Saturday, September 25, 2010

Sarkozy's Watergate?


Sarkozy Accused of Using Watergate-style Tricks to Muzzle the French Press
By John Lichfield in Paris

'Le Monde' launches legal action against President, claiming he used security services to find insider who leaked information to paper

In a scandal having many parallels with the Watergate affair, President Nicolas Sarkozy was accused by France's most prestigious newspaper yesterday of illegally using the counter-intelligence service to muzzle the press.

Le Monde said that the President's office had deployed France's equivalent of MI5 like a "cabinet noir", or dirty-tricks operation, to uncover the source of leaks in the L'Oréal family feud and political financing scandal. The newspaper said that it had started a legal action against "persons unknown" at the Elysée Palace for breaking a century-old French law which guarantees the secrecy of journalistic sources.

Le Monde said that the French security service, the DCRI, had tracked down a senior figure in the Justice Minister's office as the source of embarrassing leaks to the newspaper in July on the so-called "Bettencourt-Woerth" affair. The official, a long-term aide of the Justice Minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie, had been forced out of his post and sent on a minor legal mission to French Guyana.

The Elysée Palace flatly denied the accusation. It said "the presidency of the Republic has never given the slightest instruction to any (state) service" to investigate leaks in the L'Oréal affair. Other newspapers had already reported, however, that the official, David Sénat, had been punished for leaking witness interviews in the Bettencourt scandal to the press.

Mr Sarkozy's government was also accused yesterday of acting illegally in another great French political soap opera of the summer: the clampdown on Roma immigrants from Eastern Europe. From President Sarkozy's viewpoint, the "Mondegate" saga may prove to be the more damaging of the two.

In a front-page editorial yesterday, Le Monde said that the Elysée had tried to cover its embarrassment in the Bettencourt affair - and to intimidate the press - by misusing the counter-intelligence services whose mission was to "protect the state". Le Monde also said that the Elysée had broken a law protecting press sources which had been strengthened by Mr Sarkozy's government less than a year ago.

The alleged witch-hunt for sources of embarrassing leaks in the Bettencourt affair implies that Mr Sarkozy has been far more rattled by the scandal than he likes to admit. The saga began with a family feud over the alleged abuse of France's wealthiest woman, Liliane Bettencourt, 87, who gave €1bn in cash and art works to a playboy photographer who befriended her.

Secret tapes of her conversations with advisers and the photographer, François-Marie Banier, were handed to the police and leaked to the press in July. The tapes also implied that Ms Bettencourt, the largest shareholder in the cosmetics giant L'Oréal, had been sheltered from possible charges of tax evasion by her links with the Sarkozy government.

It appeared from the tapes that Mr Sarkozy's campaign treasurer in 2007, Eric Woerth - now Employment Minister - had sought campaign donations from Ms Bettencourt. Mr Woerth had also sought a job for his wife.

A former accountant for Ms Bettencourt then told the press, and police, that the billionairess had given illicitly large donations to Mr Woerth for the Sarkozy campaign.

Both President Sarkozy and Mr Woerth rejected the allegations. A preliminary investigation was begun by the public prosecutor for the suburbs west of Paris.

Ms Bettencourt's financial manager, Patrice de Maistre, was interviewed by investigators and contradicted parts of Mr Woerth's story. Details of his confidential testimony appeared on the front page of Le Monde the following day, 15 July.

The leaks so infuriated Mr Sarkozy, Le Monde said yesterday, that the Elysée ordered an investigation by the Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur. This is a new umbrella internal security organisation created by Mr Sarkozy two years ago because, he claimed, its predecessors had become too "politicised".

Sources in the DCRI told Le Monde that they checked the telephone records of all potential leakers inside government until they found the trace of a call from the reporter who wrote the story. The DCRI sources insisted that they had acted as part of their "mission to protect the state".

Opposition politicians said that this was a clear abuse of power. Aurélie Filippetti of the Parti Socialiste said that the misuse of security agencies and the muddling of state interests and personal interests were the hallmarks of the Watergate affair which brought down President Richard Nixon in the 1970s. Ms Filippetti said: "This is a new scandal worthy of Watergate, which we could perhaps call 'Woerthgate'."

Watergate, she might have recalled, was also a battle of wills between a right-wing President and a "liberal" newspaper.

