Tuesday, December 28, 2010

Intelligence Applications of Hypnosis


Docs Detail CIA’s Cold War Hypnosis Push
By Spencer Ackerman December 28, 2010 7:00 am Wired

Excerpt: It was an innocent time, the mid-1950s. America wasn’t yet cynical about its geopolitical games in the Cold War. Case in point: In order to maintain its spying edge over the Russkies, the CIA considered the benefits of hypnosis.

Two memos from 1954 and 1955 dredged up by Cryptome show the CIA thinking through post-hypnotic suggestion in extensive, credulous detail. How, for instance, to pass a secret message to a field operative without danger of interception?

Encode it in a messenger’s brain, an undisclosed author wrote in 1954, so he’ll have “no memory whatsoever in the waking state as to the nature and contents of the message.” Even if a Soviet agent gets word of the messenger’s importance, “no amount of third-party tactics” can pry the message loose, “for he simply does not have it in his conscious mind.” Pity the poor waterboarded captive.

But the counterintelligence benefits of hypnosis are even greater. . .

See: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/12/cia-hypnosis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+wired%2Findex+%28Wired%3A+Index+3+%28Top+Stories+2%29%29


For a number of fascinating records, be sure to visit Cryptome!
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Monday, December 27, 2010

1917 -- Spies & Saboteurs!


The Hidden History of the Espionage Act
The much-maligned 1917 law had a real purpose—stopping spies and saboteurs.

By David Greenberg
Slate
Posted Monday, Dec. 27, 2010, at 8:47 AM ET

On July 24, 1915, the World War was raging in Europe and the belligerents were vying for the sympathy of the neutral United States. In Lower Manhattan, on a Sixth Avenue elevated train, Secret Service agents were tailing George Sylvester Viereck, a German propagandist and a mysterious companion of his—who was, unbeknown to the agents, Heinrich F. Albert, an attaché in the German Embassy. When Viereck got off at 23rd Street, one agent followed him; Albert continued on to 50th Street, where he suddenly looked up from his newspaper, noticed he had reached his stop, and hurried off the car, leaving behind a brown briefcase that the second agent promptly seized. A chase ensued, but the purloined bag ultimately made it to Treasury Secretary William McAdoo, who shared it with President Woodrow Wilson.

The documents that Wilson and McAdoo beheld detailed a sweeping secret campaign, linked to high-ranking German officials, of espionage, sabotage, and propaganda. There were plans to take over American newspapers, bankroll films, send hired lecturers on the Chautauqua circuit, and create pseudo-indigenous movements to agitate on behalf of pro-German policies. More disturbing were schemes to provoke strikes in armaments factories; to corner the supply of liquid chlorine, an ingredient in poison gas, in order to keep it from Allied hands; even to acquire the Wright Brothers' Aeroplane Company and use its patents on Germany's behalf. American officials also learned of sabotage plans hatched by a different German spy, Franz Rintelen von Kleist, who was plotting to destroy American munitions plants and blow up the Welland Canal, a Canadian waterway of vital importance to the United States. It was no wonder that Wilson wrote to his adviser Edward House that summer that the country was "honeycombed with German intrigue and infested with German spies."

Although these plots are omitted from most discussions of the 1917 Espionage Act—the law now being invoked by those who would prosecute WikiLeaks mastermind Julian Assange—they go a long way toward explaining (but not excusing) that unfortunate piece of wartime legislation. When Wilson made the case for entering the world war, he warned that "if there should be disloyalty, it will be dealt with with a firm hand of stern repression." Contrary to some interpretations, the president wasn't perversely touting his intention to trample civil liberties; he was grimly cautioning would-be saboteurs, like those who had blown up the supply depot at Black Tom, New Jersey, the year before, not to undermine the combat effort.

The Espionage Act had a legitimate purpose: to try to stop the real threat of subversion, sabotage, and malicious interference with the war effort, including the controversial reinstatement of the draft. It's context that's worth recalling as Democrats and Republicans alike clamor to use the law against Assange

On April 6, 1917, Congress declared war on Germany and for the next nine weeks it engaged in robust, contentious debate about the proper scope of an espionage bill. Some elements were struck from the first drafts. Originally, the White House wanted to censor the press, but Congress—reflecting fierce resistance in the newspapers—killed the provision. A provision to let the postmaster general regulate the mails remained, but was narrowed to restrict suppressible materials to those urging treason or lawbreaking that would hinder the war effort. A ban on efforts to "cause disaffection" in the military was replaced with a more closely tailored prohibition on efforts to cause insubordination, mutiny, or disloyalty—that last word used, as it was in Wilson's speech, to mean disloyal action, not private sentiment. Overall, the act wasn't meant, as it has often been represented, to stifle antiwar dissent, but to address particular wartime problems that officials had good reason to worry about: draft avoidance, sabotage, espionage.

