists, software developers and software engineers.
"For diverse, technologically savvy people looking to work in cutting-edge areas of IT, it really doesn't get much better than the National Security Agency," Lori Weltmann, NSA recruitment marketing manager, said. NSA is a leader in the intelligence community in areas such as network management and compliance, cyber defense, biometrics and wireless mobility.
"And we're not new to any of this," Weltmann continued. "We've been leaders for years. Given the increasingly complex and rapidly changing world of global communication, our need for qualified people with technology skills continues to grow. In fiscal year 2011, we plan to hire more than 1,500 new workers-¿more than half of whom will have skills in areas such as computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering and mathematics. A career at NSA offers the opportunity to work with the best and brightest, shape the course of the world and secure your own future."
As at the CIA, U.S. citizenship and a thorough background investigation are required for prospective NSA employees.
Professional development is an important aspect of working at NSA, and career development programs are available in numerous disciplines including computer science, information assurance, business and others. There is also the opportunity to pursue your education at outside educational institutions, as well as at the NSA's own National Cryptologic School.
For more information on career opportunities at the CIA or NSA, visit cia.gov or nsa.gov.
###
Friday, December 10, 2010
Turkish "Surprise"? Um, I don't think so . . .
Mysterious Cache Found at Turkish Naval Base
ISTANBUL - Huerriet Daily News with wires
Friday, December 10, 2010
The confiscation of nine sacks of documents that were hidden at a Turkish naval base is expected to intensify investigations into alleged anti-government activity. The files are said to provide detailed information about coup plots.
The documents were confiscated Tuesday from a hidden location under the floor of the office of the head of intelligence at Gölcük Navy Command in the northwestern province of Kocaeli.
The confiscated documents include data on plans to be implemented after a military coup, including where to keep 167 special figures incarcerated; special dossiers on 46 high-level government officials; charts pointing to hidden locations of ammunition; data gathered on the wives of admirals; documents that appear to be a continuation of the “Kafes” (Cage) and “Action Plan for the Fight against Fundamentalism” plots; a list of military personnel who would be deported after a coup; secret documents from crucial state organizations; a Navy fleet command navigation logbook; and 34 voice recording tapes.
The operation was conducted by Fikret Seçen and Ali Haydar, both public prosecutors with special authority, as part of an ongoing espionage investigation into Turkish naval forces.
The search began after an unidentified person called in a tip to prosecutors, saying some documents regarding the espionage case would soon be destroyed.
Seçen said Thursday the operation was not a police raid as mentioned in the press but was instead conducted with the military in his presence.
The confiscated documents were transferred to Istanbul for inspection and were opened in the presence of an Army colonel assigned by the Chief of General Staff. The presence of the colonel, who videotaped the process and the search for DNA, hair samples and fingerprints on the documents, is to prevent allegations of the planting of suspicious evidence, as has happened in past investigations.
The espionage investigation, which began in August with blackmail charges against members of the Navy following claims of running a prostitution ring, was initially referred to as the “prostitution gang investigation” in the press. The prosecution later dropped the charges of prostitution after evidence of espionage emerged.
A number of military secrets and issues concerning national defense has allegedly been leaked by the alleged gang.
The alleged “action plan” features strategies to end both Justice and Development Party, or AKP, rule and the activities of the Fethullah Gülen religious community by planting fake evidence and weaponry in various locations. “Cage,” meanwhile, is an alleged anti-government plan to target non-Muslim communities in Turkey so as to bring heat upon the AKP from the West.
ISTANBUL - Huerriet Daily News with wires
Friday, December 10, 2010
The confiscation of nine sacks of documents that were hidden at a Turkish naval base is expected to intensify investigations into alleged anti-government activity. The files are said to provide detailed information about coup plots.
The documents were confiscated Tuesday from a hidden location under the floor of the office of the head of intelligence at Gölcük Navy Command in the northwestern province of Kocaeli.
The confiscated documents include data on plans to be implemented after a military coup, including where to keep 167 special figures incarcerated; special dossiers on 46 high-level government officials; charts pointing to hidden locations of ammunition; data gathered on the wives of admirals; documents that appear to be a continuation of the “Kafes” (Cage) and “Action Plan for the Fight against Fundamentalism” plots; a list of military personnel who would be deported after a coup; secret documents from crucial state organizations; a Navy fleet command navigation logbook; and 34 voice recording tapes.
The operation was conducted by Fikret Seçen and Ali Haydar, both public prosecutors with special authority, as part of an ongoing espionage investigation into Turkish naval forces.
The search began after an unidentified person called in a tip to prosecutors, saying some documents regarding the espionage case would soon be destroyed.
Seçen said Thursday the operation was not a police raid as mentioned in the press but was instead conducted with the military in his presence.
The confiscated documents were transferred to Istanbul for inspection and were opened in the presence of an Army colonel assigned by the Chief of General Staff. The presence of the colonel, who videotaped the process and the search for DNA, hair samples and fingerprints on the documents, is to prevent allegations of the planting of suspicious evidence, as has happened in past investigations.
The espionage investigation, which began in August with blackmail charges against members of the Navy following claims of running a prostitution ring, was initially referred to as the “prostitution gang investigation” in the press. The prosecution later dropped the charges of prostitution after evidence of espionage emerged.
A number of military secrets and issues concerning national defense has allegedly been leaked by the alleged gang.
The alleged “action plan” features strategies to end both Justice and Development Party, or AKP, rule and the activities of the Fethullah Gülen religious community by planting fake evidence and weaponry in various locations. “Cage,” meanwhile, is an alleged anti-government plan to target non-Muslim communities in Turkey so as to bring heat upon the AKP from the West.
###
Sunday, December 5, 2010
Comment re: WikiLeaks
I've deliberately ignored it until now, but after a couple of emails from readers . . .
Here's my assessment of the impact of the latest WikiLeaks release: So what?
Is there anything major that you didn't really already "know" or suspect? The only persons surprised by anything Mr. Assange pumped out into the Internet are naive or uninformed generally. Embarrassing? Awkward? Sure.
Next.
###Sphere: Related Content
Here's my assessment of the impact of the latest WikiLeaks release: So what?
Is there anything major that you didn't really already "know" or suspect? The only persons surprised by anything Mr. Assange pumped out into the Internet are naive or uninformed generally. Embarrassing? Awkward? Sure.
Next.
###Sphere: Related Content
Saturday, December 4, 2010
Espionage Case Breaks at Fort Bragg
Espionage Case Unfolding at Ft. Bragg
Saturday, December 04, 2010
FORT BRAGG, N.C. (WTVD) -- A man with high-level military security clearance is under arrest, accused of trying to sell access to classified military computers.
The suspect is Bryan Martin, who is enlisted in the Navy, and assigned to the Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg.
According to federal documents obtained by the I-Team, Martin told an undercover F-B-I agent he had access to military computer systems, and said he was seeking long-term financial reimbursement.
The undercover agent paid Martin $3500 for documents labeled "Top Secret."
The I-Team has learned Martin thought he was selling U.S. military secrets to China.
According to the court documents, he also told the FBI agent that over his 15-20 year career, he could be very valuable because of his access to military secrets.
"These cases are rare," said Frank Perry, who used to run the Raleigh FBI office. "For a case like this to have been made in Raleigh or certainly in North Carolina - this area - is quite significant."
The undercover sting operation to arrest Martin happened at three different hotels - one on post, and two in Spring Lake.
The FBI says none of the Joint Special Operations Command secrets were ever compromised by the sting.
###Sphere: Related Content
Friday, December 3, 2010
Army Stonewalls on Probe of Spying on US Civilians
Army Withholding Results of Ft. Lewis Spying Probe
By GENE JOHNSON
Associated Press -- Thursday, December 2, 2010
The Army is still refusing to release the results of its investigation into spying on anti-war activists by a civilian intelligence specialist at Joint Base Lewis-McChord south of Seattle.
Officials released more than 100 pages of records this week to The Associated Press in response to a Freedom of Information Act request, most with names redacted. The Army withheld the results and recommendations made by an investigating officer, citing law enforcement and privacy exemptions.
Col. John Wells of the Army's Litigation Division noted an ongoing federal civil rights lawsuit brought by the activists and the possibility of criminal charges against Army employees, and said release of the documents could impair the rights of those involved to fair trials or disciplinary proceedings.
The documents outline the scope of the inquiry, which was initially completed in mid-2009 and then reopened early this year to determine whether military legal advisors were given complete and accurate information about the protest group's infiltration.
They also show that before the story broke, senior officials at the base were concerned about bad publicity "should mainstream media decide to report U.S. 'spying' on protesters," and they were upset that local agencies, including the city of Tacoma, had turned over documents to the protesters revealing the intelligence specialist's involvement.
"Future information sharing operations with local agencies are at risk because we cannot depend on them to comply with FOIA restrictions and/or our dissemination guidance," said a "point paper" dated March 2, 2009.
The base's leadership should "express their displeasure with their Tacoma counterparts (for) the mishandling of this FOIA request," the paper said.
Anti-war activists with a group called Olympia Port Militarization Resistance discovered in early 2009 that the administrator of their e-mail list-serve, whom they knew as John Jacob, was actually John Jacob Towery, then an employee of the Force Protection Division at Lewis-McChord. The Force Protection Division includes civilian and military workers who support law enforcement and security operations to ensure the security of Fort Lewis personnel.
Towery had been attending the group's meetings for two years, and information he collected about the protesters appears to have been passed to his superiors on base as well as local law enforcement, documents released to the AP show.
The Reconstruction-era Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the Army from directly engaging in domestic law enforcement.
The Army launched its investigation in July 2009, after members of the group complained. The investigating officer's marching orders said the inquiry should focus on Towery's actions, whether he undertook them at the behest of civilian law enforcement, whether he was paid by any civilian police agency, what his supervisors knew of his activities, and whether he might have violated federal law or Army directives.