French FBI: Agency at heart of accusations was created by Sarkozy

It is scarcely new for French governments to misuse the security services for political purposes. The accusation is, however, especially damaging for President Sarkozy.

Two years ago, he transformed the landscape of counter-intelligence and internal security in France by ordering a shotgun marriage between two competing agencies.

His official argument was that efficiency demanded a single organisation which would become a "French FBI". His real reason, it was said, was he suspected one or both of the old agencies had been used by his enemy and former mentor, President Jacques Chirac, pictured, to try to wreck his rise to power.

Mr Sarkozy suspected they had played a part in dirty tricks such as leaks about his failing second marriage in 2005 and the Clearstream scandal, an attempt to smear Mr Sarkozy as financially corrupt in 2004. Creating a new agency would, it was suggested, separate counter-intelligence from internal politics.

There were other arguments for reform. The old agencies had long fought each other as fiercely as they fought any of France's presumed enemies.

The Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire was in charge of counter-espionage. The Direction Central des Renseignement Généraux was a more shapeless agency in charge of everything from spying on French "subversives" to running private opinion polls and the control of horse racing.

From 1 July, 2008, the two agencies were merged into the Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur (DCRI) in a new building just north of Paris. The first director of the new agency is Bernard Squarcini, known as a Sarkozy loyalist.

The DCRI's mission is to fight against espionage, subversion, terrorism and "any act which seeks to weaken the authority of the state, national defence or the economic well-being of the nation."

Which one of those categories covers leaking embarrassing information to the press is unclear.

.Sphere: Related Content

Friday, September 24, 2010

Norway's "Greatest Spy Case" Under Review


24 September 2010 - 19H42

Norway's 'Greatest Spy Case' to be Re-examined

AFP - The case of former Norwegian diplomat Arne Treholt, who was sentenced during the Cold War in "Norway's greatest spy case" will be re-opened, a Norwegian judiciary authority said Friday.

The Norwegian Criminal Cases Review Commission decided to re-open Treholt's case after the publication of book called "Forfalskningen" (Counterfeit) in which two journalists charged Norwegian police fabricated evidence against Treholt.

The book's publication at the beginning of September was followed by testimonies in the press casting further doubts on the reliability of parts of the case against the diplomat.

Treholt, then a top official at the Norwegian foreign ministry's press department, was arrested at the Oslo airport in 1984 as he was boarding a plane to Vienna where he was going to meet a Soviet agent.

He was sentenced in 1985 to 20 years in jail for high treason and spying for the USSR and Iraqi intelligence. He was pardoned in 1992.

"It is an important first step in the right direction", said Treholt, 67, at press conference in Oslo following the decision.

Treholt has admitted to have supplied foreign powers with documents, which he said were without importance, in exchange for money, but has always maintained he was not a spy.

When Treholt got out of prison, he went on to live in Russia and Cyprus.

The Treholt affair is widely considered the "greatest spy case" of Norway's contemporary history.

Chief prosecutor Tor-Aksel Busch asked the commission earlier this week to re-examine the case.

It will determine if the new elements published in the book and in the press warrant holding a re-trial.

"If there is any substance to the new allegations, it implies that doubt can be casted on at least part of the basis for Arne Treholt's conviction," commission president Helen Saeter told reporters.

"These are extremely serious accusations that have to be examined and clarified as much for the sake of the accused as for the rule of law in Norway," she added.Sphere: Related Content

Sunday, September 19, 2010

NYPD Antiterror Unit


The Terror Translators
By ALAN FEUER
Published: September 17, 2010

INSPIRE magazine, an English-language journal published by Al Qaeda, included in its summer edition what amounted to a “Friends and Foes” list. There, on Page 4, following the letter from the editor (“We survive through jihad and perish without it”), were pictures of, and quotations from, kindred spirits like Faisal Shahzad, who pleaded guilty in a plot to detonate a car bomb in Times Square, and, perhaps surprisingly, David Letterman, who was praised for recent criticism of former President George W. Bush.

Among the magazine’s “foes” were Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates; Nicolas Sarkozy, the president of France; and King Abdullah II of Jordan. Then there was Mitchell D. Silber, a studious and mild-mannered former financier who grew up in Atlantic Beach, N.Y.