Nonetheless, the Espionage Act was deeply problematic. Above all, its wording, even in its softer version, left far too much room for aggressive prosecutors and overzealous patriots to interpret it as they wished. (Things got worse the next year when Congress passed more draconian amendments that came to be called the Sedition Act; that law outlawed statements during war that were "disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive … about the form of government of the United States." Unlike the Espionage Act proper, though, the Sedition Act was repealed when World War I ended.)

The resulting crackdown on antiwar groups under the Espionage Act—and the shame it brought to Wilson and the nation—is widely known. Postmaster General Albert Burleson, a reactionary and intolerant Texan considered by Edward House to be "the most belligerent member of the cabinet," denied use of the mails to publications like the left-wing Masses and scared many others into silence. Around the country, meanwhile, the U.S. attorneys in Thomas Gregory's Justice Department prosecuted socialists, pacifists, and German-Americans on flimsy grounds. Many people were arrested for crimes of mere speech. Filmmaker Robert Goldstein was prosecuted for making a movie about the American Revolution that depicted the British—now a U.S. ally—in an unfavorable light. The socialist leader Eugene Debs was thrown in jail for a speech that defended freedom of speech. Of 1,500 arrests under the law, only 10 involved actual sabotage. To the dismay of progressives, moreover, not even the Supreme Court stopped the prosecutions. In March 1919, the liberal icon Oliver Wendell Holmes, coining his famous "clear and present danger" standard, led the court in upholding three dubious Espionage Act verdicts, including the conviction of Debs.

It has been common to view the Espionage Act as the product of a paroxysm of wartime hysteria. There's obviously some truth to that view. In 1917 and 1918, war fever drove many politicians, in all three branches of government, to lose sight of basic rights—just as during other wars a sense of urgency led Abraham Lincoln to wrongfully suspend the habeas corpus writ and subject civilians to military trials, and Franklin Roosevelt to approve the internment of Japanese-Americans. But just as the presence of real communist spies during the early Cold War years helps to explain (but, again, not excuse) the witch hunts that followed, so the legitimate fears of German saboteurs constitute an important piece of the context in which the Espionage Act became law.

The real problem occurred not in its drafting but in its application. All laws are enforced selectively. Discretion always shapes which possible violations of a law are prosecuted and which are deemed unwise to pursue. In deciding whether to indict Assange, President Obama—who has already endorsed the worst of George W. Bush's civil-liberties violations, the indefinite jailing of suspects without trial—might do well to consider how his decision will look in the light of history. Wilson's greatness is sullied today because of the license he granted to Gregory and Burleson to abuse the act; conversely, Richard Nixon's reputation as our worst president is only enhanced by his attempt to use the law to retaliate against Pentagon Papers leaker Daniel Ellsberg.

Assange's case is different, of course, from Ellsberg's, but it's still far from clear that his posting and sharing of classified government documents—as embarrassing and frustrating to diplomats as their publication may be—amounts to the kind of sabotage or espionage that the law was intended to punish. A former professor who taught his students ably about the Constitution, Woodrow Wilson would fare better in the history books today had he instructed his Cabinet officials more emphatically that laws on the books are only as wise as the people who enforce them.
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Wednesday, December 15, 2010

Help Wanted -- CIA & NSA


A Glimpse at Positions at the CIA and NSA
Washington Post -- December 12, 2010

It is hard to keep up with the ever-changing global developments in technology, but that is the mission of those who work for such government agencies as the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.

The classified work these agencies undertake means there are a multitude of positions in the fields of science, engineering and technology that hold the nation's security as their utmost goal.

"We're always looking for engineers, computer scientists and other technically qualified applicants who can advance our vital mission of keeping America safe," CIA spokeswoman Paula Weiss said. "Anyone with a scientific or technical background who would like to apply his or her skills to our intelligence mission should check out our Web site to see the wide range of opportunities we offer. It's helpful to have an interest in world affairs, overseas experience or language skills, but it's not necessary."

Not surprisingly, the CIA is on the cutting edge of technological developments, and it develops and implements many state-of-the-art technologies in order to help the agency fulfill its mission of gathering foreign intelligence.

Among the positions the CIA is currently recruiting for are electrical engineer, materials engineer, mechanical engineer, programs management engineer and systems engineer. In the science, technology and weapons areas, positions are open for research scientist; science, technology and weapons analyst; technical/targeting analyst; machinist; and technical operations officer.