The highest-ranking person interviewed for the investigation appears to have been a colonel, whose name is redacted.
One of the documents provided to the AP, an "information paper" apparently prepared by the Force Protection Division, says: "Information provided by (redacted) and a law enforcement official with the Pierce County Sheriff's Office (PCSO) indicate that the activities alleged by the Olympia activist were done in support of the PCSO and Tacoma Police Department as a confidential informant/source and not as a member of the FP Division."
The protest group, which formed in 2006, was one of several in the region opposed to the use of civilian ports for shipping military items, such as Stryker vehicles, overseas. They claim that thanks to Towery's infiltration, police knew where they were going to protest in advance - sometimes arresting them before their civil disobedience even began.
Having a spy among them chilled their First Amendment and other rights, they argued.
About 200 people were arrested over a two-week period in November 2007, but only about three dozen were ever charged.
###
Sphere: Related Content
By GENE JOHNSON
Associated Press -- Thursday, December 2, 2010
The Army is still refusing to release the results of its investigation into spying on anti-war activists by a civilian intelligence specialist at Joint Base Lewis-McChord south of Seattle.
Officials released more than 100 pages of records this week to The Associated Press in response to a Freedom of Information Act request, most with names redacted. The Army withheld the results and recommendations made by an investigating officer, citing law enforcement and privacy exemptions.
Col. John Wells of the Army's Litigation Division noted an ongoing federal civil rights lawsuit brought by the activists and the possibility of criminal charges against Army employees, and said release of the documents could impair the rights of those involved to fair trials or disciplinary proceedings.
The documents outline the scope of the inquiry, which was initially completed in mid-2009 and then reopened early this year to determine whether military legal advisors were given complete and accurate information about the protest group's infiltration.
They also show that before the story broke, senior officials at the base were concerned about bad publicity "should mainstream media decide to report U.S. 'spying' on protesters," and they were upset that local agencies, including the city of Tacoma, had turned over documents to the protesters revealing the intelligence specialist's involvement.
"Future information sharing operations with local agencies are at risk because we cannot depend on them to comply with FOIA restrictions and/or our dissemination guidance," said a "point paper" dated March 2, 2009.
The base's leadership should "express their displeasure with their Tacoma counterparts (for) the mishandling of this FOIA request," the paper said.
Anti-war activists with a group called Olympia Port Militarization Resistance discovered in early 2009 that the administrator of their e-mail list-serve, whom they knew as John Jacob, was actually John Jacob Towery, then an employee of the Force Protection Division at Lewis-McChord. The Force Protection Division includes civilian and military workers who support law enforcement and security operations to ensure the security of Fort Lewis personnel.
Towery had been attending the group's meetings for two years, and information he collected about the protesters appears to have been passed to his superiors on base as well as local law enforcement, documents released to the AP show.
The Reconstruction-era Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the Army from directly engaging in domestic law enforcement.
The Army launched its investigation in July 2009, after members of the group complained. The investigating officer's marching orders said the inquiry should focus on Towery's actions, whether he undertook them at the behest of civilian law enforcement, whether he was paid by any civilian police agency, what his supervisors knew of his activities, and whether he might have violated federal law or Army directives.
The highest-ranking person interviewed for the investigation appears to have been a colonel, whose name is redacted.
One of the documents provided to the AP, an "information paper" apparently prepared by the Force Protection Division, says: "Information provided by (redacted) and a law enforcement official with the Pierce County Sheriff's Office (PCSO) indicate that the activities alleged by the Olympia activist were done in support of the PCSO and Tacoma Police Department as a confidential informant/source and not as a member of the FP Division."
The protest group, which formed in 2006, was one of several in the region opposed to the use of civilian ports for shipping military items, such as Stryker vehicles, overseas. They claim that thanks to Towery's infiltration, police knew where they were going to protest in advance - sometimes arresting them before their civil disobedience even began.
Having a spy among them chilled their First Amendment and other rights, they argued.
About 200 people were arrested over a two-week period in November 2007, but only about three dozen were ever charged.
###
Tuesday, November 16, 2010
Mexican-American Intel Center Profiled
North American Union – “U.S. Super Spy Center” Uncovered in Mexico
- Mexican Magazine Proceso reveals the location of a US Military-Intelligence Megaplex in Mexico City.
-Megaplex includes offices for the CIA, FBI, DEA, Defense Intelligence, BATF, Department of Treasury and others.
- U.S. Intelligence Operatives will no longer have to disguise themselves as diplomats.
- Mexico will now have a Military ‘Liaison’ for NORTHCOM.
- U.S. is now in charge of all tactical efforts against the drug war, counter-insurgency, and counter-terrorism in Mexico.
- Obama and Hillary Clinton are credited for the creation of the Office of Bi-lateral Intelligence in Mexico (OBI).
Jorge Carrasco and Jesus Esquivel
proceso.com.mx
Translated by Mario Andrade
With the approval of Felipe Calderón’s Administration, the U.S. Government finally got what it always wanted: To set up a super spy center in Mexico City. It was the escalation of the drug war in the country what opened the door to all U.S. intelligence agencies, including the military, to operate out of the Federal District without having to disguise their agents as diplomats.
The establishment of the Office of Bi-national Intelligence (OBI) was authorized by Calderon, after negotiations with Washington, which began under the government of his predecessor, Vicente Fox Quesada. The creation of the super spy center was authorized by the director of the Center for Investigation and National Security (CISEN), Guillermo Valdés Castellanos, without taking into account any objections from the Mexican military.
Through the OBI, Calderon has given the green light to U.S. Intelligence agents to spy on organized crime syndicates and drug cartels. They can also spy on Mexican government agencies, including the Secretariat of National Defense, Navy, and the diplomatic missions in Mexico.
The building headquarters, which includes offices from the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and the U.S. Department of Treasury is located at 265 Paseo de la Reforma Avenue, approximately 250 meters from the U.S. embassy.
The most significant presence at the OBI building is that of the Pentagon, which includes the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the National Security Agency (NSA). It is followed by the U.S. Department of Justice, also with three agencies: the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF).
With two services, there is the Department of Homeland Security: Coast Guard Intelligence (CGI) and the Bureau of Customs and Immigration Enforcement (ICE), while the Treasury Department has officers of the Bureau of Intelligence on Terrorism and Financial Affairs (TFI) .
In addition, the OBI opened two remote offices: one in Ciudad Juarez and one in Tijuana, housing U.S. agents and “task force commanders” who coordinate operations against drug trafficking with the support of Mexican Government personnel.
It is not known how many intelligence agents from the U.S. are operating in Mexico with the authorization of the Mexican Federal Government, since the creation of this center was announced on August 31st. They maintain that the exact number is “classified.”
The building occupied by the OBI in the Federal District is right next to the Mexican Stock Exchange and is part of what the security and intelligence services in Mexico define as a “soft target area” in reference to the possibility of an attack on U.S. interests in Mexico.
At this strategic point for Washington in the Mexican Federal District, there are also facilities for transnational corporations such as Ford, American Airlines, as well as Marriott and Sheraton hotels, among others.
The building where the OBI is located gives the impression of an ordinary business facility, with banks, insurance, telecommunications, commercial offices and private offices. The only thing that stands out is the entry and departure of U.S. citizens.
The building directory lists the names of the occupants all the way up to the 21st floor. However, after the 22nd floor, there are three penthouses that are only listed as “occupied.” And on the roof, there is a dozen satellite dishes placed just above the logo of the telecommunications company Axtel.
“It’s the best covert location for the agencies to operate,” said the source that provided the location of the OBI. The ordinary appearance of the building is the way in which the United States often disguise intelligence centers around the world.
The reception and parking are guarded by private security services, while Federal District Police provide outside support.
Furthermore, the city government has installed special surveillance cameras with sirens to observe the movement of pedestrians and vehicles outside the building.
The scope and power of the OBI in Mexico is similar to the El Paso Intelligence Center, in Texas (EPIC), which dates back to 1974 and operates exclusively to combat drug trafficking, weapons and money laundering on the border between Mexico and United States.
EPIC has been credited for creating the strategies launched against drug trafficking and organized crime in Mexico. Among the most successful are “Operation White Tiger,” which was used to investigate the activities of the Hank Rhon family in 1997, the capture and extradition, a year earlier, of Gulf Drug Cartel Leader Juan Garcia Abrego, and the discovery of narco-graves in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, in 1998.
Subordination
Overrun by drug trafficking, the government of Felipe Calderón agreed to the establishment of the OBI in Mexico, which was a proposal of the then head of National Intelligence in the United States, Admiral Dennis Blair, who last March was accompanied by Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, during his working visit to Mexico.
According to the formal agreement, the new U.S. office workers interact with their Mexican counterparts, under the coordination of the State Department and the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE).
For the Pentagon, the strong presence of its agents in Mexico is intended to merge the intelligence and espionage services of both countries to identify and exploit the vulnerabilities of drug trafficking organizations and organized crime gangs.
Under this directive, issued on 18 March by Gen. Victor Eugene Renuart, then head of Northern Command (NORTHCOM), Mexico has carried out several operations against drug traffickers.
Since then, among some of the actions taken against the drug lords have been the killing of Arturo Beltran Leyva, (aka El Barbas), Ignacio “Nacho” Coronel, and Ezequiel Cardenas Guillen (aka Tony Tormenta), in addition to the arrests of other drug lords, such as Edgar ‘Barbie’ Valdez Villarreal.
Since the killing of Beltran Leyva in December of 2009, U.S. intelligence services, mainly the DEA, have mentioned their participation in various operations, against the very Arturo Beltran Leyva, Barbie Valdez, Teodoro Garcia Simental (aka El Teo), Jose Gerardo Alvarez Vazquez (aka El Indio or El Chayán), operator of the Beltran Leyva organization and Carlos Ramon Castro, a drug dealer who worked for several organizations.