Mr. Silber (“I guess I was flattered in a strange way”) may seem an unlikely choice to occupy that space with a terrorist, a television star, a cabinet secretary, a European head of state and an Arab potentate. He is not, after all, a boldface name. Rather, he is a 40-year-old father with a master’s degree in international affairs from Columbia University who says his main hobby is reading deeply on the Middle East.

What landed Mr. Silber on that list was his leadership of a little-known counterterrorism team deep within the crime-fighting structure of the New York Police Department.

Formally known as the Analytic Unit of the department’s Intelligence Division, the team was created in 2002 as part of the city’s response to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. It stands as a unique experiment in breaking traditional law-enforcement boundaries, comprising two dozen civilian experts — lawyers, academics, corporate consultants, investment bankers, alumni of the World Bank and the Council on Foreign Relations and even a former employee of the Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan.

The team serves as the Police Department’s terrorism reference arm: available on demand to explain Islamic law or Pakistani politics to detectives in the field.

“We have found that conducting terrorism investigations is more art than science and requires a breadth of complementary skill sets,” Mr. Silber said during one of several interviews this summer. “Our detectives tend to have a very narrow focus. But the analysts have 360-degree visibility. They focus on the bigger picture, and they sometimes see things detectives don’t see.”

To bolster counterterrorism operations after 9/11, the Police Department expanded its Intelligence Division — run by David Cohen, a 30-year veteran of the C.I.A. — with detectives who had mainly spent their careers chasing street gangs, drug lords and violent Mafiosi. Such trained investigators brought with them specific skills the department thought would translate into the fight against terror: the ability to read a suspect’s manner and the talent for managing secret informants.

What they needed, in turn, were people to help them translate their skills to new terrain, people with a firm cultural grasp of the suspects they were meant to be pursuing. Over the years, a gang detective in the Bronx will probably have developed a radar able to determine at a glance the meaning of a hand gesture or a prison tattoo. But, as one former intelligence detective said of potential Islamic extremists, “when we first started, we didn’t even know they prayed on Fridays.”

Enter the Analytic Unit, which Samuel J. Rascoff, who ran it from 2006 to 2008 and is now a law professor at New York University, described as an attempt to bring “the culturally exotic world of the ivory tower to bear on the gritty problems of counterterrorism as experienced by beat cops and seasoned detectives.”

Consider the time a detective was investigating an Afghan immigrant suspected of involvement in terror activities. The detective found it helpful when an analyst informed him that the United States military had attacked the man’s hometown three months earlier with a drone strike. Sometimes, analysts walk detectives through Google Earth images of Pakistani villages — the mosque is here, the bazaar is there — so the detectives sound more informed and enhance their credibility when dealing with potential covert sources.

“Say a detective is doing surveillance on a cabdriver and he pulls over and goes into a mosque,” Mr. Silber said. “Is this a secret meeting or is it Ramadan and the driver is simply going to pray? The detective is just unlikely to be familiar with that kind of thing, but the analyst can put it in context.”

Mr. Silber’s analysts earn $55,000 to $95,000 a year working daily shifts at their offices in Manhattan and at the Brooklyn Army Terminal, but are available to put things into context around the clock, at the ring of a cellphone. Their assistance can be as complicated as explaining the interlocking network of Afghan tribes or the nuances of the Koran, or as simple as keeping current with New York’s foreign-language newspapers.

As one detective from the Intelligence Division’s Priority Targeting Unit, which focuses on the highest-profile cases, said: “I’m not reading that stuff. I’m reading Sports Illustrated.”

LESS than an hour after a Nissan Pathfinder was found spewing smoke and rigged with a car bomb on West 45th Street on May 1, several members of the Analytic Unit had gathered at their secret office on the West Side of Manhattan trying to assess what, by all accounts, was the most severe terror threat to face the city in years.

For the next 24 hours, as detectives in the field scoured the car for clues, pulled apart the bomb and began tracking down witnesses, their civilian counterparts helped them, by brainstorming leads to be pursued. In which stores, they asked themselves, could the fireworks and propane tanks that had made up the bomb be obtained? And what did that Arab-language sticker on its timing device — a cheap alarm clock — say?

The unit’s linguists monitored jihadist Web sites for useful hints or boastful chatter. Others searched the Internet — sometimes using methods as basic as typing “Times Square car bomb” into Google, but filtering the results through eyes trained to see obscure tidbits. Eventually, they came across a YouTube video posted by the Pakistani Taliban, claiming responsibility for the plot.