CIA employees come from a variety of academic and professional disciplines and experiences. The agency's recruitment Web site lists various career paths. In addition to science, engineering and technology positions, there are jobs in areas such as National Clandestine Service, languages and support services, to name a few.

Requirements for CIA jobs include U.S. citizenship as well as successful results from a thorough medical exam, polygraph test and background investigation.

If you are considering a job in the intelligence field, the CIA offers undergraduate student internships or co-ops as well as graduate studies. The programs combine educational and practical work experiences that complement students' preferred academic fields. Students receive a salary and benefits.

Another of the country's foremost intelligence agencies, the National Security Agency, is also actively recruiting for students, professionals and transitioning military.

The NSA Web site notes that "intelligence and imaginative critical thinking skills" are important attributes for applicants. In the technology fields, positions are available in computer science, computer/electrical engineering, information assurance and security, among others. Posted on the NSA's Web site under "Hot Jobs" are computer scientists, software developers and software engineers.

"For diverse, technologically savvy people looking to work in cutting-edge areas of IT, it really doesn't get much better than the National Security Agency," Lori Weltmann, NSA recruitment marketing manager, said. NSA is a leader in the intelligence community in areas such as network management and compliance, cyber defense, biometrics and wireless mobility.

"And we're not new to any of this," Weltmann continued. "We've been leaders for years. Given the increasingly complex and rapidly changing world of global communication, our need for qualified people with technology skills continues to grow. In fiscal year 2011, we plan to hire more than 1,500 new workers-¿more than half of whom will have skills in areas such as computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering and mathematics. A career at NSA offers the opportunity to work with the best and brightest, shape the course of the world and secure your own future."

As at the CIA, U.S. citizenship and a thorough background investigation are required for prospective NSA employees.

Professional development is an important aspect of working at NSA, and career development programs are available in numerous disciplines including computer science, information assurance, business and others. There is also the opportunity to pursue your education at outside educational institutions, as well as at the NSA's own National Cryptologic School.

For more information on career opportunities at the CIA or NSA, visit cia.gov or nsa.gov.
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Friday, December 10, 2010

Turkish "Surprise"? Um, I don't think so . . .


Mysterious Cache Found at Turkish Naval Base

ISTANBUL - Huerriet Daily News with wires
Friday, December 10, 2010


The confiscation of nine sacks of documents that were hidden at a Turkish naval base is expected to intensify investigations into alleged anti-government activity. The files are said to provide detailed information about coup plots.

The documents were confiscated Tuesday from a hidden location under the floor of the office of the head of intelligence at Gölcük Navy Command in the northwestern province of Kocaeli.

The confiscated documents include data on plans to be implemented after a military coup, including where to keep 167 special figures incarcerated; special dossiers on 46 high-level government officials; charts pointing to hidden locations of ammunition; data gathered on the wives of admirals; documents that appear to be a continuation of the “Kafes” (Cage) and “Action Plan for the Fight against Fundamentalism” plots; a list of military personnel who would be deported after a coup; secret documents from crucial state organizations; a Navy fleet command navigation logbook; and 34 voice recording tapes.

The operation was conducted by Fikret Seçen and Ali Haydar, both public prosecutors with special authority, as part of an ongoing espionage investigation into Turkish naval forces.

The search began after an unidentified person called in a tip to prosecutors, saying some documents regarding the espionage case would soon be destroyed.

Seçen said Thursday the operation was not a police raid as mentioned in the press but was instead conducted with the military in his presence.

The confiscated documents were transferred to Istanbul for inspection and were opened in the presence of an Army colonel assigned by the Chief of General Staff. The presence of the colonel, who videotaped the process and the search for DNA, hair samples and fingerprints on the documents, is to prevent allegations of the planting of suspicious evidence, as has happened in past investigations.

The espionage investigation, which began in August with blackmail charges against members of the Navy following claims of running a prostitution ring, was initially referred to as the “prostitution gang investigation” in the press. The prosecution later dropped the charges of prostitution after evidence of espionage emerged.

A number of military secrets and issues concerning national defense has allegedly been leaked by the alleged gang.

The alleged “action plan” features strategies to end both Justice and Development Party, or AKP, rule and the activities of the Fethullah Gülen religious community by planting fake evidence and weaponry in various locations. “Cage,” meanwhile, is an alleged anti-government plan to target non-Muslim communities in Turkey so as to bring heat upon the AKP from the West.
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Sunday, December 5, 2010

Comment re: WikiLeaks

I've deliberately ignored it until now, but after a couple of emails from readers . . .
Here's my assessment of the impact of the latest WikiLeaks release: So what?
Is there anything major that you didn't really already "know" or suspect? The only persons surprised by anything Mr. Assange pumped out into the Internet are naive or uninformed generally. Embarrassing? Awkward? Sure.
Next.
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Saturday, December 4, 2010

Espionage Case Breaks at Fort Bragg


Espionage Case Unfolding at Ft. Bragg
Saturday, December 04, 2010


FORT BRAGG, N.C. (WTVD) -- A man with high-level military security clearance is under arrest, accused of trying to sell access to classified military computers.