As part of the Mexican government’s need to justify the militarization of the fight against drug trafficking, the Pentagon has strengthened its cooperation with the Mexican military. In early 2009, just as the Department of State and the Mexican Exterior Relations Secretariat (SRE) fine-tuned the details for the establishment of the OBI, the U.S. Department of Defense stepped up military training for Mexicans in Mexico and in several U.S. military bases.
The training has been an unprecedented event in the history of military relations between the two countries. For the first time, the Pentagon has brought counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism expertise from Iraq and Afghanistan to their offices in central Mexico.
In the case of Mexico, the training courses are developed and run by the Defense Department, and are focused on intelligence and tactical operations against drug trafficking, terrorism and the implementation of counterinsurgency tactics.
In addition to the courses offered in Mexico, the Mexican military has significantly increased the number of special forces troops in the Army, Air Force and the Navy to attend specialized intelligence training in U.S. military bases.
Liaisons
The main example of this cooperation is the presence -for the first time in the bilateral relationship- a member of the Mexican Army as a “liaison” between the Mexican military (Central Command) and the Northern Command in Colorado (NORTHCOM), according to a military source who spoke to the Mexican magazine Proceso.
On Wednesday 10, The Washington Post published on its front page a note informing that the liaison will also serve as deputy commander of the Institute for Security and Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere at Fort Benning, Georgia. From the sixties to the eighties, these facilities housed in the so-called School of the Americas, which went down in history as a supplying center for Latin American dictators, which are characterized by the systematic violation of human rights.
A U.S. official, who told the Post on condition of anonymity, said that given the seriousness of the drug violence in Mexico, “we have received direct instruction from the President (Barack Obama) and the highest levels in government, to really examine what more can be done in this counter-narcotics cooperation with Mexico.”
The establishment of the Office of Bi-national Intelligence (OBI) implies that for the first time in the history of Mexico, surveillance, supervision and qualification of work against organized crime between federal government agencies, including the military, rests in part on foreign officials.
According to the document unveiled by the White House on March 25, 2009 on the establishment of the OBI, the office is also responsible for overseeing the proper use of resources that Washington provides the Calderon administration in combating drug trafficking through the ‘Merida Initiative.’
“We will be coordinating our efforts with the government of Mexico through high-level contacts, which in part are related to the new intelligence services responsible for overseeing the implementation of Merida Initiative,” according to the document released by the White House (published by Proceso).
A year later, on March 23, 2010, Hillary Clinton announced during her working visit to the Federal District, in the context of the implementation of Plan Merida, the establishment of two “pilot programs” in the Tijuana-San Diego and Ciudad Juárez-El Paso corridors.
The two governments declared in a joint statement, that in the case of Ciudad Juárez, the program considers the development of “a model for the Mexican Government to collect and analyze tactical intelligence” as well as to “take action against drug trafficking, extortion, kidnapping and other criminal activities.”
However, the actual operations of the OBI in security and intelligence services, Mexicans will be subordinates of the U.S.. Agencies of the U.S. Government will play the role as experts in intelligence work, apart from previous advisory roles in order to increase Mexico’s ability to use information resources against drug cartel operations.
###
- Mexican Magazine Proceso reveals the location of a US Military-Intelligence Megaplex in Mexico City.
-Megaplex includes offices for the CIA, FBI, DEA, Defense Intelligence, BATF, Department of Treasury and others.
- U.S. Intelligence Operatives will no longer have to disguise themselves as diplomats.
- Mexico will now have a Military ‘Liaison’ for NORTHCOM.
- U.S. is now in charge of all tactical efforts against the drug war, counter-insurgency, and counter-terrorism in Mexico.
- Obama and Hillary Clinton are credited for the creation of the Office of Bi-lateral Intelligence in Mexico (OBI).
Jorge Carrasco and Jesus Esquivel
proceso.com.mx
Translated by Mario Andrade
With the approval of Felipe Calderón’s Administration, the U.S. Government finally got what it always wanted: To set up a super spy center in Mexico City. It was the escalation of the drug war in the country what opened the door to all U.S. intelligence agencies, including the military, to operate out of the Federal District without having to disguise their agents as diplomats.
The establishment of the Office of Bi-national Intelligence (OBI) was authorized by Calderon, after negotiations with Washington, which began under the government of his predecessor, Vicente Fox Quesada. The creation of the super spy center was authorized by the director of the Center for Investigation and National Security (CISEN), Guillermo Valdés Castellanos, without taking into account any objections from the Mexican military.
Through the OBI, Calderon has given the green light to U.S. Intelligence agents to spy on organized crime syndicates and drug cartels. They can also spy on Mexican government agencies, including the Secretariat of National Defense, Navy, and the diplomatic missions in Mexico.
The building headquarters, which includes offices from the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and the U.S. Department of Treasury is located at 265 Paseo de la Reforma Avenue, approximately 250 meters from the U.S. embassy.
The most significant presence at the OBI building is that of the Pentagon, which includes the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the National Security Agency (NSA). It is followed by the U.S. Department of Justice, also with three agencies: the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF).
With two services, there is the Department of Homeland Security: Coast Guard Intelligence (CGI) and the Bureau of Customs and Immigration Enforcement (ICE), while the Treasury Department has officers of the Bureau of Intelligence on Terrorism and Financial Affairs (TFI) .
In addition, the OBI opened two remote offices: one in Ciudad Juarez and one in Tijuana, housing U.S. agents and “task force commanders” who coordinate operations against drug trafficking with the support of Mexican Government personnel.
It is not known how many intelligence agents from the U.S. are operating in Mexico with the authorization of the Mexican Federal Government, since the creation of this center was announced on August 31st. They maintain that the exact number is “classified.”
The building occupied by the OBI in the Federal District is right next to the Mexican Stock Exchange and is part of what the security and intelligence services in Mexico define as a “soft target area” in reference to the possibility of an attack on U.S. interests in Mexico.
At this strategic point for Washington in the Mexican Federal District, there are also facilities for transnational corporations such as Ford, American Airlines, as well as Marriott and Sheraton hotels, among others.
The building where the OBI is located gives the impression of an ordinary business facility, with banks, insurance, telecommunications, commercial offices and private offices. The only thing that stands out is the entry and departure of U.S. citizens.
The building directory lists the names of the occupants all the way up to the 21st floor. However, after the 22nd floor, there are three penthouses that are only listed as “occupied.” And on the roof, there is a dozen satellite dishes placed just above the logo of the telecommunications company Axtel.
“It’s the best covert location for the agencies to operate,” said the source that provided the location of the OBI. The ordinary appearance of the building is the way in which the United States often disguise intelligence centers around the world.
The reception and parking are guarded by private security services, while Federal District Police provide outside support.
Furthermore, the city government has installed special surveillance cameras with sirens to observe the movement of pedestrians and vehicles outside the building.
The scope and power of the OBI in Mexico is similar to the El Paso Intelligence Center, in Texas (EPIC), which dates back to 1974 and operates exclusively to combat drug trafficking, weapons and money laundering on the border between Mexico and United States.
EPIC has been credited for creating the strategies launched against drug trafficking and organized crime in Mexico. Among the most successful are “Operation White Tiger,” which was used to investigate the activities of the Hank Rhon family in 1997, the capture and extradition, a year earlier, of Gulf Drug Cartel Leader Juan Garcia Abrego, and the discovery of narco-graves in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, in 1998.
Subordination
Overrun by drug trafficking, the government of Felipe Calderón agreed to the establishment of the OBI in Mexico, which was a proposal of the then head of National Intelligence in the United States, Admiral Dennis Blair, who last March was accompanied by Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, during his working visit to Mexico.
According to the formal agreement, the new U.S. office workers interact with their Mexican counterparts, under the coordination of the State Department and the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE).
For the Pentagon, the strong presence of its agents in Mexico is intended to merge the intelligence and espionage services of both countries to identify and exploit the vulnerabilities of drug trafficking organizations and organized crime gangs.
Under this directive, issued on 18 March by Gen. Victor Eugene Renuart, then head of Northern Command (NORTHCOM), Mexico has carried out several operations against drug traffickers.
Since then, among some of the actions taken against the drug lords have been the killing of Arturo Beltran Leyva, (aka El Barbas), Ignacio “Nacho” Coronel, and Ezequiel Cardenas Guillen (aka Tony Tormenta), in addition to the arrests of other drug lords, such as Edgar ‘Barbie’ Valdez Villarreal.
Since the killing of Beltran Leyva in December of 2009, U.S. intelligence services, mainly the DEA, have mentioned their participation in various operations, against the very Arturo Beltran Leyva, Barbie Valdez, Teodoro Garcia Simental (aka El Teo), Jose Gerardo Alvarez Vazquez (aka El Indio or El Chayán), operator of the Beltran Leyva organization and Carlos Ramon Castro, a drug dealer who worked for several organizations.
As part of the Mexican government’s need to justify the militarization of the fight against drug trafficking, the Pentagon has strengthened its cooperation with the Mexican military. In early 2009, just as the Department of State and the Mexican Exterior Relations Secretariat (SRE) fine-tuned the details for the establishment of the OBI, the U.S. Department of Defense stepped up military training for Mexicans in Mexico and in several U.S. military bases.
The training has been an unprecedented event in the history of military relations between the two countries. For the first time, the Pentagon has brought counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism expertise from Iraq and Afghanistan to their offices in central Mexico.
In the case of Mexico, the training courses are developed and run by the Defense Department, and are focused on intelligence and tactical operations against drug trafficking, terrorism and the implementation of counterinsurgency tactics.
In addition to the courses offered in Mexico, the Mexican military has significantly increased the number of special forces troops in the Army, Air Force and the Navy to attend specialized intelligence training in U.S. military bases.