Cyber specialists were able to determine that the YouTube account had been set up less than 24 hours before the attack occurred. The video was analyzed by the unit’s Pakistan expert, who knew, for instance, that a leader of the group, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, or T.T.P., had posted videos during the previous month, announcing that commandoes had “penetrated” the United States and were poised to strike.

By 9 p.m. on May 2, a Sunday, the Analytic Unit had prepared an eight-page report for Mr. Cohen, the Police Department’s deputy commissioner for intelligence, suggesting that an “evolving, highly dynamic” terrorist group, T.T.P., was probably behind the failed attack. Officials in Washington announced the same conclusion days later. (Mr. Shahzad eventually acknowledged that the group had trained him for the operation.)

No other municipal police force in the country has a team similar in scope and sophistication to the Analytic Unit. Its specialists speak Urdu, Farsi, Russian, Arabic and Hebrew, and “cover” subjects including South Asia, Somalia, Yemen, Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, Iran and homegrown terrorist groups.

The unit began with five analysts working for a police captain. When Mr. Rascoff, its first civilian leader, was tapped four years ago to enhance the team — quadrupling its size to 20 — he described his mission as finding people who “combined very solid analytic and cultural skills with the ability to make it in a world of cops where the coin of the realm is not whether your degree came from Harvard or Columbia.”

As an Ivy Leaguer himself who once clerked for a Supreme Court justice, Mr. Rascoff understood it would be difficult having “pointy-headed youngsters” interacting with veteran cops and wanted analysts with what he called “a low jerk quotient.”

Mr. Silber, who was hired to run the team in 2008 and has further expanded it to 24 analysts, spent nine years in the financial world with the Carson Group and Evolution Capital, but left because, as he put it, 9/11 made him want “to get into the fight.” At Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs, he specialized in Saudi Arabia’s laws regulating the flow of terrorist money. “I went from corporate finance to terrorist finance,” he said.

The analysts he has brought in are mostly in their 20s and 30s and have worked at the United Nations, the State Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the New America Foundation, a research group in Washington.

“We come into this with a couple of years’ experience in a region, or with a law degree or master’s degree,” said one analyst, Jennifer, who, like most, spoke on the condition that her last name not be used, for security reasons. “We’re not like the street cops. But it’s the blending of those worlds that’s the best part of the job.”

Mr. Rascoff said this “blending” was his goal. Analysts sometimes accompany detectives into the field, where they offer what Sgt. Steven Hines called “another set of eyes.” Those eyes are often attuned to what police eyes may not see: a poster in Pashto for a local demonstration against drone strikes; or a collection box on a deli counter seeking spare change for a charity suspected of having terrorist ties.

Mr. Rascoff said the working relationship between the civilian and sworn counterterrorism officials in New York was better than the parallel relationships in the Federal Bureau of Investigation because federal agents, unlike the local detectives, were often as highly educated as the analysts they work with.

“F.B.I. agents sometimes look at their analysts and say, ‘So, basically, we do the same job, but I carry a gun and kick down doors while you sit at your desk all day,’ ” said Mr. Rascoff, who has been working in intelligence since 2003, when he was a consultant to L. Paul Bremer, the special envoy to Iraq.

In the C.I.A., Mr. Rascoff added, the relationship between operatives and analysts is often the chilly one between “an author of cables and a reader of cables.”

In the Police Department, he said, there is an “educational, experiential but not intellectual” gulf that can, paradoxically, bring the sides together.

“While it’s sometimes hard to harness those conflicting energies,” Mr. Rascoff said, “when it succeeds, it succeeds wildly.”

The police officers agree, noting that academics versed in the culture of the region are able to seize upon investigative subtleties that they themselves might miss.

“An analyst once pointed out an individual on the street I thought was Afghan, but was actually Pakistani,” said the detective from the Priority Targeting Unit. “She knew because of the henna in his beard, the lack of a mustache and the pants length.

“They’re from a different world,” he added. “They’re educated; I’m not. My education is locking up bad guys.”

Another detective, sounding a bit like a Woody Allen character, put it this way: “Whenever I have problems, I call my analyst.”