The suspect is Bryan Martin, who is enlisted in the Navy, and assigned to the Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg.

According to federal documents obtained by the I-Team, Martin told an undercover F-B-I agent he had access to military computer systems, and said he was seeking long-term financial reimbursement.

The undercover agent paid Martin $3500 for documents labeled "Top Secret."

The I-Team has learned Martin thought he was selling U.S. military secrets to China.

According to the court documents, he also told the FBI agent that over his 15-20 year career, he could be very valuable because of his access to military secrets.

"These cases are rare," said Frank Perry, who used to run the Raleigh FBI office. "For a case like this to have been made in Raleigh or certainly in North Carolina - this area - is quite significant."

The undercover sting operation to arrest Martin happened at three different hotels - one on post, and two in Spring Lake.

The FBI says none of the Joint Special Operations Command secrets were ever compromised by the sting.
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Friday, December 3, 2010

Army Stonewalls on Probe of Spying on US Civilians


Army Withholding Results of Ft. Lewis Spying Probe
By GENE JOHNSON

Associated Press -- Thursday, December 2, 2010

The Army is still refusing to release the results of its investigation into spying on anti-war activists by a civilian intelligence specialist at Joint Base Lewis-McChord south of Seattle.

Officials released more than 100 pages of records this week to The Associated Press in response to a Freedom of Information Act request, most with names redacted. The Army withheld the results and recommendations made by an investigating officer, citing law enforcement and privacy exemptions.

Col. John Wells of the Army's Litigation Division noted an ongoing federal civil rights lawsuit brought by the activists and the possibility of criminal charges against Army employees, and said release of the documents could impair the rights of those involved to fair trials or disciplinary proceedings.

The documents outline the scope of the inquiry, which was initially completed in mid-2009 and then reopened early this year to determine whether military legal advisors were given complete and accurate information about the protest group's infiltration.

They also show that before the story broke, senior officials at the base were concerned about bad publicity "should mainstream media decide to report U.S. 'spying' on protesters," and they were upset that local agencies, including the city of Tacoma, had turned over documents to the protesters revealing the intelligence specialist's involvement.

"Future information sharing operations with local agencies are at risk because we cannot depend on them to comply with FOIA restrictions and/or our dissemination guidance," said a "point paper" dated March 2, 2009.

The base's leadership should "express their displeasure with their Tacoma counterparts (for) the mishandling of this FOIA request," the paper said.

Anti-war activists with a group called Olympia Port Militarization Resistance discovered in early 2009 that the administrator of their e-mail list-serve, whom they knew as John Jacob, was actually John Jacob Towery, then an employee of the Force Protection Division at Lewis-McChord. The Force Protection Division includes civilian and military workers who support law enforcement and security operations to ensure the security of Fort Lewis personnel.

Towery had been attending the group's meetings for two years, and information he collected about the protesters appears to have been passed to his superiors on base as well as local law enforcement, documents released to the AP show.

The Reconstruction-era Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the Army from directly engaging in domestic law enforcement.

The Army launched its investigation in July 2009, after members of the group complained. The investigating officer's marching orders said the inquiry should focus on Towery's actions, whether he undertook them at the behest of civilian law enforcement, whether he was paid by any civilian police agency, what his supervisors knew of his activities, and whether he might have violated federal law or Army directives.

The highest-ranking person interviewed for the investigation appears to have been a colonel, whose name is redacted.

One of the documents provided to the AP, an "information paper" apparently prepared by the Force Protection Division, says: "Information provided by (redacted) and a law enforcement official with the Pierce County Sheriff's Office (PCSO) indicate that the activities alleged by the Olympia activist were done in support of the PCSO and Tacoma Police Department as a confidential informant/source and not as a member of the FP Division."

The protest group, which formed in 2006, was one of several in the region opposed to the use of civilian ports for shipping military items, such as Stryker vehicles, overseas. They claim that thanks to Towery's infiltration, police knew where they were going to protest in advance - sometimes arresting them before their civil disobedience even began.

Having a spy among them chilled their First Amendment and other rights, they argued.

About 200 people were arrested over a two-week period in November 2007, but only about three dozen were ever charged.
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Tuesday, November 16, 2010

Mexican-American Intel Center Profiled


North American Union – “U.S. Super Spy Center” Uncovered in Mexico

- Mexican Magazine Proceso reveals the location of a US Military-Intelligence Megaplex in Mexico City.