Liaisons
The main example of this cooperation is the presence -for the first time in the bilateral relationship- a member of the Mexican Army as a “liaison” between the Mexican military (Central Command) and the Northern Command in Colorado (NORTHCOM), according to a military source who spoke to the Mexican magazine Proceso.
On Wednesday 10, The Washington Post published on its front page a note informing that the liaison will also serve as deputy commander of the Institute for Security and Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere at Fort Benning, Georgia. From the sixties to the eighties, these facilities housed in the so-called School of the Americas, which went down in history as a supplying center for Latin American dictators, which are characterized by the systematic violation of human rights.
A U.S. official, who told the Post on condition of anonymity, said that given the seriousness of the drug violence in Mexico, “we have received direct instruction from the President (Barack Obama) and the highest levels in government, to really examine what more can be done in this counter-narcotics cooperation with Mexico.”
The establishment of the Office of Bi-national Intelligence (OBI) implies that for the first time in the history of Mexico, surveillance, supervision and qualification of work against organized crime between federal government agencies, including the military, rests in part on foreign officials.
According to the document unveiled by the White House on March 25, 2009 on the establishment of the OBI, the office is also responsible for overseeing the proper use of resources that Washington provides the Calderon administration in combating drug trafficking through the ‘Merida Initiative.’
“We will be coordinating our efforts with the government of Mexico through high-level contacts, which in part are related to the new intelligence services responsible for overseeing the implementation of Merida Initiative,” according to the document released by the White House (published by Proceso).
A year later, on March 23, 2010, Hillary Clinton announced during her working visit to the Federal District, in the context of the implementation of Plan Merida, the establishment of two “pilot programs” in the Tijuana-San Diego and Ciudad Juárez-El Paso corridors.
The two governments declared in a joint statement, that in the case of Ciudad Juárez, the program considers the development of “a model for the Mexican Government to collect and analyze tactical intelligence” as well as to “take action against drug trafficking, extortion, kidnapping and other criminal activities.”
However, the actual operations of the OBI in security and intelligence services, Mexicans will be subordinates of the U.S.. Agencies of the U.S. Government will play the role as experts in intelligence work, apart from previous advisory roles in order to increase Mexico’s ability to use information resources against drug cartel operations.
###
Sphere: Related Content
Monday, November 15, 2010
Nordic Govts Supposedly Bristle @ CIA Ops
Blogger Note: A thoroughly dishonest bit of "reporting" from that bastion of journalistic integrity and political independence, Pravda
. . .
. . .America Conducts Subversive Activities in Friendly Territories
13.11.2010 14:19
Pravda
The United States found itself embroiled in a major spy scandal. As many as five countries caught the Americans illegally spying on their citizens.
Nobody would think it was strange if we were talking about the citizens of Russia, China, Iran, Syria and Venezuela. With these five countries, everything is clear: U.S. officials constantly refer to them as those presenting threats to the national security. But this time the U.S. was caught by quite friendly countries of Northern Europe - Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Finland and Sweden.
The scandal erupted earlier this month. On November 3, Norwegian television channel TV2 released a report which stated that over ten years, a group of Americans have been doing surveillance on 15 to 20 Norwegian subjects - mostly participants of various kinds of rallies. Potential terrorists and other undesirable persons were photographed, and the information was sent to Washington.
The report stated that the purpose of the surveillance was supposedly to prevent terrorist attacks against U.S. embassies. Nordic Governments were not informed of such actions.
The spokesman of the U.S. State Department, Philip Crowley, on November 11 said that the Norwegian authorities have been notified about a covert operation. "We are implementing the program throughout the world and are vigilant against people who can keep track of our embassies, as we understand that our diplomatic missions are a potential target," he explained.
However, the Scandinavians were not satisfied with this comment. A representative of the American embassy was called to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry for an explanation, but no clear answers were provided. It turns out that the surveillance was conducted without the knowledge of the Norwegian authorities.
If it was limited to Norway, this episode could have been considered an isolated case. Yet, after the Norwegians, Denmark spoke about the surveillance of its citizens. Local newspaper Politiken wrote that all American embassies have groups of employees leading external surveillance of suspicious persons in order to address threats to the U.S. security. It has been suggested that Denmark was hardly an exception.
Former head of the Danish security service PET Jorgen Bonniksen said that he had never heard of such groups: "If this is true, then we have to deal with illegal intelligence operations in Denmark. On Danish territory such operations can be conducted by PET, and PET only," he stressed.
The current head of PET, Jakob Scharf, made it clear: if illegal activity is determined, "of course, we will take action." Justice Minister of Denmark Lars Barfoeda has been summoned for an explanation to the Folketing (parliament). The U.S. Embassy in Copenhagen, as well as in Oslo, provided no clear comments.
Followed by Norwegians and Danes, Swedes brought up the illegal activities of American agents. According to the Minister of Justice of Sweden Beatrice Ask, people connected with the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm have been spying on people on the Swedish territory since 2000. The Minister stated that it "is not yet known whether in this case Swedish law was violated." She did not rule out that the objects of the surveillance actually might have been people who pose a threat to the U.S. security.
On his part, head of the local security police Anders Danielsson directly accused the U.S. of violating international norms. He said that the U.S. did not bother to inform the Swedish authorities of their intentions. "The Swedish security police (SÄPO) did not give the U.S. a permission to engage in activities that are contrary to Swedish law," he said.
Representatives of the U.S. embassy were quick to say that "they have nothing to hide" and that they have notified the Swedish authorities about their actions. However, Sweden is the third country which had been "made aware." Could the Scandinavian countries have entered into a conspiracy to defame the United States?
When we talk about three countries at once, it looks like a trend. Following its neighbors, Finland grew concerned as well. Local security police SUPO originally said it had not found anything illegal in the activities of the U.S. Embassy in Helsinki. However, they immediately proceeded to a more detailed verification. Apparently, the Finns also did not believe the assurances of the Americans.
Only the small Iceland with the population of 320 thousand with no army is lacking to complete the picture. On November 11 it was revealed that the islanders also have questions for the U.S. Local authorities immediately declared that they suspected members of the American Embassy in Reykjavik in espionage. The diplomatic mission is being verified.
This is a stunning picture. The U.S. did not even consider it necessary to inform its allies of its actions on their territory, as if they were colonies. In fact, Denmark, Iceland and Norway joined NATO and, consequently, they entered the circle of the closest allies of the U.S. Finland and Sweden are not members of the North Atlantic alliance, but are working with it very closely. That's how Americans value their allies.
However, Washington seems to have confused Scandinavians with Poland, Lithuania and Romania. These countries have repeatedly been suspected of placing secret CIA prisons on their territories. The authorities of these states have been blindly following in the footsteps of American politics in the past two decades. This is not true about rich countries of Northern Europe. Given the national pride of the Scandinavians, they are unlikely to forgive the Americans the dismissive attitude.
Denmark is the only country that followed the U.S. without asking questions. Sweden and Finland harshly condemned the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Norway was among the first to withdraw its troops from Iraq, as well as (unlike Americans) has signed an agreement with Russia on the delimitation of the Arctic shelf. Even little Iceland allowed itself to contradict the States when it refused to extradite the late chess player Robert Fisher, who was facing a jail term at home.
The explanation of the incident with the need to combat terrorism, of course, can be taken into account. Radical Islamists are making themselves visible in Denmark and Sweden, as well as Norway and Finland. Yet, the United States could have informed the local security forces of their suspicions as these countries also have qualified staff. And as for surveillance of Icelanders - it is simply ridiculous. They have fewer than a hundred of Muslims, let alone Islamists.
The author of numerous books on the work of intelligence Alexander Kolpakidi commented on the behavior of the U.S. agents in the Nordic countries for Pravda.ru.
"There is nothing surprising here. U.S. intelligence services have always behaved that way around the globe. Virtually all countries of the world, including the members of European Union and NATO, have secret CIA tracking stations. This is not the first scandal of this kind. For example, several years ago, the Greek police found one of these stations having mistaken it for a terrorist base. When the attack began, "terrorists" opened a furious fire, killing a police officer.
Why is America conducting subversive activities in foreign territories, including, apparently friendly countries? This is because in an era of the global crisis, the U.S. changed its strategy. If before it had adhered to the concept of the "golden billion" according to which the good life was allowed to a limited group of countries, mainly Western countries, but now it has changed the strategy to the "golden million," which implies that the good life is the exclusive privilege of the U.S. ".
###
Sphere: Related Content
13.11.2010 14:19
Pravda
The United States found itself embroiled in a major spy scandal. As many as five countries caught the Americans illegally spying on their citizens.
Nobody would think it was strange if we were talking about the citizens of Russia, China, Iran, Syria and Venezuela. With these five countries, everything is clear: U.S. officials constantly refer to them as those presenting threats to the national security. But this time the U.S. was caught by quite friendly countries of Northern Europe - Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Finland and Sweden.
The scandal erupted earlier this month. On November 3, Norwegian television channel TV2 released a report which stated that over ten years, a group of Americans have been doing surveillance on 15 to 20 Norwegian subjects - mostly participants of various kinds of rallies. Potential terrorists and other undesirable persons were photographed, and the information was sent to Washington.
The report stated that the purpose of the surveillance was supposedly to prevent terrorist attacks against U.S. embassies. Nordic Governments were not informed of such actions.
The spokesman of the U.S. State Department, Philip Crowley, on November 11 said that the Norwegian authorities have been notified about a covert operation. "We are implementing the program throughout the world and are vigilant against people who can keep track of our embassies, as we understand that our diplomatic missions are a potential target," he explained.
However, the Scandinavians were not satisfied with this comment. A representative of the American embassy was called to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry for an explanation, but no clear answers were provided. It turns out that the surveillance was conducted without the knowledge of the Norwegian authorities.