THE history of domestic intelligence in the United States has, to say the least, a checkered record. From Cointelpro, a series of F.B.I. counterintelligence programs, to the New York Police Department’s own spying at the Republican National Convention in 2004, there are enough instances of the authorities’ inappropriately surveilling their own citizens to make even the firmest law-and-order advocate wince.

Christopher Dunn, a lawyer for the New York Civil Liberties Union who has criticized the Police Department’s surveillance of political groups, expressed some concern about the arrangement.

“This is yet another step toward the N.Y.P.D. being able to operate entirely outside of the larger law-enforcement community,” he said. “This type of lone-wolf approach, which we saw during the convention, is a recipe for abuse, or worse.”

But if civilian analysts help bring intellectual rigor to terrorism investigations, if the police “are more sophisticated and less stereotypical in their work,” Mr. Dunn added, “that’s all to the good.”

Investigations undertaken by the Analytic Unit, like those of the Intelligence Division over all, are governed by legal controls put in place in 1985 as a result of a 1971 class-action lawsuit, Handschu v. Special Services Division, that concerned harassment of political groups by the department’s so-called Red Squad.

Mr. Silber argued that, by nature, a team of academics trained in Islamic law and mores mitigated abuse. “The unit helps detectives dealing with sources and suspects to be more sophisticated,” he said, “and to develop a nuanced understanding of doctrines, ideology and historical and cultural references.”

NEW YORK seems an ideal place to practice this theory of intellectual investigation, and the unit has managed over the years to attract people who have worked in the Washington bureaucracy and seem to prefer the city.

“We had people leaving jobs with the C.I.A. and military intelligence to come work for us,” Mr. Rascoff said. “Why were they doing that? Part of it was the noir quality of being within the confines of an institution like the N.Y.P.D. There is an emotional, even an aesthetic, immediacy in being in New York rather than sitting in a cubicle in some fluorescent-lit office in Langley.”

To Mr. Silber, the attraction is the opportunity to work at street level on terrorism cases.

This year, analysts used their knowledge of cultural and political trends in Somalia to help prepare an undercover officer in his dealings with two New Jersey men, Mohamed Mahmood Alessa and Carlos Eduardo Almonte, arrested in June just before they traveled to Somalia to join Al Shabab, a group that claims kinship with Al Qaeda. Last year, an analyst provided unique advice to detectives investigating Najibullah Zazi, an Afghan immigrant who has pleaded guilty in a plot to detonate a bomb on the subway. The analyst, who served in Afghanistan with the elite Army Rangers, drew upon his knowledge of local tribes in Waziristan to create a flow chart of the numerous suspects in the Zazi case, highlighting those that shared hometowns and family affiliations.

The Zazi case, Mr. Silber said, was the largest surveillance effort the Police Department ever mounted in a terrorism investigation, and the unit’s analysts worked around the clock at covert locations, debriefing detectives as they came in off the street, then analyzing and sharing the information with the next shift before it went into the field.

“We’re very much in the weeds of investigations,” Mr. Silber said. “We’re looking at the threat to New York, in New York, so there’s a feeling of grittiness in a sense.”

He said that working in Washington, where the focus is often on events and people thousands of miles away, can feel “a little antiseptic.”

“Here we’re all in the same domain — the suspects and the analysts,” he said. “You might hear that yesterday, at 3 o’clock, people gathered at this street corner or in this cafe. We’re all in the same fishbowl together. It makes for an odd, exciting dynamic.”Sphere: Related Content

Further Reporting on the Censorship Idiocy


U.S. Secrets in Plain Sight in Censored Book’s Reprint
By SCOTT SHANE
Published: September 17, 2010
The Pentagon blacked out hundreds of supposed secrets in a new, censored edition of an Afghan war memoir.
MORE . . .Sphere: Related Content

Saturday, September 18, 2010

Desperately Trying to Silence Tony Shaffer (unsuccessfully)

Operation Silence Shaffer | Harper's Magazine
September 14, 2010

By Scott Horton

A fascinating new chapter in the story of the intelligence community’s obsessive secrecy is the Pentagon’s duel with St Martin’s Press over Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer’s book, Operation Dark Heart. Chris McGreal gives a run-down in The Guardian:

The US defence department is scrambling to dispose of what threatens to be a highly embarrassing exposé by the former intelligence officer of secret operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and of how the US military top brass missed the opportunity to win the war against the Taliban. The department of defence is in talks with St Martin’s Press to purchase the entire first print run on the grounds of national security. The publisher is content to sell the books but the two sides are in a grinding dispute over what should appear in a censored version and when it should be released.