-Megaplex includes offices for the CIA, FBI, DEA, Defense Intelligence, BATF, Department of Treasury and others.

- U.S. Intelligence Operatives will no longer have to disguise themselves as diplomats.

- Mexico will now have a Military ‘Liaison’ for NORTHCOM.

- U.S. is now in charge of all tactical efforts against the drug war, counter-insurgency, and counter-terrorism in Mexico.

- Obama and Hillary Clinton are credited for the creation of the Office of Bi-lateral Intelligence in Mexico (OBI).

Jorge Carrasco and Jesus Esquivel
proceso.com.mx
Translated by Mario Andrade

With the approval of Felipe Calderón’s Administration, the U.S. Government finally got what it always wanted: To set up a super spy center in Mexico City. It was the escalation of the drug war in the country what opened the door to all U.S. intelligence agencies, including the military, to operate out of the Federal District without having to disguise their agents as diplomats.

The establishment of the Office of Bi-national Intelligence (OBI) was authorized by Calderon, after negotiations with Washington, which began under the government of his predecessor, Vicente Fox Quesada. The creation of the super spy center was authorized by the director of the Center for Investigation and National Security (CISEN), Guillermo Valdés Castellanos, without taking into account any objections from the Mexican military.

Through the OBI, Calderon has given the green light to U.S. Intelligence agents to spy on organized crime syndicates and drug cartels. They can also spy on Mexican government agencies, including the Secretariat of National Defense, Navy, and the diplomatic missions in Mexico.

The building headquarters, which includes offices from the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and the U.S. Department of Treasury is located at 265 Paseo de la Reforma Avenue, approximately 250 meters from the U.S. embassy.

The most significant presence at the OBI building is that of the Pentagon, which includes the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the National Security Agency (NSA). It is followed by the U.S. Department of Justice, also with three agencies: the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF).

With two services, there is the Department of Homeland Security: Coast Guard Intelligence (CGI) and the Bureau of Customs and Immigration Enforcement (ICE), while the Treasury Department has officers of the Bureau of Intelligence on Terrorism and Financial Affairs (TFI) .

In addition, the OBI opened two remote offices: one in Ciudad Juarez and one in Tijuana, housing U.S. agents and “task force commanders” who coordinate operations against drug trafficking with the support of Mexican Government personnel.

It is not known how many intelligence agents from the U.S. are operating in Mexico with the authorization of the Mexican Federal Government, since the creation of this center was announced on August 31st. They maintain that the exact number is “classified.”

The building occupied by the OBI in the Federal District is right next to the Mexican Stock Exchange and is part of what the security and intelligence services in Mexico define as a “soft target area” in reference to the possibility of an attack on U.S. interests in Mexico.

At this strategic point for Washington in the Mexican Federal District, there are also facilities for transnational corporations such as Ford, American Airlines, as well as Marriott and Sheraton hotels, among others.

The building where the OBI is located gives the impression of an ordinary business facility, with banks, insurance, telecommunications, commercial offices and private offices. The only thing that stands out is the entry and departure of U.S. citizens.

The building directory lists the names of the occupants all the way up to the 21st floor. However, after the 22nd floor, there are three penthouses that are only listed as “occupied.” And on the roof, there is a dozen satellite dishes placed just above the logo of the telecommunications company Axtel.

“It’s the best covert location for the agencies to operate,” said the source that provided the location of the OBI. The ordinary appearance of the building is the way in which the United States often disguise intelligence centers around the world.

The reception and parking are guarded by private security services, while Federal District Police provide outside support.

Furthermore, the city government has installed special surveillance cameras with sirens to observe the movement of pedestrians and vehicles outside the building.

The scope and power of the OBI in Mexico is similar to the El Paso Intelligence Center, in Texas (EPIC), which dates back to 1974 and operates exclusively to combat drug trafficking, weapons and money laundering on the border between Mexico and United States.

EPIC has been credited for creating the strategies launched against drug trafficking and organized crime in Mexico. Among the most successful are “Operation White Tiger,” which was used to investigate the activities of the Hank Rhon family in 1997, the capture and extradition, a year earlier, of Gulf Drug Cartel Leader Juan Garcia Abrego, and the discovery of narco-graves in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, in 1998.

Subordination

Overrun by drug trafficking, the government of Felipe Calderón agreed to the establishment of the OBI in Mexico, which was a proposal of the then head of National Intelligence in the United States, Admiral Dennis Blair, who last March was accompanied by Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, during his working visit to Mexico.