If it was limited to Norway, this episode could have been considered an isolated case. Yet, after the Norwegians, Denmark spoke about the surveillance of its citizens. Local newspaper Politiken wrote that all American embassies have groups of employees leading external surveillance of suspicious persons in order to address threats to the U.S. security. It has been suggested that Denmark was hardly an exception.
Former head of the Danish security service PET Jorgen Bonniksen said that he had never heard of such groups: "If this is true, then we have to deal with illegal intelligence operations in Denmark. On Danish territory such operations can be conducted by PET, and PET only," he stressed.
The current head of PET, Jakob Scharf, made it clear: if illegal activity is determined, "of course, we will take action." Justice Minister of Denmark Lars Barfoeda has been summoned for an explanation to the Folketing (parliament). The U.S. Embassy in Copenhagen, as well as in Oslo, provided no clear comments.
Followed by Norwegians and Danes, Swedes brought up the illegal activities of American agents. According to the Minister of Justice of Sweden Beatrice Ask, people connected with the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm have been spying on people on the Swedish territory since 2000. The Minister stated that it "is not yet known whether in this case Swedish law was violated." She did not rule out that the objects of the surveillance actually might have been people who pose a threat to the U.S. security.
On his part, head of the local security police Anders Danielsson directly accused the U.S. of violating international norms. He said that the U.S. did not bother to inform the Swedish authorities of their intentions. "The Swedish security police (SÄPO) did not give the U.S. a permission to engage in activities that are contrary to Swedish law," he said.
Representatives of the U.S. embassy were quick to say that "they have nothing to hide" and that they have notified the Swedish authorities about their actions. However, Sweden is the third country which had been "made aware." Could the Scandinavian countries have entered into a conspiracy to defame the United States?
When we talk about three countries at once, it looks like a trend. Following its neighbors, Finland grew concerned as well. Local security police SUPO originally said it had not found anything illegal in the activities of the U.S. Embassy in Helsinki. However, they immediately proceeded to a more detailed verification. Apparently, the Finns also did not believe the assurances of the Americans.
Only the small Iceland with the population of 320 thousand with no army is lacking to complete the picture. On November 11 it was revealed that the islanders also have questions for the U.S. Local authorities immediately declared that they suspected members of the American Embassy in Reykjavik in espionage. The diplomatic mission is being verified.
This is a stunning picture. The U.S. did not even consider it necessary to inform its allies of its actions on their territory, as if they were colonies. In fact, Denmark, Iceland and Norway joined NATO and, consequently, they entered the circle of the closest allies of the U.S. Finland and Sweden are not members of the North Atlantic alliance, but are working with it very closely. That's how Americans value their allies.
However, Washington seems to have confused Scandinavians with Poland, Lithuania and Romania. These countries have repeatedly been suspected of placing secret CIA prisons on their territories. The authorities of these states have been blindly following in the footsteps of American politics in the past two decades. This is not true about rich countries of Northern Europe. Given the national pride of the Scandinavians, they are unlikely to forgive the Americans the dismissive attitude.
Denmark is the only country that followed the U.S. without asking questions. Sweden and Finland harshly condemned the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Norway was among the first to withdraw its troops from Iraq, as well as (unlike Americans) has signed an agreement with Russia on the delimitation of the Arctic shelf. Even little Iceland allowed itself to contradict the States when it refused to extradite the late chess player Robert Fisher, who was facing a jail term at home.
The explanation of the incident with the need to combat terrorism, of course, can be taken into account. Radical Islamists are making themselves visible in Denmark and Sweden, as well as Norway and Finland. Yet, the United States could have informed the local security forces of their suspicions as these countries also have qualified staff. And as for surveillance of Icelanders - it is simply ridiculous. They have fewer than a hundred of Muslims, let alone Islamists.
The author of numerous books on the work of intelligence Alexander Kolpakidi commented on the behavior of the U.S. agents in the Nordic countries for Pravda.ru.
"There is nothing surprising here. U.S. intelligence services have always behaved that way around the globe. Virtually all countries of the world, including the members of European Union and NATO, have secret CIA tracking stations. This is not the first scandal of this kind. For example, several years ago, the Greek police found one of these stations having mistaken it for a terrorist base. When the attack began, "terrorists" opened a furious fire, killing a police officer.
Why is America conducting subversive activities in foreign territories, including, apparently friendly countries? This is because in an era of the global crisis, the U.S. changed its strategy. If before it had adhered to the concept of the "golden billion" according to which the good life was allowed to a limited group of countries, mainly Western countries, but now it has changed the strategy to the "golden million," which implies that the good life is the exclusive privilege of the U.S. ".
###
Friday, November 12, 2010
Shcherbakov's Defection
Medvedev Says He Knew about Double Agent
By Anna Smolchenko (AFP)
SEOUL — President Dmitry Medvedev confirmed Friday that a Moscow double agent helped Washington crack a major Russian spy ring that sparked the worst espionage row between the two countries since the Cold War.
Medvedev conceded that Russia would have to draw lessons from the fiasco but dismissed talk that it was time to start firing officials over the case -- an increasingly popular sentiment in disgruntled Moscow.
"To me, what Kommersant said was not news. I knew about it the day it happened, with all its attributes and accessories," Medvedev said at the G20 summit in South Korea's capital when asked about the respected daily's report.
Kommersant identified Washington's Russian accomplice as a colonel with the Russian foreign intelligence service named Shcherbakov, whose job was to plant civilian moles in the United States similar to the deep cover spy ring dismantled by Washington.
The paper also wrote that a Russian hit squad had been especially assigned to hunt down Shcherbakov in retribution and to prevent him from passing any other sensitive information to Washington.
"You can already have no doubt that a Mercader has already been sent after him," an intelligence source told the paper in reference to Ramon Mercader, the man sent by Stalin to Mexico to assassinate his rival Leon Trotsky.
Mercader used an ice pick for the job.
This summer's scandal culminated in 10 spies -- many working for years undercover in the United States as sleeper agents -- returning to Russia in exchange for four convicted US spies.
Medvedev did not confirm specific elements of the Kommersant story. But his comments suggested that he knew about the double agent before the June arrests and prior to his summit talks that month with his US counterpart Barack Obama.
But he firmly brushed aside suggestions that he should sack the head of his country's foreign intelligence service, Mikhail Fradkov, who has been the subject of growing dismissal talk.
His sacking was backed heavily Thursday by some opposition lawmakers and discussed widely both on television and in the popular press.
"I would not like to comment on the investigation," Medvedev said. "There has to be an investigation and we will draw our conclusions then."
Medvedev's comments echoed a similar statement from Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who suggested in the aftermath of the crisis that Russia knew about the double agent all along.
"This was the result of treason and traitors always end badly. They finish up as drunks, addicts, on the street," Putin said at the end of July.
Putin then enigmatically added that "recently one (traitor) for instance ended his existence abroad and it was not clear what the point of it all was."
But some Russian media and lawmakers suggested that the Kremlin was simply trying to put a brave face on a bad situation and that Shcherbakov had done long-term damage to Moscow's espionage programme.
"The damage committed by the colonel to the state is too enormous" not to have further repercussions, said parliament's security council deputy chairman Gennady Gudkov.
The double agent's naming forced Medvedev to return to a sensitive issue for Russia just as the country attempts to play a more forceful role in foreign affairs.
Medvedev came to the G20 summit promoting a makeover of the global economic order designed to win Russia respect and keep major economies such as the United States in check.
But Russian officials found themselves talking about the Cold War, with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov particularly stressing that it was time to move on from the issues of the past.
Lavrov said he would be heading to Russia-NATO talks in Lisbon next week expecting to register the "conclusion of the post-Cold War era."
See: http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iokhy5fQsMxUxOIv2_s_iVq6VSWQ?docId=CNG.4e6b770ae2ca3b8f8eb41fd7adc33980.241
###Sphere: Related Content
Tuesday, November 9, 2010
Nicholson & Son Espionage Services, Inc.
CIA Officer Pleads to Spying for Kremlin
Son also has been convicted of receiving data for Russians
by Jerry Seper Washington Times 8 Nov 10
A former high-ranking CIA employee now serving a 23-year sentence for conspiracy to commit espionage pleaded guilty Monday in federal court in Portland, Ore., to new charges of conspiring to act as an agent of Russia and international money laundering, the Justice Department said.
Harold J. Nicholson, 59, pleaded guilty before U.S. District Judge Anna J. Brown, admitting that during the course of the conspiracy he met with his son, Nathaniel, on several occasions at the federal prison in Sheridan, Ore., where he provided information intended for Russia.
David Kris, assistant attorney general for national security, said Nicholson admitted that it was part of the conspiracy that his son would travel to several locations including San Francisco, Mexico City, Lima, Peru, and Nicosia, Cyprus, to meet with Kremlin agents.
At those meetings, Mr. Kris said, Nathaniel Nicholson provided the Russians with information they had requested from his father and collected money for his father's past espionage activities. The father admitted sneaking notes to his son on crumpled napkins during prison visits, which later were passed on to Russian agents.
Mr. Kris also said Harold Nicholson counseled his son on how to covertly travel with the Russians' funds and provide them to family members. The father was convicted of selling U.S. intelligence to Russia for $180,000 and was sentenced to prison in 1997.
"Harold Nicholson, one of the highest-ranking CIA officials ever convicted of espionage, dispatched his son around the globe to collect on past espionage debts from Russian agents," Mr. Kris said. "Today, he admitted using this scheme to continue to profit from his spying activities while in prison. The many agents, analysts and prosecutors who worked on this matter deserve our thanks."
Nathaniel Nicholson, 26, was arrested after traveling to Russia to negotiate a pension for his father and to learn whether any espionage funds were held in escrow. The son, who was paid $45,000 for meeting with the Russians, pleaded guilty last year to conspiracy charges and agreed to testify against his imprisoned father, if necessary, in a plea deal that could help him avoid jail time.