Now St Martin’s Press says it will put the partly redacted manuscript on sale next week whether or not the defence department likes it—and there doesn’t appear much the authorities can do. The army had cleared the book by Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer, about “black ops” in the Afghan war when he was based at Bagram in 2003, for publication after relatively minor changes. But when the intelligence services and defence department officials saw it they were alarmed.

This account leaves a key player in the shadows. JSOC, the Joint Special Operations Command, has become a power unto itself within the Pentagon. In essence, Shaffer’s book went through the regular review and clearance process, was approved for publication, and then JSOC had a temper tantrum. The thrust of their objection was simple: “Our people don’t talk about JSOC operations, period.” In their view, special forces officers are subject to a code of silence. This view would seem to clash with the U.S. Constitution, and the notion of a duty to be silent also seems odd in a Pentagon headed by Robert Gates, who built his Washington comeback on a tell-all bestseller, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story.

According to an individual involved in negotiations between St Martin’s and the Pentagon, the publishers plan to have the book in bookstores around the country within a fortnight. St Martin’s is proposing to black out all passages about which the Pentagon raised questions—a process that of course reveals the Pentagon’s concerns to the reader. The Pentagon has replied that it would then insist on striking whole paragraphs, even where most of the text raises no questions of sensitivity. The publisher and author believe that many of the questions raised at this late stage have no bona fide basis, and they will insist on review of claims and subsequent disclosure if their challenge is sustained. This mirrors the process following Matthew Alexander’s book How to Break a Terrorist, where extensive censorship efforts by the Pentagon also failed when put to the test before a classifications review board.

Throughout the war on terror, JSOC has succeeded in keeping the wraps on its black ops in a way the CIA has not. That’s a key reason why Colonel Shaffer’s book is so eagerly anticipated. Nothing sells a book like an effort to suppress it. The Pentagon’s belated and ham-handed efforts to silence Colonel Shaffer’s book may be a blessing in disguise for St Martin’s Press.Sphere: Related Content

Russia's Security State IS the New Nobility

From Steven Aftergood's "Project on Government Secrecy" . . .

THE NEW NOBILITY: RUSSIA'S SECURITY STATE

"The Soviet police state tried to control every citizen in the country. The new, more sophisticated Russian [security] system is far more selective than its Soviet-era counterpart; it targets only those individuals who have political ambitions or strong public views." That's what Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan discover in "The New Nobility," their impressive new book on the resurgence of Russia's security services in the post-Cold War era.

Soldatov and Borogan, Russian journalists who have produced some of the boldest reporting on the subject over the past decade, are also the creators and editors of Agentura.ru, a pioneering web site devoted to public interest research on Russian intelligence policy and related matters.

In "The New Nobility," they present many of the decisive episodes in the recent history of the FSB, the primary Russian security service, from the 2002 Moscow theater siege, to the 2004 Beslan school massacre, the war in Chechnya, and more. Overall they present a picture of a security service of increasing power and influence, uneven competence -- but virtually no accountability to parliament or the public.

"The Soviet KGB was all-powerful," Soldatov and Borogan write, "but it was also under the control of the political structure: The Communist Party presided over every KGB section, department, and division. In contrast, the FSB is a remarkably independent entity, free of party control and parliamentary oversight...."

The book is based on the authors' original reporting, which itself is a demonstration of unusual courage and commitment. A reader soon loses track of the number of times their computers are seized by authorities, how often their papers' web servers are confiscated, and how many times they are summoned for interrogation or even charged with crimes based on their reporting. Yet they persist.

Their book is full of remarkable observations. For example:

* In 2006, the FSB organized a competition "for the best literary and artistic works about state security operatives."

* The history of Moscow's Lefortovo prison has never been documented. "Even the prison's design [in the shape of the letter K] remains a mystery."

* The Russian security services in Chechnya have made extensive use of the tactic known as "counter-capture," which involves seizing the relatives of suspected terrorists in order to induce them to surrender.