According to the formal agreement, the new U.S. office workers interact with their Mexican counterparts, under the coordination of the State Department and the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE).

For the Pentagon, the strong presence of its agents in Mexico is intended to merge the intelligence and espionage services of both countries to identify and exploit the vulnerabilities of drug trafficking organizations and organized crime gangs.

Under this directive, issued on 18 March by Gen. Victor Eugene Renuart, then head of Northern Command (NORTHCOM), Mexico has carried out several operations against drug traffickers.

Since then, among some of the actions taken against the drug lords have been the killing of Arturo Beltran Leyva, (aka El Barbas), Ignacio “Nacho” Coronel, and Ezequiel Cardenas Guillen (aka Tony Tormenta), in addition to the arrests of other drug lords, such as Edgar ‘Barbie’ Valdez Villarreal.

Since the killing of Beltran Leyva in December of 2009, U.S. intelligence services, mainly the DEA, have mentioned their participation in various operations, against the very Arturo Beltran Leyva, Barbie Valdez, Teodoro Garcia Simental (aka El Teo), Jose Gerardo Alvarez Vazquez (aka El Indio or El Chayán), operator of the Beltran Leyva organization and Carlos Ramon Castro, a drug dealer who worked for several organizations.

As part of the Mexican government’s need to justify the militarization of the fight against drug trafficking, the Pentagon has strengthened its cooperation with the Mexican military. In early 2009, just as the Department of State and the Mexican Exterior Relations Secretariat (SRE) fine-tuned the details for the establishment of the OBI, the U.S. Department of Defense stepped up military training for Mexicans in Mexico and in several U.S. military bases.

The training has been an unprecedented event in the history of military relations between the two countries. For the first time, the Pentagon has brought counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism expertise from Iraq and Afghanistan to their offices in central Mexico.

In the case of Mexico, the training courses are developed and run by the Defense Department, and are focused on intelligence and tactical operations against drug trafficking, terrorism and the implementation of counterinsurgency tactics.

In addition to the courses offered in Mexico, the Mexican military has significantly increased the number of special forces troops in the Army, Air Force and the Navy to attend specialized intelligence training in U.S. military bases.

Liaisons

The main example of this cooperation is the presence -for the first time in the bilateral relationship- a member of the Mexican Army as a “liaison” between the Mexican military (Central Command) and the Northern Command in Colorado (NORTHCOM), according to a military source who spoke to the Mexican magazine Proceso.

On Wednesday 10, The Washington Post published on its front page a note informing that the liaison will also serve as deputy commander of the Institute for Security and Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere at Fort Benning, Georgia. From the sixties to the eighties, these facilities housed in the so-called School of the Americas, which went down in history as a supplying center for Latin American dictators, which are characterized by the systematic violation of human rights.

A U.S. official, who told the Post on condition of anonymity, said that given the seriousness of the drug violence in Mexico, “we have received direct instruction from the President (Barack Obama) and the highest levels in government, to really examine what more can be done in this counter-narcotics cooperation with Mexico.”

The establishment of the Office of Bi-national Intelligence (OBI) implies that for the first time in the history of Mexico, surveillance, supervision and qualification of work against organized crime between federal government agencies, including the military, rests in part on foreign officials.

According to the document unveiled by the White House on March 25, 2009 on the establishment of the OBI, the office is also responsible for overseeing the proper use of resources that Washington provides the Calderon administration in combating drug trafficking through the ‘Merida Initiative.’

“We will be coordinating our efforts with the government of Mexico through high-level contacts, which in part are related to the new intelligence services responsible for overseeing the implementation of Merida Initiative,” according to the document released by the White House (published by Proceso).

A year later, on March 23, 2010, Hillary Clinton announced during her working visit to the Federal District, in the context of the implementation of Plan Merida, the establishment of two “pilot programs” in the Tijuana-San Diego and Ciudad Juárez-El Paso corridors.

The two governments declared in a joint statement, that in the case of Ciudad Juárez, the program considers the development of “a model for the Mexican Government to collect and analyze tactical intelligence” as well as to “take action against drug trafficking, extortion, kidnapping and other criminal activities.”

However, the actual operations of the OBI in security and intelligence services, Mexicans will be subordinates of the U.S.. Agencies of the U.S. Government will play the role as experts in intelligence work, apart from previous advisory roles in order to increase Mexico’s ability to use information resources against drug cartel operations.
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Monday, November 15, 2010

Nordic Govts Supposedly Bristle @ CIA Ops

Blogger Note: A thoroughly dishonest bit of "reporting" from that bastion of journalistic integrity and political independence, Pravda . . .