Harold Nicholson, who joined the CIA in 1980 after service as an Army captain, is serving a 283-month sentence at the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) in Sheridan, Ore., for a 1997 conviction of conspiracy to commit espionage. At a plea hearing, he admitted that from 2006 to 2008, with the aid of his son, he acted on behalf of the Russian Federation, passed information to the Kremlin, and received cash proceeds for his past espionage activities.
He had faced up to 30 additional years in prison and fines totaling $750,000. A plea agreement in the case states that both parties will ask the court at sentencing to impose an eight-year prison sentence to be served consecutively to the sentence he is currently serving. Judge Brown has scheduled sentencing on Jan. 18.
The guilty plea came on the same day his trial was scheduled to begin.
"Mr. Nicholson hopes that his resolution of these charges will allow his children to move on with their lives, and he appreciates their ongoing love and support," his lawyer, Samuel Kauffman, said in a statement.
Dwight C. Holton, U.S. attorney in Portland, said the elder Nicholson "admitted not only betraying his country — again — but also betraying his family by involving his son Nathaniel in his corrupt scheme to get more money for his past espionage activities."
Arthur Balizan, special agent in charge of the FBI field office in Portland, said the elder Nicholson took an oath when he was hired at the CIA to protect the nation's security, but he violated that oath.
Nicholson served as a deputy chief of station for the U.S. Embassy to the Philippines and a chief of station to the U.S. Embassy to Romania. He also was assigned as an instructor at Camp Peary, a training facility for new CIA agents in Williamsburg, Va.
Son also has been convicted of receiving data for Russians
by Jerry Seper Washington Times 8 Nov 10
A former high-ranking CIA employee now serving a 23-year sentence for conspiracy to commit espionage pleaded guilty Monday in federal court in Portland, Ore., to new charges of conspiring to act as an agent of Russia and international money laundering, the Justice Department said.
Harold J. Nicholson, 59, pleaded guilty before U.S. District Judge Anna J. Brown, admitting that during the course of the conspiracy he met with his son, Nathaniel, on several occasions at the federal prison in Sheridan, Ore., where he provided information intended for Russia.
David Kris, assistant attorney general for national security, said Nicholson admitted that it was part of the conspiracy that his son would travel to several locations including San Francisco, Mexico City, Lima, Peru, and Nicosia, Cyprus, to meet with Kremlin agents.
At those meetings, Mr. Kris said, Nathaniel Nicholson provided the Russians with information they had requested from his father and collected money for his father's past espionage activities. The father admitted sneaking notes to his son on crumpled napkins during prison visits, which later were passed on to Russian agents.
Mr. Kris also said Harold Nicholson counseled his son on how to covertly travel with the Russians' funds and provide them to family members. The father was convicted of selling U.S. intelligence to Russia for $180,000 and was sentenced to prison in 1997.
"Harold Nicholson, one of the highest-ranking CIA officials ever convicted of espionage, dispatched his son around the globe to collect on past espionage debts from Russian agents," Mr. Kris said. "Today, he admitted using this scheme to continue to profit from his spying activities while in prison. The many agents, analysts and prosecutors who worked on this matter deserve our thanks."
Nathaniel Nicholson, 26, was arrested after traveling to Russia to negotiate a pension for his father and to learn whether any espionage funds were held in escrow. The son, who was paid $45,000 for meeting with the Russians, pleaded guilty last year to conspiracy charges and agreed to testify against his imprisoned father, if necessary, in a plea deal that could help him avoid jail time.
Harold Nicholson, who joined the CIA in 1980 after service as an Army captain, is serving a 283-month sentence at the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) in Sheridan, Ore., for a 1997 conviction of conspiracy to commit espionage. At a plea hearing, he admitted that from 2006 to 2008, with the aid of his son, he acted on behalf of the Russian Federation, passed information to the Kremlin, and received cash proceeds for his past espionage activities.
He had faced up to 30 additional years in prison and fines totaling $750,000. A plea agreement in the case states that both parties will ask the court at sentencing to impose an eight-year prison sentence to be served consecutively to the sentence he is currently serving. Judge Brown has scheduled sentencing on Jan. 18.
The guilty plea came on the same day his trial was scheduled to begin.
"Mr. Nicholson hopes that his resolution of these charges will allow his children to move on with their lives, and he appreciates their ongoing love and support," his lawyer, Samuel Kauffman, said in a statement.
Dwight C. Holton, U.S. attorney in Portland, said the elder Nicholson "admitted not only betraying his country — again — but also betraying his family by involving his son Nathaniel in his corrupt scheme to get more money for his past espionage activities."
Arthur Balizan, special agent in charge of the FBI field office in Portland, said the elder Nicholson took an oath when he was hired at the CIA to protect the nation's security, but he violated that oath.
Nicholson served as a deputy chief of station for the U.S. Embassy to the Philippines and a chief of station to the U.S. Embassy to Romania. He also was assigned as an instructor at Camp Peary, a training facility for new CIA agents in Williamsburg, Va.
###
Sphere: Related Content
Monday, November 8, 2010
For Once, Security Trumps (Chinese) $$$
Security Fears Kill Chinese Bid in U.S.
By JOANN S. LUBLIN and SHAYNDI RAICE
Sprint Nextel Corp. is excluding Chinese telecommunications-equipment makers Huawei Technologies Ltd. and ZTE Corp. from a contract worth billions of dollars largely because of national security concerns in Washington, according to people familiar with the matter.
The Defense Department and some U.S. lawmakers have been increasingly concerned about the two companies' ties to the Chinese government and military, and the security implications of letting their equipment into critical U.S. infrastructure.
Some officials argue China's military could use Huawei or ZTE equipment to disrupt or intercept American communications.
The Obama administration has also weighed in on the matter. Commerce Secretary Gary Locke called Sprint Chief Executive Dan Hesse this week to discuss concerns about awarding the work to a Chinese firm, but didn't ask Sprint to exclude the Chinese suppliers, according to an administration official familiar with the conversation. Mr. Hesse declined to comment.
Read more: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704353504575596611547810220.html?KEYWORDS=sprint#dummy#ixzz14iTo8bZx
###
By JOANN S. LUBLIN and SHAYNDI RAICE
Sprint Nextel Corp. is excluding Chinese telecommunications-equipment makers Huawei Technologies Ltd. and ZTE Corp. from a contract worth billions of dollars largely because of national security concerns in Washington, according to people familiar with the matter.
The Defense Department and some U.S. lawmakers have been increasingly concerned about the two companies' ties to the Chinese government and military, and the security implications of letting their equipment into critical U.S. infrastructure.
Some officials argue China's military could use Huawei or ZTE equipment to disrupt or intercept American communications.
The Obama administration has also weighed in on the matter. Commerce Secretary Gary Locke called Sprint Chief Executive Dan Hesse this week to discuss concerns about awarding the work to a Chinese firm, but didn't ask Sprint to exclude the Chinese suppliers, according to an administration official familiar with the conversation. Mr. Hesse declined to comment.
Read more: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704353504575596611547810220.html?KEYWORDS=sprint#dummy#ixzz14iTo8bZx
###
Sphere: Related Content
Thursday, November 4, 2010
CIA Control of SF?
Growing Support for CIA Control of Special Forces: Report
(AFP) – 3 days ago
WASHINGTON — Support is growing in the US military and administration of President Barack Obama for shifting to the CIA operational control over elite special forces teams secretly in Yemen, The Wall Street Journal reported Monday.
Citing unnamed officials, the newspaper said the foiled mail bombing plot by suspected Al-Qaeda militants in Yemen has added urgency to an administration review of expanded military options.
Officials said such a shift would allow the United States to strike suspected militant targets unilaterally with greater stealth and speed, the report said.
Allowing US Special Operations Command units to operate under the Central Intelligence Agency would also give the United States greater leeway to strike without the explicit blessing of the Yemeni government, the paper said.
In addition to streamlining the launching of strikes, it would allow the Yemeni government deniability because the CIA operations would be covert, The Journal said.
The White House is already considering adding armed CIA drones to the arsenal against militants in Yemen, the paper said.
(AFP) – 3 days ago
WASHINGTON — Support is growing in the US military and administration of President Barack Obama for shifting to the CIA operational control over elite special forces teams secretly in Yemen, The Wall Street Journal reported Monday.
Citing unnamed officials, the newspaper said the foiled mail bombing plot by suspected Al-Qaeda militants in Yemen has added urgency to an administration review of expanded military options.
Officials said such a shift would allow the United States to strike suspected militant targets unilaterally with greater stealth and speed, the report said.
Allowing US Special Operations Command units to operate under the Central Intelligence Agency would also give the United States greater leeway to strike without the explicit blessing of the Yemeni government, the paper said.
In addition to streamlining the launching of strikes, it would allow the Yemeni government deniability because the CIA operations would be covert, The Journal said.
The White House is already considering adding armed CIA drones to the arsenal against militants in Yemen, the paper said.
###
Sarkozy Accused of Using Security Service to Spy on Journalists
Magazine editor claims President oversees 'dirty-tricks unit' to investigate reporters
By John Lichfield in Paris
Thursday, 4 November 201
President Nicolas Sarkozy personally supervises a team of security agents which spies on troublesome French journalists, it was claimed yesterday.
The claim – dismissed by the Elysée Palace as "utterly ridiculous" – follows a high-profile law suit brought in September by France's most prestigious newspaper and a series of burglaries in recent weeks at the homes or offices of investigative reporters.
According to the satirical weekly Le Canard Enchaîné, President Sarkozy regularly orders the boss of France's internal security service to investigate and uncover the sources of any journalist who writes stories which embarrass the government.
A team of agents within the Division Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur (DCRI) – the French equivalent of MI5 and Special Branch – has been created to lead the investigations, the newspaper said.