Fundamentally, the authors contend, Russia's FSB has gone astray by acting as an agent of state authority instead of representing the rule of law. "In today's Russia,... the security services appear to have concluded that their interests, and those of the state they are guarding, remain above the law." An American reader may ponder the similarities and differences presented by U.S. security services.

"The New Nobility: The Restoration of Russia's Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB" by Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan is being published this month by Public Affairs Books.

"To those following the increasingly hostile environment for journalists in Russia, Soldatov's career is a curiosity," according to an internal profile of him prepared by the DNI Open Source Center in 2008. "Despite being questioned and charged by the FSB on several occasions, Soldatov has continued to cover hot-button issues such as corruption, security service defectors, and the increasing role of the special services in limiting free speech in Russia."

The New York Times featured Agentura.ru in "A Web Site That Came in From the Cold to Unveil Russian Secrets" by Sally McGrane, December 14, 2000.

The New York Times has also published Above the Law, a continuing series of stories by Clifford J. Levy on "corruption and abuse of power in Russia two decades after the end of Communism."Sphere: Related Content

Wednesday, September 15, 2010

Reassuring that Some Things Never Change


Analysis: Spycraft, Contacts Still Key in Espionage World

By Peter Apps, Political Risk Correspondent

LONDON | Wed Sep 15, 2010 7:36am EDT

(Reuters) - Smartphones and e-mail might be revolutionizing espionage, but old-style personal spycraft is as important as ever when it comes to protecting -- or breaking -- state and corporate secrets.

The rise of "state capitalist" economies that may use government intelligence agencies to win commercial advantage for official-linked companies could pose a growing threat to their Western corporate rivals, experts say.

China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and India either have or are all pushing for security agency access to encrypted BlackBerry smart phones, which they say they need to monitor dangerous militants.

But while the skills of electronic snooping are important, where information ends up can come down just as much to private deals put together in anonymous offices by spy chiefs, companies and powerful individuals.

"In somewhere like the UAE, if I was the CIA or MI6 station chief I might go to the head of local intelligence and ask for help in following or monitoring someone," said Fred Burton, a former U.S. counterterrorism agent now vice president for U.S. political risk consultancy Stratfor.

"If the Chinese station chief comes to him and makes a similar request, you want to be in a position where he is going to tip you off about it. A lot comes down to these personal relationships. Whoever has the best liaison relationship obtains the information."

What technology has revolutionized, of course, is how much can be stolen. Electronic hacking can lift truckloads of documents with barely a trace. But older tradecraft continues.

In some countries, hotel rooms are bugged and some local staff -- particularly cleaners and drivers -- may be being paid extra to keep an eye on their employers.

Local intelligence agencies -- from small sub-Saharan African countries to global powers -- may also have particularly close relationships with other powers. Many are legacies of the big power's Cold War practice of cultivating local proxies.

SHADOWY RELATIONSHIPS

How much support Western corporates received from their national intelligence services is similarly opaque -- but once again, personal contacts look likely to be key. Some firms have a reputation for being particularly well-connected.

Officials from Britain's MI6 spy agency and Foreign Office, for example, have previously gone on to work for U.K. firms such as energy giant BP after leaving public service.

The MI6 website publicly acknowledges that the service acts in the interests of the economic well-being of the U.K., as well as on national security, defense and crime.

In more opaque emerging economies, it is generally accepted that intelligence and security officials may sell information or security access to the private sector for personal gain.

In Western economies, that is much less widespread -- but Burton says it is far from unheard of.

"People using intelligence resources for their own private ends?" he said. "I'd love to say it doesn't happen. Doing someone a favor, maybe getting yourself a nice position on a board when you go into the private sector? It happens. Even in the United States."

Analysts say help provided by Western intelligence officers to personal contacts in companies more often will involve giving additional protective advice or tipoffs to firms that might be targeted by criminals or foreign intelligence agencies, rather than using government spy assets to snoop on rivals.

Alastair Newton, who worked for Britain's foreign office on both cyberwarfare and trade and is now senior political analyst for Japanese bank Nomura, says maintaining a good relationship with your embassy and government has its advantages.

"If you're on a trip to Ruritania organized by UK Trade and Industry (department) and you get a briefing from the High Commissioner on business opportunities, you won't ask exactly where he got his information from," he says -- deliberately choosing an imaginary country.

"You just assume he knows what he's talking about."Sphere: Related Content