America Conducts Subversive Activities in Friendly Territories
13.11.2010 14:19
Pravda

The United States found itself embroiled in a major spy scandal. As many as five countries caught the Americans illegally spying on their citizens.

Nobody would think it was strange if we were talking about the citizens of Russia, China, Iran, Syria and Venezuela. With these five countries, everything is clear: U.S. officials constantly refer to them as those presenting threats to the national security. But this time the U.S. was caught by quite friendly countries of Northern Europe - Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Finland and Sweden.

The scandal erupted earlier this month. On November 3, Norwegian television channel TV2 released a report which stated that over ten years, a group of Americans have been doing surveillance on 15 to 20 Norwegian subjects - mostly participants of various kinds of rallies. Potential terrorists and other undesirable persons were photographed, and the information was sent to Washington.

The report stated that the purpose of the surveillance was supposedly to prevent terrorist attacks against U.S. embassies. Nordic Governments were not informed of such actions.

The spokesman of the U.S. State Department, Philip Crowley, on November 11 said that the Norwegian authorities have been notified about a covert operation. "We are implementing the program throughout the world and are vigilant against people who can keep track of our embassies, as we understand that our diplomatic missions are a potential target," he explained.

However, the Scandinavians were not satisfied with this comment. A representative of the American embassy was called to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry for an explanation, but no clear answers were provided. It turns out that the surveillance was conducted without the knowledge of the Norwegian authorities.

If it was limited to Norway, this episode could have been considered an isolated case. Yet, after the Norwegians, Denmark spoke about the surveillance of its citizens. Local newspaper Politiken wrote that all American embassies have groups of employees leading external surveillance of suspicious persons in order to address threats to the U.S. security. It has been suggested that Denmark was hardly an exception.

Former head of the Danish security service PET Jorgen Bonniksen said that he had never heard of such groups: "If this is true, then we have to deal with illegal intelligence operations in Denmark. On Danish territory such operations can be conducted by PET, and PET only," he stressed.

The current head of PET, Jakob Scharf, made it clear: if illegal activity is determined, "of course, we will take action." Justice Minister of Denmark Lars Barfoeda has been summoned for an explanation to the Folketing (parliament). The U.S. Embassy in Copenhagen, as well as in Oslo, provided no clear comments.

Followed by Norwegians and Danes, Swedes brought up the illegal activities of American agents. According to the Minister of Justice of Sweden Beatrice Ask, people connected with the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm have been spying on people on the Swedish territory since 2000. The Minister stated that it "is not yet known whether in this case Swedish law was violated." She did not rule out that the objects of the surveillance actually might have been people who pose a threat to the U.S. security.

On his part, head of the local security police Anders Danielsson directly accused the U.S. of violating international norms. He said that the U.S. did not bother to inform the Swedish authorities of their intentions. "The Swedish security police (SÄPO) did not give the U.S. a permission to engage in activities that are contrary to Swedish law," he said.

Representatives of the U.S. embassy were quick to say that "they have nothing to hide" and that they have notified the Swedish authorities about their actions. However, Sweden is the third country which had been "made aware." Could the Scandinavian countries have entered into a conspiracy to defame the United States?

When we talk about three countries at once, it looks like a trend. Following its neighbors, Finland grew concerned as well. Local security police SUPO originally said it had not found anything illegal in the activities of the U.S. Embassy in Helsinki. However, they immediately proceeded to a more detailed verification. Apparently, the Finns also did not believe the assurances of the Americans.

Only the small Iceland with the population of 320 thousand with no army is lacking to complete the picture. On November 11 it was revealed that the islanders also have questions for the U.S. Local authorities immediately declared that they suspected members of the American Embassy in Reykjavik in espionage. The diplomatic mission is being verified.

This is a stunning picture. The U.S. did not even consider it necessary to inform its allies of its actions on their territory, as if they were colonies. In fact, Denmark, Iceland and Norway joined NATO and, consequently, they entered the circle of the closest allies of the U.S. Finland and Sweden are not members of the North Atlantic alliance, but are working with it very closely. That's how Americans value their allies.

However, Washington seems to have confused Scandinavians with Poland, Lithuania and Romania. These countries have repeatedly been suspected of placing secret CIA prisons on their territories. The authorities of these states have been blindly following in the footsteps of American politics in the past two decades. This is not true about rich countries of Northern Europe. Given the national pride of the Scandinavians, they are unlikely to forgive the Americans the dismissive attitude.

Denmark is the only country that followed the U.S. without asking questions. Sweden and Finland harshly condemned the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Norway was among the first to withdraw its troops from Iraq, as well as (unlike Americans) has signed an agreement with Russia on the delimitation of the Arctic shelf. Even little Iceland allowed itself to contradict the States when it refused to extradite the late chess player Robert Fisher, who was facing a jail term at home.