Le Canard said that "since the start of the year" the President had "personally" intervened on several occasions with the head of the DCRI, Bernard Squarcini, a Sarkozy appointment and loyalist. Whenever the President saw an investigative article which "embarrassed him or his friends", he ordered the journalist to be placed "under surveillance", the newspaper said.
The Elysée Palace dismissed the claims as "utterly ridiculous". The leader of Mr Sarkozy's centre-right party, Xavier Bertrand, accused the newspaper of publishing a "great absurdity". The DCRI said that Mr Sarkozy had never given direct orders to Mr Squarcini on any subject.
However, sources within the DCRI confirmed to Le Monde that an "anti-leak" team did exist within the counter-intelligence agency to "protect national security". An opposition politician compared the "shameful" allegations to the Watergate affair in the US in the 1970s. Aurélie Filippetti of the Socialist Party accused President Sarkozy of being the "spiritual son of Richard Nixon".
Unusually for Canard, the article making the claims against the President was signed by the newspaper's editor, Claude Angeli. He told French radio yesterday that the story was based on information from within the DCRI. "We would not have written such a hard headline unless our sources were solid," he said. The article was headlined: "Sarko supervises spying on journalists."
The allegations follow the dramatic decision in September by Le Monde to bring a criminal action against "persons unknown" for the alleged illegal use of the counter-intelligence service to muzzle the press.
France's most respected newspaper said that officials in Mr Sarkozy's office had deployed the DCRI like a "cabinet noir", or dirty-tricks operation, to uncover the source of leaks in the L'Oréal family feud and political financing scandal.
A legal case is proceeding against "X" or person unknown but the French government has refused to release sensitive documents to the Paris public prosecutor for "reasons of state security".
The DCRI admits that it searched mobile phone records to track down a senior figure in the Justice Minister's office as the source of embarrassing leaks to Le Monde in July in the so-called "Bettencourt-Woerth" affair. Although the agency claimed to have done so legally, it later emerged that it had not sought the permission of the state's surveillance watchdog. Although the Bettencourt affair began as a family feud between France's wealthiest woman, Liliane Bettencourt, and her daughter, it exploded last summer into a state scandal.
Mr Sarkozy's Budget Minister, and former campaign treasurer, Eric Woerth, was accused of soliciting illegal political donations – and a job for his wife – from Ms Bettencourt's personal fund manager.
In the last few weeks, there has been a series of unexplained burglaries, and the theft of computers and other equipment, from the homes or offices of journalists who wrote investigative articles on the Bettencourt affair.
A laptop computer and a global positioning system was stolen from the home of Gérard Davet of Le Monde. A computer belonging to Hervé Gattegno was stolen from the offices of the centre-right news magazine, Le Point. Two computers and tapes were stolen from the offices of left-wing investigative website, Mediapart, which has led the way in uncovering the political aspects of the Bettencourt affair.
Asked about these crimes at his press conference after the EU summit in Brussels last week, President Sarkozy hesitated and said: "I don't see what they have to do with me."
As Canard pointed out yesterday, it was unusual for Mr Sarkozy to miss an opportunity to condemn a crime.
Marie-Pierre de la Gontrie, the secretary general for public liberties in the main opposition party, the Parti Socialiste, said yesterday: "The revelations in Canard Enchaîné are extremely serious. There must be an official investigation and the boss of the DCRI, Bernard Squarcini, must appear before the legal committee of the National Assembly."
Sarkozy's media battles
* France's most prestigious newspaper, Le Monde, accused Mr Sarkozy in September of illegally using the counter-intelligence service to muzzle the press. The newspaper said it had started legal action against 'persons unknown' at the Élysée Palace for breaking a century-old French law guaranteeing the secrecy of journalistic sources. The Élysée Palace flatly denied the accusation.* President Sarkozy ordered the merger of two competing intelligence agencies two years ago. He said the change was necessary on efficiency grounds and would create a French FBI. However, it was claimed that he suspected that one or both of the agencies had played a part in a dirty tricks campaign that had led to leaks about his failing marriage to Cécilia Attias.
Magazine editor claims President oversees 'dirty-tricks unit' to investigate reporters
By John Lichfield in Paris
Thursday, 4 November 201
President Nicolas Sarkozy personally supervises a team of security agents which spies on troublesome French journalists, it was claimed yesterday.
The claim – dismissed by the Elysée Palace as "utterly ridiculous" – follows a high-profile law suit brought in September by France's most prestigious newspaper and a series of burglaries in recent weeks at the homes or offices of investigative reporters.
According to the satirical weekly Le Canard Enchaîné, President Sarkozy regularly orders the boss of France's internal security service to investigate and uncover the sources of any journalist who writes stories which embarrass the government.
A team of agents within the Division Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur (DCRI) – the French equivalent of MI5 and Special Branch – has been created to lead the investigations, the newspaper said.
Le Canard said that "since the start of the year" the President had "personally" intervened on several occasions with the head of the DCRI, Bernard Squarcini, a Sarkozy appointment and loyalist. Whenever the President saw an investigative article which "embarrassed him or his friends", he ordered the journalist to be placed "under surveillance", the newspaper said.
The Elysée Palace dismissed the claims as "utterly ridiculous". The leader of Mr Sarkozy's centre-right party, Xavier Bertrand, accused the newspaper of publishing a "great absurdity". The DCRI said that Mr Sarkozy had never given direct orders to Mr Squarcini on any subject.
However, sources within the DCRI confirmed to Le Monde that an "anti-leak" team did exist within the counter-intelligence agency to "protect national security". An opposition politician compared the "shameful" allegations to the Watergate affair in the US in the 1970s. Aurélie Filippetti of the Socialist Party accused President Sarkozy of being the "spiritual son of Richard Nixon".
Unusually for Canard, the article making the claims against the President was signed by the newspaper's editor, Claude Angeli. He told French radio yesterday that the story was based on information from within the DCRI. "We would not have written such a hard headline unless our sources were solid," he said. The article was headlined: "Sarko supervises spying on journalists."
The allegations follow the dramatic decision in September by Le Monde to bring a criminal action against "persons unknown" for the alleged illegal use of the counter-intelligence service to muzzle the press.
France's most respected newspaper said that officials in Mr Sarkozy's office had deployed the DCRI like a "cabinet noir", or dirty-tricks operation, to uncover the source of leaks in the L'Oréal family feud and political financing scandal.
A legal case is proceeding against "X" or person unknown but the French government has refused to release sensitive documents to the Paris public prosecutor for "reasons of state security".
The DCRI admits that it searched mobile phone records to track down a senior figure in the Justice Minister's office as the source of embarrassing leaks to Le Monde in July in the so-called "Bettencourt-Woerth" affair. Although the agency claimed to have done so legally, it later emerged that it had not sought the permission of the state's surveillance watchdog. Although the Bettencourt affair began as a family feud between France's wealthiest woman, Liliane Bettencourt, and her daughter, it exploded last summer into a state scandal.
Mr Sarkozy's Budget Minister, and former campaign treasurer, Eric Woerth, was accused of soliciting illegal political donations – and a job for his wife – from Ms Bettencourt's personal fund manager.
In the last few weeks, there has been a series of unexplained burglaries, and the theft of computers and other equipment, from the homes or offices of journalists who wrote investigative articles on the Bettencourt affair.
A laptop computer and a global positioning system was stolen from the home of Gérard Davet of Le Monde. A computer belonging to Hervé Gattegno was stolen from the offices of the centre-right news magazine, Le Point. Two computers and tapes were stolen from the offices of left-wing investigative website, Mediapart, which has led the way in uncovering the political aspects of the Bettencourt affair.
Asked about these crimes at his press conference after the EU summit in Brussels last week, President Sarkozy hesitated and said: "I don't see what they have to do with me."
As Canard pointed out yesterday, it was unusual for Mr Sarkozy to miss an opportunity to condemn a crime.
Marie-Pierre de la Gontrie, the secretary general for public liberties in the main opposition party, the Parti Socialiste, said yesterday: "The revelations in Canard Enchaîné are extremely serious. There must be an official investigation and the boss of the DCRI, Bernard Squarcini, must appear before the legal committee of the National Assembly."
Sarkozy's media battles
* France's most prestigious newspaper, Le Monde, accused Mr Sarkozy in September of illegally using the counter-intelligence service to muzzle the press. The newspaper said it had started legal action against 'persons unknown' at the Élysée Palace for breaking a century-old French law guaranteeing the secrecy of journalistic sources. The Élysée Palace flatly denied the accusation.* President Sarkozy ordered the merger of two competing intelligence agencies two years ago. He said the change was necessary on efficiency grounds and would create a French FBI. However, it was claimed that he suspected that one or both of the agencies had played a part in a dirty tricks campaign that had led to leaks about his failing marriage to Cécilia Attias.
###
Wednesday, November 3, 2010
Shin Bet Counter-Terror Strategy Outline
Head of Israel's 'Shin Bet' Outlines Israel's Joint Countering Terror Strategy
The first decade of the 21st century demonstrated the potential risk of modern terror, and how determined response, led by dedicated personnel, backed by technological and a legal infrastructure, can defeat terror attacks.
Facing terror for over 60 years, Israel has developed the methods, means and procedures, to effectively combat this dangerous phenomena. During the 1970s most attacks were directed at Israeli-related aviation – airlines flying to and from the country. Palestinian terror activities gradually escalated, through domestic and cross-border attacks, through popular uprisals in the occupied territories, in the 1980s and a guerilla-like campaign in South Lebanon, waged through the 1990s.
Yet the terror campaign against Israel culminated in the early 2000s, as Palestinian Tanzim, Islamic Jihad and Hamas organizations launched a massive onslaught, employing a new type of weapon - suicide attacks - directed primarily against Israel's civilian population. This weapon was the most effective the terrorist organizations possessed - less than one percent of the activists were responsible to more than half of the casualties caused to the other side.