The explanation of the incident with the need to combat terrorism, of course, can be taken into account. Radical Islamists are making themselves visible in Denmark and Sweden, as well as Norway and Finland. Yet, the United States could have informed the local security forces of their suspicions as these countries also have qualified staff. And as for surveillance of Icelanders - it is simply ridiculous. They have fewer than a hundred of Muslims, let alone Islamists.

The author of numerous books on the work of intelligence Alexander Kolpakidi commented on the behavior of the U.S. agents in the Nordic countries for Pravda.ru.

"There is nothing surprising here. U.S. intelligence services have always behaved that way around the globe. Virtually all countries of the world, including the members of European Union and NATO, have secret CIA tracking stations. This is not the first scandal of this kind. For example, several years ago, the Greek police found one of these stations having mistaken it for a terrorist base. When the attack began, "terrorists" opened a furious fire, killing a police officer.

Why is America conducting subversive activities in foreign territories, including, apparently friendly countries? This is because in an era of the global crisis, the U.S. changed its strategy. If before it had adhered to the concept of the "golden billion" according to which the good life was allowed to a limited group of countries, mainly Western countries, but now it has changed the strategy to the "golden million," which implies that the good life is the exclusive privilege of the U.S. ".

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Friday, November 12, 2010

Shcherbakov's Defection


Medvedev Says He Knew about Double Agent

By Anna Smolchenko (AFP)

SEOUL — President Dmitry Medvedev confirmed Friday that a Moscow double agent helped Washington crack a major Russian spy ring that sparked the worst espionage row between the two countries since the Cold War.

Medvedev conceded that Russia would have to draw lessons from the fiasco but dismissed talk that it was time to start firing officials over the case -- an increasingly popular sentiment in disgruntled Moscow.

"To me, what Kommersant said was not news. I knew about it the day it happened, with all its attributes and accessories," Medvedev said at the G20 summit in South Korea's capital when asked about the respected daily's report.

Kommersant identified Washington's Russian accomplice as a colonel with the Russian foreign intelligence service named Shcherbakov, whose job was to plant civilian moles in the United States similar to the deep cover spy ring dismantled by Washington.

The paper also wrote that a Russian hit squad had been especially assigned to hunt down Shcherbakov in retribution and to prevent him from passing any other sensitive information to Washington.

"You can already have no doubt that a Mercader has already been sent after him," an intelligence source told the paper in reference to Ramon Mercader, the man sent by Stalin to Mexico to assassinate his rival Leon Trotsky.

Mercader used an ice pick for the job.

This summer's scandal culminated in 10 spies -- many working for years undercover in the United States as sleeper agents -- returning to Russia in exchange for four convicted US spies.

Medvedev did not confirm specific elements of the Kommersant story. But his comments suggested that he knew about the double agent before the June arrests and prior to his summit talks that month with his US counterpart Barack Obama.

But he firmly brushed aside suggestions that he should sack the head of his country's foreign intelligence service, Mikhail Fradkov, who has been the subject of growing dismissal talk.

His sacking was backed heavily Thursday by some opposition lawmakers and discussed widely both on television and in the popular press.

"I would not like to comment on the investigation," Medvedev said. "There has to be an investigation and we will draw our conclusions then."

Medvedev's comments echoed a similar statement from Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who suggested in the aftermath of the crisis that Russia knew about the double agent all along.

"This was the result of treason and traitors always end badly. They finish up as drunks, addicts, on the street," Putin said at the end of July.

Putin then enigmatically added that "recently one (traitor) for instance ended his existence abroad and it was not clear what the point of it all was."

But some Russian media and lawmakers suggested that the Kremlin was simply trying to put a brave face on a bad situation and that Shcherbakov had done long-term damage to Moscow's espionage programme.

"The damage committed by the colonel to the state is too enormous" not to have further repercussions, said parliament's security council deputy chairman Gennady Gudkov.

The double agent's naming forced Medvedev to return to a sensitive issue for Russia just as the country attempts to play a more forceful role in foreign affairs.

Medvedev came to the G20 summit promoting a makeover of the global economic order designed to win Russia respect and keep major economies such as the United States in check.

But Russian officials found themselves talking about the Cold War, with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov particularly stressing that it was time to move on from the issues of the past.

Lavrov said he would be heading to Russia-NATO talks in Lisbon next week expecting to register the "conclusion of the post-Cold War era."

See: http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iokhy5fQsMxUxOIv2_s_iVq6VSWQ?docId=CNG.4e6b770ae2ca3b8f8eb41fd7adc33980.241

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