Israel's security services required time to adjust and develop new and effective countermeasures to combat the new threat of suicide bombers. The results were remarkable: Compared to 452 suicide attacks carried out by the Palestinians in 2003, only two suicide attacks occurred since 2007. (see also: "Suicide Bombers as Weapons")
According to Yuval Diskin, Director, Israel Security Agency (ISA – Shin Bet), the winning formula developed by Israel's security services is based on jointness - the ability of all services to work together, sharing operational concepts (CONOPS), with a clear definition of the combined objective for all the organizations engaged in homeland security and defense. Multidisciplinary intelligence activity, based on advanced technological and human intelligence, tailored and channeled through processing and dissemination, means to turn intelligence from raw data into an operationally valuable, real-time asset. "Operational systems must be adapted and learn to operate as efficiently as possible with such real-time intelligence assets" said Diskin.
Such adaptation is enabled by introducing technological means to improve connectivity, interoperability and joint operations by combined task forces, composed of elements from different organizations, such as ISA, National Police, Army and Air Force. Under such a cooperation umbrella, different organizations must share common counter-terror techniques, tactics and procedures (TTP), optimizing for rapid response, based on real-time intelligence. According to Diskin, the main advantage of the joint-operating concept is by combining the unique capabilities and characteristics of each of the participating organizations. "The main challenge is not integrating the technologies, but overcoming leadership and human nature obstacles" Diskin added.
One of the keys to establishing jointness was the setup of inter-service command posts, manned by representatives from all the services and organizations involved in operations.
Interoperability also requires maintaining real-time common operational pictures among all organizations - a task achieved by implementing common communications interfaces among all organizations, enabling real-time information flow between command centers. These preparations paid dividends in recent years, as Israel's security services managed to repel multiple Palestinian terror attacks, intercepting suicide bombers before they could reach their targets.
Diskin considers the legal infrastructure a critical element in the success of Israel's counter-terror campaign. "It took Israeli lawmakers 14 years to agree on the legal framework for the ISA, until the so-called 'ISA Law' was completed in 2002. Once implemented, this legal foundation became instrumental for the success of Israel's counter-terror campaign." Said Diskin.
The absence of terror strikes does not indicate that Israel's security organizations are remaining idle. On the contrary, during this period the Palestinians in the West Bank continuously and relentlessly prepared and launched attacks. They trained hundreds of potential suicide bombers and managed to launch about 120 attacks, alas, almost all were intercepted and repelled by Israel's security services. Real-time intelligence and the combined, rapid response capability developed by the ISA, the Special Police Unit, military and air force elements were instrumental factors for thIs remarkable anti-terror success.
According to Diskin, ISA' special operations units and the Police Special Unit (yamam) were able to intercept most of these suicide bombers before theise could reach their objectives. "It takes a suicide bomber launched from Nablus about 60 minutes to reach his target in a major Israeli city like Netanya" explains Diskin, "we had to tailor our response to meet this short cycle". Typically, the ISA would get fragments of information about an imminent terror act before, or when the suicide bomber is launched, immediately triggering an early warning. When such intelligence was accurate enough, pre-emptive action would take place.
But when the first indication is received after the suicide bomber leaves on its final mission,all the fragmented intelligence must be gathered and updated continuously, developed into a clear understanding of the threat and its potential target, enabling to scramble the rapid-response teams to disrupt the threat's movement. These action teams are called to establish contact with the target, identify the threat and eliminate it before reaching its target. These operational teams are controlled by the inter-agency operational command and control centers, conducting the entire intercept, feeding on all intelligence sources throughout the event, to maintain a constant situational picture in real-time.
It took years to prepare all the organizations responsible for homeland security to operate effectively under these short timelines. "These capabilities must be prepared in advance, in order to work effectively in time of crisis" Diskin concludes.
Future threats are expected to be more complex, as terrorist organizations, operating in the modern, globalized and networked world are less hierarchical, more elusive than ever. In fact, most Islamic terror organizations are 'state sponsored', even when they do not have direct geographical access to the host nation. For example, Palestinian terrorist movements in Gaza, like the Islamic Jihad and Hamas get their weapons from sponsoring nations like Iran or North Korea. The military supplies are shipped through a global supply network by sea, with destinations in Yemen or Sudan. From clandestine beachheads the loads are smuggled over-land, entering Gaza through tunnels dug under the Egyptian - Gaza border at Rafah. Palestinian terror activists are also sent to Iran to train in the operation of these weapons. The level and sophistication of weapons accessible by terrorists is becoming unprecedented - ranging from advanced, powerful explosives, to anti-aircraft missiles, guided weapons, unmanned aerial vehicles, long range rockets and missiles.
Cyber terrorism is also becoming a growing challenge, and, since such activities are performed over cyberspace, the location of the perpetrators is irrelevant to their ability to cause harm, get support or access their targets.
In fact, the global Internet provides terrorists with many advantages, including recruitment tools - certain social network sites and chat-rooms where potential candidates undergo 'brainwashing', with their minds being indoctrinated and 'tendered', preparing them for potential suicide attacks. Other sites are used as indoctrination, and training tools, transferring knowledge and developing skills among remotely located recruits, on how to prepare improvised weapons, counter-intelligence actions and terror cells operations.
Terrorist's cybernetic capabilities also exploit the information services made available for peaceful purposes, such as GPS and geospatial intelligence, real-time communications via Internet, cellular phones or messaging devices, powerful encryption devices etc. These capabilities are added to the determination and willingness of terrorist organizations to carry out 'mega-terror' actions, regardless of the casualties or damage they cause.
"The world can successfully defeat and win the war against global terror" Diskin stated, " But to win this war, the nations determined to fight terror, must join forces, develop joint intelligence and effective operational capabilities."
According to Diskin, such joint operability must rely on close cooperation among intelligence agencies, establishing an agreeable legal framework among nations that will eliminate potential loopholes to be exploited by terrorists, and formulating cooperation among homeland security and counter-terror organizations from different countries, by developing joint operational capabilities. "The is a growing understanding and openness to these cooperative principles among the countries facing terror threats" Diskin concluded.
See: http://defense-update.com/analysis/2010/02112010_isa_counterterror_strategy.html
###Sphere: Related Content
Tuesday, November 2, 2010
Yet More Chinese Espionage
Taiwan Military Intel Officer, 'Double Agent' Detained for Espionage
TAIPEI (Kyodo) -- A Taiwanese military intelligence officer and an alleged double agent for China were in custody Tuesday as investigators probe the latest espionage scandal to hit Taiwan's defense establishment and assess the damage to its intelligence network.
The detained officer, identified by local media as Col. Lo Chi-cheng, allegedly transferred classified data over several years to a Taiwanese man linked to Taiwan's intelligence network and who has business interests in China.
The data was then allegedly passed on to Chinese intelligence, media reports said.
The two suspects were arrested Sunday and their homes searched after investigators witnessed the two men allegedly exchanging classified data in a Taipei street.
The Defense Ministry confirmed late Monday that the officer had been arrested, while ministry spokesman Yu Sy-tue told a press conference Tuesday that the case only had a limited impact on military intelligence activities.
Nonetheless, the Taipei-based China Times newspaper, whose editorial line strongly supports integration with China, described the case in its report as "probably the highest-level case of espionage involving the military in 20 years."
Local newspaper reports Tuesday were inconsistent on details of the case, including the content of the leaked intelligence and the name of the alleged double agent.
But reports that the data included names of Taiwan's agents in China were seemingly vindicated when Premier Wu Den-yih told the legislature Tuesday that the government has a duty of care and will do its best to bring the agents to Taiwan, the semiofficial Central News Agency reported.
Wu added, however, that the leaked list of names is four years old and that the government could "only do its best," CNA reported.
Taiwan has suffered several security breaches in its intelligence apparatus in recent years, including retired agents working for China and weapons information being sold to Beijing.
The latest incident coincides with an easing of tensions between Taipei and Beijing as economic relations flourish.
But growing Chinese support for military-to-military contact and political talks with Taiwan has not been reciprocated, with Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou saying such talks must wait until at least the next presidential term.
(Mainichi Japan) November 2, 2010
TAIPEI (Kyodo) -- A Taiwanese military intelligence officer and an alleged double agent for China were in custody Tuesday as investigators probe the latest espionage scandal to hit Taiwan's defense establishment and assess the damage to its intelligence network.
The detained officer, identified by local media as Col. Lo Chi-cheng, allegedly transferred classified data over several years to a Taiwanese man linked to Taiwan's intelligence network and who has business interests in China.
The data was then allegedly passed on to Chinese intelligence, media reports said.
The two suspects were arrested Sunday and their homes searched after investigators witnessed the two men allegedly exchanging classified data in a Taipei street.
The Defense Ministry confirmed late Monday that the officer had been arrested, while ministry spokesman Yu Sy-tue told a press conference Tuesday that the case only had a limited impact on military intelligence activities.
Nonetheless, the Taipei-based China Times newspaper, whose editorial line strongly supports integration with China, described the case in its report as "probably the highest-level case of espionage involving the military in 20 years."
Local newspaper reports Tuesday were inconsistent on details of the case, including the content of the leaked intelligence and the name of the alleged double agent.
But reports that the data included names of Taiwan's agents in China were seemingly vindicated when Premier Wu Den-yih told the legislature Tuesday that the government has a duty of care and will do its best to bring the agents to Taiwan, the semiofficial Central News Agency reported.
Wu added, however, that the leaked list of names is four years old and that the government could "only do its best," CNA reported.
Taiwan has suffered several security breaches in its intelligence apparatus in recent years, including retired agents working for China and weapons information being sold to Beijing.
The latest incident coincides with an easing of tensions between Taipei and Beijing as economic relations flourish.
But growing Chinese support for military-to-military contact and political talks with Taiwan has not been reciprocated, with Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou saying such talks must wait until at least the next presidential term.
(Mainichi Japan) November 2, 2010
###
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
